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Abstract
This thesis sets out specifically to investigate business wealth holders in modem 
Japan. It includes the study of businessmen, landlords or even peers who were 
engaged in business and commerce as founders, owners or investors. It attempts to 
locate their social, historical and business characteristics in the context of the early 
20th century, when Japan emerged as one of the economic powers of Asia, having 
passed through the transitional period of the late 19th century. The research focuses 
primarily on characteristics related to the development of Japanese business, and 
incorporates some comparisons with contemporary members of the European 
bourgeoisie, especially in Britain and Germany. The second major concern is to 
analyse Japanese business through an investigation of those wealth holders who 
succeeded in the modem business world by managing to survive the transition from 
the pre-modem to the modem economic system. The third and final focus is on the 
relationship between the state and wealth holders. Chapter 1 of the thesis explains the 
methodology adopted for the research, along with a detailed explanation of the data 
and sources utilised. Chapter 2 seeks to establish a profile of Japanese wealth holders 
in the prewar period. Data on estimated wealth, class and social structure is presented, 
with some comparisons with Britain and Germany. Chapter 3 deals with the role of 
wealth holders in the development of modem Japanese business, in relation to the role 
of the business family and business organisation. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
relationship between wealth holders and the state. This chapter consists mainly of an 
analysis of the formation of informal networks through marriage, and the operation of 
various state honours. A major finding of the research is that the Japanese household 
(ie) system strongly influenced wealth holders’ attitudes towards business, and their 
business activities.
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Note on Conventions
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in the text and notes (consult the bibliography 
(and especially chapter 1 for the Japanese materials) for complete information on the 
publications listed below):
DBB: Dictionary of Business Biography: edited by David Jeremy et al.
MNZSJSS: Meijiki Nihon Zenkoku Shisanka Jinushi Shiryo Shusei, edited by Shibuya 
Ryuichi; the compilation of data and information of Japanese wealth holders and 
landlords in the Meiji period. 5 volumes.
TBSJS: To-Do-Fu-Ken betsu Shisanka Jinushi Soran, edited by Shibuya Ryuichi; the 
compilation of data, information, materials and primary sources of Japanese wealth 
holders and landlords from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. 65 
volumes.
TSNZSJSS: Taisho Showaki Nihon Zenkoku Shisanka Jinushi Shiryo Shusei, edited by 
Shibuya Ryuichi; the compilation of data, information and primary sources of 
Japanese wealth holders and landlords from the Taisho to the middle of Showa period. 
7 volumes.
Japanese Names
Japanese name in this thesis are given in Japanese order: family name first, followed 
by given name.
Japanese Terms
All of Japanese terms in this thesis are basically written in the Hepburn style of 
romanization. However, the macron (long mark which is utilised to indicate all long 
vowels) is not utilised in this thesis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 .Introduction
Just as in the case of Rothschilds and Armstrong in Britain, or Krupp and Siemens in 
Germany, a small number of individuals represented the business world in pre-war 
Japan. Mitsui, Iwasaki (the owners of Mitsubishi), Sumitomo, Yasuda, who were the 
owners of so-called zaibatsu, became one of the symbols or icons of the pre-war 
Japanese economy. Their activities, both socially and economically, have been 
symbolized as an indispensable factor for the progress of modem Japanese history. 
The triumphs of these families in the business world and their abundant wealth also 
signified the visible and unbelievable distance between the rich and poor in pre-war 
Japan, and thus led to public antagonism, from both left and right wing. Moreover, the 
zaibatsu have been considered as a driving force for the rise of militarism in the 1930s 
and the Sino-Japanese war, later the Great Pacific War, because of their greediness to 
expand their external markets to Asia. This view was common among the GHQ 
economic bureaucrats, who condemned the business activities of the zaibatsu and 
consequently undertook their dissolution in the early postwar period of Japan.1
These unique individuals, that is, the owners of the zaibatsu, and the zaibatsu 
themselves, have become a major subject of academic research, aimed at analysing 
and interpreting some of the largest questions in modem Japanese history, for 
example, the nature of the government-led economic system, the nature of war aims
•y
in pre-war Japan, and the nature of disputes between capitalists and workers. 
However, although many studies have been presented and published, many of their 
studies have tended to analyse their subject from a Marxist perspective, in the context
■j
of a postwar Japanese academic world strongly influenced by Marxist theory. In 
addition, the research has usually tended to focus on zaibatsu or particular business 
groups, and therefore researchers did not tend to consider individual businessman as a 
single social group from a socio-historical perspective.
1 See E.Hadley, Antitrust in Japan (Princeton, 1970).
2 For example, see K. Oishi, Nihon Sangyo Kakumei Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1975).
3 For example, see T. Morris-Suzuki, A History o f Japanese Economic Thought (London, 1989) and G 
A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis o f Development in Prewar Japan (Princeton, 1986).
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However, this trend has gradually changed as recent studies have begun to challenge 
the old perspectives on modem Japanese economy and history. These recent studies 
have paid more attention to collective and quantitative analysis in addition to 
traditional case studies. In particular, empirical research on businessmen or local 
wealth groups as an elite group or as a segment of society’s upper class has provided 
new and somewhat different perspectives from the more traditional view. Also this 
research has become an important part of the subject not only for political or 
economic historians, but also for business historians, who have been primarily 
concerned about the peculiarities of Japanese business organization or the 
management system. These businessmen or local elites, whose wealth played a 
significant role in the development of business and the economy in pre-war Japan, are 
known in Japanese as shisanka or meiboka. It is they who are the subject of this 
thesis.
It should be noted that these Japanese terms have some particular connotations, so that 
they do not wholly correspond to the term bourgeoisie in English. The difference in 
definition partly reflects differences in historical development between Japan and 
Europe. The concept of shisanka or meiboka contains somewhat vague characteristics 
if we compare these specific terms with bourgeoisie in English or Biirgertum in 
German. In short, bourgeoisie indicates a social group of the upper-middle class 
whose wealth is based on various economic activities with the exception of the 
agricultural sector. In addition, they are separated from the old elite groups, such as 
landowners or the aristocracy, because of their different habitual or social customs. In 
the case of Germany, although Burger means citizen if  translated into English, the 
Biirgertum itself was divided into two categories. While the Besitzbiirgertum 
(propertied bourgeoisie) had characteristics in common with the bourgeoisie, and can 
therefore be regarded as having the same meaning as bourgeoisie, there was another 
group, which was called the Bildungsbiirgertum (educated bourgeoisie), which mainly 
included university educated professionals, for instance, lawyers or professors.4
However, none of these examples are appropriate for explaining the definition of
4 The explanation of these terms is based on the description in J.Kocka, ‘Einleitung’ in Kocka (ed.), 
Burger und Biirgerlichkeit (Gottingen, 1987), pp.7-20.
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shisanka or meiboka. Although shisanka can be directly translated into English as 
‘wealth holder’, this group differed from the bourgeoisie since it included landlords or 
the non-business elite. This stemmed from the nature of their economic activities 
during the period of industrialization in pre-war Japan. In contrast to the gentry in 
Britain or the Junker in Prussia, who were reluctant to directly invest or engage in 
business, Japanese landlords and the local elite had no hesitation in enthusiastically 
engaging in business activities. Furthermore, it was not rare in rural or local areas for 
Japanese merchants to have their own estates and thus they were not only engaged in 
commerce, but also in agriculture. Therefore, it is not possible to separate landlords or 
local non-business elites from the category of shisanka in terms of their business 
activities. A certain difference from the definition of bourgeoisie is therefore 
apparent.
In the case of meiboka, the terminology becomes even more vague. In general, 
meiboka indicates a wealth elite, and thus indeed includes merchants, businessmen or 
landlords. However, the code of social behaviour of meiboka was in part similar to 
that of the gentry in Britain. Nominally at least, their business activities, such as 
investment or the establishment of firms in their local community, were aimed at 
contributing to the community as a form of local economic development, rather than 
achieving profits for themselves. The term therefore denotes a pillar of the local 
community. Thus, even though there is still debate about the definitions of both these 
two terms, in the current study both terms will be understood to include a wide range 
of middle or upper middle class groups who were engaged in business for 
themselves.5 The groups contained under these two headings of shisanka and 
meiboka are referred to in this thesis as wealth holders.
The group considered in this thesis consists of the wealth holders who were active 
during the pre-war period (1868-1937).6 However, the main target of the research is 
not to look at meiboka or shisanka in general at a national and local level, but to look 
at the top of Japan’s wealth elite. Particular attention will be focused on the upper
5 Although it is still a debatable point, my definition of shisanka (wealth holder) is based on Abe and 
Tanimoto’s definition. See Abe and Tanimoto, ‘Kigyo Bokko to Kindai Keiei, Zairai Keiei’ in 
Miyamoto and Abe(eds.), Nihon Keieishi, vol.2 (Tokyo, 1995).
6 This period is quite broad, from the starting point of the Meiji Restoration to the beginning of the 
Sino-Japanese War. By contrast, it is usual for the period between the First World War and the Second
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echelons of both groups measured according to their wealth. The Japanese wealth 
holders that are the subject of this thesis therefore represent the top of the hierarchy 
within the meiboka and shisanka groups. As will be explained in a later section, these 
Japanese wealth holders also possessed a level of wealth that enables comparison with 
the European wealthy bourgeoisie of the same period. With regard to the time scale, 
this thesis will mainly discuss the latter half of the pre-war period, from the early 20th 
century, when Japan gradually became one of the world’s economic powers. Given 
the difficulty of dividing wealth holders into several distinct categories, a wide range 
of social groups will be included into my analysis. Thus, in line with the definitions 
discussed above, not only are businessmen or merchants included, but also 
professionals, landlords or members of the aristocracy are all considered as wealth 
holders. This signifies that categorization does not depend on particular social or 
economic factors, for instance, whether or not they were active in any kind of 
business or commercial sector. In addition, this thesis is somewhat unusual since it 
does not focus on any special region or sector. The analysis itself will be done at a 
national level, and the criterion for the selection of wealth holders is the amount of 
their wealth, as will be discussed below. This approach allows us to show that the top 
wealth holders were extremely rich in the pre-war period in Japan, and were therefore 
certainly isolated from the majority of Japanese, both economically and socially.
This research sets out specifically to investigate business wealth holders in modem 
Japan. It will include the study of modem businessmen, merchants, landlords or even 
peers, who were engaged in business and commerce as founders, owners or investors. 
It will attempt to identify their social, historical and economic characteristics in the 
context of prewar Japan. The period covered by this research is the early 20th century, 
when Japan emerged as one of the economic powers of Asia, having passed through 
the transitional period of the late 19th century. In this period, as will be shown below, 
accurate data and information on wealth holders’ wealth became available, largely as 
a consequence of greater economic and political stability.
This research will firstly focus on the characteristics of the development of Japanese 
business. In this context, particular attention will be concentrated on the question of
World War to be called the ‘interwar period’.
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similarities and differences in Japanese wealth holders’ business and investment 
activities compared with those of contemporary members of the European bourgeoisie. 
The contemporary British and German cases, both of which strongly influenced the 
establishment of the prewar Japanese business system, will be utilized for partial 
comparative analysis. The second main point of concern will be the analysis of 
Japanese business through an investigation of those wealth holders who succeeded in 
the modem business world by managing to survive the transition from the pre-modem 
to modem economic systems. It will therefore include research on some of the 
‘peculiarities’ of Japanese business, for instance, the methods of adaptation and 
integration of western business systems, such as the management system or business 
organization, within traditional merchant houses or newly founded Japanese firms. 
The third and final focus deals with the relationship between the state and wealth 
holders. Particular attention will be focused on whether Japanese wealth holders were 
dependent on the state in terms of their business activities and social behaviour. This 
will also be connected with the question of whether or not the Japanese economy and 
society was shifting towards convergence with western countries, since Japanese 
wealth holders are likely to have represented at the time one of the most westernised 
groups in terms of social life and behaviour compared to the majority of Japanese 
society.
1.2. Themes and debates
Although numerous studies about Japanese wealth holders, including both case 
studies and theoretical analyses, have been done by many Japanese researchers, a 
certain number of issues remain unclear even now. The existing studies have been 
inclined to focus on businessmen, merchants or local shisanka to explain or analyse 
Japanese economic development. Also, as mentioned earlier, until the recent period, 
this field of study has been strongly influenced by a Marxist conceptual framework. In 
addition, among Japanese wealth holders, landlords have usually been divided into a 
separate category for research, since landlords were considered by Japanese 
academics, especially of those who were strongly influenced by Marxist thought to be 
significant for the interpretation of certain characteristics of modem Japanese history,
12
such as the exploitation of tenants by large landlords.7 The studies of landlords have 
tended to be categorized as part of Japanese agricultural history or as a separate field 
within economic history. Therefore, while there are plenty of works and studies about 
wealth holders in some detail, it is rare to find any analysis of Japanese wealth holders 
in a broader and comparative perspective.
Before explaining about the characteristics and content of this thesis, it is necessary to 
reconsider the study of wealth holders in historical perspective. Moreover, in order to 
be able to compare the similarities and difference offered by the Japanese case, we 
need also to focus on the progress of research in the case of Europe, especially in 
Britain and Germany. Following this part, the importance of comparative research 
will be explained with regard to categorization, terminology and methodological 
approach. The latter part of this chapter will explore the methods and sources used in 
this thesis. Mainly Japanese sources, both quantitative and qualitative, will be 
discussed in detail, in addition to giving a brief explanation of the sources used for the 
European cases. Finally, the specific aims of this thesis and the content of each 
chapter will be presented.
1.2.1 Japan
In discussions of Japanese economic development, the continuities and discontinuities 
between the pre-war and postwar economies form a significant focus of debate. This 
debate is closely associated with interpretation of the legacy of traditional (or 
reinvented) factors from Japan’s past. In addition to discussions of the role of the state, 
these debates have, therefore, been the main focus point of researchers on Japanese 
economy and business from a variety of perspectives. Until recently, since the 
characteristics of Japanese economic development were considered as the key to 
analysis of the postwar ‘miracle’, almost all researchers, in particular non-Japanese, 
found themselves attempting to discover the most acceptable and reliable historical 
explanation for the contemporary modem Japanese economy.
7 The importance of research on prewar Japanese landlords among Japanese academics during the 
postwar period is explained in M. Nakamura, ‘Watashi no Rekishigaku’, esp. pp.352-3 in idem (ed.), 
Kin-Gendai Nihon no Shinshiten (Tokyo, 2001).
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The interpretation of economic ‘success* is also related to the utilisation of the 
particular terminology of ‘modernisation’ (kindaika) in the Japanese historiography. 
In contrast to the Euro-American academic world, which has frequently debated the 
definition of ‘modernisation’, there has been no debate around its interpretation in the 
Japanese academic world. In the context of modem Japanese history, it seems 
self-evident to Japanese researchers that the entire historical process of modem Japan, 
including its economic success and the political failure represented in the militarism 
of the mid 20th century, was connected to the process of ‘modernisation’ during the 
period from the late 19th to the mid 20th centuries. This perspective also reflects a 
self-consciousness of Japanese from the Meiji period onwards, as some American and 
European academics have pointed out, which constituted a dichotomy between the 
‘advanced’ west and the ‘underdeveloped’ east, and a process whereby Japanese 
internalised this concept to overcome the social and economic backwardness of Japan 
itself.8 It may be assumed that the interpretation of ‘modernisation’ has become more 
difficult, since recent Japanese studies has suggested that ‘modernisation’ is also 
related to the dichotomy of ‘tradition’ and ‘modem’ in modem Japanese history. As 
Andrew Barshay has analysed in his study of the Japanese Marxist view of modem 
Japanese historiography, the concept of ‘tradition’ of Japanese Marxists was, along 
with ‘modernisation’, utilised to particularise modem Japanese capitalism and its 
experience.9 The terminology of ‘modernisation’ in Japanese historiography is 
therefore extremely vague and ambiguous. However, even now, it is apparent that this 
particular term has undoubtedly dominated the Japanese historiography of Japanese 
academics, including research on Japanese economic and business history.
In the early postwar period, research in Japan on modem Japanese economic 
development was mainly dominated by two theories. On the one hand, Marxist ideas, 
with particular innovations adopted with a view to applying Marxist-Leninist theory 
to the Japanese case, exercised a strong influence in the academic world, in particular 
in the social sciences.10 On the other hand, the so-called Otsuka Historiography 
(Otsuka Shigaku), named after Otsuka Hisao, probably the most influential economic
8 See for example, E. O. Reischauer, ‘Not Westernization But Modernization’, in H. Wray and H. 
Conroy (eds.), Japan Examined (Honolulu, 1983).
9 See A. Barshay, ‘Doubly Cruel: Marxism and the Presence of the Past in Japanese Capitalism’ in S. 
Vlastos (ed.), Mirror of Modernity (Berkeley, 1998).
10 For an example of the particular Marxist view, see K. Oishi, Nihon Sangyo Kakumei Kenkyu, (Tokyo,
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historian in the early postwar period, formed the other mainstream in this field. 
Broadly speaking, Otsuka’s theory added some perspectives from Max Weber’s 
theories to those of Marxism, and considered Britain as the ideal model of modem 
capitalism.11 Although these two mainstreams were to some extent different in their 
interpretation of the modem Japanese economy, both consistently took the view that 
analysis of commercial wealth or financial wealth in the modem period was of lesser 
importance than industrial development in understanding the driving force of 
Japanese industrialization.
This situation gradually changed, in particular from the early 1980s, when academic 
works about modem merchant capital in Japan began to be published and appear in 
academic journals.12 The survey, collection and publication of old data, particularly 
quantitative data, contributed to changing the view of merchants in prewar Japan. 
These works signified the active and dynamic role of commercial wealth in the 
transitional period of modem Japan, from the end of the Tokugawa period to the early 
Meiji period. Nevertheless, research about the development of commercial capital has 
remained relatively scarce compared with analysis of industrial or agricultural 
development in prewar Japan. If we look at the work of a number of recent 
researchers on commercial capital, we find that scholars’ methods can be divided into 
several broad categories. Some research has focused on the relationship between the 
early economic development of Japan and the structure of human resources. Secondly, 
the analysis of ownership and control from case studies of modem Japanese firms, in 
particular through research on the business systems of the zaibatsu, has also 
demonstrated some significant factors in modem Japanese business history. In 
addition, the recent trend of research has gradually shifted towards looking into the 
business activities and business networking of wealth holders at a local level, while a 
number of researchers have continued to look at these things at a national level.
From a historical perspective, debates about the social origins of businessmen in 
modem Japan have long taken place with a view to explaining the nature of
1975).
11 Although Otsuka’s work is quite abundant, for seeing his perspective on the modem Japanese 
economy, especially on commerce and merchants, a good source is H. Otsuka, ‘Kindai Shihonshugi 
Hattatsushi ni okeru Shogyo no Chii’ in Otsuka, Otsuka Hisao Chosakushu, vol.3 (Tokyo, 1969).
12 For a pioneering work in this field, see for example V. Chakepaichayon, ‘Meiji Shoki no Kaisha
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entrepreneurship in Japanese economic development. From the early 1960s to the 
1980s, this formed the centre of debates relating to Japanese wealth holders, since it 
was important to analyse whose initiatives had led the process of modernization in the 
business sector. It was clear that a few critical representatives, for instance, 
Shibusawa Eiichi, or Godai Tomoatsu, who undertook modernization in the business 
sector as well as promoting Japanese industrialization, with the certain cooperation of 
the new Meiji government, had originated in the former samurai class. For this reason, 
it was argued that modernization in the business sector was overshadowed by 
government initiatives during the period of the transitional economy. It was also 
believed that after the Meiji Restoration the lower samurai class, who had been 
technocrats of feudal domains or in the territory of the Shogunate, became the major 
source of human resources for the transitional Japanese business world of the late 19th 
century. However, this conception was based on studies from limited sources and the 
image of contemporary observers who criticized merchants as being less innovative 
and reluctant to change their own business customs. Therefore, it can be said that this 
view also indicated the bias of contemporary political and business leaders.
Although many Japanese scholars have insisted on the role of the samurai as 
innovative entrepreneurs, many studies attacking this old conception have emerged.13 
Over time researchers gradually gave less priority to the role of the samurai class, 
while the role of local and urban wealth holders, including merchants or landlords, 
has become an important factor for the analysis of human resources.14 In the English 
language literature, Yui and Hirschmeier conceded that Japanese businessmen came 
from both samurai and merchant groups, although they also insisted that priority 
should be given to the former group.15 Some researchers outside Japan also traced the 
change of trends shown in Japanese writing. Kozo Yamamura stressed the assumption 
that less priority should be given to the samurai, from his empirical research on 
samurai income.16 Nakamura Takafusa also emphasized the contribution of merchant
Kigyo’, in Osaka Daigaku Keizaigaku, 31-1 and 32-1 (1981,1982).
13 For example, see T. Tsuchiya, Nihon Shihonshugi no Keieishi teki Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1954).
14 For an example of a pioneering work, which focused on the role of merchants, see H. Mannari, 
Bijinesu Elite, (Tokyo, 1965).
15 See T. Yui and J. Hirschmeier, The Development o f Japanese Business, (Tokyo, 1975), esp. 
pp.95-103, pp.309-10, and also J. Hirschmeier, The Origins of the Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
16 See K. Yamamura, A Study o f Samurai Income and Entrepreneurship (Boston, 1974).
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1 7groups to the establishment of and investment in modem firms.
However, the debates themselves have not been concluded even now.18 This is 
largely due to the limitations of the research methods used in the previous period. 
These debates were based on collective research from biographies and 
autobiographies to trace the social origins of numerous businessmen or business 
leaders. As the debate deepened, researchers were confronted with the problem that 
almost all the data from these sources only covered urban areas, and were therefore 
inappropriate for explaining any general trend for businessmen at the national level. 
From the 1990s, some researchers have begun to introduce quantitative data analysis 
on a greater scale. Although the results from such analysis at the national level are not 
yet complete, some preliminary findings also support the important role of merchants, 
and the need to reconsider the relationships between merchants and newly established 
firms.19
On the other hand, Japanese businessmen have also been analysed from the 
perspective of managerial change. Such studies are crucial in analysing long-term 
change in employment and training systems associated with the politics of power in 
Japanese firms. The peculiarity of the process of the founding of the modem company 
system, and the influence of the Japanese family system (the ie, whose role has been 
emphasized by some scholars20) in business organization is a major part of this 
complex debate. In addition, debates relating to this field have focused on the issue of 
whether modem Japanese business is convergent with or divergent from the 
contemporary western case. These studies are mainly divided into two streams, that is, 
the more theoretical approach and the more empirical historical approach. Although 
both these two approaches basically depend on case studies of firms, in particular case 
studies of zaibatsu, and the two share certain characteristics, a difference of 
perspective towards modem Japanese business and how it should be interpreted
17 See T. Nakamura, Nihon Keizai, (Tokyo, 1980), especially, pp.94-98.
18 For the historical progress of this debate, see K. Ishikawa, ‘Kigyoka, Keieisha’, in Keieishigakukai 
(ed.), Keieishigaku no Nijuunen, (Tokyo, 1985), and T. Asano, ‘Meiji (Jitsugyoka Bunken) yori mita 
Kigyoka no Bunseki’, in T. Asano, Nihon no Kindaika to Keiei Rinen, (Tokyo, 1991).
19 Abe Takeshi and Miyamoto Mataro have conducted this project. Both of them are professors of 
economic history in Osaka University. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Abe for 
showing me their paper, presented at the Japan Business History Conference in 1999(Abe and 
Miyamoto, ‘Meiji ki ni okeru Shisanka Shokogyosha no Kosei’).
20 For example see I. Mito, Ie no Ronri, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1992).
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separates the two approaches.
The more theoretical approach is represented by the works of Morikawa Hidemasa, 
who has been influenced both by Marxist ideas, and by A. D. Chandler’s analysis of 
the managerial hierarchy system. Especially, many of Morikawa’s recent works 
reflect Chandler’s theories relating to the transition of modem firms from family 
capitalism to organizational capitalism.21 In addition, in his analysis, Morikawa has 
assigned importance to the convergence of the Japanese business system with the 
western business system as a whole. According to his interpretation, which is 
informed by case studies of Japanese firms and salaried managers, there was a 
long-term change from family (and capitalist) ownership to management by salaried
99manager. Morikawa has also considered the conflict between personal investors and 
managers in firms during the period of prewar Japan, suggesting that this conflict 
represented a negative attitude towards management on the part of personal investors, 
who were less interested in day-to-day business and more concerned with profit. This 
therefore caused problems for salaried managers who wished to reinvest the profits of 
firm to expand their scale of business, and who had to confront the difficulty of 
sharing the firm’s profits with investors.23 From Morikawa’s perspective, it can be 
said that even though some theoretical convergence is significant in his analysis, he 
also emphasizes the role of certain peculiarities in modem Japanese business, such as 
the corporate governance system or the lesser importance of personal investors, as 
positive factors for Japanese economic development, in both the prewar and postwar 
periods 24
In contrast to this argument, some Japanese historians have placed more emphasis on 
the historical and socio-cultural influences on the business system. Yasuoka Shigeaki, 
whose studies have largely focused on the continuities and discontinuities of
21 See A. D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962) and also, Scale and Scope, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
22 See H. Morikawa, Nihon Keieishi, (Tokyo, 1981) and Zaibatsu no Keieishiteki Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 
1980, in English version, Zaibatsu, (Tokyo 1992)). Also Top-Management no Keieishi, (Tokyo, 1996). 
Morikawa’s assumption about the lesser importance of the dispersion of shares has also provoked some 
criticism from other scholars. See E. Yasube, ‘Chandler model to Morikawa Hidemasa shi no 
Keieisha-Kigyoron’, Keieishigaku, 28-4, 1994.
23 See Morikawa, Top-Management, in particular chapter 3.
24 Takeda Haruhito provides another perspective on these peculiarities in Japanese business. See H. 
Takeda, Zaibatsu no Jidai, (Tokyo, 1995), and Nihonjin no Keizaigainen, (Tokyo, 1999).
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traditional business customs in modem Japanese business, is a prominent example of 
this ‘historical* approach. Yasuoka’s research does not imply that Morikawa ignores 
the historical evolution of Japanese business. However, if  we contrast the two 
approaches, we see that Yasuoka mainly stresses the importance of internal influences 
on the prewar Japanese economy, while Morikawa emphasizes external influences on 
prewar Japanese business. Most of Yasuoka’s studies are concentrated on research on 
the Mitsui zaibatsu and traditional merchant houses in the transitional period of the 
economy. On the basis of this research, Yasuoka explains the role of the business 
activities of merchants whose business customs and systems had originated in the 
Tokugawa period, and shows how these provided a ‘soft-landing’ for the modem 
Japanese economy, especially given the chaotic situation resulting from the Meiji 
Restoration.25 Moreover, Yasuoka’s case study of the Mitsui zaibatsu indicates the 
progress of efforts to ‘invent’ a modem Japanese business which was a complex 
mixture of western business systems and traditional Japanese business customs.26 In 
general, among Japanese business historians, Yasuoka’s approach is more empirical 
historical rather than theoretical. What is certain is that Yasuoka has become part of 
the mainstream in Japanese business studies.
Recent trends in studies about wealth holders or businessmen have also provided new 
research looking at local economies. Recently, some scholars have highlighted the 
contribution of local wealth holders in adjusting and fixing a modem business and 
economic system in Japan. In this field, the business and social networking of wealth 
holders in terms of their capital investments, case studies of wealthy local 
industrialists, especially those engaged in the traditional manufacturing sector, and 
research on the retailing and marketing activities of local merchants, have all been 
cmcial subjects. Networking analysis has primarily been based on quantitative 
analysis of the data from shareholders’ lists as well as personal and formal data. As 
this kind of research has evolved, it has become apparent that the networking of local 
merchants took the form of personal and area networking. Moreover, this networking 
itself had a strong impact on their business, leading, for instance, to cooperative 
investment in newly established firms by merchant groups as part of a risk-sharing
25 See S. Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka no Keiei Rinen, (Tokyo, 1999).
26 See Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi no Kenkyu, (Kyoto, 1970; 2nd Edition 1998).
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strategy.27
On the other hand, case studies of local industrialists also indicate that their business 
was, to some extent, associated with risk-taking. It is apparent that from the Meiji 
Restoration, the shift in economic and business policy made the national economy 
more centralized, and that this policy heavily depended on the economic and 
industrial development of particular sectors and regions. Thus it provoked a 
downward spiral and disastrous depression in some local economies. To recover from 
this miserable situation, local wealth holders needed to establish new and modem 
business systems not only for their own survival but also to help the local economy, in 
addition to creating new markets for their products or goods. In other words, they 
were certainly conscious of the fact that their business activities could contribute to 
boosting the local economy, and therefore the social stability of local communities. 
This condition made their business part of a sort of code of honour, but it also led to 
considerable danger of loss or bankruptcy in their businesses as a consequence of 
their commitment to local politics.28
As regards social networking and the contribution of local wealth holders to regional 
economic development, some studies have focused on the business activities of local 
merchants in the prewar period. Among this research, the approach of Suenaga 
Kuniaki’s work is characterized by a focus not only on the domestic business 
networking of merchants but also on their attempts to expand their external markets, 
for example, in Japanese colonies or states to which Japanese had emigrated. 
Therefore it may be said that the interest in Suenaga*s research lies in its 
interpretation of the existence of some sort of cosmopolitanism in business among 
modem Japanese merchants. His case studies of Omi merchants, who had been active 
on a national scale during the Tokugawa period, attempts to analyse the 
transformation in their business in prewar Japan, in particular their response to the 
challenge of creating new markets by the integration of traditional marketing skills
27 For example, see K. Wada, Y. Kobayakawa and M. Shiomi, ‘Meiji 31 nen jiten no Chukyo Zaikai ni 
okeru Juyaku Kennin’ Nanzan Keiei Kenkyu, 7-2, 1992. Also Y. Uekawa, ‘Meiji 40 nen Osaka-fu no 
Kigyoka Shudan’ Kyoto Gakuin Daigaku Keieigaku-bu Ronshu, 8-2, 1998.
28See M. Tanimoto, ‘Bakumatsu Meijiki Menpu Kokunai Shijo no Tenkai’ Tochi Seido Shigaku, 115, 
1987. Also M.Sawai and T. Abe (eds.), Kindai Nihon ni Okeru Kigyoka no Shokeifu, (Osaka, 1996).
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and the modem business system, though their scale of business was not so large. 
Suenaga also shows how the success of their challenge was based on their experience 
in Tokugawa Japan since the federal nature of the economic system had given to their 
domestic retailing operations a certain ‘cosmopolitan* tendency. As Suenaga’s 
analysis indicates, studies of local merchants have had some influence on Yasuoka’s 
approach, and, to some extent, on the historical approach more broadly.30
The result is that this research and these debates have become fruitful sources for 
explaining and analysing modem Japanese business, including the characteristics of 
businessmen and wealth holders. However, certain problems may be identified, in that 
these works have not embraced several important perspectives. The most crucial 
problem is the ignorance of gender issues. It was not rare before the modernization 
period for women in Japanese merchant house to take responsibility for merchant 
house management or day-to-day business. Nevertheless, in many cases, as 
modernization and industrialization progressed, women gradually vanished, or were 
forced to vanish, from the business world, devoting themselves to their households. 
Undoubtedly, this circumstance signifies a change in the ie system within merchant 
houses as a result of institutional reforms and social changes in Japan. However, 
researchers who have emphasized the significance of the ie system for the formation 
of modem Japanese business have not really pointed out the change in women’s 
roles inside the business world. Moreover, there is hardly any research which has
-j 1
chosen women as the subject of modem Japanese business studies. This is probably 
due in part to the shortage of female researchers in this field.
In addition to this serious omission, existing research invariably lacks a comparative 
perspective, even though modem Japanese business introduced various western 
systems, from the legal to the industrial, to accommodate to, or compete with, 
external rivals. While many studies have focused on convergent factors rather than 
divergent factors within modem Japanese business, it is clear that, in many respects, 
the peculiarities of modem Japanese business have been exploited when it comes to 
any explanation of the postwar success of the Japanese economy. Therefore,
29 See K. Suenaga, Kindai Omi Shonin Keieishiron, (Tokyo, 1997).
30 For example, see R. Hayashi (ed.), Henkakuki no Shonin Shihon, (Tokyo, 1984).
31 For a rare example see R. Hayashi, Josei no Kinsei, (Tokyo, 1993), even though this book is about
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research in this area has not changed the image of the ‘uniqueness* of Japanese 
business along with that of Japanese businessmen. Furthermore, recent comparative 
studies have been inclined to focus on case studies, thus lacking a broader perspective 
in which to locate the research.32
Finally, although quantitative and empirical methods have frequently been utilized for 
the analysis, businessmen’s social networks and the process of change in Japan from 
pre-modem merchants to modem and westernized businessmen have rarely been 
researched from the simultaneous perspective of both economic development and 
social change.33 Some recent research, however, attempts to interpret the reforming 
of the pre-modem class system of modem Japan in terms of social restructuring.34
Thus, on the one hand, the number of works and studies of Japanese researchers is 
enormous, and to some extent, extremely detailed. On the other hand, the research 
itself tends to be narrow, precluding a focus on significant factors, which might 
enable some expansion of, or radical change in, the existing analytical approach. In 
contrast to this situation, research on the European bourgeoisie or businessmen has 
advanced in the context of some comparative analysis, looking both at economic 
factors and at a socio-cultural level, and utilizing a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. In particular, it has become clear that earlier class structures 
within European countries have greatly influenced the modem European economy.
1.2.2 Britain
Britain has long been considered as the archetypal industrialized country in the 
modem era, and therefore has usually been interpreted as an ‘ideal’ model for 
comparative analysis. In this view, the British model was indicated as showing the 
‘normal’ way for historical progress towards modernization and industrialization, in
the era of Tokugawa Japan and focuses not only on business activities,
32 For example, see T. Yui and H. Morikawa (eds.), Kokusai Hikaku Kokusai Kankei no Keieishi 
(Nagoya, 1997).
33 ‘Westernization’ in the business world signifies the reforming of the economy and business 
organization, including private and public reform, for example, the establishment of legal institution 
and a financial system, based on the contemporary European system, in addition to the establishment of 
modem infrastructure.
34 For example, see H. Sonoda, Seiyoka no Kozo (Kyoto, 1993), and Sonoda (eds.), Shizoku no Shakai 
Rekishigakuteki Kenkyu (Nagoya, 1995).
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contrast to other ‘peculiar’ and ‘tragic’ ways, especially those of Germany or Japan.35 
The cooperation between democracy and industrialization in modem Britain has 
become a powerful theme in much modem historiography. The rise of the British 
bourgeoisie as a result of the so-called ‘Industrial Revolution’ and ‘Bourgeois 
Revolution’ also corresponded with interpretations focusing on the prominent position 
of the industrial sector in the modem British economy. On the other hand, the 
pre-industrial elite, which consisted of the aristocracy and landowners, has tended to 
be considered as a declining power in the modem period, especially in Britain.
However, as other methods of analysis, in particular econometric methods, have 
begun to impact on the interpretation of economic growth in modem Britain, these 
studies have been forced to modify their former perspectives on the Industrial 
Revolution and the modem British economy. Newer studies indicate that even in the 
stage of relatively rapid growth generated by the Industrial Revolution, the 
agricultural sector still remained a significant force of economic activities and a major 
source of national income. The share of the agricultural sector in national income, and 
the high level of its contribution to employment until the middle of the 19th century, 
signifies the power of this sector as well as that of the pre-industrial elite, who owned 
a large part of the arable and farming land throughout Britain.37 Research on the 
growth in productivity has also pointed to the relatively low growth in the industrial
t V i  1 0sector even in the late 19 century, when agricultural output absolutely declined. 
Also studies on the growth rate of the service sector in modem Britain have assigned 
an equivalent importance to this sector, arguing that it contributed to economic 
growth in Britain as much as did the industrial sector.39 Consequently, these studies 
began to challenge older views of the modem British economy, in addition to the 
historical myth of modem Britain that had been generated.
Empirical studies have also called into question the interpretation of a whole range of
35 For example see Otsuka, ‘Kindai Kigyoka to sono Keifu’, in Otsuka Hisao Chosakushu vol. 9 
(Tokyo, 1969).
36 See D. Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, (New Haven, 1990), and D. 
Spring (ed.), European Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century, (Baltimore, 1977), for example.
3 See E. L. Jones, The Development o f English Agriculture, 1815-73, (Cambridge, 1968).
38 See N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution, (Oxford, 1985), esp. 
p.45.
9 See C. H. Feinstein et al (eds.), British Economic Growth, 1856-1973, (Oxford, 1982), pp.222-23, 
pp.288-89.
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older views on indicators of social change during the modem period. These studies 
are, to some extent, more detailed, which meant that they were in themselves 
sufficient to break with older views, and not based on an ambiguous and unreal image 
of modem British society. This research also tended to focus on the continuity of the 
old elite as an element of social, political and economic power, rather than on their 
social discontinuity consequent on radical changes during the Industrial Revolution. 
Among works of this kind, Rubinstein’s research on millionaires and 
multi-millionaires in modem Britain is especially significant, and has had a great 
impact in changing earlier perspectives. Utilizing probate records to estimate
th thmillionaires’ wealth from the late 19 to the early 20 centuries, Rubinstein 
emphasised that even though the proportion of the total number accounted for by the 
pre-industrial elite relatively declined throughout the period, British millionaires were 
not represented only by the industrial bourgeoisie, but also by the commercial and 
financial bourgeoisie.40 Rubinstein’s long-term analysis also showed that while 
industrial millionaires were the largest group among the wealthy bourgeoisie, their 
regional distribution indicated the predominant position of the London area, which 
was mainly non-industrial and was the centre of the financial sector.41 In addition, 
among industrial millionaires, traditional sectors like brewing were the largest group, 
and not millionaires from the cotton industry. From these results, Rubinstein pointed 
out the relative importance of the non-industrial bourgeoisie in modem Britain. In 
another work, he also stressed the gradual integration of the British bourgeoisie with 
the pre-industrial elite through educational influence, for instance, through the 
entering of bourgeoisie sons into public schools. He disputes, however, that this 
caused any decline of the British economy, since their choice of profession after 
completing higher education was quite business-oriented.42 At the same time, 
Rubinstein’s analysis of the predominant position of the non-industrial bourgeoisie, 
and his denying of the negative impact of the cultural influence of the pre-industrial 
elite on the bourgeoisie, has provoked some criticism from his opponents.43
40 See W. D. Rubinstein, Men of Property, (London, 1981). In particular pp.60-66.
41 Ibid, p. 88.
42 See Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture and the Decline o f Britain, (London, 1993), esp. chap. 4.
43 Particular debates have been conducted between Rubinstein and Berghoff, and also between 
Rubinstein and Nicholas recently. For example, see H. Berghoff, ‘British Businessmen as Wealth 
Holders, 1970-1914: A closer look’, Business History, 33-2 (1991), ‘A reply to W. D. Rubinstein’s 
response’, Business History, 34-2 (1992), and Rubinstein, ‘British Businessmen as Wealth Holders, 
1870-1914: A Response’, Business History, 34-2 (1992). Also, see Rubinstein, ‘Wealth Making in the 
late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century: A response’, Business History 42-2 (2000), and T.
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This shift in the focus of research about modem Britain has also stimulated the growth 
of studies of the role of the financial sector in modem Britain. In this sense, many 
researchers have looked at the contribution of the City of London, as a worldwide 
financial centre and a huge source of British wealth, and at the financial bourgeoisie. 
These studies have emphasised the integration of the financial bourgeoisie with the 
pre-industrial elite, both socially and economically, and the assistance this gave to the 
survival of the old elite and its cultural values. Informal networking with the political 
and social elite through non-business meetings, marriage or friendship from their 
study at public schools, caused the assimilation of the financial elite into the old elite, 
and thus enabled them to exercise influence in politics or the economy.44 The 
financial elite’s social and political attitude was also in strong contrast with that of the 
industrial bourgeoisie, who were basically outside this assimilation because of the 
difference in cultural values between the newly emerging upper class of industry and 
finance capital. However, the extent to which industrialists who succeeded in business 
and became rich wished to assimilate into a new national elite or not, remains a topic 
of debate among researchers.45
Recent studies of modem Britain have assigned some importance to the financial 
and commercial sector as a driving force of modem British economic development. 
One particular example is shown in the debate about ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in 
modem Britain. Cain and Hopkins, who elaborated the concept of ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ in their long-term and broad analysis of the British Empire, stressed a 
number of significant points as follows. Firstly, they focused on the non-industrial 
sector, such as commerce or finance, to achieve a reconsideration of modem British 
capitalism. They indicated that greater improvement and innovation within the 
commercial and financial sectors, and not just the Industrial Revolution, contributed 
to the British economy. Secondly, they emphasised the influential power in British 
economic policy of the financial and commercial elite, which was assimilated into the 
old political elite. In contrast to this elite, the role of the industrial elite was more
Nicholas, ‘Wealth Making in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century: The Rubinstein hypothesis 
revisited’, Business History 42-2 (2000).
44 For details, see Y. Cassis, City Bankers, 1870-1914 (Cambridge, 1994).
45 For example, see L. Stone and J. C. F. Stone, An Open Elite? (Oxford, 1986), and F. M. L.
Thompson, ‘Life after Death: How Successful Nineteenth-Century Businessmen Disposed of their
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marginal, and its influence remained at the local level. Thirdly, the continuity in 
long-term policy of modem Britain may be summarized as depending on the newly 
integrated gentlemanly elite and its political philosophy. 46 Although this 
interpretation has provoked controversy and debate among researchers47, it is certain 
that Cain and Hopkins’ studies have contributed to a rethinking of modem British 
history, in addition to a rethinking about the British bourgeoisie.
Consideration of long-term changes within modem British history have thus indicated 
the strong presence of the pre-industrial elite, which had been considered as a 
declining power in the modem period as a result of the Industrial Revolution. This 
elite still maintained its power both politically and socially through integration with 
other influential groups, notably the financial and commercial bourgeoisie, both of 
which could share its social values and traditional customs. Studies of modem British 
capitalism and the bourgeoisie have focused on the question of modernity within 
British society, but it is clear that none of these studies has shown the existence of a 
radical reorganization in social and class structure in modem Britain. These 
perspectives have also forced a shift in the historiography of other European countries, 
such as Germany, whose historiography had excessively idealized modem British 
society, in contrast with the ‘backwardness’ in modem society in Germany that was 
considered as having led the country to National Socialism. This German perspective 
will be considered next.
1.2.3 Germany
Many researchers who have studied modem German history have been convinced that 
from the early 19th to the middle of the 20th century, German society in its entirety 
chose a different path from other western European societies for reasons of tradition, 
outlook, different internal social structure and enthusiastic national consciousness, 
even though the state system was not totally centralized until the 1930s, when the 
Nazis took hold of the political power and the democratic political system 48 It has 
been frequently stated that the road to this great tragedy was initiated with the failure
Fortunes’, Economic History Review, 33 (1990).
46 See P. J. Cain and A. G Hopkins, British Imperialism, 2vols. (London, 1993), esp. chap 2,3 of vol.l .
47 See e.g. D. Cannadine, ‘The Empire Strikes Back’, Past and Present, 147, (1995).
26
tfiof the German bourgeoisie in the 19 century to transform Germany into a liberal and 
democratic state. The existence of two groups within the German bourgeoisie, that is, 
the Bildungsburgertum (educated bourgeoisie) and the Besitzbiirgertum (propertied 
bourgeoisie) caused conflict between the two, both socially and politically.49 The 
weakness of the bourgeoisie in the face of the pre-industrial and authoritative elite 
during the period of the unification movement had a decisive impact in that these 
bourgeoisie, in particular those who were propertied, were unable to expel the old 
elite from political power. All they could do was seek assimilation into traditional 
power groups through abandoning modem and liberal values. Their betrayal of 
democracy, known specifically as the ‘feudalization of the bourgeoisie’, separated 
them from the rest of the European bourgeoisie and changed their social and political 
attitude towards something altogether more authoritative and suppressive. 50 
Consequently, their ambiguous position and the alliance with the old elite during the 
period of Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic led to the rise of the National 
Socialism. This assumption forms part of the so-called ,Sonderweg, a distinct path of 
modem German history, and thus Sonderweg theory long dominated modem German 
historiography.51
However, the Sonderweg and ‘feudalization’ theories as a component of the overall 
approach to German history have fallen into disfavour in recent years. The first 
backlash came from historians researching modem German history in Britain, who 
were undoubtedly influenced by British social historians, like Hobsbawm or 
Thompson. In the early 1980s, David Blackboum and Geoff Eley initiated an attack 
on the Sonderweg theory. They questioned what they considered the excessive 
idealization of modem British society by German historians, who criticized the social 
backwardness of contemporary Germany in contrast to Britain, arguing that British 
social structure resolved elements of backwardness and traditional customs. They also 
emphasized that the transition of Germany into a modem state during the 19th century 
certainly depended on the rise of the bourgeoisie, who benefited substantially from 
the ‘revolution from above’ by the German state, for example, the unification,
48 For example, see H-U Wehler, German Empire 1871-1918 (Leamington Spa, 1985) for detail.
49 For details see, J. Kocka et al(ed), Burger und Biirgerlichkeit im 19 Jahrhundert, (Gottingen, 1987).
50 See H-U. Wehler, German Empire, 1871-1918, esp. chap 2.
51 For Sonderweg theory, see R. Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, (Munich, 
1965), esp. pp.62-64.
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economic growth through state intervention or the formation of standards for the 
social system. In addition, they argued that during this period bourgeois values 
became dominant in many areas of German society. As explained above, their 
interpretation was indeed a challenge to earlier perspectives on modem German 
history. Therefore, it provoked a serious and enthusiastic debate among historians 
who studied modem Germany, both German and British. International debate thus 
also partly contributed to the opening up of debates and the development of 
comparative research on the German bourgeoisie.
Comparative research based on empirical studies of the bourgeoisie gradually 
appeared from the middle of the 1980s. A significant role in this research was played 
by an international group of researchers who jointly discussed and conducted research 
at the University of Bielefeld, in Germany. Their contribution was published as a 
three volume set edited by Jurgen Kocka, a famous social historian.53 The studies in 
this book mainly consist of comparisons between the German bourgeoisie and other 
European bourgeoisies, from various aspects, like the difference in economic 
activities, status, self-consciousness or mentality. Without doubt, these endeavours 
have been successful in their attempt to place modem German history in a European 
context, and to give a broader and precise vision of the interpretation of the German 
bourgeoisie. Also from this research, it is apparent that the German bourgeoisie 
shared many common characteristics with other European bourgeoisies, in particular 
the British or French, who were considered to be influential in many areas of society, 
including the political area. Even though there has been some criticism from other 
researchers, who have pointed out that these scholars’ definition of bourgeoisie is too 
narrowly determined,54 this type of comparative research has been quite influential 
on later studies focused on the so-called German bourgeoisie, like businessmen and 
merchants.
Studies of the German bourgeoisie have been inclined to emphasise the bourgeoisie’s 
tendency towards ‘feudalization’. The bourgeoisie’s failure to hold a predominant
52 See, D. Blackboum and G Eley, The Peculiarities o f German History, (Oxford, 1984).
53 See J. Kocka et al.(eds.), Burgertum im 19Jahrhundert, 3vols. (Munich, 1988).
54 This criticism is especially from Lothar Gall. See, for example L. Gall, ‘Stadt und Burgertum im 
Ubergang von der traditionalen zur modemen Gesellschafr’, in Gall (ed.), Stadt und Burgertum im 
Ubergang von der traditionalen zur modemen Gesellschaft (Munich, 1993).
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position within the German state was considered to have led to a negative assimilation 
into the pre-industrial elite. In this sense, the ‘feudalization of the bourgeoisie’ was 
defined as a phenomenon that opposed or reversed modernity or the development of a 
modem society, shown through the ennoblement of the bourgeoisie on retirement 
from the business world, their alliance with the authoritarian state to secure their 
status, and the formation of a coalition with the pre-industrial elite through marriage 
or choice of profession. As newer empirical studies carefully examined and analysed 
new data, the results of the research cast doubt on this concept of ‘feudalization’. 
Some of the pioneers of these studies, such as Friedrich Zunkel’s research on 
businessmen in the Rhineland and Westphalia in the middle of the 19th century, 
provided limited evidence for the ‘feudalization’ of these businessmen.55 However, in 
the 1980s, the existence of major weaknesses in the feudalization thesis became 
apparent to many historians and sociologists.56 In addition, as quantitative methods 
began to be introduced into this field of study and as empirical studies became more 
elaborate, many researchers became suspicious of the concept of ‘feudalization’. 
Some researchers stressed the relative lack of significance for businessmen of the ties 
with the pre-industrial elite, and study of businessmen families who were newly 
ennobled indicated the separation of those groups from the old aristocracy. Karin 
Kaudelka-Hanisch’s study of holders of the title ‘Commercial Councillor’, which was 
the state title specifically awarded to honour businessmen, signifies the pride and
C O
self-awareness of businessmen in relation to their economic activities.
Recent trends in studies of the German bourgeoisie show a further expansion in 
interest among researchers, though many of these works assign importance not only 
to business and economic factors, but also to political and social factors. Augustine’s 
study of the wealthiest businessmen in Wilhelmine Germany explains the similarities 
and peculiarities of the wealthy German bourgeoisie in terms of their business
55 See F. Zunkel, Die Rheinisch-Westfalische Untemehmer, 1834-1879, (Cologne, 1962).
56 For example, see H. Kaelble, ‘Long-Term Changes in the Recruitment of the Business Elite’,
(Journal o f Social History, 13-3,1980), and Kaelble, ‘Wie feudal waren die deutschen Untemehmer im 
Kaiserreich?’ in R. Tilly (ed), Beitrdge zur quantitativen vergleichenden Untemehmergeschichte, 
(Stuttgart, 1985).
7 See H. Henning, ‘Soziale Verflechtung der Untemehmer in Westfalen, 1860-1914’, Zeitschriftfur 
Untemehmergeschichte, 23 (1978) and H. Berghoff, ‘Aristokratisierung des Biirgertums?’ 
Vierteljahrschriftfur Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 81-2 (1994).
58 See K. Kaudelka-Hanisch, ‘The Titled Businessmen: Pmssian Commercial Councilors in the 
Rhineland and Westphalia during the Nineteenth Century’, in D. Blackboum and R. Evans (eds.), The 
German Bourgeoisie, (London, 1991).
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activities and social status. She basically stresses that the wealthiest German 
businessmen, who were considered to have had easy access to the pre-industrial elite 
because of their enormous economic and financial power, and who had been closely 
identified with the model of ‘feudalization’ of the bourgeoisie, had hardly ever lost 
their consciousness of being businessmen. Although in some cases, a minority lost 
confidence in their own traditional social and economic values, and their social 
behaviour was gradually assimilated into that of the pre-industrial elite, the majority 
remained active in the business world, since they never forgot that the source of their 
influence and power rested on their business activities. In addition, in their private life, 
including marriage and the upbringing of children, they were indeed highly strategic. 
On the one hand, sons of businessmen were expected to inherit their father’s 
businesses, and therefore it was rare for a son’s choice of profession or private life to 
lie outside his father’s expectations or decision. On the other hand, the role of 
daughters was to expand the social network through marriage. However, Augustine 
concludes that the wealthiest businessmen in Imperial Germany remained in a 
somewhat isolated position in relation to the political and pre-industrial elite, in 
contrast to Britain.59 While Augustine’s study has had a major impact on research on 
the German bourgeoisie, other recent studies have discussed the role in Imperial 
Germany of the financial elite, a core element in the study of the European 
bourgeoisie.60 Boris Barth’s study of the banking and financial elite in Imperial 
Germany indicates the relationship between banking activities and foreign policy, and 
the link of the financial elite with the political elite.61
The trend in studies of the modem German bourgeoisie has, therefore, become more 
convergent with trends found in the study of the European bourgeoisie more broadly. 
Comparative research has made it apparent that the modem German bourgeoisie, 
which had been assumed to be distinct from other western bourgeoisies in a number 
of respects, in particular in their social and political attitude, in fact shared many 
common characteristics with them. This also signifies the contribution of comparative 
research to analysing them in a broader perspective. In addition, it is clear that these
59 For details, see D. L. Augustine, Patricians and Parvenus, (Oxford, 1994).
60 For pioneering work in this field, see F. Stem, Gold and Iron, (New York, 1977).
61 See B. Barth, Die deutsche Hochfinanz und die Imperialismus, (Stuttgart, 1995), and also Barth, 
‘Weder Burgertum noch Adel’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 25-1 (1999); M. Reitmeier,
‘Biirgerlichkeit als Habitus’, (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 25, 1999).
30
studies have not ignored any of the political and unusual social characteristics that 
may have led to the final tragedy of modem German history. This indicates the strong 
impact of the Sonderweg thesis among researchers even now, although the concept of 
‘feudalization’ has almost disappeared and lost its impact on German historiography.
1.3 . The Importance of Comparative Research
From the brief description of the existing progress of research, outlined in the 
previous section, it is apparent that there are certain differences in method, analysis 
and tendency of research among these three countries. Even in the case of definition 
of the terminology for the so-called bourgeoisie, the various definitions indicate 
strong social, cultural and traditional influences that have certainly made a 
comparison difficult. It is clear that the terms bourgeoisie, Burgertum, shisanka or 
meiboka, all of which are broadly defined as including the wealthy individuals (in 
particular those who are propertied), have partly differing meanings and 
characteristics. None of these words can be wholly translated into another language, 
and while some of the terms have embraced a broad variety of social groups within 
the definition, some terms only embrace the social group which was engaged in 
economic and business activities. Moreover, the nature of historical progress and the 
different power statuses of the three countries, as well as the extent to which they 
were developed or a late developer, created peculiarities in each case. However, it 
should be noted that there can be no doubt that a commitment to the development of 
the nation-state, which was closely associated with a process of modernization and 
industrialization, and a commitment to modernity, constituted a common 
characteristic of bourgeoisie, Burgertum and shisanka. Taking a long-term 
perspective, these groups were never totally anti-modem or anti-capitalistic, and 
gained various benefits from social, economic and political reform.
In addition to the social and economic differences in the characteristics of these 
groups themselves, there is also a clear distinction in the style and the methodology of 
research on them, in particular of European and Japanese research. On the one hand, 
the studies of the European bourgeoisie, in both Britain and Germany, have placed the 
research in a broader and longer-term historical context. Recent studies have made 
extensive use of empirical and comparative methods, and have gained fruitful results,
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which have been able to give a new perspective on the analysis of bourgeois society 
and its social influence. The new trend has also contributed to breaking down the 
barriers within historical research, which had been very distinct, since many historians, 
politically either left or right, had tended to focus on internal factors which had made 
their historical view quite narrow and somewhat ‘nation-based’. Therefore, although 
socio-cultural factors were significant in forming clear differences among the 
European bourgeoisie, and it is certain that there was little consolidation over national 
boundaries (even in the case of the Jewish bourgeoisie in some European countries, 
although this might have been doubted by many contemporary observers), the new 
research has indicated a relatively more powerful status and position of the European 
bourgeoisie than indicated by previous research, and has shown that they shared a 
common attitude towards modernity and their economic activities as the true source of 
their power and influence.
On the other hand, in the case of Japan, research on wealth holders was for a long 
time left to political, economic and business historians. This meant that research and 
studies in this area tended to focus on certain specific factors, for example, the style of 
the business, their authoritative attitude towards the working class, or their informal 
alliances and coalitions with power elite groups. While this tendency has produced 
numerous detailed works in each of these historical areas, it has also caused a lack of 
long-term social and historical perspective. This is especially true of business history. 
Researchers who have emphasized either the internal or external influences on the 
formation of modem Japanese business have tended to focus their attention and 
interest especially on Japan itself. In some cases, influential foreign theories have 
been introduced to expand the perspective of the study. However, comparative 
analysis has relatively rarely been pursued for research into modem Japanese business. 
This is also due to a systemic problem in historical studies in Japan, namely that many 
researchers have just concentrated on the analysis of the plentiful sources and 
literature available, and therefore have only assigned importance to the interpretation 
of the peculiarities of the Japanese historical experience. Moreover, cultural values or 
bias in interpretation has constituted an invisible barrier to comparison. Even though 
Marxist historians, who were long the mainstream of the academic field, have
62 For example see W. Mosse, Jews in the German Economy, (Oxford, 1987), esp. chap.3.
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exploited comparative analysis for criticising social ‘backwardness’ and the existence 
of some ‘feudalistic’ characteristics in modem Japan, their studies have hardly ever 
been associated with any reconsideration of Japanese ‘peculiarities’. Thus, even 
though, as mentioned in the above section, studies of the bourgeoisie in the three 
countries have gradually shifted towards looking at the role of the financial and 
commercial sector rather than the industrial sector, the analytical approach to such 
research is self-evidently distinct in both the Japanese and European cases.
Undoubtedly, this difference in methodological approach and historical progress has 
to some extent pushed studies of the Japanese bourgeoisie into an isolated position 
and poses certain difficulties for comparison. However, it is plausible to argue that 
some similarities can be discovered between Japan and the contemporary European 
case. The introduction into modem Japan from the late 19th century of Western 
models, economic, social and political, caused a merging with the traditional Japanese 
system. The emergence of new wealth holders who enthusiastically engaged in the 
modem business world as a result of the reform and transformation of the Japanese 
state signifies the partial move by the Japanese business system towards the standards 
set by western business. This was conducted through export-oriented development in 
Japanese business and the importance of external trade for the Japanese economy. 
Also, institutional changes, such as those in the educational system, significantly 
contributed to minimizing the differences in social behaviour between the Japanese 
and western bourgeoisies. Apart from these social and institutional changes, there is 
evidence that in the role of commercial and agrarian wealth during the modem period, 
we can find similarities between the European commercial and agrarian elite and that 
of Japan. These observations provide some justification for the importance of 
comparative research and analysis between the Japanese and European cases. 
However, it should be stressed that in contrast to Britain and Germany, both of which 
were industrialized and had secured the position of ‘developed’ countries during the 
late 19th -  early 20th centuries, Japan was still in the position of a developing country, 
and this situation did not change until the post World War II period. Therefore, the 
analytical perspective must be not simply to find any peculiarities or similarities in the 
case of Japanese business and wealth holders, but to analyse how the combination of 
traditional, non-traditional and newly created factors was structured, and how it
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functioned on an economic and social level.
1.4. Methods and Sources
Methodologically, my research on modem Japanese wealth holders is a combination 
of two approaches, that is, quantitative data analysis and a non-quantitative approach 
embracing the consideration of socio-cultural factors. Although quantitative methods 
can be extended in the direction of econometric analysis, the approach utilized here is 
to use basic statistical data to analyse social aspects, such as the social status or social 
behaviour of wealth holders. Therefore, my research will be oriented towards a social 
history rather than purely economic history approach. However, the combination of 
these two methods is crucial for my thesis. On the one hand, the quantitative method 
is useful for analysing Japanese wealth holders as a group, so that they can be 
examined in a broader context. In addition, since numerous studies of the European 
bourgeoisie have researched them as a social group, and comprehensive quantitative 
analysis has been utilised for this research, this method will make a comparative 
analysis of Japanese wealth holders easier. Collective data analysis is also more 
convenient for researching wealth holders at the national level, in particular for 
interpreting regional trends and differences, the degree of concentration of personal 
wealth, or identifying leading sectors or social groups within wealth holders. On the 
other hand, the qualitative analysis used in my thesis is crucial for examining social 
and political attitudes that cannot be determined by quantitative analysis. This 
approach would seem to address the weakest point of the quantitative analysis, 
namely its inability to comprehend the social or cultural factors which undoubtedly 
constituted a dynamic in Japanese wealth holders’ activities, especially in the business 
world. The implications of traditional or newly invented elements within wealth 
holders’ social behaviour also cannot be unveiled without the introduction of a 
non-quantitative approach.
The reliability of both quantitative and qualitative data sets is crucial to my analysis. 
Though utilizing both methods can reduce or minimize possible errors in the results of 
the research, the question of actual reliability is more complex, as will be explained in 
more detail in later sections. In the case of the quantitative data set, which will be 
discussed in more detail below, there are likely to be some errors and omissions. In
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this case, the use of qualitative evidence, for instance, biographies or autobiographies, 
may be able to supplement these data. This is necessary if the quantitative analysis 
focuses on personal data, like, for example, age, date or place of birth. On the other 
hand, these qualitative materials also provide fascinating information about the 
individuals who are the object of the analysis, especially about their life and social 
behaviour. However, it should be noted that in many cases, the information provided 
by these qualitative materials might to some extent be fictional rather than reliable 
and non-fictional. In particular, any discussion relying on data contained in 
autobiographies must be a cautious one, since the writers tend to inaccurate and 
selective memories, for example where there are references to issues such as 
childhood.
The remaining parts of this chapter discuss the materials and sources, which have 
been utilized in my thesis. The quantitative materials must be explained in detail, not 
only to show the historical progress made in data collection, but also to enable some 
discussion of the characteristics or bias of the Japanese sources and materials. Also, 
the nature of the qualitative materials will be discussed so as to identify their 
particular characteristics. In addition the secondary sources used will be outlined.63
1.4.1. Quantitative Sources
Although there exist abundant sources on Japanese wealth holders, these materials are 
dispersed everywhere throughout Japan, and some important materials, in particular 
official documents, may well have been destroyed during the period of the Second 
World War. Thus, there have been serious limitations on individual researchers’ 
ability to access and search these materials at a national level. However, fortunately, 
the collection of materials about Japanese wealth holders has advanced rapidly, and 
improved in recent years. The most reliable comprehensive sources have been edited 
and published through the efforts of a single academic researcher. These are, Meijiki 
Nihon Zenkoku Shisanka Jinushi Shiryo Shusei (Compilation of Materials on Wealth 
Holders and Landlords in the Meiji period); Taisho Showaki Shisanka Jinushi Shiryo 
Shusei (Compilation of Materials on Wealth Holders and Landlords in the Taisho and
63 See also the appendix part of this thesis for further detail of data compilation.
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Showa periods); and To-Do-Fu-Ken betsu Shisanka Jinushi Soran (Compilation of 
Materials on Wealth Holders and Landlords by Locality).64
These compilations were all produced as part of a project to collect prewar Japanese 
surveys and other data initiated in the early 1960s by Shibuya Ryuichi, who had been 
an academic fellow of the Institute of Agricultural Research, an external organization 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery. At first, the purpose of this 
project was to collect surviving surveys of local landlords, since many old official 
collections, including registers or lists of landlords, had been disposed of after the 
postwar land reform.65 Therefore, the searching, collecting and editing of these data 
or documents at a national level was both significant and necessary. Although, to 
some extent, the project needed the assistance of Shibuya’s colleagues, it was mainly 
conducted by the individual efforts of Shibuya himself.
From the end of the 1960s to the early 1970s, this data collection was extended to 
include data on local wealth holders, including merchants and businessmen, and the 
interest of the project began to shift towards analysis of the role of local wealth 
holders in modem Japanese economic development and their contribution to business 
and economic activities. Further collections of surveys, in particular at national level, 
became the main focus of this project, and since the 1980s the results of this extensive 
research have been published as major compilations. This work has recently been 
completed, and all the materials collected by Shibuya have been published as the three 
multi-volume compilations mentioned above.
These comprehensive compilations comprise, therefore, enormous and wide-ranging 
data sets, which can be utilised for academic research. If we focus on this huge data 
set, we can identify certain characteristics within the sources that have been collected. 
These data can be divided into several categories, both official and private. Within 
both sets of data, further sub-categories can be identified from sources and references. 
Many of the official data sets, though with some exceptions, concentrate on the
64 The date of publication of these three bibliographies is as follows: R. Shibuya (ed), Meijiki Nihon 
Zenkoku Shisanka Jinushi Shiryo Shusei, 5 vols. (Tokyo, 1984); Shibuya (ed), Taisho Showaki Nihon 
Zenkoku Shisanka Jinushi Shiryo Shusei, 7 vols. (Tokyo, 1985); Shibuya (ed), To-Do-Fu-Ken betsu 
Shisanka Jinushi Soran, 65 vols. (Tokyo, 1985-1999). In the following, these three texts are 
abbreviated as MNZSJSS, TSNZSJSS, and TBSJS.
36
agricultural sector, especially providing data on the scale of landholding among 
Japanese landlords. This type of investigation was not only conducted by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Commerce, but also by local governments. This indicates that 
agricultural policy was undoubtedly a central issue for the prewar Japanese 
government, since much social and political instability was regarded as being largely 
caused by the landlord system. However, in contrast to the landlords who owned 
estates in local and rural areas, official investigation of urban landlords, whose 
income largely depended on rents from urban properties, in particular in metropolitan 
areas, is hardly ever reflected in the data researched by government.66 Apart from 
research on contemporary landlords, some official tax records, showing the income 
structure of major taxpayers in detail, are also included in these compilations. 
However, these data are not available across the board. A huge amount of official tax 
records would seem to have disappeared during the Second World War, and it is 
impossible to examine the remaining data in any time series, or at a national level, as 
will be discussed later.
As mentioned above, official investigation of prewar Japanese wealth holders tended 
to be concentrated on landlords. It is also apparent that public research in the Japanese 
colonies in the prewar period, including Taiwan and Korea, also focused on 
landholding. In the case of Korea, after the annexation of the Korean Kingdom in 
1910, the office of the colonial government regularly conducted surveys of landlords, 
in particular of those who were Japanese immigrants.67 Also in Taiwan, the colonial 
government investigated in detail the nature of estate management undertaken by 
Japanese farming immigrants.68 Although one should be cautious about emphasizing 
the bias within Japanese governmental investigation from remaining documents, it is 
plausible to suggest that official research was inclined to pay attention to landholding 
or landlords’ activities rather than to commercial or industrial wealth holders.
65 For detail see introductory part of Shibuya (ed), MNZSJSS, vol. 1.
66 Only private research about this type of landlord can be found among the references in these 
collections. For example see, Tokyo Shinai ni okeru Takuchi hoka Tochi Chosasho, in TBSJS, Tokyo 
Section.
67 Although the first census was conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, the 
following census was undertaken by the Chosen Sotoku-fu (Korean Colonial Office). These censuses 
are called Naichijin Noji Keieisha Shirabe, and are in DBSJS, Chosen Section.
68 For example see, Taiwan Sotoku-fu Shokusan Kyoku, Taiwan Nogyo Shokumin no Kaku Kobetsu 
Keieigaiyo oyobi Shimei Ichiran (1931) in DBSJS, Taiwan Section.
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On the other hand, privately collected data sets indicate a broader interest in wealth 
holders. If we look at national level investigations, there are substantial lists of 
national merchants and industrialists. These lists are called Shokonin Meiroku (List of 
merchants and industrialists) or Shokoroku, and are available from 1913 to 1930. 
They cover a wide range of information, giving for instance, the names of merchants 
and industrialists, and the names of the firms or merchant houses which they managed, 
along with data about income tax and corporate tax.69 Some of these listings cover 
several tens of thousands of people, and thus have been utilised for quantitative
HC\analysis of modem Japanese merchants and industrialists. However, the definition 
of merchant or industrialist in these lists is quite unclear, since some owners of big 
business, especially the zaibatsu owners, are not included in this data set. Therefore, it 
is certainly difficult to trace data on the very rich group of wealth holders from either 
of these sources. In addition, the existence of these lists may possibly signify that 
Japanese and Japanese society may have assigned less importance to the secrecy of 
information or the violation of privacy than in some other countries. This tendency 
becomes very apparent if  we shift our eyes to the lists of wealth holders’ wealth or 
assets, which were compiled privately.
Lists of wealth holders according to their wealth have a strong tradition in Japanese 
history. The oldest list can be traced back to a date of publication in the 
mid-Tokugawa period, although copies of these lists had almost disappeared before 
the Meiji Restoration. Notwithstanding the great transition within Japanese society
thduring the late 19 century, these lists continued to be published. The oldest lists of 
wealth holders were called Meiyokagami or Banzukehyo, names that utilised as a 
model the rankings assigned to sumo wrestlers. The Meiyokagami or Banzukehyo only 
contained the names and addresses of wealth holders who were specifically wealthy 
merchants, since the existence of landlords was officially denied by the Tokugawa 
government under the quasi-federal system of feudal lords that existed. To confirm 
the status and number of wealth holders without providing any sort of statistical or 
official information, these lists utilised the ranking of sumo wrestlers as a means of
69 Shokonin Meiroku and Shokoroku were collected in each prefectural section and the colonial section 
of DBSJS. The full name of both materials is Nihon Zenkoku Shokonin Meiroku 5th Version (1913), and 
Dainihon Shokoroku 11th Version (1930).
70 This project has been done by Abe Takeshi and Miyamoto Mataro, and some of the preliminary 
results are presented in Abe and Miyamoto, ‘Meijiki ni okeru Shisanka Shokogyosha no Kosei’, in Abe
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identification. Therefore, for instance, the status of yokozuna, who is at the top of the 
sumo wrestlers’ hierarchy, would be used in the Meiyokagami or Banzukehyo to 
indicate prominent wealthy merchants. Ozeki (second ranking), sekiwake (third), and 
komusubi (fourth) etc., downwards could all be used as a conversion table for the 
ranking of wealth holders.71 It was easy for many Japanese to understand the 
meaning and ranking of wealth holders by means of these lists. In addition, even 
though the true purpose of the publication of these lists is uncertain, it is plausible that 
these lists were made to encourage business competition among wealth holders.
This initial type of list had already disappeared by the middle of the Meiji period. 
Instead of Meiyokagami or Banzukehyo, a new type of list of wealth holders, based on 
tax payment or estimated total assets, began to emerge. These new lists partly 
depended on relatively scientific methods of investigation and wealth estimation, 
and needed long-term research and many investigators. Therefore, the publication of 
these lists was conducted by large organizations, like newspaper publishers or private 
detective companies. Also data on the income tax payment of wealth holders began to 
be widely available in the form of lists available to the public through publishers. In 
addition, the publication of new types of list partly resulted from the crucial influence 
of investigations into wealth holders conducted in European countries or the United 
States. However, even though some doubt remains about the methods used for 
estimating wealth holders’ assets, it is very difficult to trace any accurate data on 
this during the Meiji period. Firstly, scientific methods of data collection began to be 
introduced no earlier than the beginning of the 20th century, and the data sets, both 
official and private, tended to be incorrect and inaccurate because of delays in 
taxation reform and fluctuations in economic circumstances in Japan. This situation 
contributed to the existence of great differences in methods of calculating and 
estimating wealth holders’ wealth. Secondly, although from the late Meiji period (in
i L
the early 20 century), pioneering lists based on scientific methods began to emerge, 
the first list of 1901 did not disclose data about the estimated wealth of wealth holders. 
This list only provided data concerning the names of wealth holders whose estimated 
wealth was over 500,000 yen in the late Meiji period, since the publisher who
(eds.), Nihon Keieishi, vol. 2. (1992).
1 For detail on this see the introduction by Shibuya, MNZSJSS, vol. 1. Shibuya also points out that 
there is a possibility that publishers changed the ranking in the lists in line with particular merchants’
39
conducted the research was afraid that individuals contained in this list would suffer 
from violation of their privacy, and that the data that appeared might be inaccurate . 
Therefore, the emergence of more detailed lists had to wait until the early Taisho 
period.
In 1916, a new list gave information about wealth holders’ estimated wealth, along 
with names, addresses and occupations. The list was published in the form of a 
supplement of a newspaper. The name of this list was Zenkoku 50man yen ijo 
Shisanka Hyo (List of Japanese Wealth Holders with Estimated Wealth in Excess of 
500,000 yen), and its publisher was Jiji Shinposha, a leading newspaper publisher. 
Although this publisher had earlier disclosed data on wealth holders, it was the first 
time estimated wealth data were provided. According to the preface of this list, the 
company had spent a long time on the investigation, from January to September of 
1915, and the researchers had carefully estimated wealth holders* assets by utilising 
time price data for the shares which they owned, minimizing the estimated level of 
wealth to avoid any sort of inaccuracy.73 Though this list does not provide any 
additional information, for example by including brief profiles or biographies, the 
publication of this list had a major impact on the publishing of wealth holders’ lists in 
that no subsequent lists omitted estimated wealth data.
Also it should be noted that, even though the purpose was different, the government 
also secretly investigated wealth holders in this period, with a view to confirming 
political tendencies among wealth holders. As a result of the era of Taisho Democracy 
and the introduction of a new general election system, in 1924 the Home Ministry 
attempted to collect various information about the leading taxpayers who had the right 
to choose and send representatives to the Upper House of the Diet. The secret 
document that resulted contains information on wealth holders, including their 
occupation, curriculum vitae, political party supported, tax payment and wealth.74 
However, the document itself had a strongly political aim and therefore the concern 
with wealth was just an additional piece of information for political analysis.
requirements, since these ranking lists greatly influenced their business.
72 See Jiji Shinposha, Nihon Zenkoku SOman Yen ijo no Shisanka Ichiran, (1901), wMNZSJSS, vol. 1.
73 See Jiji Shinposha, Zenkoku 5Oman yen ijo Shisanka Hyo (1916) in TSNZSJSS, vol. 1. pp. 16-19.
74 See Naimusho Keihokyoku, Kizokuin Tagaku Nozeisha Gosen Shikakusha Mikomi Hyo, in 
TSNZSJSS, vol. 2., and vol. 3.
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Although many lists estimating wealth holders’ assets, were published after the 
appearance of the 1916 list by Jiji Shinposha, other publishers’ lists lack reliability 
and accuracy since their methods were inadequate and their investigations often quite 
inappropriate. Nevertheless, Jiji Shinposha suddenly terminated publication of its list 
after 1916, and a reliable list of wealth holders’ wealth did not again appear until the 
early Showa period. In the early Showa period, Kodansha, another famous publisher, 
again initiated publication of a list of wealth holders, which was called Zenkoku 
Kinmanka Dai Banzuke (The List of National Wealth Holders). The survey itself was 
conducted by Teikoku Koshinsho, a private detective agency, which had been 
established in 1921. The purpose of the publication was uncertain. However, such a 
list was published three times, in 1929, 1931 and 1934.75 The reason for frequent 
publication was quite apparent; economic depression and severe inflation required 
frequent reconsideration of wealth holders’ estimated wealth, which largely 
constituted fluctuating assets, like shares or properties. It was also said that the third 
and final list, which was called 5Oman yen ijo Zenkoku Kinmanka Dai Banzuke (The 
List of National Wealth Holders with wealth in excess of 50man yen), took over six 
months to compile, and that Teikoku Koshinsho utilized nearly two thousand 
employees at 58 branches nationwide for this investigation.76 After the publication of 
this final 1934 list, this type of list never again appeared in the prewar period. It is 
plausible to argue that social insecurity and antagonism towards wealth holders 
groups from militant groups or the working class may have forced the abandonment 
of the disclosure of wealth holders’ data. In addition, terrorist incidents, like the 
assassination of Dan Takuma, the chief executive of the Mitsui Holding Company, 
and the rise of militarism exacerbated existing social uncertainties.
The quantitative data used in this thesis is based on this type of wealth holders’ list. In 
particular, the Zenkoku 5Oman yen ijo Shisanka Hyo, briefly outlined above, is a 
significant source on wealth holders as defined in my research. In addition, Taisho 
Shoki no Dai Shisanka Meibo (List of wealth holders in the early Taisho period) 
which was edited by Shibuya and based on the former list, with additional information
75 Two of the three lists are collected in TSNZSJSS. See Kodansha, Zenkoku Kinmanka Dai Banzuke, 
(1931), and Kodansha, 5Oman yen ijo Zenkoku Kinmanka Dai Banzuke, (1934) in TSNZSJSS, vol. 1. 
There is no extant copy of the 1929 list.
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about wealth holders’ occupations or their estates, has been utilised to confirm the 
wealth holders’ data.77 Those wealth holders who will be researched were those 
living in the Japanese Empire, including the colonies (Taiwan and Korea), whose 
estimated wealth, according to the data of the two lists, exceeded one million yen in 
1916. If we convert 1 million yen to GBP at the contemporary exchange rate, this was 
equivalent to approximately £100,000.78 The data shows 768 Japanese wealth holders 
in this category; they included the most prominent business figures, members of the 
aristocracy and local merchants.
There are two significant reasons why the data from 1916 has been chosen. Firstly, 
the data on British and German millionaires, which I will utilize for comparative 
analysis, is mainly drawn from before 1914. In addition, in the case of German 
millionaires, it is virtually impossible to trace and estimate their wealth during the 
period of the Weimar Republic, which was a period of great upheaval in both the 
economy and society. For this reason, I decided to use the 1916 data, as this probably 
corresponds most closely to the European data sources used for comparison. Secondly, 
data for Japan from after this period are likely to include the business parvenus 
{narikin) whose wealth was based on the great economic boom of the First World 
War, and who in many cases rapidly declined after the 1920s. The existence of this 
group may be associated with inaccuracies in the data, since narikin were distinct 
from the wealth holders’ group with which I am primarily concerned, both because of 
the difference in their speed of wealth accumulation and because of their different 
position in society. I therefore abandoned the idea of utilizing data from after 1918 as 
my basic data set. Moreover, the 1916 list which I have utilized, is based on a survey 
of estimated wealth undertaken in 1915, and thus is likely to have omitted the wartime 
narikin.
In order to trace the survival of wealth holders from the Taisho period through to the 
Second World War another list has been utilized, in particular the 50man yen ijo 
Zenkoku Dai Kinmanka Banzuke, to ascertain the existence of any fluctuations in
76 See Introduction of TSNZSJSS, vol. 1, p. 8.
77 This list was originally published in Chiho Kinyushi Kenkyu 16 (1984) and later was collected on 
TSNZSJSS, vol.l.
78 Exchange rate of the yen vis-a-vis the GBP in 1916 was about 10 yen =£1. See T. Nakamura, 
Economic Growth, p. 34.
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social status and wealth accumulation. Although, the publication of the 1916 and 1934 
lists were not undertaken by the same publisher, the methodology and style of the 
surveys for both lists were very similar, thus utilizing these two lists should be more 
reliable and accurate, when compared with using other wealth holders’ lists. 
Furthermore, from these two lists, we are able to analyse certain trends in Japanese 
wealth holders over time.
Overall these wealth holders, who were millionaires in the Japanese context, 
unquestionably constituted a key elite in Japanese society at that time. However, if we 
check these lists of wealth holders, many questions regarding possible inaccuracies in 
estimated wealth obviously emerge. Tax statistics or tax records from the prewar 
period are hardly ever found now as easily accessible sources. Many of these records 
may be assumed to have disappeared during the Second World War. Even in the 
documents contained in the multi-volume compilations, we are confronted with 
difficulties in identifying reliable official sources. According to their editor Shibuya, a 
rare available exception in these compilations is the detailed tax records of leading 
taxpayers in the Kansai, Shikoku, Hokuriku and Tohoku areas. Tax records of the first 
three areas are found in documents from a 1924 survey, and in the case of Tohoku the 
records date from 1928.79 There also exist some tax records of the Tokyo area, dating
O A
from 1922. However, it is impossible to compare the information in these tax 
records with that in the wealth holders* lists, since these records lack much 
information about other regional areas. Moreover, the record on Tokyo lacks 
information about numerous wealth holders, since the record itself was compiled 
under the chaotic situation after the Kanto Earthquake. Another possible accessible 
source is the income tax records occasionally produced by some publishers.81 
However, these records only include data on income tax, and are thus insufficient to 
estimate the overall tax payment of each wealth holder.
79 The Osaka Tax Office conducted the survey of the former three areas, and the latter was done by the 
Sendai Tax Office. See Osaka Zeimu Kantokukyoku, Daisanshu Shotoku Dainozeisha Shotoku 
Kinshirabe, (1924) in TBSJS Kinki Volume; Osaka Zeimu Kantokukyoku, Toyama Ishikawa Fukui 
Sunken Daisanshu Shotoku Dainozeisha Shirabe, (1924) in TBSJS Toyama Ishikawa Fukui Volume; 
Osaka Zeimu Kantokukyoku, Daisanshu Shotoku Dainozeisha Shirabe, (1924) in TBSJS Tokushima 
Kagawa Kochi Volume; and Sendai Zeimu Kantokukyoku, Daisanshu Shotokuzei Kojin Eigyo 
Shuekizei Dainozeisha Shirabe, (1928) in TBSJS Tohoku Volume.
80 See Tokyo Zeimu Kantokukyoku, Shokogyo Shogyo no Shotoku Dainozeisha Shirabe, (1922), in 
TBSJS Tokyo region vol. 1.
81 See Tokyo Shobunsha, Zenkoku Tagaku Nozeisha Ichiran, (1930,33) in TSNZSJSS vol.l.
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Consequently, it is not possible to assess the accuracy of the data in these wealth 
holders lists by comparing them with official tax records. Nevertheless, in some cases, 
the estimations on these lists can be compared with data in other documents. In the 
case of Niigata, where landlords were at the top of the local social hierarchy, a local 
newspaper publisher compiled a list of Niigata wealth holders in 1916, at the same 
time as the Jiji Shinposha’s list was published.82 The methodology and style of 
survey of the two are almost identical. The Jiji Shinposha’s list indicates 28 wealth 
holders in Niigata with fortunes of over one million yen, while there were 32 wealth 
holders in this category according to the local paper’s list. Although there is no way of 
testifying which list is more accurate, there is the possibility of there being some 
missing data in the Jiji Shinposha’s list. Another case study that can be cross-checked 
is through looking at data on Sumitomo Kichizaemon Tomoito, who was actually the 
owner of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu. In 1915, when the survey of the Jiji Shinposha was 
conducted, Sumitomo had not established their own holding company, and their 
business organization was still in the style of an individual merchant house. This 
means that at this time the assets of Sumitomo’s business organization could be 
equated with the owner’s fortune. According to the review of their annual accounts, 
the total assets of Sumitomo Sohonten in 1915 was approximately 50 million yen, 
which contrasts with the Jiji Shinposha’s estimation of 70 million yen.83 Although 
there must be an assumption of some statistical manipulation within the official 
Sumitomo data, in particular relating to assets such as properties, land and holdings of 
antiques or works of art, which were presumably more easily concealed, in order to 
reduce further the tax burden, the possibilities of error and miscalculation in the Jiji 
Shinposha list cannot be eliminated.
Nevertheless, these examples do not seriously undermine the reliability of the Jiji 
Shinposha’s list. A comparison with the official tax record, for example in the case of 
Kansai, which provides information about large taxpayers whose annual income 
exceeded 30,000 yen (about £3,000), indicates that information in this document came
82 See Nikkan Niigatasha, Echigo Chikamochi Meikan (1916), in TBSJS Niigata region vol. 1.
83 The data from the annual account review is quoted from K. Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Sohonten: 
Taisho 2 -5 nen’, in Sumitomo Shiryokanho, 27,1996, p. 134.
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close to accounting for and naming all wealth holders in the Kansai area.84 This 
evidence indicates that even though we cannot prove to what extent the wealth 
holders’ estimation was fully accurate, the data on the list does actually contain 
representative Japanese wealth holders in terms of their wealth. In addition, some 
researchers have already utilised this list as a reliable source for analysing certain 
aspects of modem Japanese wealth holders.85 Therefore, though the estimates in the 
Jiji Shinposha’s list cannot be regarded as completely accurate, since Jiji Shinposha 
did not disclose in any detail the process and methods for wealth estimation, it can be 
said that of all the quantitative data sources, this list can be assumed to be one of the 
most reliable, and it certainly provides data on prominent wealth holders throughout 
Japan. It can also be assumed that this list was influential in establishing the standard 
for survey methods for the publication of wealth holders’ lists from the Taisho period. 
Thus, the reliability of this list can be taken as evidence for the accuracy of the other 
list utilised here, the Teikoku Koshinsho survey, which will be utilized to explore the 
survival of wealth holders over the longer-term.
Unfortunately, these lists as they stand do not contain any biographical information. 
They thus have to be supplemented by other data sources. These other data are taken 
from other published sources, for example biographical dictionaries or the equivalent 
of Who's Who. Materials of this kind can be utilized to collect personal data, 
including data on the social origins or status of wealth holders, and to investigate the 
existence of personal networks within these groups. Among these published sources, 
the most famous biographical dictionary is the Jinji Koshinroku, published by a 
private investigative company, which provides a great deal of personal data, such as 
curriculum vitae or family data. However, although it was regarded as one of the most 
reliable sources until the end of the Taisho period, Jinji Koshinroku dramatically lost 
its reliability after the start of the Showa period. This was due to a shift in the methods 
of investigation. From the early Showa period, the publisher of Jinji Koshinroku 
abandoned his own collection of information. Instead of direct investigation, the 
company sent questionnaires to prominent individuals appearing in the Jinji
84 See, Osaka Zeimu Kantokukyoku, Daisanshu Shotoku, in TBSJS Kinki Volume.
85 For example, see K. Ishii, ‘Nihon Shihonshugi no Kakuritsu’, in K. Ishii et al (eds.), Koza Nihonshi, 
vol. 6.
86 Jinji Koshinroku was published by Jinji Koshinsha, and the publication was irregular until the 
postwar period. The date of publication are, 1903,1908,1911, 1915,1918, 1921,1925,1928, 1931,
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Koshinroku to collect the information. This caused serious damage to the reliability of 
the Jinji Koshinroku, and many mistakes and errors began to appear in this 
biographical dictionary.87 This evidence therefore suggests that other supplementary 
sources are necessary for checking personal data. For businessmen or merchants, the 
most reliable source of additional information is the Zaikai Jinmei Jiten (Biographical 
Dictionary of Businessmen), which was published irregularly.88 In addition, data 
from biographies, autobiographies, archival sources and secondary sources can be 
added to compensate for additional lacking or unknown data omitted from the 
biographical dictionaries. Some brief explanation is also needed of the characteristics 
and problems in utilizing these qualitative materials, and this will be discussed in the 
next section.
1.4.2. Other Sources
The question of the quality and reliability of biographies and autobiographies is very 
complex and partly associated with certain characteristics of these materials written in 
Japanese. Most biographies of wealth holders, in particular those who were prominent 
businessmen or merchants, including company owners and investors, were written by
O Q
hensan iinkai (editorial committees), established within each firm after the death of 
an individual. The characteristics of biographies edited by these committees are 
invariably apparent. The committees selected anonymous writers, possibly including 
some academics but mostly consisting of employees of the firm, to write the 
biography. In many cases, the committee did not disclose information about these 
anonymous writers, and only they received permission to access many potentially 
more reliable sources, including letters or diaries, which were collected through the 
hands of the committee and to which access might be prohibited after the biography 
was published. Nominally, in order to maintain the objectivity of the account in the 
biography, many of the data sources were kept secret. However, these biographies 
were usually inclined to praise and honour the social and economic contribution of the
1934,1937, 1939,1941 and 1943.
87 This information was provided by Prof. Yui Tsunehiko, and I would like here to express any 
appreciation of his help.
8 For example see Ozorasha (ed.), Showa Senzen Zaikai Jinmei Dai Jiten, (Tokyo, 1993) and 
Jitsugyo-no-Nihonsha (ed.), Zaikai Bukkosha Ketsubutsu Den, (Tokyo, 1936).
89 In some cases, the hensan iinkai is called henshu iinkai or tanen iinkai etc, but the meaning is the 
same.
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dead person, and thus they often avoided focusing on many aspects, especially the 
darker side of individuals. Also, it is hardly possible to check the references which 
were utilized for writing, since many biographies do not contain any footnotes or any 
sort of bibliographical references. The anonymity of the biographers also causes 
certain idiosyncrasies in the publication style; editor, book title and publishers could 
all be the same.90 Therefore, even if we want to use them just to check personal data, 
we need to have a certain scepticism about the accuracy and reliability of the 
information which is provided in such biographies. Only a few biographies are 
regarded as reliable in a genuine sense, since there is a lack of any tradition of critical 
biography as in the European case.91 The quality of other biographies written by 
professional journalists often remained at a low level in terms of reliability, and 
sometimes contained little information about the private lives of the subject. In 
contrast, a few exceptional cases can be found, in particular the case of the famous 
entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi. In this case, abundant data collected from both private 
and public sources, were published as a huge multi-volume set of collected 
documents.92
Similar problems pertain to the case of autobiographies. The publication of 
autobiographies was quite rare among wealth holders, and some of these 
autobiographies come in the form of a transcripted dialogue with the writer. This may 
suggest that autobiographies are even less reliable than biographies written by 
anonymous writers. Other accessible sources in this field are company histories, 
although these can be just as problematic as the former two sources. Therefore, it 
should be noted that these qualitative materials will be utilized as supplementary 
sources, but not as the main data source. This also means that in spite of the apparent 
abundance of sources, there will be a number of individual cases for which no 
information is available, especially if individuals were not prominent or famous
90 See also Morikawa, Zaibatsu, p.249 for further information on this issue.
91 For an exceptional case of a Japanese biography of a wealth holder, see for instance, Mitsui 
Hachiro’uemon Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Mitsui Hachiro ’uemon Takamirte Den, (Tokyo, 
1988). This was written and edited by reliable academic researchers, and covered various information, 
including personal and business with the cooperation of Mitsui Bunko (Mitsui Archives).
92 These documents are edited and published as Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryo, over 70 volumes by 
Ryumonsha, the memorial organisation of Shibusawa Eiichi(Tokyo, 1952-70).
93 The descriptions of individuals, like owners or prominent managers, in Japanese company histories 
tend to make them appear divine, and therefore they can be virtually useless for acquiring personal data. 
However, there are again some exceptional cases, particularly if the editing and writing has been 
conducted under the auspices of prominent academics.
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wealth holders.
Extensive and comprehensive materials relevant to wealth holders also exist in private 
and public archives in Japan, in the form of official or secret documents. However, 
compared to private archives in European countries, the quality and characteristics of 
collected references and materials among Japanese private archives are quite distinct 
and very variable, even in the case of the archives of the former zaibatsu. One of the 
most reliable private archives is Mitsui Bunko, which contains private and public 
primary sources relating to the former Mitsui zaibatsu, along with its affiliates. This 
archive has also frequently published primary business materials relating to the 
Mitsui.94 In the case of Mitsubishi Shiryokan, the archive of the former Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu and one of the divisions of the Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute, the 
collection of primary sources from former affiliates has been continuing, although 
many documents are still to be collected. However, the archive has not obtained 
permission to collect family documents from the Iwasaki families, the former owners. 
The case of Sumitomo is more complex. The Sumitomo Shiryokan, the Sumitomo 
Archive, which is located in Kyoto, only holds documents from before the end of the 
Tokugawa era, and many documents from the Sumitomo Holding Company were 
destroyed after the GHQ occupation of the headquarters of the Sumitomo Holding Co. 
in Osaka, and many private documents disappeared during the period of the Second 
World War. Former affiliates have not provided or disclosed any of their official 
documents to the Sumitomo Archive.95 Access to other private archives, too, is often 
confronted with difficulty since many archives have been reluctant to disclose data to 
the public, making it accessible to their employees.
The situation for collecting materials from public or official archives is also rather 
patchy. Despite pressure to disclose information, many ministries and official 
organizations have not totally disclosed all documents and data, even in the case of 
prewar documents. One of the most difficult cases in terms of access to documents 
and data is that of the Ministry of Finance, which may be assumed to be in possession 
of official tax records or related documents. There are, however, some official
94 These business materials are published as Mitsui Jigyoshi (The history of Mitsui’s business) by 
Mitsui Bunko (4 vols.; Tokyo, 1966-2001).
95 This information was provided by Yamamoto Kazuo, the Vice-Director of the Sumitomo Archive. I
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archives which have been particularly useful for the quantitative and qualitative 
investigation required for this thesis. Firstly, the Kokuritsu Komonjo Kan (The 
National Archives of Japan) has a large volume of files and documents on wealth 
holders being considered for titles, official rankings and decorations. These files and 
documents, jokun saikasho (files on candidates for decoration), and jo i saikasho (files 
on candidates for non-aristocratic titles) are useful for analysing the relationship 
between the state and wealth holders, since it must be assumed that appropriate 
information was utilised by the government of the time in order to try and establish 
control over wealth holders. Also the granting of titles or other awards may be 
considered to have been a way of honouring their contribution to the state through 
their economic activities. Secondly, the Kunaicho Shoryobu (The Archive of the 
Imperial Household Ministry) holds documents that contain some information about 
ennobled wealth holders, most of whom tended to be prominent businessmen. This 
data is useful for analysing various aspects and characteristics of the ennoblement 
system in Japan, and for reconsidering whether or not this system was utilized to 
strengthen the predominant position of the aristocratic and bureaucratic elite. In 
addition to these documents, other official documents can be explored to try and 
acquire further information on Japanese wealth holders or Japanese business policy.
The information and data on Japanese wealth holders, therefore, has come largely 
from primary sources, as described above. By contrast, the materials and sources used 
in this thesis to introduce comparisons with the European bourgeoisie, especially the 
British and German bourgeoisies, have mainly been secondary sources, because there 
already exists an abundance of detailed work on the bourgeoisie in these two 
countries. As explained in section 1.1.2., Rubinstein’s work is particularly useful for 
the British case, since his subject of research, British millionaires, includes those who 
were part of the pre-industrial and non-business elite, thus making the comparison 
with Japanese wealth holders easier. In the case of Germany, many of the works 
concentrate on the period of Imperial Germany, since data for after this period tended 
to be scarce and unreliable. Of these works on the German bourgeoisie, Augustine’s 
work on the wealthiest businessmen in Imperial Germany has been particularly 
helpful for comparative analysis. However, unfortunately, Augustine’s data set
greatly appreciate his helpful comments.
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lacks information of non-business wealth holders in Imperial Germany, the group 
which can be assumed to comprise the pre-industrial and aristocratic elite, and which 
is likely to have formed a significant element in German wealth holders group as a 
whole, as in the case of Britain. Therefore, further data has been acquired from other 
secondary sources, in particular works focusing on pre-industrial or rich aristocratic 
groups in Imperial Germany. Some other academic works have utilized the same data 
source, Jahrbuch der Milliondre Deutschlands (The Yearbook of Millionaires in 
Germany), which was the main source for Augustine’s quantitative analysis, for their 
data interpretation.96
1.5. The Structure of the thesis
The final task of this chapter is to outline briefly the content of each chapter. The 
main body of the thesis consists of three substantive chapters. Chapter 2 seeks to 
establish a profile of Japanese wealth holders in the prewar period. Data on estimated 
wealth, class and social structure will be presented, with some comparisons with 
Britain and Germany. The regional distribution of wealth holders and their area of 
economic activity, which is highly significant for any analysis of sources of wealth 
during the prewar period, will be explored in some detail. Other data, for instance the 
categorization of firms by sector with which wealth holders were engaged or 
participated as director or manager, will also be analysed. In addition, the survival rate 
of wealth holders, in particular of those who were able to avoid collapse or 
bankruptcy as a result of economic recession, financial crisis and the great depression 
during the 1920s and 1930s, will be discussed, with a view to examining the 
concentration of wealth among particular individuals, and identifying the extent to 
which wealth concentration was related to the business expansion of any particular 
industrial sector. Also throughout this chapter, the role and economic contribution of 
merchants in the prewar Japan economy will be a major object of focus, since this 
perspective may enable reconsideration of modem Japanese economic development.
The next chapter (chapter 3) deals with the role of wealth holders in the development 
of modem Japanese business. Particular attention will be focused on the Japanese
96 For example see D. Lieven, Aristocracy in Europe 1815-1914, (London, 1992).
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business organization system, in relation to the role of the business family and 
business organization. Both a socio-historical approach and the approach of business 
history will be utilized to identify the complex structure of Japanese family businesses, 
which tended to be a combination of family ownership and professional management 
control. The education of wealth holders who were owners or managers, their choice 
of profession, and long-term changes in recruitment systems, will be examined in 
order to explain trends in the attitudes and behaviour of wealth holders towards their 
business. Analysis of the structure of wealth holders’ business organization will form 
a significant part of this consideration, and will provide an opportunity to consider 
some of the characteristics of the Japanese business system in the prewar period. 
Certain aspects of the system of holding companies, the influence of traditional 
business structures and organization, notwithstanding the introduction and 
establishment of modem business systems, and the tension, conflict and cooperation 
between owners and salaried managers within wealth holders’ firms, will all be 
considered as key elements in this business historical analysis. This chapter will also 
attempt to briefly illustrate convergent and divergent factors within Japanese business 
through the prism of wealth holders.
The final substantive chapter (chapter 4) will focus on the relationship between wealth 
holders and the state. The main content of this chapter will be an analysis of the 
operation of various state honours, like titles, decorations and ennoblement, which 
may be assumed to symbolise the state’s attempts to control prominent elite groups, 
and engender support for government and national policy. Both quantitative and 
qualitative methods will be utilized to examine various aspects of wealth holders and 
the Japanese state, with a view to exploring nationalist sentiments, and changes in 
their social behaviour. The most significant question in this chapter is to ask to what 
extent wealth holders’ business activities were appreciated by the state, and whether 
the granting of these honours was seen as a sort of compensation for wealth holders. 
Consideration of social networking through business connections and other forms of 
networking, for example through marriage, will also make up a part of this chapter, to 
incorporate an element of social history and enable comparative analysis.
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Chapter 2. Perspectives on Japanese Wealth Holders
2.1. Introduction
As mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, research on Japanese wealth holders has 
especially focused on some of the most notable and wealthiest individuals and most 
famous business leaders. In particular, since these people have been considered as key 
individuals for any interpretation and understanding of the characteristics of the 
pre-war Japanese economy and business, numerous works, both in Japanese and 
English, have been published. However, although zaibatsu owners played a significant 
role in terms of their wealth accumulation and business expansion, and pre-eminent 
business leaders, like Shibusawa Eiichi or Godai Tomoatsu, clearly contributed to the 
introduction and establishment of a modem business system throughout Japan, they 
were not a majority among Japanese wealth holders as a group. In addition, the 
concentration of research on particular individuals has meant that analysis has largely 
ignored the questions of which sector or which industry became a major source of 
personal wealth, or which social group had a predominant position among wealth 
holders.
This chapter sets out to analyse and interpret the composition of Japanese wealth 
holders, who represented the Japanese wealth elite, utilising a quantitative approach. 
Particular attention will be focused on the grouping of wealth holders into regional and 
occupational categories, and also to the survival of these wealth holders throughout the 
pre-war period. Analysis of these factors is highly significant in a number of respects. 
Firstly, the regional distribution of wealth holders manifests some of the characteristics 
of pre-war Japanese economic development. It can also be used to suggest the existence 
of regional differences within leading industrial or business sectors as a source of 
wealth holders’ wealth. Secondly, a focus on the class structure of wealth holders by 
occupational categories and social group will demonstrate which category or group 
constituted the majority among the wealth holders. In addition, it will indicate the 
extent to which it was only the modem business sector that contributed to personal 
wealth accumulation. Thirdly, the survey of wealth holders’ survival is important to 
confirm how these wealth holders maintained their position as a wealthy elite. This
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survey can also indicate the impact of economic upheaval, in particular from the 1920s, 
for instance, financial crisis or the great depression, on both wealth accumulation and 
business activities.
In addition, in this chapter, comparative analysis, especially comparison with the 
contemporary British and German cases, will form a crucial part of the consideration, 
since it can be utilised as a measurement of the level of economic development, and of 
inequality in wealth distribution within Japanese society. Comparative analysis is also 
an indispensable part of this chapter if we are to explain similarities and differences in 
the class structure of wealth holders, especially when it comes to considering landlords 
and the aristocracy, where the Japanese experience differs greatly from the European 
examples. Furthermore, it is also useful in analysing the characteristics of regional 
distribution, for instance, in looking at the extent to which regional development in 
business emerged within particular areas, or at its concentration in a particular 
metropolitan area, as in the case of current developing countries.
2.1.1. Brief Explanation of the Data Set
Before moving to the main sections of this chapter, it is necessary to explain about the 
data set. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the data set on Japanese wealth 
holders in the early 20th century is based on one particular data source, that is, 50man 
yen ijo Shisanka Hyo, the list of the wealth holders whose wealth exceeded 500,000 yen, 
published in 1916 by the newspaper publisher, Jiji Shinposha. The list has already been 
explained in some detail in the first chapter. However, although it was published 
publicly, the method of the investigation remains uncertain (even though it was 
emphasised that a scientific method had been utilised for wealth estimation). Therefore, 
it is unclear to what extent the estimation of the wealth holders’ fortune was entirely 
accurate. It may be assumed that comparison with official data, for example, tax 
records, would make it possible to evaluate the correctness of this particular list. 
Unfortunately, access to the official data sources is extremely limited not only due to 
the barrier of bureaucratic control of these data, but also because of the disappearance 
of much pre-war official data due to its destruction by fire or other means, during the 
period of the Second World War. However, although it is difficult to discover useful 
sources at the national level, the recent publication of certain data sources, like the
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above mentioned To-Do-Fu-Ken betsu Shisanka Jinushi Shiryo Shusei, has opened the 
way to comparing the 5Oman yen ijo list with official local data sources, included in 
this material. The most reliable such source is Dai Nozeisha Shotokukin Shirabe, 
official information from the Osaka Tax Office, published privately in 1924, which 
incorporates data on several local areas where the Osaka Tax Office had responsibility 
for tax collection, for instance, the Kansai, Shikoku and Hokuriku areas.1 This 
publication provided information on the annual income of particular individuals, 
including the large wealth holders and professionals, for instance, doctors, lawyers and 
artists. In the case of the wealth holders, it covered those whose annual income 
exceeded 30,000 yen (about £3,000) in 1924. Despite some differences if compared 
with 50man yen ijo, since this official record is slightly different in the time scale and 
duration of the investigation, and it focused only on the level of annual income, it may 
be regarded as useful for checking whether or not the wealth holders of these areas 
considered in this thesis (in this case, the yen millionaire in 1915) also belonged to the 
category of high taxpayers according to the official record. Through cross-checking the 
5Oman yen ijo with the official data, it is apparent that none of the 1915 wealth holders 
in these areas were outside of the official record. In addition, according to the official 
record, the majority of the wealth holders considered in this thesis also had a certain 
level of annual income, which exceeded 50,000 yen (over £5,000). Therefore, even 
though it has only been possible to check the data for particular local areas, and it is not 
possible to estimate the total assets of the wealth holders from the limited official record, 
a look at this official record does indicate that the wealth estimates in 5Oman yen ijo are 
likely to have been relatively accurate, and the wealth holders in the list undoubtedly 
represented the upper echelon of the wealthy elite in modem Japan.
There is also another problem relating to the formation of the data set. The content of 
this chapter largely depends on the results from quantitative analysis of the data set 
compiled for this thesis, based on various collected information from wealth holders’ 
lists (in particular, the 1915 list), biographical dictionaries and biographies. As 
indicated earlier, the utilisation of various sources is largely due to the limited 
information available in SOmanyen ijo which only covers the name, occupational status, 
estimated wealth and place of residence of wealth holders. However, even in the case
1 The Osaka Tax Office Dai Nozeisha Shotokukin Shirabe, (1924), in TBSJS Kinki Volume, esp. 
pp.25-94.
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of this limited information, certain criticisms have come from some academic 
researchers with regard to the accuracy of the information, making it necessary to 
double or triple check the limited information from 50man yen ijo. For example, 
Morikawa has cast some doubt on the accuracy of the information in this list, noting 
one particular case, that of Tsukamoto Sadaemon, who was a notable textile merchant 
in modem Japan. Morikawa indicated that although in the 1915 survey, Tsukamoto is 
identified as a wealth holder in Shiga prefecture, which is located in the Kansai area, 
Tsukamoto had already moved the headquarters of his business to Tokyo from the early 
Meiji period, thus with regard to his business activities, Tsukamoto was no longer a 
wealth holder of his native prefecture.2 However, according to the biographical 
dictionary Jinji Koshinroku, the formal address of Tsukamoto’s residence was still 
Shiga prefecture in the early Taisho period, and even in the later version of Jinji 
Koshinroku in the early 1930s, the information was no different. Moreover, the record 
of the Osaka Tax Office in 1924 indicates that Tsukamoto paid his tax in his native 
prefecture, Shiga, since the record includes data on his annual income.3 Consequently, 
with regard to his formal residential address, Tsukamoto was officially categorised as a 
resident of Shiga prefecture. This case also reinforces the assumption that information 
from 5Oman yen ijo is likely to be accurate. Nevertheless, as Morikawa insists, it 
should also be assumed that some local wealth holders, in particular those who were 
engaged in business activities, had their business centre or headquarters in urban areas, 
in either Tokyo or Osaka. In addition, in the case of aristocratic wealth holders, even if 
they are defined as local wealth holders in the 1915 list, all were compelled to live in 
Tokyo from the early Meiji period as a result of governmental policy, and it was rare for 
them to live in their main address, located in a local area.4 However, as the case of 
Tsukamoto signifies, it seems likely that in terms of tax payment, they paid their tax in 
their native prefecture, except for those who decided to move permanently their formal 
residential address to Tokyo. Therefore, in this thesis and in this chapter, the 
categorisation of wealth holders with regard to their place of residence, which is crucial 
for the analysis of the regional distribution of wealth holders in the later section, will be 
based on the data from 5Oman yen ijo. This evidence also suggests that in general the
2 See Morikawa, Chiho Zaibatsu (Tokyo, 1984), p.46.
3 See ‘Dai Nozeisha’, p.29, in TBSJS Kinki Volume.
4 This was particularly tine of former feudal lords. For instance, the Mori family, the former feudal lord 
of Choshu domains, still formally lived in Yamaguchi prefecture, their native place, even though they 
were , in fact, residing in Tokyo.
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data from 50man yen ijo can be regarded as reliable and accurate when it comes to 
defining who the wealth holders were, including their estimated wealth. It may also be 
assumed, therefore, that the publisher of the list was not wrong in insisting that the 
investigation was conducted according to scientific method.
Finally, with regard to analysis of the survival of the wealth holders, the attempt to 
confirm the extent of the survival of these wealth holders into the later pre-war period, 
another wealth holders list will be utilised, as indicated earlier. This is 50 man yen ijo 
Zenkoku Kinmanka Banzuke, which was issued in 1934 based on a 1933 survey. The 
details of this survey were discussed in the previous chapter. In this section, the main 
purpose of the analysis is to discuss and explore the changes which occurred in the 
regional distribution of wealth holders, and in addition in their social class structure, as 
evidenced by their wealth accumulation. Particular attention will be focused on the 
difference between those members of the wealthy elite who increased their fortunes, 
and those who suffered a decline compared to 1915. Although the time span from 1915 
to 1933 was a really short period of less than 20 years, Japan experienced various 
changes during this period, with the economic boom in the late 1910s followed by 
relative stagnation in the 1920s and then the suffering of the Great Depression from the 
end of the 1920s, not to mention the 1927 financial crisis. These events had a great 
impact not only on those members of the wealthy elite within the traditional sector, but 
also on those within the modem sector. This section will consider the extent of 
continuity and discontinuity within the wealth holders’ group resulting from the change 
in their business environment.
2.2 General View
In 1915, when the survey 50 man yen ijo Shisanka Hyo utilized as the basic data set of 
this thesis took place, the political and economic climate of Japan was encountering a 
range of problems. Although in the late 19th century, Japan experienced economic 
take-off and rapid growth, the Japanese economy tended toward stagnation after the
thearly 20 century because of the heavy financial burden caused by the military 
expenditure of the Russo-Japanese war. The excessive issue of financial bonds during 
this period and constant deficits from the import surplus worsened the government’s
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financial position, and therefore had a negative impact on the Japanese economy itself.5 
Even in 1915, after the outbreak of the First World War, economic recovery remained 
sluggish. Although there was a great demand for industrial goods from European 
colonial areas, which were suffering from the interruption of trade with the homelands, 
and this led to a great shift in the economic situation, its positive impact became quite 
apparent only after 1916. Thus, even Japanese wealth holders were confronted with 
relatively difficult conditions in this period, especially in economic terms.
It is also widely accepted by many researchers that the early 20th century was the period 
of ‘family capitalism’ in Japan, which had some resemblances to similar cases in 
Europe and America. Not only the zaibatsu, but also many firms, enterprises and 
merchant houses took the form of family-organized and family-run businesses in this 
period, while the establishment of corporations had rapidly become popularised at the 
same time.6 This may be regarded as indicating an easier situation for personal wealth 
accumulation by those wealth holders.
The number of Japanese wealth holders identified by this study whose estimated wealth 
exceeded 1 million yen is 768, including businessmen, merchants, landlords, members 
of the aristocracy and other professionals. However, the data included some Japanese 
who were running their own businesses outside of Japanese territory. If we omit these 
people from the data set, the total number of wealth holders is 763.7 Also, since the data 
includes not only Japanese in the main islands, but also the Japanese colonies, the 
Korean peninsula and Taiwan, there were some Korean and Taiwanese-Chinese within 
the wealth holders’ group.8
5 For details, see T. Nakamura, Meiji Taishoki no Keizai, (Tokyo, 1985), esp. chap. 4.
6 For the summary of this perspective see, M. Miyamoto ‘Kaidai’, in Miyamoto and Abe (eds.), Nihon 
Keieishi vol. 2. for example.
7 Of these five people, four were residents of the United States, and the remaining one lived in Singapore.
8 Although 50 man yen ijo Shisanka Hyo includes data on Japanese wealth holders in Manchuria and 
mainland China, there were no such wealth holders whose wealth exceeded 1 million yen.
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Table 2.1 Distribution of wealth holders by estimated wealth
(A) Absolute 
number of (A)
(B) Absolute number 
of (B)
More than 50 million yen 2.3 18 25.2 650 million
10 to 50 million yen 4.7 37 16.5 478 million
5 to 10 million yen 9.6 74 18.5 427.6 million
3 to 5 million yen 10.3 79 10.1 260.5 million
2 to 3 million yen 14.0 107 8.8 229.6 million
1 to 2 million yen 59.1 448 20.9 534.75 million
Total (in percentage) 100.0 100.0
Total (absolute) 763 763 2580.45 million 
yen
2580.45 million 
yen
Note (A) percentage depending on total number within each group
(B) percentage depending on total amount of wealth within each group
Sources: Calculated from Zenkoku 5 Oman yen ijo Shisanka Hyo (published by Jiji Shinposha; Tokyo, 
September, 1916), and R. Shibuya (ed.), Taisho shoki no Dai Shisanka Meibo, Chiho Kinyushi Kenkyu 16 
(1984); both lists were later compiled in R. Shibuya (ed.), Taisho Showa Nihon Zenkoku Shisanka Jinushi 
Shiiyo Shusei vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1985).
The distribution of wealth holders’ wealth is shown in Table 2.1. If we focus on the 
grouping of wealth holders with regard to their estimated wealth, the majority had a 
fortune of less than 3 million yen. About 57 percent were in the category of between 1-2 
million yen, and 14 percent 2-3 million. As for the rest, about 10 percent of the total 
held 3-5 million, and 10 percent 5-10 million. Only 9 percent of the total had fortunes of 
more than 10 million yen. However, if we consider this grouping according to the total 
amount of estimated wealth of each group, the majority of wealth holders had less than 
one-third of the total amount of wealth held by the group, that is, those possessing 1-2 
million yen accounted for about 20 percent of the wealth, and those with 2-3 million 
yen around 9 percent. For the other groups the result is as follows: the 3-5 million yen 
group held about 10 percent of the wealth, the 5-10 million yen group 7 percent, and 
those above 10 million yen 44 percent of the total wealth. This result indicates a 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the top group of the wealth pyramid. In other 
words, it also signifies an inequality of wealth distribution within the wealth holders’ 
group.
Nevertheless, the comparison with contemporary European wealth holders, in 
particular in Britain and Germany, provides another perspective on the Japanese case. 
Rubinstein’s famous work on British millionaires indicates that between 1900 and 1919,
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according to estimates from probate records, 502 wealth holders left a fortune of over 
£500,000.9 In Japan, only 129 (about one quarter) match this category. Rubinstein’s 
most recent research shows that from1800 to 1899, there were 7461 wealth holders who 
left fortunes of over £100,000.10 In addition, Nicholas’ study on British businessmen in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, sampling from the Dictionary o f  Business 
Biography, utilizes for his analysis 790 British businessmen who left non-landed 
estates of over £100,000.11 Although this figure does not represent the total figure for 
wealthy British businessmen in this period, it does also suggest a great difference in the 
extent of personal wealth accumulation between Britain and Japan.
German data on wealth holders also provides material for comparative analysis, and 
shows major differences with the Japanese case. Augustine’s work on the wealthiest 
businessmen in Imperial Germany, is based on an analysis of 502 businessmen whose 
wealth exceeded 6 million marks (£300,000 if converted into contemporary GBP) in 
the 1910s. Augustine also explains that if the minimum wealth is downsized to 5 
million marks (£250,000), the size of the group approximately doubles.12 Although her 
study does not include German wealth holders in other social groups, like the 
aristocracy, Junker, or professionals, the size of this group, too, is about two and a half 
times larger than in the Japanese case (208 of them had wealth equivalent to more than 
3 million yen (£300,000)). In addition, even though it is not nationwide data on 
Gennany, the official statistics for Prussia, which constituted the largest territory within 
the German Empire, shows 3426 taxpayers listed in Prussia in the period between 1912 
and 1914 as having a fortune of over 2 million marks (£100,000).13 If we compare this 
with the Japanese data, Prussian wealth holders were thus nearly five times as 
numerous as Japanese wealth holders. These results also, of course, indicate the 
existence of differences in the level of wealth accumulation, which are likely to reflect 
the difference in economic power, and the level of economic development of the three 
economies. Consequently, as may be expected, these results from a comparative 
perspective partly demonstrate the relative backwardness of the Japanese economy in
0 Calculation based on Rubinstein, Men o f Property, pp.62-65.
10 See Rubinstein, ‘Wealth Making in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century: A Response’, 
Business History, 42-2 (2000), p. 151.
11 See T. Nicholas, ‘Wealth Making in late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century Britain’, Business 
History, 41-1 (1999), and also ‘The Rubinstein Hypotheses Revisited’, Business Histoiy, 42-2 (2000).
12 Augustine, Patricians, p. 19.
13 Calculation based on ibid; p.22. Augustine also points out that there are some missing data in Jahrbuch
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contrast to Britain and Germany.
However, if we compare Japanese wealth holders’ wealth with the country’s 
contemporary GNP, it indicates another aspect of these wealth holders. The total 
amount of their estimated wealth reaches about 2.58 billion yen, equivalent to about 51 
percent of Japanese GNP in 1915 (estimated at 4.991 billion yen).14 This signifies the 
existence of an extraordinary concentration of wealth among this group given the 
strength of the contemporary Japanese economy. The data also shows the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of particular groups. For example, the total estimated wealth of 
the top four zaibatsu families in 1915 was over 540 million yen, which was equivalent 
to nearly 11 percent of the total GNP that year. Among those four zaibatsu families, at 
the top of the apex stood the Mitsui families, the owners of Mitsui zaibatsu (which was 
a complex of 11 families, the descendants of the founder, who all held the wealth in 
common)15 and the Iwasaki families, the owners of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. The 
estimated wealth of each of these two sets of families accounted for over 200 million 
yen. In some cases their wealth exceeded that of the richest members of the European 
bourgeoisie, for instance, Bertha Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, the wealthiest 
individual in Imperial Germany with estimated wealth of 283 million marks (£14.15 
million).16 Following these two families were the Yasuda families, the owners of the 
Yasuda zaibatsu (70 million yen) and Sumitomo Kichiza’emon Tomoito, the owner of 
the Sumitomo zaibatsu (also 70 million yen). In addition, the greatest fortunes were 
concentrated in the hands of the owners of the so-called old zaibatsu, like Furukawa 
Toranosuke (60 million), Fujita Heitaro (50 million), Kuhara Fusanosuke (40 million), 
and Okura Kihachiro (30 million). All of these were the owners of the zaibatsu, which 
had been named after them. This indicates that the prestige of these old zaibatsu owners 
was enormous, not only in terms of their economic power, but also in terms of their 
wealth accumulation, and they undoubtedly held a predominant position and status in 
prewar Japanese society.
On the other hand, the wealth holders who stood at the bottom of this pyramid
der Millionare, which was utilized as her data set, compared to the official statistics.
14 GNP data based on K. Okawa (eds.), Choki Keizai Tokei, Vol. 1. (Tokyo, 1974), p.200.
15 This will be discussed in a later chapter, but for further information, see, for example, S. Yasuoka, 
Zaibatsu Keieishi no Kenkyu, (Kyoto, 2nd ed., 1998).
16 Data based on Augustine, Patricians, p.31.
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(estimated wealth: 1-2 million yen) also comprised a significant element in terms of 
their business activities. Most of those who belonged to this category, as will be 
discussed in a later section and in a later chapter, played an indispensable role in 
Japanese economic development. It is also true, however, that this group certainly 
consisted of individuals who were super-rich if their wealth is compared to that of most 
other social groups. Even in the case of this group, their total wealth accounted for 11 
percent of the total GNP at this time.
Consequently, in a general perspective, these Japanese wealth holders clearly 
represented the upper echelons of society in terms of their fortunes. Although they were 
definitely a small group in relation to the total population of Japan, their wealth 
accumulation had reached an extraordinary and overwhelming level. In addition, while 
the Japanese economy was still at a relatively underdeveloped stage in this period, (this 
is particularly apparent in contrast to the British and German cases), the data on 
Japanese wealth holders does in part indicate an enormous difference in their relative 
economic power. In relative terms some of these Japanese wealth holders possessed 
wealth accumulation and fortune equal to, or far in excess of those of the richest 
members of the European bourgeoisie. The comparison with the contemporary 
Japanese GNP also testifies to a concentration of national wealth in the hands of this 
particular group. Thus, it signifies the greater level of wealth inequality within prewar 
Japanese society.
2.3. Regional Distribution
It has to be noted briefly, that, to a considerable extent, economic policy and reforms 
throughout the initial modem period in Japan strongly influenced the formation of a 
class of wealth holders and also their regional distribution. Although the impact of the 
Meiji Restoration had tended to be nationalistic and not revolutionary with regard to the 
political field, it played a significant role as far as concerns the reconstruction and 
renovation of the Japanese economy and Japanese business. While many wealth 
holders who were engaged in the business sector had suffered from the abolition of 
previous protection, such as had been offered by the guild system, as well as by the 
initial failure of economic reforms followed by economic depression and inflation, the 
establishment of new infrastructure, particularly the railway network, created new
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business opportunities and consequently stimulated in the late 19th century a boom in 
the establishment of firms (something referred to in Japanese as kigyo bokko).17 On the 
other hand, this situation was also connected with the decline of regional economies in 
many areas, especially those which lay outside of this new infrastructure network. Thus, 
unlike the economy in Tokugawa Japan, which was characterized by the relative 
importance of regional economies, modem Japanese economic development began to 
concentrate on a number of particular commercial centres. This situation, too, strongly 
influenced the distribution of the regional wealthy elite, which is shown in Tables 2.2 
and 2.3. It has often been considered that prewar Japan had dual economic and 
commercial centres, that is, Tokyo, the capital of Japan, and Osaka, the center of 
commerce and the textile industry, which was the leading industrial sector in prewar 
Japan, well-known as ‘Manchester of the Orient’ throughout this period. The data on 
wealth holders also suggests this assumption. Of the Japanese wealth holders in the 
survey, more than 50 percent were concentrated just on these two areas (30 percent in 
Tokyo and 23 percent in Osaka).
Table 2.2 Regional distribution of wealth holders
Region (A) (B)
Hokkaido 1.9 1.2
Tohoku 3.2 1.8
Kanto 5.4 3.6
Chubu 9.4 5.8
Hokuriku 1.7 1.1
Kansai 14.4 11.1
Shikoku 1.9 0.7
Chugoku 3.2 1.9
Kyushu 3.7 3.1
Colonies 2.0 0.8
Tokyo 30.0 46.2
Osaka 23.3 23.7
Total (in percentage) 100.0 100.0
Total (absolute) 763 2580.45 million yen
Note (A): percentage depending on total number within each area
(B): percentage depending on total value of wealth within each area 
Sources: calculated from; Zenkoku 50mcin yen ijo Shisanka Hyo and Taisho shoki no Dai Shisanka Hyo
17 For details, see N. Takamura ‘Introduction’ in Takamura (ed.), Kigyo Bokko, (Tokyo, 1992).
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Table 2.3 Occupational distribution in each areas (percentage of the total sample 
(left side): absolute number of the sample (right side))
a) Metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka) and Kanto, Kansai
O c c u p a t io n a l s ta tu s T okyo K an to O sa k a K a n sa i
L a n d lo rd s 2 .6 6 9.7 4 5.1 9 6.3 7
A r is to c ra c y 22 .3 51 2.7 1 1.9 2
P r im a ry  s e c to r 7 .2 8
In d u s tr ia l s e c to r 3 .9 9 14.6 6 6 .8 12 18.2 2 0
S e rv ic e  s e c to r 4 5 .2 103 6 0 .9 25 6 3 .3 112 5 0 .9 5 6
Zaibatsu  fa m ilie s 7.8 18 2 .3 4 1.9 2
S a la r ie d  m a n a g e r 16.3 37 12.1 5 15.2 27 12 .7 14
P ro fe s s io n a ls 0 .9 2 0 .5 1
O th e rs 0 .9 2 6 .8 12 0 .9 1
T o ta l (% ) 9 9 .9 100.0 9 9 .9 1 00 .0
T o ta l (a b s .) 22 8 22 8 41 41 177 177 110 110
N o te : N o te : th e  c a te g o ry  o f  reg io n s  is b a sed  o n  reg io n a l d is tr ic ts  as  d e f in e d  in  Ja p a n , e x c e p t th e  c a se  o f  T o k y o  a n d  O s a k a , s in c e  a 
la rg e  n u m b e r  o f  b u s in e s s  w ea lth  h o ld e rs  w e re  c o n c e n tra te d  in b o th  p re fe c tu re s . T h e  p re fe c tu re s  w h ic h  m a d e  u p  e a c h  re g io n a l 
d is tr ic t  a re  a s  fo llo w s:
K a n to : K a n a g a w a , C h ib a , S a ita m a , Ib a rag i, G u n m a , T och ig i.
K a n sa i: H y o g o , K y o to , S h ig a , N a ra , W a k ay am a .
F ig u re s  d o  n o t to ta l 100  p e rc e n t d u e  to  ro u n d in g .
S o u rc e : A s  T a b le  2 .1 .
b) north and central Japan
O c c u p a t io n a l s ta tu s H o k k a id o T ohoku C h u b u H o k u r ik u
L a n d lo rd s 4 8 .0 12 3 6 .2 26 16 .7 2
A r is to c ra c y 8 .0 2 16.7 2
P rim a ry  s e c to r 21 .5 3 16.0 4 5 .6 4
In d u s tr ia l s e c to r 2 4 .0 6 15.2 11 16.7 2
S e rv ic e  s e c to r 78 .5 11 3 7 .5 27 3 3 .3 4
Zaibatsu  fa m ilie s
S a la r ie d  m a n a g e r 4 .0 1 4 .2 3 16.7 2
P ro fe s s io n a ls 1.3 1
O th e rs
T o ta l (% ) 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.1
T o ta l (a b s .) 14 14 25 25 72 72 12 12
N o te : T h e  p re fe c tu re s  w h ic h  m a k in g  up  each  re g io n a l d is tr ic t  a re  as  fo llo w s: 
H o k k a id o : H o k k a id o  only.
T o h o k u : A o m o r i, M o rio k a , A k ita , Y am ag a ta , M iy a g i, F u k u sh im a .
H o k u r ik u : T o y a m a , I sh ik aw a , F uku i.
C’h u b u : N iig a ta , N a g a n o , Y am a n a sh i, S h iz u o k a , A ic h i , G ifu , M ie .
F ig u re s  d o  n o t  to ta l 100  p e rc e n t d u e  to  ro u n d in g .
c)south Japan and colonies
O c c u p a t io n a l s ta tu s C h u g o k u S h ik o k u K y u sh u C o lo n ie s
L a n d lo rd s 3 3 .4 8 7.7 1 6.3 2 4 0 .0 6
A r is to c ra c y 12.6 3 6.3 2 13.3 2
P r im a ry  s e c to r 4 .3 1
In d u s tr ia l s e c to r 2 8 .4 7 15.3 2 28.1 9 13.3 2
S e rv ic e  s e c to r 16.8 4 61 .5 8 4 3 .7 14 2 6 .7 4
Z aibatsu  fa m ilie s
S a la r ie d  m a n a g e r 7 .7 1 12.5 4 6 .7 1
P ro fe s s io n a ls 4 .3 1
O th e rs 7 .7 1 3.1 1
T o ta l (% ) 9 9 .8 9 9 .9 10 0 .0 100 .0
T ota l (a b s .) 24 2 4 13 13 32 32 15 15
N o te : T h e  p re fe c tu re s  o f  ea ch  reg io n a l d is tr ic t  a re  as  fo llo w s:
C h u g o k u : O k a y a m a , T o tto r i, S h im a n e , H iro sh im a , Y am a g u ch i.
S h ik o k u : K a g a w a , T o k u sh im a , K o c h i, E h im e.
K y u sh u : F u k u o k a , S a g a , N a g a s a k i, K u m a m o to , O ita , M iy a z a k i, K a g o s h im a , O k in a w a . 
C o lo n ie s : T a iw an  a n d  K o rea .
F ig u re s  d o  n o t  to ta l 100 p e rc e n t d u e  to  ro u n d in g .
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Although this geographical pattern certainly differed from that of current Japan, and 
even Tokyo did not at that time form the great metropolitan area that it does now (the 
Kanto area, which includes seven neighbouring prefectures as well as Tokyo 
metropolitan area), if we put together the data for the whole area equivalent to the 
current metropolitan area, the figure for Tokyo reaches about 35 percent of the total 
number. In addition, in the case of Osaka, while the present metropolitan area (now 
including five other neighbouring prefectures) at that time consisted of a number of 
relatively independent economic zones, each of these economic zones already 
depended on economic demand and business networks in Osaka. Therefore, if we add 
data on the other five prefectures to that for Osaka to cover the whole of the 
contemporary Kansai area, the figure reaches about 37 percent. On this basis, wealth 
holders in the two metropolitan areas accounted for 73 percent of the total number of 
wealth holders. In contrast, except in the Chubu area, which includes one of the 
pre-existing commercial centres, Aichi, and in Niigata, a focus of landlords, with 9 
percent in each case, other regions are hardly represented at all in the sample. No other 
regions, even some which were industrially significant zones, or the Japanese colonies, 
accounted for over 5 percent of the total. It is unlikely that this perspective would have 
to be revised even if possible mistakes in the data necessitated some corrections, and 
even if  the figures needed to be downsized to the 500,000 yen level to clarify general 
tendencies in regional distribution18
This result in terms of regional distribution is substantially different from the cases of 
Britain and Germany. In Britain, debate is still continuing about regional wealth 
distribution and the importance of particular business sectors. On the one hand, 
Rubinstein has emphasised that the British economy has been more financially and 
commercially oriented throughout the modem period. From various research, he has 
pointed out that London, in particular the City, has been the source of British wealth. 
According to his recent data set, about 46 percent of British wealth holders in the 19th 
century, with £100,000 wealth at their deaths, were in London.19 On the other hand, 
utilizing quantitative and econometric analysis, Nicholas has recently criticized
18 In the introductory part of TSNZSJSS vol. 1, Shibuya presents a brief analysis of wealth holders based 
on the 50 man yen ijo. Among 2201 wealth holders with estimated wealth of 500,000, no other minor 
region reached more than 5 percent of the total figure. Also in this case, Tokyo and Osaka stand out as 
having the predominant position. See, TSNZSJSS vol. 1, ‘Kaidai’, p.8-9.
64
Rubinstein’s hypotheses. From his data analysis, he has concluded that even in the 
context of the super wealthy, who were the subject of Rubinstein’s research, there is no 
explicit wealth dichotomy, i.e. that industrial wealth was less significant than 
commercial and financial wealth -  along the lines of region and occupation.20 However, 
leaving aside the correctness or otherwise of these hypotheses, these results do not 
match with or offer similarities to the Japanese situation.
Though this only relates to the case of businessmen, and some differences might 
possibly emerge through analysis of data on other social groups, the German case again 
offers a different example of the impact of historical aspects -  in this case a strong 
characteristic of provincialism in the German economy -  on the distribution of wealth 
holders. Augustine’s data seems to correspond with the Japanese case to some extent, 
since Greater Berlin and Potsdam, the capital and financial centre in Germany, and the 
western provinces of Prussia, the centre of German heavy industries, had almost equal 
weight in the distribution of wealth holders, at 23 and 24 percent of the total number 
respectively.21 However, unlike in the Japanese case, major regions for wealth 
distribution were spread more widely into other areas, for instance, the Hanseatic cities 
(14 percent), the province of Hesse (10 percent) and the Saxonies (both Prussian 
province and the Kingdom 10 percent).22 In the case of regional distribution, therefore, 
neither Britain nor Germany manifest any sort of similarities. The distribution of 
Japanese wealth holders was not heavily concentrated on one particular area like in 
Britain (if Rubinstein’s hypothesis is correct), but did not spread into several areas as in 
Germany.
The following section offers an analysis of Japanese wealth holders in terms of their 
regional distribution. Particular attention will be focused not only on the two areas of 
Tokyo and Osaka in which they were highly concentrated, which are important in 
analysing and explaining regional characteristics, but also on other minor regions,
19 See Rubinstein, ‘Wealth Making: A Response’, p. 151.
20 See Nicholas, ‘Wealth Making in Britain’, in particular, p.22-26.
21 See Augustine, Patricians, p. 16.
22 Ibid; p. 16 Although some possibility of the need for revision may be indicated, the need for a radical 
reconsideration is less likely. Lieven’s analysis of the German aristocracy signifies that the only thing 
possibly in need of change (in this case, by including data on the aristocracy) is the adding of Silesia as 
one of the major regions for German wealth holders, since many aristocratic wealth holders, most of 
whom ran mining businesses, were concentrated in this region. Other aristocracies tended to spread into 
major regions where non-noble wealth holders lived. See Lieven, The Aristocracies, pp.60-71.
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consideration of which will signify other aspects of modem Japanese economic 
development in terms of its regional features. Data relating to these areas is summarised 
in Table 2.3 (see page 63). In addition to the Tokyo and Osaka areas (including 
neighbouring areas), four regions are chosen for the analysis of regional distribution, 
that is, Aichi, Niigata, Fukuoka and the colonies (including both Taiwan and Korea). 
All of these regions had a relatively small number of wealth holders compared to Tokyo 
and Osaka, but can also be considered as centres of regional economies. In addition, 
each of these areas enables us to highlight some of the characteristics of the modem 
Japanese economy. Analysis of the Japanese colonies can also testify to the degree of 
economic penetration by Japanese settlers, and any economic diversity between 
Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese-Chinese. The distribution of wealth among Japanese 
and colonial peoples can indicate the extent of any inequality of wealth and hence say 
something about the colonial economic relationship.
2.3.1. Highly Concentrated Areas
a) Tokyo
There is no doubt that even in the prewar period, because of its significant position as a 
political and economic centre, Tokyo was the city in Japan with the pre-eminent 
position and status. Moreover, although Japanese wealth holders were less concentrated 
on the Tokyo area than might be expected from its economic importance (about 30 
percent of all wealth holders were in Tokyo), the level of wealth concentration in this 
geographical area shows an extraordinary position in terms of total wealth 
accumulation. The total amount of wealth held by wealth holders in Tokyo reached 
about 1.167 billion yen, which accounted for 46 percent of total wealth among Japan’s 
wealth elite as indicated in the 1915 data set. This is partly due to the concentration in 
Tokyo of the greatest fortunes. Out of the big four zaibatsu, three of the families and 
owners of the big-four zaibatsu, Mitsui, Iwasaki and Yasuda, were in Tokyo, as well as 
the Okura and Furukawa families. The estimated wealth of these families alone was 
over 560 million yen, about 48 percent of the total fortunes of wealth holders in Tokyo. 
Undoubtedly, their presence gives much importance to the Tokyo area, compared to 
Osaka, the second area of concentration, whose wealth holders accounted for wealth of 
only half the value of those in Tokyo. Meanwhile, other greater wealth holders were
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also inclined to reside in Tokyo. Of the 129 wealth holders possessing wealth of over 5 
million yen (£500,000), nearly half were in Tokyo (61 people: 47 percent). Thus, 
although the prewar period was considered to have been one of dual economic centres, 
Tokyo by itself overwhelmed other regions because of the power of its wealthy elite.
Turning to occupational distribution, the Tokyo area also had a greater diversity 
compared to other regions. Firstly, among wealth holders, the aristocracy made up 22 
percent of the wealthy elite in Tokyo.23 This aristocratic group is hardly found at all in 
other regions, and formed a major group only in Tokyo. However, unlike in Europe, the 
wealth of the aristocracy was not based on any sort of agricultural revenue or farm 
management, since they were basically landless nobles, as will be discussed in a later 
section. The high percentage of the aristocracy in Tokyo was also largely the result of 
government policy after the Meiji Restoration. Following the dissolution of the feudal 
domains, the Japanese aristocracy was ‘invented’ as a new social class, in imitation of 
the European aristocratic system, which was taken as a model. Many of its members, 
who were mainly former feudal lords and members of the old court aristocracy, were 
forced to live in Tokyo, since this class was created under a government initiative to 
maintain the ‘blue-blood’ of the Emperor’s family.24 Also in respect to promoting 
political centralization, it was considered that it might be better for the government to 
separate these aristocrats from their previous domains.
On the other hand, in contrast to this group, only a really small number of landlords is 
found in the Tokyo data. Only six landlords are included for this area, and except for 
one case, all were engaged in property management. This may be taken as an indication 
of the progress of urbanization within the Tokyo area, and also the minor role of the 
agricultural sector in terms of wealth accumulation in this area. In addition, most of this 
small number of landlords were former merchants, who mainly utilised their estates for 
property investment. This was partly due to the radical change in class structure in the 
modem period. After the Meiji Restoration, many former samurai lost their 
pre-eminent status and suffered from poverty because of their lack of sources of income. 
Therefore, they were forced to sell their own houses, which were situated in the central
23 This figure excludes businessmen who had been ennobled.
24 For detail, see Y. Sakamaki, Kazoku Seido no Kenkyu vol.l. (Tokyo, 1987), pp.86-88, and also 
Kasumikaikan(ed), Kazoku Seido Shiryoshu, (Tokyo, 1985), p 34.
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area of Tokyo; this situation created great business opportunities not only for merchants, 
but also for some wealthy nobles, in particular those who were interested in the 
property business.25
Peculiarities of wealth holders in Tokyo also appear in the occupational distribution 
according to business sector. Except for zaibatsu owners and salaried managers, 
Tokyo’s business wealthy elite mainly consisted of merchants and businessmen who 
were engaged in the service sector (over 90 percent of those engaged in business). In 
contrast to the pre-eminent position of this group, few of the business elite were 
engaged in the industrial sector. Other research also testifies to this unique distribution. 
Although the result is still limited because of the enormous data sets, quantitative 
analysis of prewar merchants and businessmen in Japan by Abe and Miyamoto also 
points out that the main group among wealthy merchants and businessmen in Tokyo 
was not those involved in the industrial sector, but retailers of traditional commodities 
and industrial goods since the late Meiji period.26 Abe and Miyamoto have also 
indicated that, compared to other regions, a relatively large number of merchants and 
businessmen in Tokyo were in the financial sector, something characteristic of Tokyo as
97a retailing and financial centre.
These results broadly correspond with the results of the analysis of data in this thesis. 
Of the 103 of Tokyo’s wealthy elite engaged in the service sector (about 45 percent of 
Tokyo’s total wealth holders), 48 (about 46 percent of the group) were engaged in the 
financial sector, including banking, stock broking, insurance, and what is called in 
Japanese shichiya (pawn broking). Some of this group also ran such business as
9Rsub-businesses in addition to their main business of retailing. This situation is likely 
to have been accelerated by the rapid development during this period of the Tokyo 
Stock Market, and those who were engaged in the stock broking business were located 
in Kabutocho, the financial centre of Tokyo.
25 See Shibuya, ‘Daijinushi chosa ni miru Meiji, Taisho no Tochimochi’, Nikkei Venture September, 1987, 
pp. 113-16.
26 See Abe and Miyamoto, ‘Meiji no Shisanka to Kaisha Seido’, in Nihon Keizciishi vol. 2., pp.229-64. 
And also ‘Meijiki ni okeru Shisanka Shokogyosha no Keisei’, Osaka Keizaigaku, vol.48-1 (1998), 
pp. 1-32.
27 See Abe and Miyamoto, ‘Meiji no Shisanka’, especially p.243-45.
28 Only Japanese literature is available for information on Shichiya. See R. Shibuya, Nihon no Shichiya,
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If we focus on the type of entrepreneurs, we find that salaried managers comprised the 
main group among the wealthy elite in Tokyo, accounting for about 16 percent of the 
total (37 out of 228). And about 43 percent of these salaried managers were those who 
worked at the holding companies of zaibatsu or their affiliates. This indicates that not 
only the zaibatsu owners, but also the professional managers in the zaibatsu benefited 
from their business expansion and became rich. Moreover almost all of the zaibatsu 
professional managers within the wealthy elite came from Mitsui and Mitsubishi, and 
include well-known business figures. Many of them also occupied a higher position 
among the wealth holders’ group. This group includes, for example, Masuda Takashi, 
the managerial supervisor of Mitsui zaibatsu (estimated wealth 5 million yen); 
Akaboshi Tetsuma, who later became a director of Mitsubishi Holding Company (5 
million yen); Dan Takuma, later chief director of the Mitsui Holding Co. (3 million yen), 
and Kagami Kenichi, later a director of Mitsubishi Holding Co. (2.5 million yen). On 
the other hand, apart from those zaibatsu managers, there are among the Tokyo wealth 
holders a number of salaried managers who ran several firms’ businesses, occupying a 
top management position at each. Although this characteristic will be discussed in more 
detail in a later chapter, we may note here that this tendency in part indicates the 
significance of well-educated human resources for the development of modem 
Japanese business.29
Undoubtedly, all these characteristics contributed to the predominant position of the 
Tokyo area in terms of wealth accumulation and also in terms of the level of economic 
development. However, this regional contribution does not necessarily imply economic 
expansion into sub-urban areas or neighbouring prefectures, in contrast to the present 
situation. If we add to Tokyo data the figures for the Kanto area, which currently forms 
the Tokyo metropolitan area, we find that this surrounding area was almost totally 
isolated from the wealth accumulation or economic activities of the Tokyo area. Except 
for Kanagawa, all other prefectures in the Kanto area had fewer than five wealth 
holders of over 1 million yen.30 Moreover, most of these few wealth holders were 
devoted to purely local business activities. In Kanagawa, one of the neighbouring
(Tokyo, 1982).
29 For example, see S. Yonekawa, ‘University Graduates in Japanese Enterprise before the Second World 
War’, Business History 26-2 (1984).
,0 Even if we reduce the level of wealth considered to 500,000 yen, no other prefecture (except 
Kanagawa) had more than 20 wealth holders.
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prefectures of Tokyo, there was a relatively large number of wealth holders (28 people). 
However, this figure is only about one-tenth of the figure for Tokyo, and the main 
business of wealth holders in Kanagawa was foreign trading through the port of 
Yokohama, the largest international trading port in Japan. In particular, they specialized 
in trading of Japanese export goods, like tea, silk and cocoons, and one-quarter of all 
Kanagawa wealth holders were engaged in reeled silk and cocoon trading. While these 
traders established business networks between the regions of silk production, their 
business was not directly related to the economic activities in the Tokyo area. In 
addition, there were few wealth holders here who had business relationships with the 
Tokyo area as investors or managers. Most of their wealth accumulation depended on 
local business and the specialization in external trade.
Consequently, this evidence signifies that even in the prewar period, Tokyo stood at the 
top of the hierarchy in terms of wealth accumulation, but that this area was not 
dependent on the manufacturing sector for its business activities, but on the commercial 
and financial sector. The presence of the zaibatsu in Tokyo casts a strong shadow over 
any analysis of wealth holders in this area, both through their owners’ wealth and in 
addition through the wealth of their rich salaried managers. The relatively high 
percentage of the aristocracy among the wealthy elite also characterized the wealth 
holders’ group in Tokyo. However, the wealth holders in Tokyo additionally enjoyed a 
position rather separate from the sub-urban and neighbouring areas. Even within the 
Tokyo area, wealth holders were concentrated on several particular districts, including 
the old commercial centre, in the case of native Tokyo merchants. This signifies the 
lack of geographical expansion into neighbouring areas despite the expansion of 
business networks to a national level. This, it may be suggested, constitutes a 
significant difference between Tokyo and the Osaka area, the other major centre of 
business and economic activities in Japan, where the city of Osaka tended to form part 
of an integrated regional business network with its neighbouring areas.
b)Osaka and the Kansai area
In contrast to the Tokyo area, the Osaka area exhibits several different characteristics, 
partly caused by the difference in its history. During the Tokugawa period, Osaka was 
undoubtedly the largest commercial centre along with Edo (later Tokyo), since the
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market for rice, which was not only the staple but also utilized as a means of currency, 
was located in Osaka.31 However, from a regional perspective, there was another 
commercial centre in the neighbouring area of Osaka, that is, Kyoto, formally the 
capital of imperial Japan and the centre of the textile industry during this period.32 In 
addition, the neighbouring area of Kyoto, which was called Omi (later forming part of 
Shiga prefecture), was the centre for merchants whose trading networks had expanded 
nationwide.33 Even though these regional areas underwent relative decline after the 
start of the modem period, their economic power had not totally vanished. Moreover,
th  •from the middle of the 19 century, another economic centre emerged in the west 
sub-urban area of Osaka. Kobe, another centre of external trade along with Yokohama, 
did not form an independent economic area by contrast with Yokohama, since Osaka 
totally depended on Kobe for the shipping trade. Because of the geographical features 
of the port of Osaka (the sea of Osaka is shallow for some distance from the shore), it 
was really inconvenient for large ships and steam ships, which were the main vehicles 
for the modem shipping trade, to access the port of Osaka. Instead of Osaka, Kobe 
rapidly developed as a maritime centre, not only nationally but also regionally. Thus, it 
may be argued that unlike the Tokyo area, both socially and economically Osaka 
formed part of the larger regional area, known as Kansai (or Kinki).34
The wealth holders in Osaka formed the second largest group within the national 
wealthy elite. However, if we include other wealth holders in the Kansai area because 
of the regional characteristics described above, the total number reaches 287, 
equivalent to about 38 percent of all Japanese wealth holders.35 This figure is 
considerably in excess of that for the Tokyo group, and almost the same as that for the 
whole of Kanto, the regional area including Tokyo and Kanagawa. However, in terms 
of wealth accumulation, the total wealth of the Kansai wealth holders was smaller than 
that of Tokyo. The total wealth of the Osaka wealth elite was about half (52%) of the 
Tokyo figure. Even if we include data on the remainder of the Kansai area, the total is
31 See O. Wakita, Kinsei Osaka no Keizai to Bunka, (Kyoto, 1994), for details.
32 For this case, in particular the relationship between the development of the textile industry in Kyoto 
and the importing of raw silk see, K. Tashiro, ’17,18 Seiki Higashiajia Ikinai Koeki ni okeru Nihongin’, 
in H. Kawakatsu (eds.), Ajia Koekiken to Nihon Kogyoka, (Tokyo, 1991).
3j See S. Yasuoka et al.(eds.), Omi Shonin no Keieiisan, (Tokyo, 1991), esp. pp.3-5.
34 Kansai or Kinki mainly consists of the six prefectures from the modem period, that is, Osaka, Hyogo, 
Kyoto, Shiga, Nara, and Wakayama.
3> However, if we exclude those from Nara and Wakayama prefectures, which probably formed a more 
independent area in economic terms, the total is 277.
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not equivalent to Tokyo’s, amounting to about three-quarters as much (about 77 
percent). On the other hand, although this sample includes businessmen, merchants, 
landlords and members of the aristocracy, the details of the distribution of wealth 
holders show a relative homogeneity in this Osaka group compared to the Tokyo one. 
While the service sector held a predominant position in Osaka as well as in Tokyo, 
nearly half of the Osaka wealth holders (about 47 percent) belonged to the merchant 
category. Also, if we sub-categorize this group, about 80 percent of them were engaged 
outside the commercial sector as manufacturer. Those wealth holders who can be 
categorized as members of the modem business elite, including the executive members 
of family companies (most of which were zaibatsu or zaibatsu-style companies) or 
salaried managers, comprised about 30 percent of the total sample. Landlords and 
‘traditional’ industrialists (those engaged in the production of Japanese traditional 
commodities) account for similar percentages in this distribution (about 9 percent of the 
total in each case). By contrast, members of the aristocracy are rarely found in Osaka, 
or in any prefecture of the Kansai area. Only two individuals out of the total of 287 
belong to this category, and even if we attempt to include ennobled businessmen, only 
five are added. Thus, these results indicate that in Osaka and the Kansai area, it was the 
business wealth elite that had the predominant position.
There is no doubt that among the business wealthy elite, the group whose members 
belonged to the traditional sector, like merchants or traditional industrialists, formed the 
mainstream in Osaka and the Kansai area. However, if we compare the amount of 
wealth of the traditional and modem sectors, we can find a major difference in the scale 
and speed of accumulation in the two sectors. The distribution of wealth holders by 
their estimated wealth clearly signifies this situation. 56 percent of wealth holders in the 
Kansai area had less than two million yen as their fortune, and almost one quarter had a 
fortune of 2-4.9 million yen. The rest had assets of over 5 million yen.
Although the greatest wealth holders considered in this thesis were not a totally 
homogeneous group with regard to their pattern of wealth accumulation, it is clear that 
they were concentrated in the modem sector. In particular, in Osaka as well as in Tokyo, 
many of the mega-rich, whose wealth was estimated at over 10 million yen, were those 
involved in the formation of the zaibatsu or zaibatsu-style business systems in this 
period or later. These Osaka wealth holders also included some of the most famous
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businessmen (or even businesswomen, although it was rare for women to be directly 
engaged in business) in Japanese business and economic history. At the apex of the 
wealth pyramid in this area stood Sumitomo Kichizaemon Tomoito of Osaka, the 
owner of Sumitomo, one of the big-four zaibatsu, whose estimated wealth was 70 
million yen. In the ranking of wealth holders, he was followed by the old zaibatsu 
owners who have already been mentioned in the previous section in the ranking of the 
national wealthy elite, namely Fujita Heitaro (Osaka; 50 million yen) and Kuhara 
Fusanosuke (Osaka; 40 million yen). Other leading wealth holders had similar 
characteristics, for example, Konoike Zen’uemon (Osaka; 15 million yen), who came 
from one of the largest merchant houses in Osaka, along with Sumitomo, and from the 
family that owned the Konoike zaibatsu, which was relatively more local than the other 
old zaibatsu. We also find Kawasaki Yoshitaro (Kobe; 15 million yen), the inheritor of 
Kawasaki Shipbuilding, later Kawasaki Heavy Industry, and Suzuki Yone (Kobe; 15 
million yen), the female owner of the Suzuki Trading Company, the company whose 
problems provoked the financial crisis in Japan in the late 1920s. These great fortunes 
were concentrated in the prefectures of Osaka and Hyogo, particularly in the coastal 
provinces and in the centres of business, Osaka and Kobe cities. These characteristics 
also establish the existence of certain differences between Kansai and the case of Tokyo, 
where the mega-rich were concentrated solely in the inner-city area of Tokyo. Also, in 
contrast to this top group, the estimated wealth of many of the individuals involved in 
the traditional sectors was less than 2 million yen, and their scale of business was 
relatively small.
In addition to these differences between the large-scale wealth holders and the small 
ones, in terms of the speed at which they accumulated wealth, the distribution of 
occupation indicates certain differences among the prefectures. As a whole, the 
distribution of wealth holders by prefecture in the Kansai area was as follows: about 60 
percent lived in Osaka, followed by Hyogo (about 18 percent), Shiga (9 percent), and 
Kyoto (8 percent). The remaining two prefectures (Nara and Wakayama) accounted 
together for 5 percent. In general, except for in Osaka and Hyogo, the other Kansai 
prefectures were dominated by traditional merchants and manufacturers. For instance, 
in Shiga, about 70 percent of these wealth holders were engaged in the textile sector and
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• • O/L60 percent were kimono merchants (and had been since the Tokugawa period). 
Modem industrialists and salaried managers are rarely found. Kyoto also demonstrates 
the same tendency as Shiga. In Kyoto 65 percent were engaged in textile and traditional 
manufacturing. Moreover, although the total number of individuals was quite small in 
Nara and Wakayama, all of them were engaged in the traditional sector, with
37involvement in, for example, forestry and traditional goods retailing.
In contrast to these prefectures, in Hyogo and Osaka, the distribution indicates dual 
tendencies, namely towards the traditional sectors and towards modem industry. On the 
one hand, in Hyogo, a quarter of wealth holders were engaged in rice wine making. 
This was for historical reasons. In the Tokugawa period, Hyogo (in particular the 
coastal area which was named Nada) was the largest centre of rice wine makers and 
they had been very wealthy from this period. On the other hand, Hyogo was also a 
centre of trading, shipping and related industries. About 30 percent of wealth holders 
were engaged in this sector. Moreover, about 14 percent belonged to the salaried 
manager category. In Osaka, the distribution shows a more complex structure. The most 
notable part of the wealthy elite in Osaka generally consisted of those in the modem 
sector, like zaibatsu, trading or shipping, and these form the top group. Salaried 
managers also comprised a relatively large group in Osaka (13 percent), however none 
of this group worked at zaibatsu affiliates, in contrast to Tokyo. The middle and bottom 
of the hierarchy consisted of the merchant group, and about 55 percent of the total 
belonged to this category. The service sector, including merchants and businessmen, 
formed the largest group among the wealthy elite in Osaka as well as in Tokyo (about 
63 percent), and about 38 percent of this group was engaged in the financial sector. To 
some extent, therefore, Osaka shares the same characteristics as Tokyo.
Nevertheless, the data for Osaka and Kansai also show certain differences compared to 
Tokyo. The degree of regional integration indicates a partial unity of this area in terms 
of economic and business activities. The relatively advantageous position of the
36 For details about the relationships between local economic development in the modem period and 
local merchant houses, see for example Shigaken (ed.), Shigakenshi (Shiga, 1980), and Yasuoka (eds.), 
Omi Shonin, esp. chs. 5 and 6.
37 For example, see Wakayamaken (ed.), Wakayama Kenshi: Kingendai 1 (Wakayama, 1970), 
pp.714-716. The reason for the development of forestry is described in ibid', pp.505-520.
’8 Their activities in the transition period are described in Nishinomiyashi (ed.), Nishinomiya Shishi 
(Nishinomiya, 1966), pp.464-83.
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traditional sector also represents a sharp contrast to the Tokyo area, where there was 
more variety in occupational distribution and where the zaibatsu had the predominant 
position. The distribution of wealth holders in this region thus undoubtedly signifies 
some further characteristics of the prewar Japanese wealth elite.
2.3.2. Other Areas
It has already been mentioned how the concentration of wealth holders in these two 
areas of Tokyo and Osaka was a key characteristic of the pattern of economic 
development and wealth accumulation during the prewar period, even though Tokyo 
enjoyed greater prominence than Osaka and the Kansai area. In contrast to these areas, 
however, other regions were clearly less important, and experienced a relative decline 
in their economic status. Nevertheless, the pattern of wealth in some regions signifies 
other characteristics relating to their regional economies, which also constitute part of 
the overall aspect of Japanese economy and business. The following section deals with 
three regions, which formed a middling group of wealth holders, in addition to the 
colonial area of Taiwan and Korea. All three of the regions located in the Japanese main 
islands, Aichi, Niigata and Fukuoka, show the diversity of prewar Japan’s wealthy elite, 
as well as some other aspects, for instance, the survival of regional wealth elites, the 
role of local landlords for regional economic development, and the pattern and progress 
of the development of Japanese heavy industry. Also, focusing on the colonial area will 
help to portray the pattern and difference in wealth distribution among Japanese, 
Taiwanese-Chinese and Koreans.
a) Aichi
Geographically, this area is located between the two largest economic centres, Tokyo 
and Osaka. Although this prefecture is now well known as a centre of the Japanese 
automobile industry -  exemplified by Toyota -  , the situation was largely different 
earlier in the modem period. As noted above, the position of regional economic centres 
in the era of Tokugawa Japan gradually declined after the Meiji Restoration, due to the 
centralization and integration of the national economy, especially of business networks. 
Geographic location in some cases seemed to act to deepen the economic crisis. 
However, because of the relatively large scale of the Aichi regional economy and the 
strong presence of a regional wealthy elite, this area managed to survive while
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maintaining its economic independence, and avoiding the penetration of economic and 
business power from other influential areas. This also pointed to wealth holders in 
Aichi being more homogeneous in terms of their occupational structure, since there was 
a lack of newcomers from other regions. In addition, in this period, there were no 
particular big businesses in the Aichi area. This created difficulties for the entry of big 
firms’ salaried managers as wealth holders.
The data on Aichi wealth holders strongly show the extent to which it was characterized 
by regional limitations in terms of the scale of its indigenous business. With few 
exceptions, this group (numbering 22 in total) consisted mainly of regional merchants 
and traditional manufacturers. A large proportion of this wealthy elite was concentrated 
in Nagoya, the main city of Aichi. Comparison with data at the national level shows that 
the Aichi group accounted for only about 3 percent of all national wealth holders. This 
partly signifies the small scale of the economic expansion in this area. The wealthiest 
individual in this area was Ito Jiroza’emon, whose family business was kimono 
retailing (famous since the Tokugawa period), and the owner of the well known 
department store, Matsuzakaya. His estimated wealth was 5 million yen. However, this 
figure does not nearly match the wealth of the top wealth holders’ group in the Tokyo or 
Osaka areas, whose members had more than 10 million yen. Moreover, apart from Ito, 
no wealth holder in this region had more than 5 million yen. With only one exception, 
the rest all belonged to the category of 1-2 million yen. This one exception was Kamino 
Kinnosuke, who was a regional financier with a fortune of 4 million yen. The data for 
this area therefore indicate the relatively slow and low level of wealth accumulation 
compared to the Tokyo and Osaka areas.
The predominant position of the traditional wealthy elite in this region has also been 
emphasized by other research. From their analysis of the tax payments of the wealthy 
business and commercial elite, Abe and Miyamoto have pointed out a number of 
characteristics of the Aichi wealthy elite at the end of 19th century, including the 
importance of the traditional sector, in particular of those who were retailers of 
domestic commodities and involved in traditional manufacturing.39 Some scholars 
have also indicated the absence of new industries and trading (especially foreign trade)
39 See Abe and Miyamoto, ‘Meiji no Shisanka’, p.250.
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within this group, and characterized Aichi wealth holders’ business activities as being 
totally dependent on the regional and domestic economy.40 Other research has signified 
other aspects of these traditional wealthy elites with regard to their business networks. 
Murakami’s research on the business activities of Aichi’s wealthy elite in the prewar 
period stressed the role of pre-industrial merchants, who had originated in the 
Tokugawa period and remained the privileged commercial elite during this era, in the 
modernization of business and for regional economic development.41
Quantitative analysis of the national list of company managers, conducted by Wada and 
other researchers, has described the business networking of the traditional wealthy elite 
in Aichi with regard to the establishment of modem firms, showing how its members 
tended to form several groups based on their long-term personal networks.42 This result 
was obtained from an analysis of the patterns of investment and management status 
within established firms. This also indicates that this traditional wealthy elite did not 
form a totally integrated business elite group since their investment activities were 
largely influenced by their personal networks. Other work by Sugiura has gone further 
to briefly explain about a possible division of business networks in this area, indicating 
that this group of the traditional wealthy elite can be divided into three categories. The 
‘native group’ originated in Tokugawa Japan and had been active in the commercial 
sector in Nagoya since this period. The ‘suburban group’ was also a merchant group, 
but one which originated in the suburban areas of Nagoya. Its members migrated into 
Nagoya toward the end of the Tokugawa period and in the early Meiji period, and 
rapidly succeeded and expanded their business networks. Finally, the ‘newcomer 
group’ was those who came from outside of the Aichi area and was involved in regional 
business.43 However, although we cannot be sure of the extent to which conflicts of 
business and interests existed between these three groups, we may assume that this 
situation is likely to have created a certain dynamism in the regional business sector.
In addition, there is no doubt that the regional economic development of the Aichi area 
throughout the prewar period largely relied on the business activities of these groups.
40 Ibid; p.250.
41 See H. Murakami, ‘Meiji Taisho ki ni okeru Nagoya Kyu-Yuryoku Shonin no Keieikatsudo’, 
Keieishigaku 14-3 (1980), pp.74-75.
4~ See K. Wada et al, ‘Meiji 31 nen jiten’ and ‘Taisho 7 nen jiten no Chukyo Zaikai ni okeru Jyuyaku 
Kennin’, Nanzan Keiei Kenkyu, 8-1 (1993).
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Abe and Miyamoto have compiled a list of the members of the regional wealthy elite 
who were engaged in the modem business sector as manager of these firms, and pointed 
out that many of them became managers of several firms as well as running their own 
businesses.44 This was largely due to their status as big shareholders in these firms.
tu . . .
Although this was the condition at the end of the 19 century, the situation did not 
radically change in the early 20th century. If we focus on the data set considered in this 
thesis, almost half of the regional wealth holders, many of whom were merchants, were 
engaged in several business sectors unrelated to their family business. There are some 
characteristics that suggest a similarity with the Tokyo and Osaka areas, since many of 
these multi-business merchants were involved in the financial sector, in particular 
banking. On the other hand, unlike in Tokyo and Osaka, the business activities of the 
Aichi group, including the firms in which they invested, were mainly involved with 
regional business, and the scale of business was to some extent more limited.
Consequently, we may conclude that it was because of the relatively large scale of the 
economy in the Aichi area compared to other regional economies that the wealthy elite 
in Aichi managed to survive and maintain their business networks and economic power, 
even though this area was geographically located between the largest economic centres, 
Tokyo and Osaka. In contrast, Aichi business largely depended on the regional 
economy and to a limited extent on particular business sectors that were important at a 
national level, like the cotton industry. This made for greater diversity compared to 
Tokyo and Osaka, since long-distance and foreign trading played a crucial role in the 
scale and speed of wealth accumulation. In the Aichi area, however, the lack of a large 
scale modem sector may well have limited the size and amount of wealth holders’ 
wealth, and resulted in a lesser dynamism in the whole region, even though many 
members of the regional wealthy elite were active in modernization in the business 
sector.
b) Niigata
This area indicates some clearly different features from other areas, in which the 
commercial and business sectors accounted for the predominant position among the
43 See E.Sugiura, Chukyo Zaikaishi, (Nagoya, 1956), pp. 106-8, for details.
44 Abe and Miyamoto, ‘Meiji no Shisanka’, pp.253-255.
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wealthy elite. Niigata is geographically located on the northern side of the Honshu 
mainland area, on the opposite side from the other three areas. The Niigata area is also 
famous as a centre of rice cultivation, and thus can be considered to be to some extent 
representative of certain aspects of the social and economic structure of prewar 
Japanese agriculture, in particular the pre-eminent position of great landlords. Although, 
private landholding was strictly limited under the feudal domain system during the 
Tokugawa period, the gradual dissolution of the feudal landholding system and the 
emergence of rich farmers with privatised landowning was already beginning to appear 
in certain areas, especially in Niigata, in the late Tokugawa period. Recent studies have 
shown that agricultural policy in the feudal domains of the Niigata area stimulated the 
activities of rich farmers, giving rise to the model of private landholding well before the 
Meiji Restoration, and the subsequent land reforms did no more than give official 
sanction to the existing situation in this area.45 These rich farmers became great 
landlords during the modem period, and increased their economic power throughout 
the Niigata area.
The data set relating to this area is strongly characterized by this tendency, and some of 
this elite’s members undoubtedly represent the wealthiest elite within the agricultural 
sector. In contrast to other areas, three-quarters of the total observations for this area (21 
out of 28 wealth holders) were landlords. Merchants or traditional manufacturers were 
a minority among this Niigata group. The distribution of wealth holders with their 
estimated wealth also indicates fairly large-scale wealth accumulation, even though this 
group accounts for only 4 percent of the national total. While about three-quarters of 
Niigata wealth holders belonged to the lowest category (less than 2 million yen), the 
remainder had more than 3 million yen, and this proportion is larger than is the case for 
Aichi. The wealthiest among this Niigata group was Yamaguchi Tatsutaro, from a family 
of landlords also engaged in several kinds of business, including finance and modem 
industries, with an estimated wealth of 10 million yen. Yamaguchi was followed by 
other great landlords or landlord-businessmen, for example, Nakano Kanichi 
(estimated wealth 4 million yen), who was involved in the oil industry, Niigata being 
the sole area of oil field production in Japan.
45 The landholding system of Tokugawa Japan had a strong resemblance to the leasehold system. For 
particular information about this situation, see M. Oka (eds.), Nihon Keizaishi, (Kyoto, 1983), esp. 
pp.168-175; also K. Mizumoto, Kinsei no Murashakai to Kokka, (Tokyo, 1987), pp.87-89.
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While landlords accounted for the majority of the wealthy elite in Niigata, this does not 
signify that these wealth holders totally depended on rents from their tenants as their 
source of income and wealth accumulation. Data show that about half of these landlords 
(11 out of 21) were also engaged in the business sector through their investment 
activities, in particular in the local business sector. These wealth holders held seats on 
the executive boards of local firms, and this fact indicates their contribution to the local 
economy. However, analysis of the pattern of investment shows another factor in 
relation to the business activities of wealth holders. Tanimoto has discussed and 
analysed in detail the pattern of investment and shareholding by Niigata’s wealthy elite 
during this period. Firstly, he divides wealth holders into four categories depending on 
their investment and business activities, that is, according to whether they were 
rent-seeking type, risk-taking type, local businessmen type or multiple director type. 
From his analysis, Tanimoto has pointed out that even though these men’s investment 
activities played a significant role in local economic development in the late 19th 
century, the pattern of business involvement varied depending on the size and scale of 
shareholding.46 Tanimoto’s work also indicates that the pattern of business activities by 
landlords was strongly influenced by the scale of their landholding. Although the great 
landlords’ activities can be divided into rent-seeking type and local businessmen type, 
these landlords were a minority in both categories and the majority wealth elite in 
Niigata was of the risk-taking type, including middle and small-scale landlords and 
local merchants.47 Tanimoto additionally emphasized the importance of this group for 
local economic development during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, although this 
significance does not necessarily signify the long-term survival of the firms in which 
they invested. Tanimoto’s analysis is, in some cases, critical of the perspective of 
previous research, which stressed the role of large shareholders as executive members 
of local firms who would make decisions on firms’ daily management, and whose 
activities overwhelmed those of salaried managers in each firm.49 These results 
consequently signify certain differences when it comes to discovering general
46 See Tanimoto and Abe, ‘Kigyo Bokko to Kindai Keiei Zairai Keiei’, in Abe and Miyamoto 
(eds.),Nihon Keieishi, vol. 2, pp.111-119.
47 See ibid; and also Tanimoto, ‘Nihon ni okeru Chiiki Kogyoka to Toshi Katsudo’, Shakai Keizaishigaku, 
64-1 (1998).
48 See, Tanimoto and Abe, ‘Kigyo Bokko’, pp. 109-111.
49 For an example of this perspective, see T. Ito, ‘Sangyo Shihon Kakuritsuki ni okeru Chiho Shihon no 
Sonzaikozo’, Ritsumeikan Sangyo Keizai, 35 (1983).
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tendencies and the direction of business activities by big wealth holders. Nevertheless, 
it is certain that this landed wealthy elite is substantially different from the landowning 
elite in Europe, as will be discussed in a later section.
In the light of this complex tendency in relation to local business activities, the data set 
also shows the difficulties inherent in distinguishing or categorizing the wealth elite 
according to occupational distribution. The case of the landlords indicates that there 
was no rigid separation between agricultural and business activities in terms of the 
sector in which a wealth holder was involved. On the other hand, except for one case, 
the minority group in the Niigata area, consisting of merchants or traditional 
manufacturers, were also landowners, even though their scale of landholding was 
smaller than those of the so-called landlords. This also indicates that wealth holders in 
Niigata had somewhat ‘multi-business’ characteristics. This condition may be the result 
of an inability to determine or distinguish between different groups if we categorise 
them partly in Western terms, such as ‘bourgeoisie’. It may also be related to the 
particular social hierarchy associated with Japanese landlords.
However, the profile of wealth holders in this area shows another perspective on 
Japanese wealth holders, in addition to showing the unique character of the Niigata 
wealthy elite compared to other areas of Japan. That is, the predominant position of 
landlords does not simply mean that Niigata was totally dependent on the agricultural 
sector. This landed wealth also flowed into the regional business sector as a 
consequence of wealth holders’ investment and business activities. There is no doubt 
that their activities contributed to regional economic development in the prewar period. 
On the other hand, their characteristics in Niigata show some similarities between 
members of the local business elite, in terms of a tendency on the part of the landed 
wealthy elite not to separate their activities between the agricultural and business 
sectors. The difference in their pattern of activities did not depend on any categorization 
according to social class structure, but on a personal inclination towards business or 
agriculture. It might also be said that geographical distance from the large economic 
centres may possibly have played a role in maintaining these regional characteristics, in 
conjunction with the influence of previous history.
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c) Fukuoka
While the four areas described above were geographically located on the main Honshu 
island area of Japan, Fukuoka was located on the southernmost main island of Japan, 
Kyushu. Fukuoka is located on the northern part of Kyushu Island. This area was 
particularly well known for coal mining, and became one of the main centres for heavy 
industry from the start of the modem period. However, economic development in this 
region fluctuated largely due to the economic policy of the Japanese government. 
Although the government established mining legislation in the early Meiji period to 
nationalize all mines and to prevent the penetration of foreign capital in this sector,50 
financial crisis within the government, followed by both inflation and deflation, created 
difficulties for entrepreneurs who ran coal mining businesses in this area. Even after the 
middle of the 1880s, when the government abolished the policy of nationalization of 
heavy industries, these businessmen continued to suffer from severe conditions, 
generated by fluctuating demand, technological difficulties and labour management 
problems.51 On the other hand, in terms of the wealth accumulation of Japanese coal 
magnates in this area, war demand contributed to creating a great boom for this sector. 
Both the Sino-Japanese war (against the Qing) and the Russo-Japanese war generated 
enormous demand for the coal industry, and consequently many coal magnates 
managed to overcome a crisis in their business resulting from over production and 
consequent price reductions before the period of the two wars. The circumstances 
surrounding the coal magnates also reflect the process of development in the heavy 
industry sector in modem Japan and the weaknesses in this sector, for instance, the 
difficulties facing radical technological innovation or the dependence on special 
demand, like warfare.
The number of wealth holders in Fukuoka was relatively smaller than in the other 
regions. Only 14 wealth holders had an estimated wealth of over 1 million yen. This 
figure constitutes only about 2 percent of total Japanese wealth holders in this period. 
Even if we include lesser wealth holders possessing 500,000 yen, Fukuoka’s wealth 
holders comprised only 43 individuals, also about 2 percent of the national total in this
50 See, Miyamoto et al (eds.), Nihon Keieishi, pp.125-126.
51 For detail, see Y. Ogino, Chikuho Tanko Roshi Kankeishi, (Fukuoka, 1993), pp. 140-58.
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category.52 However, turning to occupational and class structure, about half of these 
wealth holders (6 out of 14) were coal magnates, and it was they who dominated the 
upper group of this wealthy elite with regard to their estimated wealth. This figure is of 
considerable significance, since many coalmines, particularly large mines, were owned 
by zaibatsu affiliates, for instance, Mitsui or Mitsubishi. This result also indicates that, 
notwithstanding the strong presence of zaibatsu in this region, there were still great 
opportunities for regional wealth holders in this sector for wealth accumulation. The 
level of wealth concentration is further evidence for the importance of the coal mining 
industry. All the four top wealth holding individuals were coal magnates, who 
possessed more than 3 million yen as their fortune. Moreover, their business activities 
spread into several sectors, including other modem industries or the financial sector. 
The wealthiest individual, Yasukawa Keiichiro, (estimated wealth 10 million), was 
engaged in other industrial sectors, like electrical equipment, in addition to cotton 
spinning and construction, though Yasukawa’s wealth was largely based on coal mining. 
After Yasukawa came Kaijima Taisuke (8 million yen), the most famous coal magnate 
during this period, and also Aso Takichi (5 million yen), who also contributed to the 
establishment of other modem business sectors in this region.
However, the relative advantages and importance of the heavy industry sector do not 
mean that only coalmining dominated the wealth holders of Fukuoka. Although it is 
dangerous to estimate general tendencies from such a small sample, we find that wealth 
holders in the service sector made up the second largest group within the wealthy elite 
(5 out of 14). Inclusion of additional data on those with assets of 500,000 yen provides 
a further perspective on the wealthy elite in Fukuoka. Except for traditional 
manufacturing, in particular soy sauce brewing and rice wine making, there were hardly 
any wealth holders from other industrial sectors. In terms of industrial activity, it was 
the coal mining sector alone that had a pre-eminent position among the wealthy elite. If 
we look at the lesser wealth holders, we also find that, at this level, it is not just wealth 
holders in the service sector who formed the second group in this region; they are joined 
by landlords. Salaried managers account for only three among 43 regional wealthy elite. 
In addition, wealth holders in the service sector were dominated by kimono merchants 
and the non-banking sector, both of which were traditional service sector activities.
52 See, Shibuya (ed.), TSNZSJSS vol.l, intro p.9.
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Therefore, although coal magnates are representative of the predominant position of 
heavy industry in this area, especially in terms of wealth accumulation and wealth 
concentration, the distribution of the wealthy elite indicates that a more traditional 
wealthy elite remained at the lower levels of the wealth pyramid. The dynamism of the 
wealthy elite in the modem sector in Fukuoka in this period was almost totally limited 
to one particular sector, and the business activities of those in this sector did not 
substantially transform the distributional structure of wealth holders. This situation can 
be interpreted as indicating the existence of a division within business, that is, on the 
one hand the commitment of coal magnates to the modem industrial sector, and on the 
other the dependence of the business activities of the rest of the wealthy elite on 
regional and traditional networks. We may also assume, however, that this is not 
evidence that might lead us to question the importance of either group to regional 
economic development, since both groups’ business activities show some tendency 
towards modernization and the development of the regional economy. Nevertheless, the 
economic ‘distance’ between both groups may be taken as evidence of a pattern of 
concurrent development of the traditional and modem sectors in the prewar Japanese 
economy.
d) Colonial areas
In contrast to the main islands of Japan proper, we can be certain that the Japanese 
colonial area imposed different economic characteristics.53 The acquisition of Taiwan 
in 1895 as a result of the defeat of Qing China in the Sino-Japanese War, formally 
opened the way towards Japanese imperialism. From the initial period of colonization, 
the economic exploitation of Taiwan by Japan was quite apparent, and in the process it 
created business chances for Japanese businessmen. Development of the sugar refining 
industry in Taiwan by Japanese partly symbolized this method of economic 
exploitation.54 The ambitious expansion of the Japanese colonial empire was furthered 
by the annexation of the Korean Kingdom in 1910, although Korea was already 
half-colonized at the start of the 20th century, as a result of the victory of Japan in the
For accounts o f Japanese imperialism in the English literature, see W. G. Beasley, Japanese 
Imperialism (Oxford, 1987) and M. R. Peattie, ‘The Japanese Colonial Empire’ in P. Duus (ed.),77ie 
Cambridge History o f Japan, vol.6. Also, see various articles about the Japanese colonialism in Peattie 
andR. H. Myers (eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton, 1984).
54 For detail, see Togyo Kyokai (ed.), Kindai NihonTogyoshi, part 1 (Tokyo, 1961) and also in English
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Russo-Japanese war, due to the conflict of political interest in Manchuria and Korea.55 
Economic policy in both colonies was initially characterized by agricultural interests on 
the part of Japan, in particular in rice cultivation. In this context, Korea played a 
significant role for the internal trading of rice, and in the encouragement of Japanese 
agricultural migration into Korea. In both cases, it is apparent that the colonial economy 
would be likely to be dominated by Japanese benefiting from protection from the 
colonial government, and also give rise to differences in the scale and speed of wealth 
accumulation between Japanese and the colonial peoples. However, we should note that 
it is not possible to draw conclusions of this kind for the Korean case, since the survey 
of wealth holders took place in 1915, only five years after the colonization, and radical 
changes in social structure are unlikely to have taken place during this short period.
Wealth holders whose estimated wealth was over 1 million yen in Taiwan and Korea 
were a relatively small group, that is, 12 in Taiwan and 3 in Korea. Even combining 
data for the two, colonial wealth holders accounted for fewer than 2 percent of the total 
observations. Also, the sample is just too small to make any assumptions about a 
general tendency regarding the difference in economic power between Japanese and the 
native peoples of the colonies. Therefore, in this case, especially when it comes to 
considering the influence of Japanese colonization on wealth inequality, it is feasible to 
include in our consideration the data relating to the lesser wealth holders, those 
possessing 500,000 yen, even though this additional data still produces a relatively 
small figure, that is, 26 in Taiwan and 30 in Korea. However, inclusion of this broader 
sample helps to show some aspects, which should not be ignored.
It might be assumed that since Korea was still in the initial period of colonization in 
1915, many wealth holders might possibly be Korean. However, the racial distribution 
shown in the data set indicates that about 40 percent of them were already Japanese. 
These Japanese wealth holders mainly lived in Seoul, Pusan and In’chon. On the other 
hand, Korean wealth holders still maintained their position as the majority in this group, 
and about two-thirds of the Korean wealthy elite was concentrated in Seoul, the former 
capital and the centre of the colonial government. Distribution on the basis of social
see Chi-Ming Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan (New York, 1995).
55 For detail o f the colonization in English literature, see P. Duus, The Abacus and the Sword (Berkeley, 
1995).
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class and occupation also indicates some interesting characteristics. Except for a few 
cases, Korean wealth holders can broadly be divided into two groups with regard to 
their social class. Rian’pan, the members of the Korean bureaucrat-aristocracy, 
received Japanese nobility titles, and formed one-third of the Korean group. Other 
Korean wealth holders consisted largely of landlords. Within the Korean group there 
were hardly any who were engaged in the business sector. In contrast, most Japanese 
wealth holders in Korea were heavily concentrated in the business sector, in particular 
in the service sector. Many of them were involved with the trading sector, very often 
with the internal trade between Korea and Japan. The results of even such a brief 
analysis as this suggest that Japanese already had a pre-eminent position in the business 
sector, and that a significant division of economic activities was already occurring 
between Koreans and Japanese. It also shows the degree of economic penetration by 
Japanese.
The data for Taiwan wealth holders, in contrast, indicates somewhat different 
characteristics from the Korean case, although by 1915 Taiwan’s experience of 
colonization was considerably longer, compared to Korea. The racial distribution 
shows that in Taiwan about two-thirds of the total (16 out of 26 wealth holders) were 
Taiwanese-Chinese wealth holders. Surprisingly, perhaps, a look at wealth distribution 
shows that Taiwan-Chinese had a relatively strong position. Out of the 12 wealth 
holders with 1 million yen fortune, 10 were Taiwan-Chinese, and this group formed the 
top of the hierarchy among Taiwan wealth holders. Most of the Taiwan-Chinese wealth 
holders were based in Taipei. In this context, Japanese wealth holders still played a 
minority role in Taiwan, and are mainly found at the bottom of the wealth hierarchy. 
Half of them were also in Taipei, as were the Taiwan-Chinese wealthy elite. The 
occupational distribution also shows different aspects from Korea. Although the 
majority of Taiwan-Chinese were landlords (half of them), this group is also found in 
the industrial and service sectors, and figures show that the number of Taiwan-Chinese 
and Japanese in each business sector was similar. It was only the category of salaried 
manager that consisted mainly of Japanese. However, turning to the industrial sector, 
we can discover some differences between the activities of Japanese and 
Taiwan-Chinese, since the Japanese in the manufacturing sector were largely located in 
heavy industry. In addition, a further difference appears in relation to the holding of 
multi-directorships by Japanese wealth holders. Four-fifths of them were engaged in
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other business sectors as executives. Therefore, it can be assumed that in the case of 
Taiwan, Taiwan-Chinese maintained their dominant position in the traditional sector 
and Japanese were more likely to be occupied with the modem sector.
Although these results come only from a small data set, the two colonies indicate sharp 
contrasts with regard to the degree of Japanese economic penetration and wealth 
distribution. On the one hand, in Korea, the higher percentage of Korean landlords and 
Korean members of the aristocracy among the wealthy elite possibly symbolized the 
lack of opportunities for Koreans in the business sector, which contrasts with the strong 
position in the business sector held by Japanese. We might also wish to suggest that 
Japanese economic activities in Korea had already progressed to a certain level in this 
period. On the other hand, the strong presence of Taiwanese-Chinese wealth holders in 
Taiwan possibly signifies the division of economic activities in the business sector 
between Taiwanese-Chinese and Japanese, that is, the domination of the traditional 
sector by Taiwanese-Chinese and of the modem sector by Japanese. It is not reasonable 
to suggest that this condition is similar to the economic situation existing on the main 
islands of Japan itself, namely the division between the traditional and modem sectors.
e) Other Regions
Compared to the regions mentioned in the above sections, other regions are hardly 
represented at all in the group of Japanese wealth holders. The only other prefectures 
with more than 10 wealth holders possessing fortunes of over 1 million yen were 
Hokkaido, the northernmost island of the four main islands, Yamagata, in the northeast 
part of Honshu Island, and Mie, a neighbouring prefecture of Aichi. These prefectures 
had 14, 11 and 12 such wealth holders respectively. Although the data for these 
prefectures do indicate some characteristics, for example, the predominant position of 
shipping and fisheries in Hokkaido, and the pre-eminent position of the service sector in 
Mie, the wealthy elites in these prefectures were, in fact, a small minority. Even if we 
combine the figures of wealth holders in all other prefectures apart from those 
described above, the total still comes to less than the number of wealth holders in Osaka 
alone. However, it should perhaps be emphasized that in these regions particular 
wealthy groups, like landlords or merchants, held the top position in terms of wealth 
accumulation. In general, landlords had a relatively advantageous position in northern
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Honshu, and merchants played an important role in the southern region of the four main 
islands, especially in Shikoku and Kyushu. Overall, therefore, this evidence on regional 
patterns provides some evidence as to the characteristics of prewar Japanese wealth 
accumulation, and also testifies to the possible decline of regional economies in this 
period.
2.4. Occupational Distribution
In spite of the partial discussion of occupational distribution in the previous section, 
further explanation is required with regard to the occupational structure of prewar 
Japanese wealth holders, as well as a broader analysis of this subject at the national 
level. Occupational distribution is significant not only for providing information 
concerning in which sectors business wealth holders were primarily active, but it is also 
crucial when it comes to determining the degree of economic transition from traditional 
structures to a more modem system, which can be illuminated through looking at the 
diversity of wealth accumulation among sectors, as among regions. In terms of the 
comparative perspective as well, the comparison of the occupational structure in Japan 
with those of Britain and Germany will be utilised in order to measure the combination 
of modem and traditional factors within the prewar Japanese wealthy elite. Such an 
analysis will, moreover, also help to testify to the existence of continuities and 
discontinuities in Japanese society, as well as the extent of the dissolution of the feudal 
caste system.
The results outlined in the former section relating to the characteristics of regional 
distribution would lead us easily to assume that business and commercial wealth 
holders, in particular those who were active in the service sector, formed the largest 
group among the prewar Japanese wealthy elite. Fuller analysis of the data in this thesis, 
summarised in Table 2.4, also supports this assumption.
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Table 2.4 Occupational distribution of wealth holders
Occupational category (A) (B) (C)
Landlord 11.0 44.0 ( . . . ) 39.2
Aristocracy 8.5 4.4 32.3 1.5
(Business sector) 
Primary sector 2.2 ( . . . ) 17.6 58.8
Industrial sector 11.0 (—) 27.3 51.1
Service sector 48.1 (—) 13.1 43.9
Salaried Manager 12.3 (—) 7.6 47.3
Zaibatsu Families 3.2 (—) 60.7 ( . . . )
Professional 0.6 (—) 20.0 (...)
Others 2.1 (—) ( . . . ) ( . . . )
Total (percentage) 100.0 (—) ( . . . ) ( . . . )
Total (absolute) 763 36 122 296
Note (A); percentage who engaged in business sector among each group
(B); percentage who also owned land among each group
(C); percentage who engaged in financial sector among each group 
(— ) signifies no cases or impossible to calculate
Sources: calculated from: Zenkoku 5Oman yen ijo Shisanka Hyo and Taisho shoki no Dai Shisanka Meibo
Business and commercial wealth holders, including salaried managers and zaibatsu 
families, account for over three-quarters of the total number of observations (76.8 
percent). Moreover, even if we divide this group up by categories of business, the 
service sector alone accounts for nearly half of 1915 Japanese wealth holders (48.1 
percent). This tendency hardly changes if we focus on regional rather than national 
occupational distribution. Except for in a few regions, where other wealthy elite groups, 
for instance, landlords, were dominant, the service sector formed the largest group in 
many areas. In contrast to this sector, the share of the industrial sector in the business 
wealthy elite was relatively small (11.0 percent of the total number of observations), 
smaller than the share of the salaried managers’ group (12.3 percent). Even if we 
include data for those salaried managers who were engaged in the industrial sector, the 
figure does not exceed 20 percent, one-fifth of the total. The predominant position of 
the service sector is quite apparent if we focus on the data relating just to business 
wealth holders (no. of individuals). This is shown in Table 2.5. Nearly two-thirds of 
this group (62.8 percent) was in the service sector. Although, as discussed in the section 
on regional distribution, the wealth was concentrated in the hands of particular 
multi-business groups, the zaibatsu, it is the service sector that accounted for the top 
wealth holders’ group in prewar Japan, not only within the business sector, but also 
among wealth holders as a whole.
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Table 2.5 Occupational distribution within business wealthy elite
Occupational status (%) Abs. No.
Primary sector 2.7 16
Industrial sector 14.6 87
Service sector 62.8 374
Salaried manager 15.9 95
Zaibatsu families 4.0 24
Total (in percentage) 100.0
Total (absolute) 596 596
note: categorization based on prime business of business wealth holders.
Abs. no: absolute number o f the sample in each category 
Source: as for Table 2.1.
If we look at this in a comparative perspective, neither in Britain or in Germany do we 
find such a high proportion in the service sector. Even in the case of Britain, which is 
currently being extensively debated, Rubinstein’s data on millionaires and 
half-millionaires who died between 1900 and 1919 show that among these 502 
members of the British wealthy elite, the service sector (commercial and financial) 
accounted for only 35.8 percent of total observations, followed by the industrial sector 
at 34.2 percent.56 Even if we exclude data on the landed wealthy elite (including the 
aristocracy), the figure shows no significant changes, giving us 49.8 percent for the 
former sector, and 47.4 percent for the latter.57 Although in the German case data on 
non-business wealth holders is not included, Augustine’s research on the wealthiest 
businessmen in imperial Germany indicates that out of 502 business millionaires, 46.9 
percent were in the service sector, while 49.8 percent of them were industrialists.58 In 
the German case, the share of the industrial sector slightly exceeded that of the service 
sector, perhaps reflecting the characteristics of German economic development. 
Nevertheless, when we compare these results to the Japanese case, both figures can be 
interpreted as showing a more even balance between the two sectors. This comparison 
thus also highlights the extreme concentration in the service sector in the Japanese case.
Another characteristic of the social and occupational structure is also apparent with 
regard to the proportion of landed wealth holders. Although landlords and the 
aristocracy comprised 19.5 percent of the Japanese wealthy elite, they cannot be treated
56 Calculation based on Rubinstein, Men o f Property, pp.60-66.
57 Based on ibid, pp.62-65.
58 Quoted from Augustine, Patricians, p.29.
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as a homogeneous social group. In contrast to the European cases, in Japan landlords 
were totally separated from the aristocracy in terms of social hierarchy, and until the 
post World War II period no landlords received any aristocratic titles or were ennobled, 
while some predominant members of the business wealthy elite had been ennobled 
during the prewar period. Thus, if we exclude data on landlords, the proportion 
accounted for by the aristocracy accounts for 8.5 percent, less than one-tenth of the total. 
This small figure makes a sharp contrast with the two European cases, where these 
landed wealthy elites had a predominant position, even though their economic and 
political power was not overwhelming as it had been in the pre-modem period. 
Rubinstein’s data signifies that in Britain landed wealth holders (including the gentry 
and nobility, which can be regarded as forming an integrated social class in terms of 
social hierarchy), made up 27.8 percent of the British wealthy elite.59 In the case of 
Germany, while data on the non-business wealthy elite cannot be traced from 
Augustine’s research, Lieven’s research on the European aristocracy shows some 
interesting figures for comparison through his utilisation of Jahrbuch der Millionare, 
the same data source used by Augustine. Lieven makes use of data on the members of 
the Prussian wealthy elite whose estimated wealth was over 10 million marks 
(£500,000). Out of 232 Prussian wealth holders, the old aristocracy accounted for 19.3 
percent, compared to the new aristocracy (who had lower titles, most of them being 
ennobled businessmen) at 30.6 percent and the upper middle class at 41.4 percent.60 
Even though Lieven did not sub-categorize the new nobility on the basis of any social 
classification, such as the non-business aristocracy or ennobled businessmen, the cases 
of both Britain and Germany appear to show the relatively strong presence of this old 
privileged class. By contrast, the proportion of the Japanese wealthy elite accounted for 
by the aristocracy is much smaller than in the European cases, suggesting that Japan 
perhaps lacked the continuity in the old regime social class structure that characterised 
Britain and Germany with regard to wealth accumulation.
Turning to another feature of the business activities of Japanese wealth holders, the data 
also signifies a tendency towards multi-business activities as shown in Table 2.5. In the 
case of landlords and nobles, the percentage of the former group who were engaged in 
the business sector as executives or directors is surprisingly high compared to such
39 Calculation based on Rubinstein, Men o f Property, pp.60-66.
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involvement by the latter group, 44.0 percent as compared to 4.4 percent. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, sub-categorizing them in relation to European class structures 
poses considerable difficulties. A further peculiarity of the Japanese wealthy elite is 
also evident from analysis of the data. Although, as might be expected, the percentage 
of each group which was also land owners is higher among the aristocracy (32.3 percent, 
including both farming land and urban property), the share of landholders also 
accounted for a relatively high percentage among the business wealthy elite, in 
particular those in the non-metropolitan regions. The proportion of the service sector 
wealth holders in this category was smaller than that of other groups (only 13.1 percent). 
However, if we exclude figures for the main metropolitan areas (Tokyo and Osaka, 
including Kansai), the figure become much higher (39.6 percent). At a national level, 
the proportion of landholders involved in the industrial sector was greater than those 
involved in the service sector (27.3 percent).
This characteristic of a multi-business tendency is apparent if we look at the percentage 
of the wealthy elite which was engaged in the financial sector. The high percentage in 
the service sector does not necessarily signify the predominant position of the financial 
sector, since most of them (43.9 percent)ran this kind of business as a sub-business. In 
the case of 39.2 percent of landlords who became executives or directors of financial 
finns, such activities were just one part of these individuals’ multi-business activities, 
resulting either from investment or from direct involvement. The percentage of those 
who were engaged in the financial sector becomes much higher among wealth holders 
in the industrial sector, at 51.1 percent. Moreover, this tendency is even more apparent 
among wealth holders in the non-metropolitan areas. Nearly half (47.3 percent) of 
salaried managers were engaged in the financial sector. However, in the case of this 
group, many were active in several sectors or branches as executives or directors, in 
addition to being involved in the financial sector. These characteristics would seem to 
indicate that there were not hard and fast divisions between different business activities 
among Japanese wealth holders.
The next section will amplify some of the points made above regarding the 
occupational distribution and social structure of Japanese wealth holders. Particular
60 Calculation based on Lieven, The Aristocracy, pp.60-65.
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attention will be focused on four groups, that is, merchants, businessmen, landlords and 
the aristocracy. Other groups will not be analysed since they are numerically very 
small.61 The separation between merchants and businessmen is significant, and largely 
rests on the presence or absence of continuity in business activities from the Tokugawa 
period; however, both groups maintained in part earlier systems even in the early 20th 
century. Explanation regarding the position of landlords and the aristocracy will also 
testify to the existence of diversities in their roles in relation to economic development 
and industrialization. The extent of discontinuity, compared to Britain and Germany, 
will also be shown.
2.4.1. Merchants
The separation of merchants from other members of the business wealthy elite or 
‘businessmen’ is largely due to their continuity as a social class from the Tokugawa 
period. They also maintained a traditional, but also transitional, style of doing business. 
The predominant position of the service sector, to which frequent mention has already 
been made, is closely related to the influential status of merchants within the business 
sector, since it was merchants who comprised a high proportion of the service sector. 
Their particularly high percentage within the wealthy elite group of the two 
metropolitan areas, Tokyo and Osaka, demonstrates their economic power and the 
power of their wealth. In addition, in many regions merchants continued their status as 
an economic and social elite. The exceptions to this were those regions where the 
agricultural sector was the key sector in the regional economy, like Niigata or the 
northern part of Honshu. However, even in these exceptional regions, merchants could 
be listed as members of the wealthy elite on the basis of their local commercial 
activities.
The strong presence of merchants in the prewar period is associated with several 
important factors with regard to the characteristics of the prewar Japanese economy. As 
many researchers have discussed, one characteristic of prewar Japanese economic 
development, in particular in the early 20th century, was the concurrent development of 
the traditional and modem sectors. While modernising economic reforms had a
61 For example, professionals only account for 0.6 percent of wealth holders.
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decisive impact on the transformation of business structures and the modernization of 
the industrial sector, changes in personal life styles and the pattern of consumption in 
prewar Japan were relatively slow. Moreover, since 80 percent of GNP was dependent 
on personal consumption, and this consumption was largely based on traditional 
commodities,62 there is no doubt that large demand for these commodities would 
stimulate development of the traditional sector. However, by comparison with the 
modem sector, these traditional industries were often conducted on the basis of 
by-employment of local farmers and small-scale firms.63 For the sale of these products, 
producers depended on merchants who had national retailing networks. Consequently, 
it is apparent that it was merchants who through their retailing networks largely shared 
the wealth from the traditional sector.
Meanwhile, it has also been shown how merchants also exercised influence over the 
modem sector as investors. This was largely due to the relative backwardness of the 
financial sector, in particular the banking sector. Basically, in the late 19th century, when 
the boom of establishing firms began to take place, capital for these modem firms was 
mainly provided through direct investment from the merchant group. Thus the banking 
sector had problems in supplying capital to newly established firms. In addition, the 
zaibatsu banks, which might have been able to play a role in capital funding, initially 
only focused on internal-financing for their own affiliates.64
Thus merchants greatly contributed to the modem sector through their capital 
investment in new firms. Additionally, this situation created multi-directorships among 
this group, since its members tended to become executive members of modem firms 
largely as a result of their investment activities. In the later period, as the rise of salaried 
managers in those modem firms became more assured, the role of merchant investors in 
firms’ management gradually declined. However, this change and shift happened 
relatively slowly from the early 20th century.
62 See T. Nakamura, Meiji Taishoki no Keizai, (Tokyo, 1985) esp. chap. 4.
6'’ See Nakamura, ibid, esp. chap 7. Also for English literature see, T. C. Smith, Native Sources o f 
Japanese Industrialization, (Berkeley, 1988), esp. chap.l.
64 See for example, Morikawa, Zaibatsu, and idem ‘Japan: Increasing Organizational Capabilities of 
Large Industrial Enterprises, 1880s-1980s\ in A. Chandler (ed.), Big Business and the Wealth o f Nations 
(Cambridge, 1997). Self-financing or internal financing, was one of the characteristics of prewar 
Japanese banks, since many banks were also established by merchants for this purpose (in this case to
94
The role of merchants as reflected in the characteristics of the wealthy elite of Japan in 
this period, not only suggests the relatively influential position of the traditional sector 
in the economic development of modem Japan, but also shows that capital 
accumulation was not limited to the modem industrial sector. However, this wealthy 
elite, which had originated in the traditional sector or from the merchant caste, became 
over time less and less identifiable with the wealthy merchant class in Tokugawa Japan. 
While there can be no doubt that by the time of the 1915 survey, only a small minority 
of the surviving merchants could be traced back to the Tokugawa period, it is also true 
that the rise and fall of newcomers within this group was quite dramatic in the late 19th 
century. In assessing the survival of merchants during the transitional period, from the 
late Tokugawa period to the end of the Meiji period, Miyamoto has pointed out that the 
survival rate of ‘parvenus’ merchants (those who began to engage in business in the late 
Tokugawa or early Meiji periods) was much lower compared to that of the older 
merchants, even though many of the ‘old’ type experienced some decline in their 
businesses.65
Nevertheless, many of them had taken advantage of business opportunities in the 
transitional period. The abolition of the prohibition on external trade from the 1860s 
marked a change and shift in their business activities, particularly as silk and cocoon 
production shifted from domestic and local markets to being export-oriented.66 
Furthermore, as a result of the Meiji Restoration, ‘feudalistic’ constraints on Japanese 
business, like guild-style protection or the limits placed on business and commerce by 
the domains, were abolished by the new government. These changes gradually led to 
the decline of traditional wealthy merchants, particularly those who had maintained 
their social status from the previous period and whose business activities relied on the 
restriction of free trade and conservative business behaviour.67 On the other hand, 
merchants who could overcome this great upheaval and reorganize their business 
systems accordingly (especially in the traditional sector, this reorganization consisted 
of a mixing of traditional and modem systems) managed to survive and could develop
self-finance their own businesses).
63 See Miyamoto, ‘Kindai Ikoki ni okeru Shoka, Kigyoka no Seisui Doshisha Shogaku 50-5, 6 (1999).
66 For example, see Smith Native Sources, esp. chs. 1 and 3.
67 This tendency is most remarkable among traditional merchants whose business had been supported by 
significant feudal privileges, particularly in Osaka. See Osakashi (ed.), Meiji Taisho Osaka Shishi vol. 3 
(Osaka, 1966), esp. pp.356-361 for further detail.
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their businesses.68
Merchants in the early 20th century, when the survey of wealth holders took place, were, 
therefore, certainly different from those who had succeeded in business and commerce 
in the Tokugawa period. However, even though their business activities were supported 
by the modernized infrastructure system and the disappearance of certain barriers to 
trade, which contributed to expanding their business networks at a national level, as 
well as the new legal system or other governmental support, there remained traditional 
or pre-industrial customs in their management and business. Their strong and intensive 
links with the traditional sector also created considerable divisions between them and 
other members of the business wealthy elite, in particular those who were committed to 
the modem sector.
2.4.2. Businessmen
It was not just the prominence of the merchant group which displays certain 
peculiarities in the development of Japan’s modem business and economy. This was 
also true of those members of the wealthy elite who were in the modem sector. 
Although with regard to the total number of wealth holders merchants far exceeded this 
group in number, the accumulated wealth of those in modem business far exceeded that 
of the more traditional wealth holders. However, their status as a minority among the 
business wealthy elite group was the result of several factors. Firstly, wealth produced 
from the modem sector was excessively concentrated on a small number of individuals, 
especially those who were zaibatsu owners, their families, or businessmen who ran 
zaibatsu-style businesses. Other wealth holders who were engaged in the 
manufacturing and business sectors, as seen in the case of the mining magnates of 
Fukuoka, tended to share this characteristic, which can be interpreted as a further 
reflection of a multi-business tendency. This tendency was associated with relatively 
substantial wealth, and at the same time the existence of a relatively small number of 
the wealth elite in the modem sector.
However, notwithstanding the importance of modem industries within this sector, this
68 For example see ibid, pp.363-367.
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does not mean that modem manufacturing was in itself a great source of wealth for the 
business elite in the modem sector. While the zaibatsu contributed to establishing many 
modem industries in prewar Japan, they relied heavily on the service sector to obtain 
their huge profits. While Yasuda was characterized by its commitment to the financial 
sector as the core of its business, the success of Mitsui, too, was largely due to its 
banking and trading companies, which contributed over half of the profits accruing to 
its holding company from the early 1900s.69 The role of banking and trading activities 
in Mitsubishi is also quite apparent, and the Mitsubishi business was as a whole 
founded on its shipping company during the early Meiji period.70 Even in the case of 
Sumitomo, whose main businesses were copper mining and related industries, banking 
activities played an indispensable role in the diversification of Sumitomo’s business.71 
Moreover, despite their eventual failure, other old zaibatsu, like Furukawa or Kuhara, 
attempted to expand their businesses into the service sector to acquire substantial 
profits.72 This evidence undoubtedly indicates the heavy reliance of the zaibatsu on the 
service sector for their wealth accumulation and their business success. It testifies 
additionally to the relatively minor role of the industrial sector in the making of 
fortunes, which offers a sharp contrast with contemporary more industrialised countries, 
like Britain or Germany.
Turning to the salaried managers group, who were undoubtedly ‘newcomers’ and 
‘newly emerged’ individuals whose appearance was associated with the transformation 
in the business system of prewar Japan, it is perhaps surprising that this group should 
form a distinct occupational group not only within the business elite, but also within the 
group of wealth holders’ as a whole. As we might immediately expect, the majority of 
this group was in the two main economic centres, Tokyo and Osaka. By contrast, they 
were only a small minority in other localities. This group can be divided into two 
sub-groups with regard to employment status. The first group consisted of those who 
headed zaibatsu affiliates or holding companies. These businessmen in effect represent 
a transitional stage from the era of family business to the age of the corporation, and as
69 See Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi, pp.436-48, and also S. Yasuoka (ed), Mitsui Zaibatsu (Tokyo, 1981), 
pp.253-56.
0 See Y. Mishima (ed.), Mitsubishi Zaibatsu (Tokyo, 1981), pp.59-67.
71 See, H. Hatayama, Sumitomo Zaibatsu Keiseishi no Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 168-75 and also Y. 
Sakudo (ed.), Sumitomo Zaibatsu, (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 127-146, 179-81.
72 For Furukawa’s failure, see Takeda, Nihonjin no Keizaikannen, pp.37-41. And also see M. Kobayashi, 
Seisho no Tanjo, (Tokyo, 1987), pp.82-88.
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such may be termed ‘entrepreneurs’.73 However, even in the case of Tokyo, this group 
makes up a relatively small proportion of the total. In contrast, the second sub-group, 
those who headed corporations in the modem sector, account for the majority of 
salaried managers. It was rare for businessmen in this latter sub-group to make their 
fortunes through the management of a single large firm. Although for some European 
businessmen who headed large enterprises this profession sufficed for them to obtain a 
high salary and to make a huge fortune,74 this sort of case was quite exceptional in 
Japan. One rare example is Kikuchi Kyozo, who was the director of Amagasaki 
Spinning, one of the largest spinning companies in prewar Japan, with an estimated 
wealth of 5 million yen. The majority of the second sub-group, in particular those who 
were in Tokyo, were engaged in the business of several firms, and frequently took on a 
number of management or directorship positions. This situation also indicates the 
importance of well-educated or experienced individuals in the development of modem 
Japanese business, and possibly the shortage of potentially skilled employees who 
could take on management roles..
Apart from businessmen in the modem sector, those involved in the traditional sector 
were largely involved in particular manufacturing sectors. Businessmen who were 
traditional manufacturers, and whose wealth came from their businesses, tended to be 
engaged in the food industries, like soy-sauce brewing, miso or rice vinegar making, 
and rice wine brewing. These cases resemble somewhat the case of the beer industry in 
Europe. For example, Mogi Hichiro’uemon, who ran a soy-sauce brewing business in 
Chiba, later became famous for establishing the own brand name of Kikkoman, and had 
an estimated wealth of 3 million yen.75
One other particular example of such manufacturers was, as discussed previously, the 
rice wine makers of Nada, the coastal province of Hyogo adjacent to Osaka. Historical 
circumstances and the influence of economic change meant that the rice wine makers in 
this area had already made huge fortunes from their business activities; this then
7'’ See A. D. Chandler and H. Daems, “Introduction”, in Daems and van der Wee(eds.), The Rise o f 
Managerial Capitalism, (The Hague, 1974), pp. 1-34, and Chandler, Scale and Scope, (Cambridge, Mass., 
1990).
74 See Cassis, Big Business, pp. 191-195.
75 For details o f soy-sauce brewing in modem Japan, see H. Nagatsuma, ‘Kindai Shoyu Jozogyo to 
Noson’, in R. Hayashi (ed.), Shoyu Jozogyoshi no Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1990), esp. pp.423-55. In English 
literature, see M. Fruin, Kikkoman: company, clan and community, (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
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permitted them to become involved in other business sectors.76 For example, Tatsuma 
Kichiza’emon, who ran a rice wine brewing business in this area as well as his own 
shipping business, had an estimated wealth of 13 million yen, and was one of the top 
wealth holders in the Hyogo area. Another example from the rice wine brewers was 
Inui Shinbei, who later established the largest non-bank money lending firm, and also 
ran several other businesses, including one in shipping. His estimated wealth at this 
time was 8 million yen. Wealth holders from this sector are also found in other local 
regions. This suggests a relatively large scale of wealth accumulation in this sector, in 
addition to the continuing ability of this group to succeed in business well into the 20th 
century.
Those businessmen who were part of the wealthy elite thus exhibit a number of 
characteristics, which, we may argue, are closely associated with certain aspects of 
modem Japanese business development. While the pattern and style were different 
depending on the occupational group, a significant part of the activities of the business 
wealth elite was characterized by a tendency towards multi-business involvement. In 
addition, although they did gain some benefit from the modem financial and 
manufacturing sectors, the service sector played a significant role in wealth 
accumulation, in particular for zaibatsu owners and their families. Within the 
traditional manufacturing sector, it was only the food industries which supplied 
traditional commodities or necessities that made sufficient profits, as well as providing 
the wealth required to give those entrepreneurs the status of members of the wealthy 
elite. This situation might possibly be explained by the exceptional position of the food 
industries within the traditional manufacturing sector of prewar Japan, since most 
traditional manufacturing remained small-scale, hence making it difficult to 
accumulate large amounts of personal wealth .
2.4.3. Landlords
The landlord group has invariably been identified with certain particular characteristics 
of the prewar Japanese economy, and a considerable amount of research has been 
published with a view to revealing the economic role of landlords in prewar Japanese
70 For the importance of this sector, see M. Tanimoto, ‘Jozogyo’, in S. Nishikawa (eds.), Nihon Keizai no 
200nen, (Tokyo, 1996), pp.255-60, 272-79.
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history.77 However, although even in the Tokugawa period some landlords held major 
influence in rural areas, both socially and economically, their official status as landlords 
was established only after the Meiji Restoration. As a result of the land tax reform, 
which was undertaken to address the financial difficulties of the government in the 
early Meiji period, private landholding rights over farmland were finally approved for 
farmers, and this thus opened the way for landlords to expand their estates. Besides, 
economic depression, inflation and deflation during the 1870s and 1880s played a 
significant role in the decline of middle and small-scale farmers and the rise of 
landlords, especially in the northern Honshu Island area.78 However, the status of these 
landlords within modem Japanese society does not parallel the European cases, since, 
as indicated earlier, Japanese landlords had no relationship with the aristocracy in terms 
of the social hierarchy (for instance, gentry and nobility, or Junker and aristocracy). In 
the Japanese case, both groups were totally separate. This situation is especially 
apparent from looking at the cases of those who were ennobled during the prewar 
period. Although among the newly ennobled aristocracy in the Prussian Kingdom from 
1871 to 1918, 25.7 percent were great landowners, no Japanese landlords were 
ennobled during the prewar period.79 This evidence suggests a certain distinctiveness 
with regard to the social status of landlords at the national level.
The data considered in this thesis shows that this landlord group accounted for a 
relatively high percentage of the Japanese wealthy elite group (11.0 percent). However, 
they were not a homogeneous group in terms of their economic activities. While many 
landlords in rural areas certainly focused on the agricultural business, landlords in the 
Tokyo or Osaka areas mainly consisted of those who were engaged in property 
management. In addition, the business activities of the great rural landlords, either 
through investment or through direct involvement in business, makes evaluating their 
role in the prewar Japanese economy more difficult. While many earlier studies of
77 For example see M. Nakamura, Kindai Nihon Jinushiseishi Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1979) and K. Oishi (ed.), 
Kindai Nihon ni okeru Jinushi Keiei no Tenkai, (Tokyo, 1985). For English literature about the prewar 
Japanese landlord system see A. Waswo, Japanese Landlords (Berkeley, 1977).
78 For detail on this process see Nakamura, Kindai Nihon, esp. pp.122-41. However, this process cannot 
be accepted for the Niigata case, where great landlords were concentrated. Some explanation relating to 
this case is given in the Niigata part o f this thesis.
79 The data for Prussia is quoted from Berghoff, ‘Aristokratisierung des Burgertums?’ in VSWG 81-2 
(1994), p. 184. For the Japanese case, see the whole data on the prewar ennoblement in T. Sakamaki, 
Kazokuseido no Kenkyu vol.l, pp.129-190. According to this data, there is no case o f landlords’ 
ennoblement.
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Japanese landlords emphasised their rent-seeking tendencies in relation to their 
business activities, as well as their tendency to their tenants, recent studies have 
indicated that the pattern and method of their activities depended on a strong degree of 
commitment to their agricultural interests, and some of them played a significant role 
within both the agricultural and business sectors. In the case of rural businesses, Niigata 
shows various examples of the pattern of landlords’ commitment to the business
O A
sector. Some landlords in rural regions acted quite successfully as 
landlord-businessmen. Ohara Magosaburo, a landlord in Okayama prefecture, was also 
the founder of Kurashiki Spinning, one of the largest Japanese spinning firms, and 
gained considerable success in the business sector with an estimated wealth in 1915 of 
3.5 million yen. Also, many rural landlords were the executives or directors of local 
banks. While such positions were partly the result of their investment activities, it may 
also be assumed that their higher status in rural areas probably also helped to give some 
credibility to the banking business of these firms. Furthermore, merchants or traditional 
industrialists in rural areas, in particular the northern Honshu area, or Niigata, were also 
rural landlords. In many cases, the scale of landholding of those merchants or 
industrialists was in some areas almost as same as, or even more than that of the 
wealthy landlords. This poses further difficulties when it comes to distinguishing 
between their economic activities, or trying to sub-categorize them on the basis of 
occupation. It may be suggested that this makes any categorization that uses specific 
western terms, such as ‘bourgeoisie’, particularly unacceptable for the case of Japanese 
rural areas.
Turning to urban landlords, the data set reveals another diversity between the two 
metropolitan areas, Tokyo and Osaka. While urban landlords who held land as part of 
the property business were highly concentrated in these two areas, the characteristics of 
landlords in Tokyo and Osaka were strongly influenced by differences in the histories 
of the two cities. On the one hand, in the Tokyo area, the residential area available to 
non-samurai groups (except for areas designated for shrines and temples) had been 
strictly limited during the Tokugawa period, when non-samurai had only had access to 
about 10 percent of the whole residential area of Edo. About 70 percent of the Edo area 
had been designated for samurai and feudal lords. The Meiji Restoration had a decisive
80 See Abe and Tanimoto, ‘Kigyo Bokko’ and also the Niigata part o f this thesis.
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impact in transforming this urban structure. The residential areas formerly allocated to 
samurai became the object of land and property investment by both the new and the old 
wealthy elite. Most urban landlords appearing in the data considered in this thesis 
originated in the merchant group, and they purchased properties in the former samurai 
residential areas as part of their investment activities. For instance, Minejima Mohei, 
who ran his own pawn-broking business (,shichiya), obtained a huge urban estate during 
the Tokyo property boom in the Meiji period, becoming in the process an urban 
landlord.81 His estimated wealth in 1915 was 12 million yen. This case was not a rare 
one. A number of merchants in Tokyo invested in the property business.
On the other hand, while most urban landlords in Osaka were also merchants or former 
merchants, they had already been property holders before the modem period. The 
presence of samurai had been weaker in Osaka than in Edo. The property rights of 
merchants had already been approved in the Tokugawa period, although the pattern of 
land owning and purchasing gradually shifted in the direction of the property business 
during the modem period, just as it did in Tokyo.82 The evidence from both areas thus 
signifies that the urban landlord group was totally different from the rural landlord 
group in terms of its social origins, and the emergence of urban landlords resulted in 
part from a business shift by merchants into the property business, and their retirement 
from or abandonment of merchant-type activities.
As a wealthy elite, the landlord group was not, therefore, homogeneous. There was a 
marked difference between rural and urban landlords, in addition to a variation in the 
commitment to business among rural landlords. The pattern of involvement in the 
business sector by rural landlords was diverse, and highly depended on individual 
characteristics. Also, the urban landlord group was distinct in terms of social origins, 
since most of them came from the merchant group. These results also reveal certain 
distinctions between Japanese landowners and European landowners, since the status 
and position of European landowners within society was the result of a long-term 
historical progress, especially in terms of the position of landlords in the social 
hierarchy.
81 See Shibuya et al(eds.), Nihon no Shichiya, esp. Modem section, part 1.
82 See N. Natake, ‘Senzenki ni okem Osaka Toshin no Tochi Shoyu Kozo’, Toshiseidoshigaku, 163 
(1999).
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2.4.4. The Aristocracy
Unlike the other three groups, the Japanese aristocracy emerged artificially, created as a 
new ‘social’ class under the auspices of the new Meiji government. This offers a sharp 
contrast with the European aristocracies, whose existence had long been an integral part 
of European history. The Japanese aristocracy was invented, mainly out of the former 
feudal lords and the court aristocracy {huge), using the European nobility system as a 
model.83 However, in terms of hierarchy within the aristocracy, the Japanese system 
consisted merely of a hierarchy of titles, from baron (danshaku) up to prince (koshaku). 
In the Japanese case, there was thus an absence of any non-titled or lower status 
members of the nobility, equivalent to for example, members of the knighthood in 
Britain, or the lower aristocracy in Imperial Germany, whose family name was 
preceded by ‘von’. From a historical perspective, it is therefore clear that the Japanese 
aristocracy was characterised by a number of discontinuities. In addition, although the 
aristocracy accounted for about 8.5 percent of the total Japanese wealthy elite, they 
exhibit relatively weak economic power by comparison to that of the business wealthy 
elite. The wealthiest of the aristocratic group was Marquis Maeda Toshitame, the 
former feudal lord who had had the largest domain during the Tokugawa period, and 
whose estimated wealth was 20 million yen. However, even in Maeda’s case, his 
fortune was smaller than those of the zaibatsu owners or wealthy businessmen. The 
wealth of the Mitsui or Iwasaki families was over ten times larger than Maeda’s.
Comparison with the contemporary British or German cases also highlights the 
relatively minor status of the Japanese aristocracy in terms of wealth accumulation. In 
Britain, while the economic status of the British nobility gradually declined throughout 
the modem period, rich British aristocrats could achieve an income of 
£100,000-£200,000 per annum, by itself equivalent to the fortune of lower Japanese 
wealth holders.84 The wealthiest member of the British aristocracy, the Duke of 
Westminster, earned an annual income of £1 million by the outbreak of the First World
o c
War, equivalent to half of Marquis Maeda’s total fortune. The German data signifies a
83 For details see Sakamaki, Kazokuseido, pp. 102-125..
84 According to Rubinstein, 17 aristocrats belonged to this category in 1883. (Men o f Property, p. 194).
85 See Lieven, Aristocracy, p.54.
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similar tendency to Britain. According to Lieven’s research, 42 members of the old 
nobility in Prussia had wealth of more than 10 million marks (£500,000).86 Only 15 
Japanese aristocrats were in this category. The richest Prussian noble was Prince 
Henckel von Donnersmarck, a coal magnate in Silesia, with estimated wealth of 177 
million marks (£8.85 million), and an estimated annual income of 12 million marks
87(£600,000). This was more than four times larger than that of the richest member of 
the Japanese aristocracy Even though Henckel von Donnersmarck’s wealth was less 
than that of the wealthiest member of the German business elite, Bertha Krupp von 
Bohlen und Halbach, his wealth was equivalent to nearly two-thirds of her fortune, a far 
higher ratio than the equivalent figure for the richest members of the Japanese 
aristocracy and business elite. These results consequently point to the relatively weak 
position of the Japanese aristocracy within the wealthy elite, in particular in relation to 
their level of wealth accumulation.
Further sub-categorization of the Japanese wealthy elite according to their former 
social status indicates another characteristic of this group. Most of these wealthy 
aristocrats originated as former feudal lords. No former members of the court 
aristocracy can be found in the over 1 million yen wealth category, and even if we look 
further down, at the 500,000 yen category, only a small number can be found. This is 
largely due to the changes and shifts in the economic condition of this group after the 
start of the modem period. On the one hand, the former feudal lords received financial
bonds, based on their revenue from their domains, as part of the commutation of
88stipends from the early Meiji period. This meant that the feudal lords who had large 
domains could receive a huge amount of financial bonds from the new government. The 
wealthy nobility which stood at the top of the hierarchy among the Japanese aristocracy, 
therefore, consisted of those feudal lords who had had large domains or who had 
contributed to the defeat of the Tokugawa government. In the latter case they received 
prizes or funds from the new government. Apart from Marquis Maeda, most of the 
wealthiest members of the nobility belonged to this category. For instance, Prince 
Shimazu Tadashige, the former lord of Satsuma domain, had estimated wealth of 15 
million yen; Prince Mori Motoaki, the former lord of Choshu domain, had 10 million
80 Calculation based on ibid, p.60. This figure would be much higher if  data on the ‘new’ aristocracy were 
to be included.
87 See ibid, p.67.
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yen, while Marquis Nabeshima Naosumi, the former lord of Saga domain also had 
estimated wealth of 10 million yen.
In contrast to the feudal lords’ group, the financial bonds allocated to former members 
of the court aristocracy were limited because of their small estates. Moreover, while the 
feudal lords were able to increase their fortunes through skilful fund management, 
building on their earlier skills in domain management, members of the court aristocracy 
lacked these skills and the know-how for fund management. Consequently, it was these 
members of the court aristocracy that suffered from financial difficulties. Research 
shows that in the tenth year of Meiji (1877), 43 members of the former court aristocracy 
were in debt, about 30.2 percent of the total group.89 Their difficult situation was not 
resolved until the end of the 19th century, when the government established what was 
known as the ‘Former Court Aristocracy Rescue Fund’ (Kyu Tosho Kazoku Onshi 
Chokin), on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Emperor Meiji.90 The difference 
between the two groups with regard to their economic status and wealth accumulation 
is therefore apparent.
Analysis of the pattern of business activities and investment of aristocrats also shows 
the limited business involvement of this aristocratic group compared to that not just of 
the business wealthy elite, but of wealthy landlords as well. Although the Japanese 
aristocracy contributed to initial economic development to some extent, since their 
financial bonds were utilized for the foundation of a number of significant firms, as in 
railways or banking, they never seized the initiative in further business expansion and 
economic development. Viscount Okochi Masayoshi, who later became the director of 
Riken, one of the new zaibatsu, was perhaps the exceptional example that proves the 
rule .91 Some wealthy nobles were involved in investment in urban property 
management. Shibuya’s list of the great urban property landlords of Tokyo at the end of 
the Meiji period (1911) shows that all members of the aristocracy included were former 
feudal lords. We may therefore assume that such urban property-owning did become a
88 For details, see for example, Kasumi Kaikan (ed.), Kazoku Seido Shiryoshu (Tokyo, 1985), pp.32-33.
89 See M. Chida, ‘Kazoku Shihon no Seiritsu Tenkai’, Shakaiseidoshigaku 55-1 (1985).
90 For details o f this process see Asami, Kazoku Tanjo, pp.28-34, and Sakamaki, Kazokuseido, 
pp.317-18.
91 However, Okochi does not belong to the wealthy elite category in the data considered in this thesis, 
which gives Okochi’s estimated wealth as 700,000 yen, less than the 1 million yen cut-off point.
92 See Shibuya, ‘Dai Jinushi Chosa’, p. 116.
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source of wealth accumulation, since the top wealth holders in our data also appear on 
this list. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the aristocracy constituted a minority of all 
Japanese wealth holders, and that they played a less important role than other groups in 
the development of the modem Japanese economy and business.
2.5. Survival of Wealth Holders
Although the characteristics of Japanese wealth holders in the early 20th century 
indicate the existence of concurrent development between the traditional and modem 
sectors, this does not mean that the process of industrialisation in pre-war Japan did not 
bring about remarkable changes during this period. After 1915, when the survey of the 
wealth holders used as the main source of data in this thesis took place, certain shifts in 
the pattern of industrial development began to be apparent, influencing Japan’s 
economy and business in particular from the 1920s. The economic boom caused by the 
First World War benefited the improvement and growth of the industrial sector, 
especially the heavy industries and new technological industries. The emergence of 
new zaibatsu, for instance Nissan or Nitchitsu, also signified a shift in pre-war 
industrialisation, since new zaibatsu relied heavily on the industrial sector, for example 
the chemical industry, for their business expansion. In addition, economic recession in 
the 1920s and depression in the early 1930s created clear difficulties for wealth holders’ 
survival and their maintenance of wealth and social status. It may be assumed that 
these changes influenced wealth holders’ speed of wealth accumulation, and in some 
cases may possibly have led to decline in status and even bankruptcy. To analyse the 
survival of wealth holders after 1915 is, therefore, crucial if we are to explain how the 
process of modem Japanese economic development caused the rise and fall of wealth 
holders, and to ascertain whether or not these economic changes resulted in the 
disappearance of any particular group within the wealth holders.
2.5.1. General View of Survival
In the early 1930s, long term economic recession and depression provoked social 
insecurity and the rise of antagonism towards wealth holders in the form of militarism 
and the communist movement. Particular notable wealth holders, for instance, the 
owners of the old zaibatsu, became a target of violent attack, both from extreme right
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and left wing groups.93 Meanwhile, it became apparent that the economic and social 
crises were leading to the decline and collapse of some wealth holders and their 
businesses, and the possible rise of newcomers to the wealth holders’ group, in 
particular those who were engaged in the rising new industries. Nevertheless, it can be 
assumed that the leading wealth holders of 1915 remained in a prominent position even 
in this later period, since their existing outstanding level of wealth accumulation made 
survival easier than it was for the ordinary Japanese public. In fact, many cases indicate 
that member of this group experienced steady growth of their wealth between 1915 and 
1933, a period of less than two decades.
The data in the 1933 survey indicate several significant points in terms of analysing the 
survival of wealth holders in pre-war Japan. Of the 763 wealth holders whose wealth 
exceeded 1 million yen in 1915, 530 had maintained their status as wealth holders in 
1933, with either increased or diminished wealth.94 This result suggests that over 30 
percent of the 1915 wealth holders had vanished from the list of wealth holders during 
this short period. Most can be assumed to have suffered major losses of fortune or 
bankruptcy. However, turning to the general trend of regional distribution, summarised 
in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, we find that the survival rate of wealth holders in each region was 
certainly different.
93 For example, see T. Miyakawa, Iwasaki Koyata, pp. 192-94 and Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine Den 
Hensan Iinkai(ed.),Mto«/ Hachiro ’uemon Takamine Den, pp.466-72, about the attempts or attack or 
even the assassination o f these owners.
94 It should be noted that the number counted as surviving wealth holders included cases in which the 
sons had already become the head o f the house and inherited their fathers’ fortune by 1933. Therefore, in 
this sense, the survival o f wealth holders of 1915 indicates not only individual survival but also their 
families’ survival as wealth holders.
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Table 2.6 The survival of wealth holders in 1933 (percentage of 1915 wealth holders
appearing in the 1933 list)
R e g io n N o .
(1 9 1 5 )
N o .
(1 9 3 3 )
(% )
H o k k a id o 14 6 4 2 .9
T o h o k u 25 2 2 8 8 .0
K a n to  (e x c e p t T o k y o ) 41 2 4 58 .5
C h u b u 72 59 8 1 .9
H o k u rik u 12 7 58 .3
K a n sa i (e x c e p t O sa k a ) 110 7 6 69.1
C h u g o k u 24 18 7 5 .0
S h ik o k u 13 9 6 9 .2
K y u sh u 32 2 2 6 8 .8
C o lo n ie s 15 6 4 0 .0
T okyo 2 2 8 167 7 3 .2
O sa k a 177 114 6 4 .4
T ota l 6 9 .5
T o ta l (a b s o lu te  n u m b e r) 763 5 3 0 5 3 0
S o u rce : SOman yen  ijo Shisankn Hyo  ( fo r  th e  1915 d a ta  se t) , 50man yen  ijo Zenkoku Kinm anka Bnnzuke ( fo r  th e  1933  d a ta  se t) , 
su p p le m e n te d  f ro m  v a r io u s  b io g ra p h ic a l d ic tio n a r ie s , a u to b io g ra p h ie s  a n d  b io g ra p h ie s .
Table 2.7 The regional distribution of the surviving wealth holders in 1933 (wealth 
holders in each area as % of total wealth holders)
R e g io n s (% ) A b s. n o
H o k k a id o 1.1 6
T o h o k u 4 .2 22
K a n to  (e x c e p t T o k y o ) 4 .5 24
C h u b u 11.1 59
H o k u rik u 1.3 7
K an sa i (e x c e p t O sa k a ) 14.3 76
C h u g o k u 3 .4 18
S h ik o k u 1.7 9
K y u sh u 4 .2 22
C o lo n ie s 1.1 6
T okyo 3 1 .5 167
O sa k a 2 1 .5 114
Total 9 9 .9
T otal (a b s o lu te  n u m b e r) 5 3 0 5 3 0
N o te : A b s. N o : a b s o lu te  n u m b e r  o f  th e  s a m p le . F ig u re s  d o  n o t to ta l 100 p e rc e n t d u e  to  ro u n d in g . 
S o u rc e : A s T a b le  2 .6 .
The least affected regions were those in which local and traditional wealth holders had 
the predominant position. Tohoku and Chubu, in both of which the survival rate of 
wealth holders exceeded 80 percent (88.0 and 81.9 respectively) were characterised by 
this feature. On the other hand, compared to these local regions, large numbers of 
wealth holders in urban areas had disappeared from the 1933 data set. In the case of 
those areas in which the wealthy elite had been highly concentrated in 1915, more than 
a quarter of wealth holders in Tokyo had disappeared in 1933 (73.2 percent survived), 
and about one-third of the wealth holders in Osaka had vanished (64.4 percent 
survived). The situation was worse in some other areas. Both Kanagawa and Hyogo, 
with their main maritime export centres, Yokohama and Kobe, had lost about half of the
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1915 wealth holders by 1933 (46.3 percent and 56.3 percent respectively survived in 
these two areas). This contributed to the sharp decline in the survival rate in both the 
Kanto and Kansai areas (58.5 and 69.1 percent survival rate respectively), since the 
survival rate in the other prefectures making up these two regions was relatively high. 
Nevertheless, with regard to overall regional distribution, the general trend had hardly 
changed even in the 1933 data set, as indicated in Table 2.7. Both metropolitan areas, 
Tokyo and Osaka, still maintained their positions as highly concentrated areas of wealth 
holders. However, comparison of the 1915 and 1933 data does suggests a slight 
downfall in the position of Osaka, while there was slight increase in the case of Tokyo. 
In 1915, Tokyo and Osaka accounted for 30% and 23% of wealth holders respectively, 
while in 1933 the equivalent figure were 31.5% and 21.5%. In other areas, except the 
case of Chubu, whose share increased from 9.4 in 1915 to 11.1 percent in 1933, there 
was no significant change in the share of total wealth holders.
Grouping the surviving wealth holders according to their estimated wealth in 1933, 
displays a further significant characteristic related to the survival rate. The spectrum of 
wealth distribution among the wealth holders had by 1933 become broader as shown in 
Table 2.8, compared to that shown in the 1915 data set. For instance, while the majority 
of 1915 wealth holders (c. 59 percent) had belonged to the category of 1-2 million yen, 
this category had fallen to 19.8 percent in 1933. In addition, although about 53 percent 
of the surviving wealth holders owned 1-5 million yen, and about 5 percent of the total 
were in the category of less than 1 million yen, the number of the greatest wealth 
holders had also experienced steady growth.
Table 2.8 Scale of wealth of surviving 1915 wealth holders in 1933 (percentage of all
surviving wealth holders in each group)
More than 100 million yen 3.8
50 to 100 million yen 1.5
10 to 50 million yen 17.5
5 to 10 million yen 18.7
3 to 5 million yen 20.9
2 to 3 million yen 12.6
1 to 2 million yen 19.8
Less than 1 million yen 5.1
Total (percentage) 99.9
Total (absolute number) 530
Note: Figures do not total 100 percent due to rounding. 
Source: As Table 2.6.
109
In 1933, nearly 19 percent of surviving wealth holders had wealth of 5-10 million yen, 
and 18 percent had wealth of 10-50 million yen. This figure shows a considerable 
growth compared to the 1915 data set, which shows about 10 percent and 5 percent in 
the two categories respectively Moreover, in the case of the very richest category, those 
whose wealth exceeded 50 million yen, the number in this category had increased to 
about 5 percent in 1933, compared to a figure of only 2 percent in 1915 data set. 
Consequently, these results suggest that although about 30 percent of the 1915 wealth 
holders had disappeared from the 1933 data set, further concentration of wealth had 
also become apparent among the majority of the surviving wealth holders.
One of the most significant characteristics of the Japanese wealthy elite in this period is 
a further concentration of wealth among the old zaibatsu families, in particular the 
‘big-four’ zaibatsu. Although any assessment of European equivalence is rendered 
difficult by yen-pound exchange rate fluctuation,95 it is apparent that the wealth of the 
top-four zaibatsu experienced steady growth during this short term of less than two 
decades. Their total amount of wealth reached nearly 21 percent of the estimated 
Japanese GNP, and this wealth was equivalent to, or in some cases, far exceeding that of 
the richest members of the European wealthy elite. The wealthiest families among the 
big-four were undoubtedly the Mitsui families whose estimated wealth was 1.635 
billion yen, over £ 100 million if converted into GBP at the 1933 rate. This estimated 
wealth was more than eight times larger than Mitsui’s wealth in 1915 (five times larger 
in terms of GBP). This top position was followed by the Iwasaki families at 1.12 billion 
yen, the Yasuda families at 475 million yen, and Sumitomo Kichizaemon Tomonari 
(son of the former owner, Tomoito) at 300 million yen. Without doubt, these families, 
with their enormous wealth and status, stood at the top of the wealth pyramid, and their 
economic power had reached an extreme level even compared to 1915. In the case of 
other zaibatsu owners or zaibatsu-style business owners, some, such as Kawasaki or 
Suzuki, had disappeared from the data. However, while other zaibatsu owners had 
relatively declined in terms of their business activities, they still survived as top wealth 
holders, even increasing their wealth. Furukawa Toranosuke (150 million yen) and 
Okura Kihachiro (200 million yen) were particular examples of this.96
95 In 1915 £ 1=¥10, whereas in 1933 £1=¥ 16. Calculation based onT. Nakamura, Economic Growth, 
p.34.
96 In the case o f Furukawa Toranosuke, although his businesses no longer conformed to the style o f a
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The prominent position of these zaibatsu owners in terms of their wealth accumulation 
raises similar questions about the other wealth holders’ cases. Without doubt, the old 
zaibatsu owners still stood at the top of the hierarchy of Japanese wealth holders. 
However, it is possible to identify other wealth holders, who were also able to increase 
their wealth to a very substantial level. The most outstanding example was Nezu 
Kaichiro, who had been a salaried manager in 1915 and also retained this occupational 
status in 1933, but whose wealth grew more than 60 times over the period, from 1.5 
million yen in 1915 to 100 million yen in 1933.97 Some of the other big wealth holders 
also experienced significant growth in their wealth. For instance, Hattori Kintaro, the 
owner of Seiko, the watch manufacturer, saw his wealth increase from 6 million yen in 
1915 to 60 million yen in 1933. The wealth of Tatsuma Kichiza’emon the great wealth 
holder in Hyogo, who was involved in shipping, insurance, and rice-wine brewing, 
grew from 13 million in 1915 to 100 million yen in 1933, while that of Yamaguchi 
Kichirobei, the financier in Osaka, went from 10 million to 70 million yen over the 
same period.98
The fate of non-business wealth holders with regard to survival was somewhat different. 
Compared to the business wealth holders, non-business wealth holders, for instance, 
landlords and the aristocracy, seem to have been less influenced by economic recession 
and depression. In particular, the survival rate of the aristocracy was extremely high, 
since almost all the aristocratic wealth holders (except for some titled business wealth 
holders) seem to have survived this short but harsh period. However, it may be assumed 
that since these non-business wealth holders, including landlords and the nobility, stood 
at the top position of their social groups, they were less likely to suffer from economic 
difficulties than those who were medium or small scale landlords, or members of the 
nobility of less wealth and social status. Moreover, the speed of wealth accumulation of
zaibatsu organization (many former affiliates were outside of the holding company’s control), he still 
maintained his prominent wealthy elite status even in this period.
97 The case of Nezu Kaichiro, originated in a prominent landlord family, was perhaps unusual, since he 
had not got his own family business, even though he established a holding company in this period. 
Morikawa has defined him as the wealth holder, whose wealth was based on financial investment. 
However, with regard to his occupational status, this definition is not totally correct, since he was still 
engaged in various businesses as a salaried manager in 1933. See Morikawa, Zaibatsu no Keieishi teki 
Kenkyu, p.297.
98 For Yamaguchi Kichirobei see Y. Mishima, Hanshin Zaibatsu (Tokyo, 1984), esp. pp.314-36, about his 
income structure. And for Tatsuma Kichizaemon see Morikawa, Chiho Zaibatsu (Tokyo, 1985),
pp. 162-67.
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the non-business wealth holders was modest compared to that of some of the business 
wealth holders. None surpassed the prominent wealthy business elite, as represented by 
the old zaibatsu owners, in the scale of wealth accumulation. For instance, the richest 
aristocrat in the 1933 data set was Marquis Maeda Toshitame, with estimated wealth of 
60 million yen, and the wealth of his family had only increased threefold compared to 
the 1915 figure. A similar tendency is apparent in the case of landlords. Even in the case 
of some rich Niigata landlords, whose wealth accumulation progressed rapidly during 
this short period, the level of wealth was never comparable to that of the prominent 
business rich. Moreover, there is evidence that even in the case of these prominent 
non-business members of the wealth elite, many still suffered from clear losses as a 
result of the economic difficulties during the 1920s. This was largely due to the income 
structure of non-business wealth holders, in particular the aristocracy, whose revenue 
was based on returns and dividends from the holding of shares and bonds. Especially,
| L
after the bankruptcy in the late 1920s of the Jugo (15 ) Bank, which was established 
through investments by the nobility in the late 19th century, many of the prominent 
aristocratic families went into financial crisis, since they had large amounts of shares in 
this bank. Some of the big shareholders, for example, Prince Shimazu Tadashige or 
Marquis Asano Chokun, both of whom were listed as wealth holders in the 1915 data 
set, suffered from major losses which brought serious decline in their wealth." This 
evidence would seem to indicate certain difficulties confronting the survival of 
non-business wealth holders, even if they were not so serious as those facing business 
wealth holders.
99 See for example, ‘Koshaku Shimazu Tadashige Seshuzaisan o Ho Dai 19jo Dai lko ni yori Haishi 
Shinsei no Ken’ (16th March, 1928), in M. Okabe et al(eds.), Kazoku Zaisan Kankei Shoryo Vol. 2, 
(Tokyo, 1986), pp.403-04.
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Table 2.9 The occupational distribution of the surviving 1915 wealth holders in
1933 (percentage of each group)
Landlords 18.5
Aristocracy 10.6
First sector 2.2
Secondary sector 10.8
Tertiary sector 37.5
Zaibatsu (or multi-business) 4.2
Salaried manager 12.1
Professionals 2.2
Others 1.9
Total 100.0
Total (absolute number) 530
Note: the categorisation of the occupational status was based on the 1933 data set, and not depended on 
the status in the 1915 data set.
Sources: As Table 2.6.
In addition, in spite of certain differences with regard to survival, these changes had 
relatively less influence on the occupational distribution of the surviving wealth holders, 
as shown in Table 2.9. Even in the 1933 data set, wealth holders from the tertiary sector 
still maintain the dominant position, accounting for over one-third of the total number 
(37.5 percent), despite a relative decline in their position compared to 1915. One 
significant shift within the occupational distribution appears in the figure for landlords, 
who in 1933 are nearly one-fifth of the total (18.5 percent) as compared to only 11.0% 
in 1915. However, this does not directly indicate a stronger position for landlords 
compared to 1915, since the increase in the proportion accounted for by this group is 
largely due to a shift in the activities of some of the 1915 merchant group. Many urban 
landlords in the 1933 data set, in particular in Tokyo and Osaka, were ex-merchant 
wealth holders who had been categorised as merchants in 1915, but who had changed 
their business direction towards the property business. The shift of this ex-merchant 
group to becoming urban landlords in the 1933 data was probably considered as a risk 
aversion strategy in the face of financial and economic hardship during the 1920s, 
which is very likely to have damaged their mercantile activities. Except in this 
particular case, there was no shift in the occupational distribution of other wealth 
holders with regard to social status and business activities. However, even if this shift is 
relatively minor in terms of the overall picture, the change in the occupational status 
does indicate the significant influence on the prominent wealthy elite of economic 
problems in the 1920s and the ensuing depression in the early 1930s.
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Nevertheless, in general, the analysis of wealth holders’ survival shows the relatively 
stable and strong position of the surviving wealth holders. It may also be assumed that 
they achieved business and economic success even during this period of economic 
difficulties. The evidence points to further concentration of wealth among particular 
wealth holders during this short period, and many of the surviving wealth holders are 
likely to have benefited from this concentration of wealth.
2.5.2. Survival of Wealth Holders in Regional Perspective
If we turn our focus to the regional perspective, the changes that can be identified in 
regional distribution indicate certain rises and falls within the Japanese wealthy elite 
group. Comparison of the data from 1915 to 1933 suggests that a significant minority of 
the group did not survive, even in the small regions. This data is given in Table 2.6 and 
Table 2.7 (see, p. 108).
Table 2.10 Wealth holders whose estimated wealth was over 3 million yen in 1933
(percentage of total in each group)
a) General distribution
Listed as millionaire in the 1915 data set 56.8
Listed as half-millionaire in the 1915 data set 17.0
Newcomers 26.2
Total 100.0
Total (absolute number) 611
Sources: As Table 2.6.
b) regional distribution
(regions) Millionaire Half-millionaire Newcomers Total Total sample 
(absolute number)
Hokkaido 25.0 35.3 41.6 99.9 12
Tohoku 58.0 32.2 9.7 99.9 31
Kanto 56.3 6.3 37.5 100.1 16
Chubu 57.5 21.9 20.5 99.9 73
Hokuriku 30.0 40.0 30.0 100.0 10
Kansai 48.5 14.6 36.9 100.0 103
Chugoku 40.0 26.6 33.3 99.9 30
Shikoku 57.1 42.9 0.0 100.0 7
Kyushu 56.5 21.7 21.7 99.9 23
Colonies 40.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 6
Tokyo 68.4 9.6 21.9 99.9 187
Osaka 55.3 17.5 27.2 100.0 114
Note: categorisation is based on the result from the 1915 data set. Figures do not total 100 percent 
due to rounding.
Sources: As Table 2.6.
114
Table 2.11 Occupational distribution of wealth holders whose wealth exceeded
over 3 million yen in 1933 (percentage in each group)
Landlords 15.0
Aristocracy 7.9
First sector 1.8
Secondary sector 15.7
Tertiary sector 37.3
Zaibatsu (or multi-business) 5.7
Salaried managers 13.5
Professionals 1.5
Other 1.5
Total 99.9
Total (absolute number) 611
Note: Figures do not total 100 percent due to rounding.
Sources: As Table 2.6.
Undoubtedly, as mentioned above, the urbanised regions, for instance, the two 
metropolitan areas or the maritime centres of Kobe and Yokohama, experienced great 
upheavals within the wealthy elite group. However, if we consider the occupational 
distribution of the surviving and non-surviving wealth holders in the urbanised areas, 
we can see the extent to which the wealth holders’ group, as categorised by 
occupational status, suffered from the major upheavals in the economy and business 
during this period. Shibuya briefly analysed the survival in 1933 of wealth holders, 
whose wealth had exceeded 10 million yen in 1915, utilising the same data source as 
this thesis. He pointed out that many wealth holders whose wealth had declined or 
suffered from huge losses, were engaged in the modem sector, for instance, in foreign 
trading or manufacturing.100 Fuller analysis of the surviving wealth holders undertaken 
for this thesis confirms Shibuya’s results. In the case of the two metropolitan areas, 
Tokyo and Osaka, the importance of the service sector, which had comprised the largest 
group within the wealth holders in the 1915 data set, experienced relative decline, from 
45.2% in Tokyo and 63.2% in Osaka in 1915, to 29.3% and 52.0% respectively in 1933. 
In both areas the members of the wealthy elite who suffered from heavy losses in their 
wealth, were mainly engaged in the modem service and financial sector. Both cases 
show that the wealth holders in these sectors, who had disappeared from the 1933 data 
set, had been mainly engaged in banking, stock broking and also in foreign trading. The 
disappearance of the wealth holders in these sectors may be assumed to have resulted
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from the economic fluctuations during the 1920s, as well as the ensuing financial crisis, 
which had a great impact on the financial wealthy elite, causing bankruptcy in many 
cases. By contrast, other wealth holders in the service sector, in particular those who 
were merchants, managed to survive the period of economic difficulties, even though 
some of them had lost wealth relative to 1915. A similar tendency can be seen in the 
cases of Hyogo and Kanagawa prefectures, in both of which the wealth holders were 
mainly in the main cities of the two prefecture, Kobe and Yokohama. In the case of 
Kobe, the non-surviving wealth holders were engaged in shipping, banking or 
organising zaibatsu styled business, as in the cases of Suzuki or Kawasaki.101 In the 
case of Yokohama, many of the non-surviving wealthy were engaged in foreign trading 
and banking. To some extent, these results indicate the vulnerability of parts of the 
modem sector in the pre-war Japanese economy and business. However, this was not 
the case for wealth holders in the textile or related industries, since they maintained 
their predominant position in the 1933 data set.
Turning to other regions or areas, some significant characteristics of the surviving 
wealth holders become apparent. Apart from in Osaka and Hyogo, in other Kansai 
prefectures the survival rate of the wealth holders in 1933 compared to 1915 was 
surprisingly high. For instance, in Kyoto and Shiga, over 80 percent of the 1915 wealth 
holders can be found in the data set. This result may be regarded as indicating the 
relatively strong economic power of the traditional wealthy elite, since the wealth 
holders in both prefectures consisted mainly of merchants. Analysis of other regions 
also indicates similar characteristics, from the 1915-1933 comparison, namely the 
predominant position of the traditional wealthy elite. One particular example is the 
Tohoku area, where the wealthy elite consisted largely of regional landlords or 
merchants, and where the survival rate of the wealth holders in 1915 was the highest in 
the country (88 percent) as shown in Table 2.6. Similar results come from analysis of 
Niigata and Aichi prefectures. Niigata, the region of the great landlords in pre-war 
Japan, maintained its status as one of the significant areas for Japanese wealth holders 
even in 1933. Some of the great landlords’ wealth exceeded 10 million yen in 1933,
100 See Shibuya, ‘Kaidai’, in TSNZSJSS vol.l, pp.14-16.
101 In the case of the Kawasaki family, although the family business totally collapsed in the early 1930s, 
they managed to maintain their holding company for asset management. However, they frequently 
suffered from huge losses and debts even after this period, and therefore they had not made profits from 
the management of the holding company. See Y. Mishima, Hanshin Zaibatsu, pp.411-18.
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although this wealth accumulation mainly depended on their engaging in the 
non-agricultural sector.102 In Aichi, a regional economic centre but one where the scale 
of economic activities was not tied to Tokyo or Osaka, a similar tendency is apparent. 
Of 22 wealth holders in this prefecture, who had mostly originated as merchants or in 
the food manufacturing business, only three had disappeared from the 1933 data set, 
and in some cases the scale of their wealth accumulation had become very considerable.
Consequently, the results show several characteristics of the surviving wealth holders. 
On the one hand, the changes that can be identified in regional distribution and 
occupational distribution are evidence of rises and falls within the Japanese wealthy 
elite group. Comparison of the data between 1915 and 1933 also suggests that the 
dynastic survival of wealth holders from one period to the next, while maintaining the 
same level of wealth, was rare, even in the case of smaller regions. In particular, 
urbanised areas and the modem sector, both industries and services, experienced a 
considerable upheaval in relation to Japanese wealth holders. On the other hand, the 
changes and upheavals did not influence the share of wealth held by this particular 
wealthy elite group. The service sector, largely consisting of merchants, still accounted 
for the majority of wealth holders, even though they suffered from certain losses of 
wealth or a decline in status compared to 1915.
2.5.3. Comparison of Newcomers and Surviving Wealth Holders
With regard to the changing composition of this particular wealth holders’ group from 
1915 to 1933, it should be noted that during this period, the entry of new wealth holders, 
who had become yen millionaires, also took place. It may be assumed that these new 
yen millionaires, whether they had been among the medium rich in the early 20th 
century or were completely new members of the business wealthy, can indicate the 
change in economic activities or leading businesses in modem Japan as shown through 
personal wealth accumulation. Thus, in addition to the survival of wealth holders, 
comparison of the new yen millionaires with the other wealth holders in this thesis in 
the context of the change in economic activities, occupational or regional distributions, 
and the scale of wealth accumulation, can offer some insights. Because of the huge
102 For these prominent landlords’ economic activities, see for example, Shibuya et al (eds.), Chiho 
Zaibatsu no Tenkai to Ginko, (Tokyo, 1989), pp.45-51.
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amount of data involved, the analysis in this section will be limited to relatively large 
scale wealth holders, namely surviving or new wealth holders, whose estimated wealth 
was over 3 million yen in the 1933 data set. The number belonging to this category is 
611. Leaving aside price changes, the level of inflation from 1915 and 1933 and 
changes in the value of the yen, a simple comparison between the 1915 and 1933 data 
sets indicates the growth in the scale of wealth of the wealthy elite group. In 1915, 209 
wealth holders had assets of over 3 million yen, only about one-third of the number in 
the 1933 data set.
The new individuals, with fortunes of over 3 million yen in 1933, can be divided into 
two groups. The first group is individuals who had been listed in 5Oman yen ijo 
Shisanka Hyo in 1915, but whose scale of wealth had been between 500,000 and 1 
million yen, i.e., they had been half-millionaires in 1915. For this group, the speed of 
wealth accumulation between 1915 and 1933 is likely to have been rapid. The second 
group had been outside the 5Oman yen ijo Shisanka Hyo, and would seem to have 
included both less wealthy members of the elite and those who had made new business 
fortunes during this short period. Overall, the 611 wealth holders with more than 3 
million yen fortune in 1933 consisted of three groups: those who had been yen 
millionaires in 1915; yen half-millionaires in 1915; and individuals from outside of 
both categories.
Data on the 1933 wealth holders, whose wealth exceeded 3 million yen, indicates that 
about three-quarters (nearly 74 percent) had been millionaires or half-millionaires in 
1915, as displayed in Table 2.10 a) (see p. 114). Thus even though over a quarter of the 
wealth holders in this category (about 26 percent) had not belonged to the same 
category in 1915, they were not a majority within this particular group.
If we turn to the regional distribution of this wealth holders’ group, as in Table 2.10 b) 
(see p. 114), the results confirm some of the characteristics noted in relation to the 
tendency of survival of wealth holders in 1933. The Tohoku area, the region in which 
the most 1915 millionaires were surviving in 1933, displays the lowest proportion of 
individuals, who had not been millionaires or half-millionaires in 1915, less than 10 
percent of the total. The entry of newcomers was also fairly small in the Chubu area, at 
about 21 percent of the total. In contrast, in the Kansai area, newcomers accounted for a
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relatively high proportion, about 37 percent of the total. This result would seem to 
correspond to the pattern of survival of wealth holders in each area discussed above. 
However, the results from the two metropolitan areas, Tokyo and Osaka, signify certain 
differences in this respect. While Osaka shows a relatively high rate of newcomers 
(nearly 30 percent), the proportion of newcomers in Tokyo was lower than in most 
other regions, at about 22 percent of the total number of wealth holders. In addition, in 
the case of Tokyo, 1915 millionaires accounted for about 69% of all the Tokyo wealth 
holders with over 3 million in 1933, suggesting the pre-eminent position of such 
millionaires in the Tokyo area. It also suggests that even in 1933, the economic and 
wealth power of Tokyo’s 1915 millionaires was enormous.
An analysis of the scale of wealth of the 1933 sample shows that big wealth holders 
within both the group that had been half-millionaires in 1915 and the newcomer group 
were exceptionally rare. Wealth holders with an estimated wealth of over 10 million 
yen in 1933 were primarily those who had already been yen millionaires in 1915. Only 
a handful of these cases were newcomers. The small newcomer group included, for 
instance, Kimura Kuzuyata, the leading director of the Mitsubishi Holding Co. 
(estimated wealth 10 million yen), Count Otani Koyo, the top leader of one of the 
significant Buddhist sects, Jodo Shinshu (estimated wealth 40 million yen) and 
Nakamura Junsaku, president of Taiheiyo Marine Insurance Co. (with 20 million yen ). 
Moreover, although the share of the half-millionaire group within the major wealth 
holders was slightly higher than that of the newcomer group, this does not change the 
fact that the majority of the biggest wealth holders in 1933 came from the 1915 
millionaire group. Moreover, the 1933 data set shows that many of the newcomers and 
former half-millionaires belonged to the lower level of those with fortunes over 3 
million yen in 1933. This suggests that the scale and speed of wealth accumulation of 
these two groups (newcomers and half-millionaires) was rarely equivalent to those 
experienced by the surviving 1915 millionaires. This assumption is reinforced by a 
consideration of the wealth of the new zaibatsu owners, for example, the owners of 
Nissan, Nitchitsu and Riken, all of whom played a significant role in the development 
of heavy industries during the interwar period. Notwithstanding their economic 
contributions, none of these individuals can be found in the 1933 data set. Only Aikawa 
Yoshisuke, the owner of Nissan, belonged to the lowest yen millionaire category in
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1933, with an estimated wealth of 1.3 million yen.103 Even in Aikawa’s case, his wealth 
was far from reaching the level of the old zaibatsu owners. In addition, some of the new 
zaibatsu owners either disappeared or suffered declining wealth. For example, Noguchi 
Jun, who had been a salaried manager in 1915 (his estimated wealth was 2.8 million yen 
in this year) does not appear among the wealth holders surviving in 1933, although he 
was the owner of Nitchitsu in this period.104 It is thus apparent that in the case of the 
owners of the new zaibatsu, their scale of business expansion was not directly 
associated with personal wealth accumulation, in contrast to the old zaibatsu owners.
The occupational distribution of this particular group shows some small difference with 
that of surviving wealth holders, as shown in Table 2.11 (see p. 114). Among the new 
wealth holders with estimated wealth of over 3 million in 1933, individuals from the 
service sector formed the largest group (about 38 percent). Although the proportion of 
those from the industrial sector was also relatively high (about 16 percent), it was still 
less than half of the figure for the service sector group. The analysis also shows the 
pre-eminent position of business wealth holders compared to non-business wealth 
holders. The share of landlords and the aristocracy was even lower than the case of the 
surviving wealth holders, at 15 percent and about 8 percent respectively. Occupational 
distribution at a regional level also shows some similarities compared to the surviving 
wealth holders. Moreover, the analysis tends to correspond to the characteristics of the 
regional distribution of the surviving wealth holders. Thus even if we include the data 
on new millionaires in 1933, whether they had been half-millionaire in 1915 or were 
totally newcomers, we find that overall the general tendencies and occupational 
distribution had hardly changed. Therefore, the presence of these newcomers does not 
appear to have influenced or brought about major changes in the wealth accumulation 
or other characteristics of pre-war Japanese wealth holders.
103 The difficulty in accumulating personal wealth through Nissan’s business is likely to have been 
largely due to the financial structure of Nissan, which relied heavily on external financial institutions for 
business expansion. See M. Utagawa, Shinko Zaibatsu (Tokyo, 1984), pp.59-64.
104 However, there is some evidence that Noguchi had huge personal wealth through Nichitsu’s 
businesses. Nevertheless, according to his testimony, his hidden wealth, which was estimated at 30 
million yen in the late 1930s, was for reserves to rescue shareholders and employees of Nichitsu if his 
businesses went bankrupt, and therefore, he never utilised this wealth for personal purposes. In fact, in 
the early 1940s, when his health seriously deteriorated, most of the reserved wealth was utilised to 
establish an educational foundation. See ibid, p.268, and B. Molony, Technology and Investment 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp.261-63.
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2.6. Conclusion
Through the analysis of both regional and occupational distribution, in addition to a 
consideration of survival rates, this chapter has identified several characteristics of the 
wealth accumulation of pre-war Japanese wealth holders, in particular in the context of 
modem Japanese business development. It has also indicated the importance of 
business success for becoming rich in Japan in this period. There is no doubt that the 
zaibatsu families, in particular those from the old zaibatsu, stood in a prominent 
position among the modem Japanese wealthy elite, with a magnificent level of personal 
fortune. The scale of wealth and business activities of these zaibatsu owners was 
equivalent to, or even far exceeded, that of most of the richest European bourgeoisie 
throughout the pre-war period. Their existence also shows that, considering the level of 
economic development in modem Japan and the nation’s wealth at the time, they 
symbolised the existence of income and wealth inequality in modem Japanese society. 
Comparison with the case of Britain and Germany highlights this point, which is too 
often ignored. Even within the pre-war Japanese wealthy elite, no other wealth holders, 
whether from business or other occupational groups, could match them in terms of the 
scale of wealth and social status.
On the other hand, apart from the zaibatsu families, the results of the analysis 
conducted in this chapter clearly indicate the economic and business power of the 
traditional business wealthy elite, in particular those who belonged to the service sector. 
The service sector itself formed the largest group within pre-war Japanese wealth 
holders throughout the modem period, and no other occupational groups could even 
match it. This service group mainly consisted of merchants. Comparative research 
makes this characteristic even clearer, since both in Britain and Germany, the evidence 
suggests that the wealthy elite from the industrial sector formed the largest group within 
the wealthy business elite, and in the national wealthy elite as a whole. In contrast, in 
modem Japan, although the modem sector did produce the mega-rich members of the 
Japanese wealth elite, those from the industrial sector were the minority because of the 
concentration of wealth within this sector in particular individuals or families, for 
instance, the zaibatsu owners. In addition, the wealth holders from the industrial sector 
were very often traditional industrialists, at both the local and national level. However, 
this does not indicate that there was a clear separation between the ‘traditional’ wealthy
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elite in the majority, and the minority ‘modem’ wealthy elite. The traditional wealthy 
elite largely benefited from the social and economic reforms in modem Japan, and their 
business activities were also restructured and reorganised to fit to the new economic 
conditions, as will be discussed in the next chapter. It is likely that even in the case of 
the traditional wealthy elite, their success, and consequent wealth depended on whether 
or not they could catch up with the new economic situation. A failure to catch up, 
whether in business or technology, undoubtedly resulted in business failure. The 
survival of wealth holders, which was analysed by a comparison of 1915 and 1933 data 
sets, also displays only minor shifts in the structure of the wealthy elite, in terms of 
occupational or regional distribution.
Several remarks can thus be made on the basis of these characteristics. Firstly, the 
predominant position of the service sector rather than the industrial sector is an 
indicator of the level of economic development during the pre-war period. It also tends 
to confirm the existence of the concurrent development of the traditional and modem 
sectors in the pre-war Japanese economy, since many of the wealthy elite from the 
service sector were engaged in the retailing of traditional commodities, in particular 
textiles. The lower proportion accounted for by industrial wealth holders also indicates 
the further concentration of the modem industrial sector in the hands of the zaibatsu. 
Secondly, leaving aside business wealth holders, the data on wealth holders from other 
occupational groups, for instance, landlords or the aristocracy, indicates the level of 
restructuring that had taken place within the social hierarchy. None of these groups 
could continue to be totally dependent on sources of wealth outside the modem 
business world. The dependence on modem business even of so-called ‘non-business’ 
wealth holders in Japan is more apparent than in the case of European landowners and 
members of the nobility. This suggests that the social influence of the non-business 
wealthy elite on modernisation and industrialisation in Japan was relatively limited. 
This forms a sharp contrast with the two European cases, in particular the case of 
Germany.
Undoubtedly, these Japanese wealth holders accounted for a large share of the total 
national wealth by comparison with the British and German wealth holders, even 
though the nominal value of their scale and amount of wealth was far smaller than those 
of the European countries. This, too, supports the existence of a great level of wealth
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inequality in pre-war Japan. However, the business activities of both business and 
non-business wealth holders testify to the fact that the modem Japanese business and 
economy depended on this wealth for further development, at both a local and national 
level, and this will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. The importance of these 
wealth holders is also supported by the existence of multi-directorship among the 
wealthy business elite, except in the case of salaried managers, even though some of 
them were not enthusiastically engaged in the management of these firms. It also 
suggests the extent to which economic development in the pre-war period was not led 
by the government, and the extent of dynamism in the private sector.
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Chapter 3. Family and Business of Japanese Wealth Holders
3.1 Introduction
Through the analysis of my data sets in chapter 2, certain characteristics of Japanese 
wealth holders became apparent, that is, the predominant position of business wealth 
holders among this group, in particular of merchants who had established their social 
status before the modem period. Although the greatest wealth holders were 
concentrated among those who were engaged in the modem sector, like zaibatsu 
owners or other businessmen who ran conglomerate style businesses, the merchants’ 
wealth in itself testifies to their significant role for Japanese economic development 
during the prewar period. Also, from a comparative perspective, it is clear that, with 
regard to wealth accumulation, the old elite, for instance members of the aristocracy 
or landlords, was truly in a minority among Japanese wealth holders. This may be said 
to form a sharp contrast with European cases, like Britain or Germany, since in these 
cases these old elites exercised influence and power over politics and economy of 
their native countries. In addition, the wealth accumulation of these old elites in 
Europe also indicates their relatively significant power in the modem state and 
economy compared to Japan. Thus, the results from the Japanese data would appear to 
signify that a degree of class reorganization and reformation within the social 
hierarchy in modem Japan was relatively substantial and effective, especially in 
relation to wealth redistribution.
However, these results inevitably give rise to a number of critical questions about 
these wealth holders. If such Japanese business wealth holders were certainly in a 
majority among all wealth holders, we need to ask how far the success of this group 
depended on the modernization of inefficient and ineffective traditional business 
systems. To what extent does analysis of wealth holders show whether there was any 
influence of pre-modem or traditional systems within successful modem Japanese 
business? And to what extent did their experience or their business activities have 
similarities or differences with other cases, for instance, European cases of the same 
time, or even contemporary developing countries? We also need to ask whether their 
business activities were business oriented or profit oriented, and, if so, whether the 
role of wealth holders had a negative or positive impact on prewar Japanese business.
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Moreover, if some distinctive peculiarities are apparent, something which has tended 
to be assumed as an indispensable characteristic of modem Japanese business, is a 
general theoretical approach, like the Chandlerian theory of transition from family to 
corporate business that argues for a convergence of business organization, truly 
applicable to the Japanese case?
As pointed out in chapter 1, there are numerous studies and research works by both 
Japanese and non-Japanese academics, focusing on divergent and convergent factors 
in modem Japanese business. Yasuoka, for example, has emphasized the role of the 
indigenous Japanese commercial system, based on business experiences in the 
Tokugawa era, for the formation of modem Japanese business, while Morikawa has 
stressed the existence of some convergent factors of development in modem Japanese 
business with modem western business, from family business to corporate business 
along Chandlerian lines. However, these works, which can be divided into those that 
take a more theoretical approach, and those adopting a more empirical approach, have 
exposed some serious problem. Those which represent the theoretical approach have 
tended to ignore some of the peculiarities and characteristics of modem Japanese 
business. In general, they emphasize that such factors are quite minor within the 
general trend of modem Japanese business, which is assumed to be convergent with 
western business systems when viewed in a long-term historical perspective. It can be 
said this approach might possibly lead to a minimization of endogenous factors, 
which have, in fact, been crucial to the development of modem Japanese business, 
and also to an exaggeration of the impact of external factors on Japanese business. On 
the other hand, because of the wealth of historical evidence and documents, the more 
empirical approach has rarely produced studies and research capable of focusing on 
comparison with foreign experiences, although this approach has obviously 
contributed to producing historical studies of Japanese business that focus on its 
peculiar characteristics. Furthermore, both approaches have tended to focus solely on 
the business historical perspective, and it is rare to find the introduction of other 
perspectives. For example, sociological analysis has made numerous contributions to 
our knowledge of the ie system, and its significant role in Japanese society, and this is 
something that can clearly be applied to an analysis of merchant houses’ ie systems.1
1A rare exception to this case is M. Seoka, Kindai Sumitomo no Keiei Rinen (Kyoto, 1998), which
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Therefore, this chapter aims to analyse some of these peculiarities, like the ie system 
or the nature of modem Japanese business itself, through an analysis of the activities 
of wealth holders, especially those who were engaged in business during the prewar 
period. Much of the attention will be focused on wealth holders’ household systems 
and their influence on their business activities, and for this purpose a number of 
analytical approaches will be utilized. It goes without saying that a historical 
perspective and an analysis of business activities will form the main part of this 
chapter. However, as indicated, a sociological approach will also be explored as a 
cmcial tool for analysis in this chapter. Quantitative analysis, as well as qualitative 
analysis, will both be important in terms of analysis of my data set. Before moving on 
to the main part of the chapter, however, some comments about the categorization of 
business wealth holders, as well as the method of analysis utilized in this chapter, are 
in order.
3.1.1. Categorization of Business Wealth Holders
Although the previous chapters have analysed and discussed all Japanese wealth 
holders whose estimated wealth was over 1 million yen, including both business and 
non-business wealth holders, this chapter will discuss solely business wealth holders, 
since the aim is to focus on modem Japanese business through their activities. 
However, as mentioned in chapter 2, many members of the non-industrial and non­
commercial elite, like local landlords or some professionals, were also engaged in the 
prewar business world, at both local and national levels. For this reason, the 
categorization of business wealth holders in modem Japan will include such members 
of the non-business elite. This characteristic would appear to form a sharp contrast 
with the European cases which will be utilized for comparison. It is also likely to 
cause some errors and difficulties in comparison, since in the European cases, the old 
elite, in particular landowners, were largely separated from various business activities, 
except for land related or property business, in terms of both social status and customs. 
Nevertheless, the comparison between the Japanese and European cases can provide 
some new perspectives, especially regarding differences in the pattern of social
focuses on entrepreneurship through hie use of sociological analysis.
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mobility, in long-term changes and in historical background, in addition to 
highlighting the particular characteristics of Japanese modernization and 
industrialization.
However, this categorization also provokes another problem, that is, the actual 
definition of ‘business wealth holder’ in prewar Japan. To put it briefly, it can be 
defined here as those engaged in business as directors or presidents of companies, at 
both a local and national level, in the prewar period in Japan. In this case, someone 
who was at the time involved in the management of a firm is included, regardless of 
whether they were nominal directors or active managers. In addition, wealth holders 
who established their own asset management companies are also categorized as 
business wealth holders, even though they may have had no experience of 
management in other firms. It may be argued that this categorization may lead to 
some errors in the analysis. On the other hand, using this relatively broad definition, 
some significant characteristics or factors will become apparent. For instance, it 
becomes possible to measure the degree of adoption of different economic and 
business systems within local and urban societies.
Another problem can be found within the data set. Since the main data set is based on 
one particular date, 1915, it does not permit us to relate it to data from earlier or later 
years. In Zenkoku 50man yen ijo Shisanka Hyo, the source of the data set, wealth 
holders were categorized based on their main occupation and social position in 1915. 
It is not, therefore, possible to discover from this data whether the non-business elite 
was engaged in business before or after 1915. The other main source used, Shibuya’s 
Taisho Shoki no Dai Shisanka-Hyo, does provide useful data in relation to the 
definition since it contains data on those wealth holders who were engaged in 
business along with their social position and occupation. This data includes the names 
of the firms in which they were engaged and their managerial status. Nevertheless, 
since these additional data on Shibuya’s list are also based on 1915, the same date as 
the main source, it does not help us tracing further data on wealth holders, which can 
indicate whether they were engaged in business in a higher managerial position either 
before 1915 or after 1915. To confirm possibilities and explore this aspect further, 
other materials have been required. The most reliable and useful material in this
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respect is Ginko Kaisha Yoroku (List of Banks and Companies), which contains data 
on large shareholders and a list of the names of directors and presidents, along with a 
brief report on the firms themselves, for instance the address of the headquarter, the 
date of foundation, and sometimes including financial reports. This material began to 
be published in the latest Meiji period. Although it was published annually, it is 
difficult to find a complete collection of this material throughout the prewar period, 
because many copies disappeared or were lost during the period of the Second World 
War.2 Other materials, such as Shoko Shinyoroku (Report on Financial Credibility of 
Merchants and Industrialists) were also of some value, since they give concise notes 
about an individual’s sub-business, along with his main occupation.3 Also in some 
cases, Kabushiki Nenkan (Annual Review of Corporations for Shareholders) or 
biographical dictionaries (like Jinji Koshinroku), have been utilized; the former covers 
wealth holders as members of boards of directors in corporations, and the latter 
usually contains brief profiles of wealth holders. However, the critical problem in 
relation to these materials is that these sources began to be published only from the 
early 20th century. Therefore, data before 1900 has to some extent to be extracted 
from a black box. For this earlier period, additional information has been drawn from 
secondary sources, for instance, autobiographies or biographies, both of which contain 
detailed curriculae vitarum for wealth holders in addition to other personal 
information.
3.1.2. Method of Analysis
The analysis in this chapter will be a combination of several methods. The data set on 
wealth holders outlined in the previous chapters again acts as the basis for the main 
part of this chapter. However, some supplementary data has been needed since this 
chapter will focus on wealth holders’ business activities with a view to establishing 
the main tendency in their business activities, that is, whether they were business 
oriented or profit oriented. In other words, were these wealth holders primarily rent-
2 Only the Volumes from Taisho 9 (1920) to Taisho 11 (1922) have been reissued recently (Tokyo,
1987).
3 This material was published by Teikoku Koshinsho, the private investigating company that also issued 
Jinji Koshinroku. In contrast to Jinji Koshinroku, this material was published for financial institutions, 
in particular banks, to provide information for financing customers, either individuals or firms. 
Therefore, it was almost certainly also published annually, but the number of such publications is 
extremely limited and only a small amount of this material still remains.
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seekers, or was their business interest such that they used most of the profit from their 
own business to expand their business interests? Of the additional data sources 
indicated above, Ginko Kaisha Yoroku and Kabushiki Nenkan have been utilised to 
acquire detailed data on the firms and corporations which the wealth holders owned or 
in which they were engaged in management. This source has been of value in 
obtaining data regarding the holding companies of wealth holders, since these 
companies tended to be privately owned, and it is thus very difficult to trace data on 
them from other sources.4 The latter source, Kabushiki Nenkan, which gives data on 
corporations in the prewar period, provides valuable information such as the dividend 
rate of each company, lists of major shareholders, and business and financial reports.5
In addition to quantitative and qualitative analysis of the main data set, a sociological 
approach will form a crucial part of the analysis. The introduction of this approach is 
partly due to the problems in the data set. As mentioned briefly in chapter 1, after the 
Meiji Restoration the Japanese social caste system drastically changed. Officially only 
a few categories remained as formal divisions of social status. However, because of 
the vague and ambiguous social class system that existed after the Restoration, 
defining wealth holders by social class became to some extent difficult. According to 
the new classification after the Meiji period, most Japanese inhabitants were classified 
as commoners {heimin). The definition of heimin is very vague and too broad. It 
excluded only the new aristocracy class (kazoku) and the former samurai class 
(,shizoku). Moreover, as the government announced only this broad classification, it 
had no interest in classification within the heimin group in terms of occupational 
status. Most of the published materials used here as additional sources of data 
followed this government guideline on the classification of heimin, and therefore did 
not assign any importance to the detail of wealth holders’ social origins, for example 
by giving the occupational status of the father. In many cases, in the data in 
biographical dictionaries, the term heimin is the only mention of the social origins of 
each individual, and information about social origins is in general quite rare. Except 
for those who were famous or historically important figures, it is almost impossible to
4 For example, published lists of shareholders or annual reviews of corporations only included data on 
joint stock companies or corporations, and therefore did not include any data on those holding 
companies that were privately controlled by families.
5 This material was published annually by Nomura Shoten (currently Nomura Securities Co.). All 
available volumes, which cover from the late Meiji period to 1944, have recently been reissued (Tokyo, 
1983-87(32 volumes from Meiji 45 to Showa 17)).
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trace wealth holders’ social origins through these materials, as it also is through the 
data set of this thesis. Moreover, this also causes problems for determining the social 
origins of yoshi (adopted sons), a group which is crucial to the analysis in this chapter. 
The more sociological method utilized in this chapter helps us to address this major 
problem, by enabling us to make certain assumptions about the recruitment and social 
mobility of the business elite and business wealth holders. Since a great deal of 
research has been done on social mobility and the ie system from a sociological 
perspective, by both Japanese and non-Japanese, their contribution would seem to be 
helpful in shaping the analysis in this chapter. In addition, it is hoped that the 
introduction of a sociological approach, something rarely utilized in research on 
modem Japanese business, will introduce a new perspective for this field of study. 
Historical evidence will, of course, be used in conjunction with this sociological 
analysis.
3.1.3. Brief Content of the Chapter
The content of this chapter can be briefly outlined as follows. The next section (3.2) 
will focus on the social origins of Japanese wealth holders. After discussing the 
general findings on their social origins, the analysis will introduce a comparative 
perspective, in particular with the two contemporary European cases. Attention will 
also be focused on the yoshi (adopted son) system, since it will be argued that the 
system is crucial to any analysis of the particular characteristics of modem business in 
Japan. The third section (3.3) is concerned with the function of the ie system within 
wealth holders’ households. In addition to noting the importance of this system in 
merchant houses, it will be shown how the system had an influence on modem 
Japanese business, and how there was a close relationship between modem business 
organization and the ie system. Several case studies, using merchant houses and 
zaibatsu as examples, will also be discussed. The fourth section (3.4) will discuss the 
business activities of actual business wealth holders. Through an analysis of the 
various tendencies within the wealth holders’ group, the characteristics of wealth 
holders’ business activities, in particular whether they were business oriented or profit 
oriented, will be explored. Also the characteristics of their investment activities in 
other firms or sectors will also be a focus of attention. Again, a comparative
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perspective will be introduced. Finally, I will take some analysis of the profit and 
profitability of wealth holders’ businesses. Supplementary data will enable some 
discussion of the difference in profits and profitability, for instance, between zaibatsu 
and non -zaibatsu big firms, and it is hoped that this perspective will help to illuminate 
some aspects of the prewar corporate system.
3.2. Social Origins
3.2.1. General Perspectives
From a historical perspective, it seems apparent that modem Japan, in particular from 
the 1860s to the 1880s, experienced a major economic upheaval. Hyperinflation after 
the opening of the domestic market to foreigners was stimulated as European traders 
exploited the advantageous exchange rate of gold and silver.6 This financial crisis 
finally provoked social unrest which contributed to the Meiji Restoration. Various 
economic and social reforms, including the abolition of the Japanese guild system, 
ensued, resulting in the downfall of the traditional economic elite, and the rise of new 
business parvenus. Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that the drastic economic 
and social changes must have had a crucial impact on the social mobility of the 
business wealth elite in modem Japan, whose members suffered from economic and 
social instability during this period. This condition, it may be argued, would seem to 
signify that the top positions within the business elite, in terms of occupational status 
and wealth accumulation, during the early period of industrialization in modem Japan 
were open to any person from outside of the traditional business world.
However, the data set on business wealth holders, which includes data on 659 
individuals engaged in the business sector as their main or sub-occupation, shows the 
extent to which the chances for new entrants from outside of the business world were 
limited. Table 3.1 summarizes the data on the social origins of those business wealth 
holders. In this table, the father’s or (in case of yoshi) adoptive father’s, occupational 
status is utilized as an indicator of the social origins of business wealth holders.
6 See Nakamura, Nihon Keizai, pp.64-66, for more detail.
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Table 3.1 Social origins of business wealth holders 
(wealth holders in each category as % of all business wealth holders)
(S o c ia l O rig in s) (A )
Feudal Lords 0 .2 1
N e w  A ristocracy 0 .2 1
Landlords 12.3 81
F orm er Sam urai C lass 8 .5 5 6
M erchants 39 .1 2 5 8
B u sin essm en  (secon d ary  sector) 9 .3 61
B u sin essm en  (tertiary sector) 6 .4 4 2
Salaried  m anager 0 .4 3
Z aibatsu  or  m u lti-b u sin ess 0 .5 4
P ro fess ion a ls 0 .9 6
H eim in 2 0 .3 134
U nk n ow n 1.7 11
O thers 0 .2 1
Total 1 0 0 .0
Total (ab so lu te  num ber) 6 5 9 6 5 9
Sources: calculated from, Zenkoku 50man yen ijo Shisanka Hyo, Taisho shoki no Daishisanka Hyo, 
Jinji Koshinroku 4th version (Tokyo, 1915), various biographical dictionaries, autobiographies and 
biographies.
Note: The figures are based on the father’s occupation (in the case of adopted son (yoshi), the adoptive 
father’s occupation). (A) signifies the absolute number of each group.
In this group, we find a strong tendency towards the reproduction of class hierarchy. 
Over half of the sample (about 56 percent) came from the merchants and businessmen 
group. Moreover, within this group, merchants still held a predominant position, 
nearly 40 percent of total observations. These results indicate a relatively high rate of 
self-recruitment within the business wealth holders’ group. However, this data does 
not necessarily show a stable position for this business elite group. Economic 
upheaval and social changes during the late 19th century resulted in the downfall and 
rise of individuals within the business elite, especially merchants. From his research 
on the survival of elite merchants during the transitional period, from the late 
Tokugawa era, Miyamoto has emphasized the existence of great changes in the 
economic circumstances of the rich merchant group.7 Nevertheless, the data in Table
3.1 also indicate that these changes and upheavals were limited to within the merchant 
group. We may thus assume that the continuation of the merchant group as a social 
class is likely to have inhibited the entrance of newcomers, in particular persons from 
the lower social strata, into the business wealth holders’ group. It should be noted that 
the relatively high percentage of heimin (commoners) in the table does not signify the 
existence of a high proportion of those with lower class origins within this category,
7 See Miyamoto, ‘Kindai ikoki ni okeru Shoka Kigyoka no Seisui’, in Doshisha Shogaku 50-5 (1999).
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o
something which will be discussed later.
Table 3.2 Social origins of business wealth holders by regional distribution 
(percent of all business wealth holders in each group (left side): absolute number
by each category (right side))
A) Metropolitan Areas (and Kanto, Kansai)
(S o c ia l S tatus) T ok yo K anto O sak a K ansai
Feudal Lords 0 .6 1
N e w  A ristocracy 1.0 1
Landlords 4 .0 7 10 .0 4 2 .9 5 9 .9 10
Form er Sam urai 10 .2 18 2 .5 1 2 .9 5 10 .9 11
M erchants 5 0 .2 89 4 2 .5 17 4 4 .4 76 3 7 .6 38
B u sin essm en  (2"y) 4 .5 8 15 .0 6 8 .2 14 17 .8 18
B u sin essm en  (3 iry) 2 .8 5 17.5 7 9 .4 16 4 .9 5
S alaried  M an ager
Z aibatsu 1.7 3 0 .6 1
P ro fess ion a ls 2 .3 4 1.2 2
H eim in 2 3 .7 42 12.5 5 2 5 .7 4 4 1 4 .9 15
U n k n ow n 4.1 7 3 .0 3
O thers 0 .6 1
T otal 100 .0 177 1 00 .0 4 0 1 0 0 .0 171 1 0 0 .0 101
S ource: A s  T ab le  3 .1 .
N ote: the ca teg o ry  o f  reg io n s is  b ased  on  th e d efin ition  o f  the reg ion al d istrict in  Japan, e x c e p t  in  the c a s e  o f  T o k y o  and O saka, 
s in c e  a large n um b er o f  b u sin ess  w ea lth  h old ers are con centrated  in  both  p refectures. T h e p refectures w h ich  w a s m ad e up each  
reg ion a l d istrict are as fo llo w s:
K anto: K an agaw a, C hiba , S a itam a, Ibaragi, G unm a, T och ig i.
K ansai: H y o g o , K y o to , S h iga , N ara, W akayam a.
B) North and Central Japan
(S o c ia l S tatus) H ok k aid o T ohoku H okuriku C hubu
F eudal Lords
N e w  A ristocracy
Landlords 6 1 .9 13 2 7 .2 3 4 7 .6 30
Form er Sam urai 2 8 .6 4 9 .5 2 18.2 2
M erchants 9 .5 2 9.1 1 2 8 .6 18
B u sin essm en  (2 “° ) 9 .5 2 9.1 1 11.1 7
B u sin essm en  (3"y) 2 8 .6 4 4 .8 1 18 .2 2
Salaried  M an ager
Z aibatsu
P ro fess ion a ls
H eim in 4 2 .8 6 18 .2 2 12.7 8
U nk n ow n 4 .8 1
O thers
T otal 100 .0 14 100 .0 21 1 0 0 .0 11 1 00 .0 63
Source: A s T ab le 3.1
N ote: T h e p refectures w h ich  m ad e up each  reg ion a l d istrict are a s fo llo w s:  
H ok k aid o: H ok k a id o  on ly .
T ohoku: A o m o r i, M oriok a , A k ita , Y am agata , M iy a g i, Fukushim a. 
Hokuriku: T oyam a, Ish ik aw a, Fukui.
C hubu: N iig a ta , N a g a n o , Y am an ash i, S h izu ok a , A ic h i, G ifu , M ie .
8 The main problem of this categorization, heimin, is that it does not indicate social origins in any 
specific sense. For instance, under the ie system, except for the eldest son or the inheritor of the ie, 
children originated in the former samurai class or even in the new aristocracy easily lost their social 
status after die succession of the eldest brother, and were thus re-categorized as heimin. In addition it 
was common for persons who had originated in the former samurai class to abandon their status after 
the Restoration and define themselves as heimin.
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C) South Japan
(S o c ia l S tatus) Chu zoku S hik oku K yu sh u
Feu d al Lords
N e w  A ristocracy
L andlords 42 .1 8 3 .2 1
Form er Sam urai 15 .8 3 2 5 .0 3 2 5 .8 8
M erchants 2 6 .3 5 3 3 .3 4 2 5 .8 8
B u sin essm en  (2 “y) 10 .5 2 16 .7 2 3 .2 1
B u sin essm en  (3 “y) 8 .3 1 6 .5 2
Salaried  M anager 16 .7 2
Z aibatsu
P ro fess ion a ls
H eim in 5 .3 1 3 5 .5 11
U n k n ow n
O thers
T otal 100 .0 19 100 .0 12 100 .0 31
Source: A s  T ab le  3.1
N ote: T h e prefectures w h ich  m ad e up each  reg ion a l d istrict are as fo llow s:
C hu gok u : O k ayam a, T ottori, S h im an e, H irosh im a, Y am aguchi.
S h ik oku : K agaw a, T ok u sh im a, K o c h i, E h im e.
K yu sh u: Fu k u oka, S a g a , N ag a sa k i, K u m am oto , O ita, M iyazak i, K agosh im a, O kinaw a.
Leaving aside the commercial and business elite group, other social groups are barely 
represented among business wealth holders. However, turning to their regional 
distribution, as shown in Table 3.2, several characteristics which were mentioned in 
chapter 2 are also apparent from this data. Although the commercial and business elite 
had a predominant position in urbanized regions, especially in the large cities (for 
instance, Tokyo, Nagoya or Osaka), those of landlord origin constituted the majority 
in particular areas, like Tohoku and Niigata. Business wealth holders who originated 
in the former samurai class tended to concentrate in the Tokyo area. This regional 
distribution suggests the existence of a certain pattern of geographical and geo­
political influence among the wealth holders’ group. Moreover, leaving aside 
consideration of the heimin group, the recruitment pattern of Japanese business wealth 
holders seems to reflect the limitations on entrance into the business world from 
particular social groups, notably to merchants and the former samurai class. The 
degree of social isolation in terms of recruitment would seem to correspond to Yui 
and Hirschmeier’s assumption regarding the social origins of the business elite, which 
emphasised the strong presence of merchants and the former samurai within the Meiji 
Japanese business elite.9 However, this may be true only for the upper echelons of the 
business elite, and not for businessmen as a whole, including those from middle and 
small-scale businesses.
9 See Yui and Hirschmeier, Development o f Japanese business, esp. pp.95-103.
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With regards to the heimin category, it is hardly possible to classify them by 
occupational category in any detail for the reasons explained in the introductory part 
of this chapter. Thus, for many of those within the commoners’ category, their socio­
economic status is unclear, and because of the broad definition of this social class, it 
may be assumed that some of them came from the lower classes and became members 
of the business wealth holders’ group included in the data. Among famous members 
of the business elite included in the data set who had originated in the lower social 
classes was Yasuda Zenjiro. Bom in a poor commoner family in northwest Japan in 
1838 (his father had later purchased the status of lower class samurai), over a single 
generation Yasuda founded the Yasuda Zaibatsu, one of the Big-Four zaibatsu 
characterized by its focus on finance.10 Another example is Nitta Chojiro, who came 
from an outcast family on the island of Shikoku, and used the burakumin business 
network to found his own leather business in Osaka, which became one of the largest 
leather firms in Japan.11 These examples are, however, rare and exceptional cases 
among the commoner group. The reasons for this and a more detailed explanation are 
discussed on the basis of the next table.
Table 3.3 displays the occupational status of business wealth holders in accordance 
with their main business. In the case of the business elite, the table shows the strong 
tendency towards reproduction of social class. Around 80 percent of each of the larger 
groups within the business elite chose the same occupation as their fathers. The 
landlord group indicates similar characteristics to those of the business elite, since a 
high percentage of landlords’ sons chose agriculture as their first occupation, even in 
the case of those who were active in more than two sectors.
10 Although a reliable biography or autobiography of Yasuda has not been published, brief data on his 
social origins are shown in Jitsugyo-no-Nihonsha (ed.) Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsu Den Vol. 2. (Tokyo, 
1931).
11 Although his social origins are not explained on his autobiography (Kaiko 77nen (Osaka, 1934)), 
data on Nitta’s social origins is given in M. Fukuhara, Toshi Buraku Jumin no Rodo Seikatsu Katei’ in 
K. Sugihara et al(eds.), Taisho, Osaka, Suramu (Tokyo, 1986), esp. pp. 110-11. The details of the 
relationship between outcasts and the leather business are also described in this article.
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Table 3.3 Occupational status of wealth holders by social origins (depending on
their main business in this period)
a) non business elite groups and samurai (by percentage of total in each group (left 
side): by absolute number (right side))
^ ^ ^ ^ O r i g i n s ^ Feudal Lords N e w
aristocracy
Landlord Sam urai
C lass
W ealth  h olders 3 .7 3 1.8 1
M erchant 3 .7 3 8 .8 5
Industry 1.2 1 17 .9 10
S erv ice 2 .5 2 12 .5 7
F inan ce 6 .2 5 1.8 1
Zaibatsu 1.2 1
M u lti-B  a)
M u lti-B  b ) 2 2 .2 18 7.1 4
Salaried  M . 100 .0 1 100 .0 1 1.2 1 4 2 .9 2 4
Landlord 5 8 .0 4 7 7.1 4
Total 100 .0 1 100 .0 1 100 .0 81 1 0 0 .0 5 6
Source: sa m e as T ab le 3 .1 .
N ote: ‘W ealth  h o ld ers’ s ig n if ie s  th ose  form erly  en gaged  in  b u sin ess  b ut retired at th is  p eriod .
‘M u lti-b u s in ess ’ a )  in d ica tes  that the b u sin ess  a c tiv ities  o f  the sam ple em braced  severa l b ran ch es w ith in  a s in g le  b u sin ess  sector. 
‘M u lti-b u s in ess ’ b ) in d icates that th e b u sin ess  a ctiv itie s  o f  the sam p le  w ere  spread ov er  m ore  than o n e  ec o n o m ic  sector.
T h e d e fin itio n  o f  landlord as a  m ain  activ ity  is  b ased  on  in form ation  regard ing w hether th ey  w ere  m a in ly  en g a g ed  in  a particular  
b u sin e ss  sec to r  or  n ot. It d oes  n o t s ig n ify  that th ey  w ere  n o t en gaged  in an y  b u sin ess .
b) Business groups and professionals
— -> ^ ^ O r ig in s ^ M erchant B u sin ess  (2 nd) B u sin ess
(3 rt)
Zaibatsu
(M u lti-B )
Salaried
M an ager
P rofessiona ls
W ealth  h old ers 3.1 8 3 3 .3 1
M erchant 8 1 .4 21 0 16.7 1
Industry 1.6 4 7 8 .7 4 8 1.4 1
S erv ice 2 .7 7 1.6 1 64 .3 27 3 3 .3 1 16.7 1
F inan ce 2 .7 7 26.1 11 16.7 1
Zaibatsu 4 .6 12 1 0 0 .0 12
M u lti-B  a ) 0 .4 1 1.6 1 2 .4 1
M u lti-B  b ) 1.2 3 9 .8 6 2 .4 1 16.7 1
Salaried  M 2 .3 6 8 .2 5 2 .4 1 3 3 .3 1 33 .3 2
Landlord
Total 100 .0 258 1 0 0 .0 61 100 .0 4 2 10 0 .0 12 9 9 .9 3 100.1 6
S ou rces and note: sam e as ab ove.
c) other social groups
-^ ^ ^ O r ig in s ^ H eim in U n k n ow n O ther
W ealth  holders
M erchant 11.2 15 18 .2 2
Industry 11.2 15 18 .2 2
S erv ice 18 .6 25 1 0 0 .0 1
F inan ce 17 .9 24 2 7 .3 3
Zaibatsu 0 .7 1
M u lti-B  a) 1.5 2
M u lti-B  b) 3 .7 5
Salaried  M 35.1 4 7 3 6 .3 4
Landlord
T otal 100 .0 134 1 0 0 .0 11 1 0 0 .0 1
S ou rces and n ote: sa m e as ab o v e
However, the former samurai group and commoner group show different
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characteristics compared to those who originated in the business elite. The channels 
for becoming rich business wealth holders were constrained and limited for those 
whose origins lay outside the business group. Most of the commoner group 
concentrated in the service and financial sectors, in addition to being salaried 
managers. Of the commoners working in these sectors, many were engaged in 
particular businesses, for instance, the trading and share broking business, which were 
relatively new and modem sectors of business within the Japanese business world. It 
may be suggested that this signifies that their limited chances were focused on these 
somewhat risky businesses, which were repeatedly damaged by economic crises 
during the late 19th century.
3.2.2. Education of Wealth Holders
Another indicator, which helps us understand some of the characteristics of this 
wealth holders’ group is educational information. Despite an attempt to collect data on 
education, such information is hard to come by, and therefore in this thesis 
information is available for only a handful of cases. However, there is another 
plausible reason for the lack of any educational data for most of the sample. 
According to the data set, more than half (about 55 percent) was bom before the 
Meiji Restoration of 1868. Many who were bom after 1868, had a date of birth in the 
early Meiji period. It is highly likely that the relative absence of modem educational 
institutions at the time of their childhood is connected to the low levels of education 
suggested by available information in the data set.12 In addition, it is plausible to 
argue that many of those in the sample who came from merchants’ families had 
experience of practical training from their merchant houses, instead of formal modem 
education.13 Thus, compared to other social groups, we may assume that the merchant 
origin group was more practically educated, even though they may have had little 
chance of being well-educated under a modem educational system.
12 The compulsory education system was fully introduced after 1889, the year of the proclamation of 
the Meiji Constitution. Even in 1914, only around 20 higher educational institutions had been 
established in Japan, mostly concentrated on the Tokyo and Kansai areas. See Yonekawa, ‘University 
Graduates’, p. 185.
13 Research into practical training in merchant houses is substantial. For general information, see S. 
Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka no Keieirinen, Seido, Koyo (Kyoto, 1998); M. Uemura and Matao Miyamoto, 
‘Keieisoshiki to Keieikanri’, in S. Yasuoka et al(eds.), Nihon Keieishi Vol.l (Tokyo, 1995).
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Table 3.4 Percentage of the wealth holders (on whom educational information 
available) who graduated from university or higher educational institutions, by
occupation
(S o c ia l S tatus) (A )
F eudal Lords N o  sam p le
N e w  A ristocracy 1 0 0 .0 1
L andlords 4 .9 4
Sam urai C lass 2 1 .1 12
M erchants 9 .2 14
B u sin essm en  (2"y ) 9 .8 6
B u sin essm en  (3 “y ) 19 .5 8
Z aibatsu  and M u lti-B u sin ess 7 5 .0 3
S alaried  M anager U n k n ow n
P rofess ion a ls 6 6 .6 4
H eim in 2 2 .9 3 0
Note: (A) is a absolute number of the sample in each social group 
Source: same as Table 3.1.
Overall, though, a sample of fewer than one hundred for whom educational 
information is available can be obtained from the data set, and the possibility of 
mishandling or some missing data may make errors inevitable. However, the findings 
from the data set presented in Table 3.4, do show some significant characteristics of 
this group. Undoubtedly, the rarest examples are the zaibatsu owners, in particular 
those bom after the start of the Meiji period. For example, Iwasaki Hisaya and 
Iwasaki Koyata, the third and fourth heads of the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu, both graduated 
from foreign universities, namely the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania and the University of Cambridge.14
Leaving aside this kind of rather prestigious experience, perhaps the most surprising 
result from the data is that the heimin (commoner) group seems the most well- 
educated compared with other social groups. Nearly one-quarter of this group (about 
23 percent) graduated from higher educational institutions, and this figure slightly 
exceeds that shown for the former samurai class group, about 21 percent of whom 
were well-educated.15 If we focus only on those who chose salaried manager as their 
occupation, the figure is conspicuously higher. In the case of those members of the 
heimin group whose occupational status was salaried manager, nearly half (about 45 
percent) graduated from universities. Although the sample is smaller, the former 
samurai group shows a similar tendency to the heimin group, as one-third of the
14 Their experience of foreign study is described in detail in Miyakawa, Iwasaki Koyata (Tokyo, 1996), 
pp. 19-35.
However, it should be noted that information is missing on other social groups, and the real figure 
makes it likely that the sample of well-educated persons is higher than the result from the data set.
138
sample graduated from university. It may be assumed that even in early 20th century 
Japan, education itself was highly significant for engaging in the business sector from 
outside of the business world, and consequently becoming a wealthy individual.
On the other hand, the results from the data set also give some indication that 
education might be a barrier to entry into the business world, especially for those who 
originated from the lower classes. The relatively high percentage of well educated 
persons among the heimin group signifies that even though accurate information on 
social origins and their fathers’ occupation may not be available, they are unlikely to 
have originated as poor workers or farmers, whose social status posed a disadvantage 
to access to higher education. Scarcity of higher educational institutions, poverty and 
limited access to any public or private financial support, probably prevented those 
from the lower class, without any financial or other advantages, from entering the 
business world. The results relating to educational level, therefore, support the 
assumption of a lower level of upward social mobility within the business wealth 
holders’ group in modem Japan. In spite of major social and economic reform in 
addition to the continuous economic upheaval, individual opportunities and success 
within the business world remained limited to those who came from a number of 
socially more advantaged groups.
3.2.3. Comparative Perspective
These results from the data set do not, however, indicate that modem Japan was an 
unusual case. Many recent studies on the social mobility of business elites in the 
modem era in Europe (and in some cases including the example of the United States) 
have shown that these business elites during periods of rapid and late industrialization 
tended to be very socially exclusive in terms of their social origins. Therefore, in 
Europe, as well as in prewar Japan, family background becomes a significant factor 
for the making of the business elite. In an earlier contribution in this field, Kaelble 
suggested the exclusivity of this group by utilizing a sociological and comparative 
methodology. Through comparative research on long-term changes in the recruitment 
of the business elite in the U.S., Britain and Germany, Kaelble emphasized that most 
of the business elite in these three countries came from privileged families, in
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particular from the upper middle businessmen group.16 Among the three countries, the 
rate of self-recruitment was conspicuously high in the U.S. case, comprising about 70 
percent of the business elite in the period of 1891-1920.17 Despite a slightly lower 
level of self-recruitment in the British and German cases, these countries displayed 
similar tendencies to the U.S..18 What is different in each country from Kaelble’s data 
is that recruitment from professional groups was slightly higher in the U.S., compared 
to Britain and Germany (11 percent in the period from 1891 to 1920, as compared to 
7.3% in the British case, 1900 to 1919, and 3% in the German case, 1871 to 1914). A 
high rate of recruitment from upper and middle ranking civil servants characterised 
Germany, peculiar as there was a total of 16 percent from these two groups (1871 to 
1914). In Britain, the proportion of the business elite coming from the landowners’ 
group was slightly higher, at 10.6% of the total from 1900 to 1919. Despite the great 
disparities between Japan and these three more industrialized countries, whose stage 
of industrialization and level of economic stability in the early 20th century was 
diverse, it is remarkable that in terms of the social origins of the business elite, Japan 
would appear to have shared certain common characteristics with these three countries. 
In spite of some difficulties in achieving accurate comparison, largely due to the 
differences in classification and categorization of social groups in Japan as compared 
with the U.S. and European cases, these data show that differences in the social 
origins of the business elite were smaller than might have been expected.
Other studies, including regional and comparative research, show almost the same 
tendencies as Kaelble’s study. Cassis conducted similar comparative research (in this 
case on Britain, France and Germany), and his data analysis also depicted 
characteristics of social origin in the three countries that were more similar than 
different. Although Cassis’s sample date was slightly different from that of Kaelble, 
his 1907 data also shows that in terms of social origins businessmen accounted for the 
largest group in the business elite in all three countries.19 In Cassis’s findings, too, the 
lower classes, for instance workers in small businesses, are hardly represented. 
Cassis’s case likewise shows some differences in the characteristics of the recruitment 
of the business elite between these European countries, namely a slightly higher rate
16 See H. Kaelble, Historical Research on Social Mobility (London, 1981), esp. chap 5.
11 Ibid, p.85.
18 Data is shown on ibid, p.89, p.97.
19 See Cassis, Big Business, (Table 6.1) p. 124.
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for civil servants becoming business leaders in France and Germany (16 and 15 
percent of the totals respectably), and the relative importance of landowners in Britain 
and France (9 and 10 percent respectably).20 In addition, other studies also seem to 
indicate a high rate of self-recruitment among the business elite. Among the 
considerable German scholarship on the business elite, the research on commercial 
councillors, a special title in Imperial Germany granted to business leaders or 
members of the wealthy business elite, is significant for our purposes, since receiving 
this title distinguished these businessmen from their untitled colleagues, and was also 
a public manifestation of their position of honour in Imperial Germany.21 For instance, 
despite a lack of clarity about their real social status, Kaudelka-Hanisch’s research 
indicates that 89 percent of the fathers of commercial councillors in Westphalia and 
Dusseldorf had been businessmen.22 Another study of Westphalian commercial 
councillors, conducted by Henning, also indicates a high rate of self-recruitment (72 
percent from business 1880 to 1889, and 80 percent 1890 to 1909) and a low 
proportion of businessmen of lower class origin. The results from other studies of 
social mobility either on a comparative or regional basis, display similar tendencies, 
and to some extent signify the exclusivity of recruitment of the business elite and 
business leaders in more industrialised countries at this time.
These results are, however, limited in their implications for a discussion of business 
wealth holders, since the definition of ‘business elite* in these studies has invariably 
given priority to status in the business world, and has been less concerned with the 
amount of wealth. Moreover, some of these studies, especially the research on 
commercial councillors, is likely to have included those who were less wealthy or 
with only medium wealth. Thus, to analyse Japanese business wealth holders from a 
comparative perspective and in more detail, we need to focus particular attention on 
the very rich group in the European cases. For this purpose, Augustine’s study on very 
wealthy businessmen in Imperial Germany, and Rubinstein’s research on British 
wealth holders, can provide adequate samples for comparison. Despite a number of 
problems in this comparison because of differences in categorization, in historical
20 See ibid, p. 124.
21 For detail on commercial councillors, see Kaudelka-Hanisch, ‘Titled Businessmen’ in Evans (eds.), 
German Bourgeoisie, pp.91-95.
22 See ibid, pp.124-125.
23 This figure is calculated from H. Henning, ‘Soziale Verflechtung der Untemehmer in Westfalen’, 
Zeitschrifi fur Untemehmensgeschichte 23 (1978), p.5.
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influences on social class formation and in the level of economic development in 
Britain, Germany and Japan, such a comparison of rich businessmen in the three 
countries can reveal some interesting characteristics.
Rubinstein’s data on British wealth holders shows some similarities with other 
research findings on the business elite, as well as with the Japanese case. Among non­
landed wealth holders who died between 1880 and 1919 (categorized as half­
millionaires or millionaires according to probate records), nearly two-thirds (about 64 
percent) were the sons of rich businessmen (or formerly rich businessmen).24 This 
figure indicates not only a high rate of self-recruitment, but also a degree of 
exclusivity of the wealthy elite, and the limited possibility of the lower classes’ being 
elevated into the rich category within one generation. Wealth holders coming from 
small businessmen constitute one-tenth (nearly 11 percent) of the group, although 
these individuals can hardly be categorized as really lower class. It appears that poor 
workers or shopkeepers accounted for only about 7 percent of the non-landed wealthy 
elite. Some results from Rubinstein’s data make a clear contrast with other business 
elite cases. Landowners hardly appear in his data, accounting for less than 2 percent 
of the non-landed wealth holders’ group. Even when farmers’ sons are added, we get 
only slightly over 5 percent. Consequently, Rubunstein’s data suggests the 
homogeneity of non-landed wealth holders in Britain, with regard to social origins. 
However, this does not mean that the landed elite had no interest in business activities, 
since some recent studies have indicated that the landed elite was also involved in the 
business sector as a means of economic survival in the modem penod.
For Germany, Augustine’s findings on social origins correspond to Rubinstein’s 
results. Out of 502 wealthy German businessmen during the imperial period, 
information on the social origins of 407 businessmen was available, and for these the 
rate of self-recruitment was very high: 45 percent of the sample were the sons of big 
businessmen, and an additional 39 percent the sons of businessmen whose socio­
economic status was unclear. Other social classes rarely appear in Augustine’s data. A 
mere two percent of these wealthy businessmen were the sons of officers or 
landowners. Two percent were bom into the families of upper civil servants, and three
24 Calculation based on Rubinstein, Men o f Property, pp. 124,127.
25 For example, see Nicholas, ‘Businessmen and Landownership’, pp.39-43.
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percent came from the professional bourgeoisie, outside the business group. Only 8 
percent of these rich businessmen originated in what were identified as the lower 
middle class, mainly from small businesses. It is acknowledged in the results of 
Augustine’s analysis, that there is a significant grey area about the social origins of 
the 39 percent of the total sample, whose socio-economic origins were unknown. 
However, as Augustine points out, despite the possibility that this figure contains a 
number of individuals of lower class origins, this was, in fact, rarely the case.26 The 
result from Augustine’s sample is quite similar to that in Rubinstein’s study. Even 
though Augustine emphasizes the existence of a fair degree of social isolation of 
wealthy German businessmen in contrast to the British case, Germany and Britain 
would seem to share a number of characteristics in common in as far as we limit our 
focus to the social origins of the two business wealthy elites. Moreover, although we 
clearly have to take into account the major differences in historical and socio­
economic context which are regarded as having led to certain peculiarities in modem 
German history, the difference between these two groups was found to be smaller 
than Augustine had expected.
If we focus on comparing these cases with the data set on Japanese business wealth 
holders, it is apparent that in terms of social origins all three groups seem to be 
characterised by common characteristics, rather than significant differences. The rate 
of self-recruitment was high in Britain, Germany and Japan, well exceeding 50 
percent in all three countries. All three results indicate a low rate of recruitment to the 
wealthy business group from outside of the business class confirming the result of 
analysis of the ordinary business elite. Despite this apparent similarity, however, we 
need to consider that some seemingly similar characteristics may, in some cases, be 
caused by different reasons. For example, the social and historical context 
significantly influenced the lower rate of recruitment from professional occupations. 
In Germany, for instance, social conflict between the economic bourgeoisie and the 
educated bourgeoisie resulted in a lower rate of social mobility of professionals, who 
dominated the latter group, to becoming businessmen. Turning to the Japanese case, 
specialization in modem professions was still taking place in the early 20th century, 
and it is clear that since these professionals had not yet established their status as a
26 From more detailed research, only one case came to light in which an individual rose from the lower 
classes. See Augustine, Patricians, p.54.
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significant social group, in contrast to Britain or Germany, this resulted in a lower rate 
of recruitment from this group. In another example, the relatively high rate of 
recruitment from the landlord group in the Japanese case seems to be similar to the 
pattern in the British case, as despite the lower rate in Rubinstein’s sample, other 
studies have indicated that the heads of big British firms in this period were more 
frequently recruited from the families of landowner-origins.27 However, even in this 
case, we cannot ignore the fact that the Japanese landlord group had multi-business 
tendencies in relation to its business interests. Moreover, cases of those who 
abandoned their agricultural activities and became totally involved in business were 
very rare. We may assume that a relative absence of specialization in profession and 
in business activities, in particular in specific business sectors, was a common 
characteristic of Japanese business wealth holders in this period, as exemplified in the 
zaibatsu cases.
Another illuminating indicator is the education background of business wealth holders 
in the three countries. It seems likely that differences in the level of economic 
development between Britain, Germany, and Japan resulted in a better rate of formal 
education in the European cases, than in the Japanese case. However, despite this 
higher educational rate, business wealth holders in Britain and Germany, who had 
completed their studies at university, were surprisingly in a minority within both 
groups. Only in the case of 194 out of 502 wealthy German businessmen is 
information on education available in Augustine’s study, and of this group only 22 
percent studied at a university.28 In Rubinstein’s study there is no data on business 
wealth holders* education, as this lay outside Rubinstein’s own interest. However, 
other data show evidence of a relatively low rate of education of the British 
businessmen. Although his sample is less than a hundred, 35% of Cassis’s sample of 
1907 business leaders had studied at university. This appears to confirm the 
conclusion of other studies that the barriers of the class system to entry to the 
educational system, in addition to the exclusivity and snobbery of secondary and 
higher educational institutions, for instance public schools in Britain and Gymnasium
•  5 Q  ■in Germany, resulted in this lower rate of formal education in both countries. Thus,
27 For example, see Kaelble, Historical Research on Social Mobility, p.97.
28 See Augustine, Patricians, pp.55-56.
29 For example, for the German case, see P. Lundgreen et al(eds.), Bildungschancen und Soziale
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it appears that the rate of those studying at a university in the Japanese case, at about 
13 percent, is perhaps higher than expected, suggesting the relative importance of 
modem education among Japanese business wealth holders.
3.2.4. The Role of Yoshi (Adopted Son)
Although the differences with regard to social origins in Japan are less apparent in 
contrast to the European cases, from another perspective there is a cmcial difference 
between the European cases and the Japanese case, that is, the higher rate of yoshi 
(adopted sons) among Japanese business wealth holders. According to the data set, the 
result of which are summarized in Table 3.5, over a quarter of the members of the 
total group (about 28 percent) were yoshi, in terms of their position within their 
families. This signifies that many Japanese business wealth holders were not direct 
descendants by blood of the family line. Neither in Britain nor Germany can we find 
such a high rate of adopted sons within the business wealthy elite. Augustine takes the 
example of the Krupp family, in which the husband of the daughter and heir became 
an adopted son, as an exceptional case in her study.30
Table 3.5 The percentage of adopted son among wealth holders by social origins 
(% of all wealth holders in each group who were yoshi)
(S o c ia l S tatus) (A )
F eudal Lords N o  sam ple
N e w  A ristocracy N o  sam p le
Landlords 2 1 .3 17
Form er Sam urai C lass 2 3 .2 13
M erchants 3 3 .0 85
B u sin essm en  (secon d ary  sector) 3 4 .4 21
B u sin essm en  (tertiary sector) 3 3 .3 14
S alaried  M anager N o  sam p le
Z aibatsu  o r  m u lti-b u sin ess 2 5 .0 1
P ro fess ion a ls 3 3 .3 2
H eim in 2 3 .3 31
U nk n ow n N o  sam p le
O thers N o  sam p le
T ota l (ab so lu te  num ber) 184 184
T ota l w ith in  the b u sin ess  w ealth  holders  
grou p  (b y  p ercen tage)
2 7 .9
Sources: As Table 3.1.
Note: (A) is absolute number of the sample in each social group.
However, this kind of situation is very common in the Japanese case, largely due to 
the existence in Japan of the particular household (ie) system, which will be discussed
Mobilitat 2 vols.(Gottingen, 1988), esp. vol.2, pp.319-64.
30 Augustine, Patricians, pp.78-79.
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in more detail in later sections. If we look at the rate of yoshi in each social group, we 
find that in the commercial and business groups, whether merchants or modem 
businessmen, yoshi accounted for one-third of the total in each group (shown in Table 
3.1). This figure of one-third is somewhat higher than those for other social groups. 
However, in none of the other social groups in which there were yoshi was the rate of 
yoshi less than 20 percent. To analyse the significance of the yoshi system for 
Japanese business wealth holders, the following discussion will incorporate a 
sociological perspective, which can help provide a conceptual approach to the 
analysis of the data set on business wealth holders.
Although there are many factors which separate the Japanese ie system from other 
household systems, the system of yoshi was integral to the ultimate purpose of the ie 
system, namely to continue the existence of each ie as long as possible. Under this 
system, blood ties within the family are given less priority, and theoretically a non- 
relative of the head of the ie can be selected as the next possible household head. In 
addition to this characteristic, the ie system has also tended to consist of a small 
household unit, based on the head of the ie and his wife, and the eldest son, or the 
chosen heir. While this system gives the eldest son stronger powers over the 
household as the next head of the ie, the other children, who are not heirs, are 
basically excluded from the ie at the time of marriage, and form their own ie unit. 
Under this system, the ie of the heir is called the main house (honke), and the ie of the 
other children the branch houses (bunke).31 Since the ie system marks a formal 
separation between the children within the family, it is necessary for an ie head who is 
childless to adopt a son and heir in order to ensure the continuation and survival of his 
own ie. Thus, in contrast to most European cases, the selection of an adopted son, 
yoshi, has constituted a significant and inevitable part of the ie system.
From a sociological perspective, there have been a number of works regarding the 
method of adopting yoshi within the ie system. Kitaoji has looked at the ie system 
from the perspective of the inheritance of the head’s position within the ie. If only one 
child, the eldest, is allowed to inherit this position, the Japanese ie system will result
31 For a classical discussion of the ie system, see for example C. Nakane, Tateshakai no Ningenkankei 
(Tokyo, 1967). The English version is Kinship and Economic Organization in Rural Japan (London, 
1967).
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in the formation of small household units, consisting only of the retired head and his 
spouse, the current head and his spouse and the next head and his spouse. Taking into 
account one additional factor, the prohibition on marriage with near relatives under 
the ie system, Kitaoji pointed out the necessity of selecting a spouse from outside of 
the immediate family network.32 According to this argument, the adoption of a yoshi 
as the spouse of a daughter where an ie has no son to act as the next head, and the 
making of the yoshi as the next master of the ie, is the logical result of such a system. 
Kitaoji’s assumptions regarding the ie system were later discussed by Backnik, who 
regarded the adoption of a yoshi as a recruitment strategy for household continuation. 
From Backnik’s perspective, the selection of the head’s wife, the adoption of a yoshi 
as the husband of a daughter and the next head, and even choosing to adopt a married 
couple to ensure succession in a childless ie, have all been methods of ensuring the 
survival of the ie,33 Consequently, despite the relative importance of kinship and 
blood succession for the ie system, the maintenance of the ie through personnel from 
outside of the immediate family network is logically acceptable and plays an 
important role.
Although these assumptions are based on fieldwork in ordinary Japanese local 
families, Lebra indicates that these ideas are also applicable to the Japanese 
aristocracy. From her research on yoshi, who became heads of a number of 
aristocratic ie, Lebra has shown that about half of the aristocratic families on whom 
genealogical information is available had chosen yoshi as the head of the ie (from a 
sample spanning six generations).34 In addition to these arguments, Moore has pointed 
out from his research on the selection of yoshi in the samurai class during the 
Tokugawa period that the composition of yoshi conformed to a pattern of downward 
social mobility from the upper classes or horizontal movement within the same 
samurai class. Moore also suggested that the general assumption about the yoshi 
system, namely that it was a method of upward social mobility from the lower classes 
is a misunderstanding and cannot be accepted.35
32 See H. Kitaoji, ‘The Structure of the Japanese Family’, American Anthropologist 73 (1971), pp.1036- 
57.
33 See J. Backnik, ‘Recruitment Strategies for Household Succession’, Men 18 (1983).
34 See Lebra, Above the Clouds, (Berkeley, 1993) esp. chap. 4.
35 See R. Moore, ‘Adoption and Samurai Mobility in Tokugawa Japan’, Journal o f Asian Studies 29 
(1970).
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These sociological works have made clear several particular characteristics of the 
Japanese ie system, that is, the priority of continuing one’s own ie, the lesser 
importance of direct blood succession, and the limited social mobility in relation to 
the selection of yoshi from outside of the family’s own networks. Although these 
studies have not focused on the Japanese business elite, their results and assumptions 
are likely be applicable also to those Japanese business wealth holders.
Table 3.6 Social Origins of yoshi (adopted son) wealth holders by status of birth 
father (as % of total yoshi wealth holders)
(S o c ia l S tatus) % A b so lu te  N o .
C ourt aristocracy 1.1 2
Sam urai c la ss 12 .5 23
Landlords 4 .9 9
M erchants 15.2 2 8
B u sin essm en  (2*ry) 3 .8 7
B u sin essm en  (3"y) 1.6 3
P rofession a ls 0 .5 1
H eim in 5 8 .2 107
U nknow n 2 .2 4
T otal 100 .0
T otal (ab so lu te ) 184 184
Source: As Table 3.1.
Table 3.7 Social mobility of yoshi (adopted son) wealth holders by adoptive 
family (% of 2XL yoshi wealth holders in each category (left side); absolute 
number in each category (right side))
(S o c ia l S tatus) S am e c la ss  m ob ility D ow n w ard  m o b ility
C ourt aristocracy N o  sam ple 1 0 0 .0 2
Sam urai c la ss 4 7 .8 11 5 2 .2 12
Landlords 7 7 .8 7 2 2 .2 2
M erchants 8 9 .3 25 10 .7 3
B u sin essm en  (2*y ) 7 1 .4 5 2 8 .6 2
B u sin essm en  (3"y ) 1 0 0 .0 3 N o  sam ple
P ro fess ion a ls N o  sam ple 1 00 .0 1
H eim in U n k n ow n U n k n ow n
U n k n ow n U nk n ow n U nk n ow n
Sources: As Table 3.1.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 display the social origins of the yoshi in the sample, based on the 
class or occupational status of their birth father. As shown in the table, the majority of 
yoshi came from the heimin category, whose exact socio-economic status is unknown 
and unclear; this group accounts for nearly three fifths of the sample (about 58 
percent). However, if  we focus on the remaining 40 percent on whom information is 
available, this indicates similar tendencies to those identified by the sociological 
studies mentioned above. In the case of this ‘known* sample, no member originated in
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the lower classes, and social mobility was largely limited to internal mobility within 
the same group or downward mobility from higher social groups. Table 3.7 also 
shows some differences depending on social origins. Among this group, merchants 
and businessmen tended to select their yoshi for the heir from the same occupational 
group. By contrast, cases in which the social origins of the yoshi were higher than 
those of the adopted family are more frequently found among the former samurai 
class. Notwithstanding some differences, this figure suggests the same pattern as 
Moore’s results, and supports the case that the recruitment of Yoshi was essentially 
limited in terms of social mobility.
Some specific cases signify the complexities involved in the selection of yoshi within 
the ie system. The Big-Four zaibatsu families, often seen as representative of 
Japanese business in the modem era, also constitute a suitable sample for analysis of 
the yoshi system. In the case of the Mitsui Families, there was one grand main house 
(soryoke), four main houses {honke) and six branch houses (renke). According to their 
own particular ie system, the head of the Mitsui families and businesses was the head 
of the soryoke. Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine, the head of the Mitsui Zaibatsu 
from 1885 to 1933, was the fifth son of his father’s second marriage. His father, 
Takafuku, the eighth head of the soryoke, already had an heir by his first marriage. 
However, the heir, Takaro, who became the ninth head of the soryoke, died young and 
childless shortly after succeeding to the headship. Normally, because of his status 
within the family, the only choice for Takamine would have been to establish his own 
branch house, since his elder brothers would be more likely candidates to head the 
soryoke. However, by the time of Takaro’s death, his elder brothers had already been 
adopted into other houses due to childlessness. Under the Japanese ie system, since 
his half brother had already inherited the soryoke and become its head, Takamine had 
formally to be adopted by his half brother, Takaro, and had legally to become his half 
brother’s son in order to succeed to the status of head. As a result, even though the 
process of adoption was really complex, Takamine was ironically offered this 
unexpected position as the head of the Mitsui families, and his authority within the 
families exceeded that of his elder brothers. The example of Sumitomo Kichizaemon
36 For a more detailed story about this process, see Mitsui Hachiro’emon Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai 
(ed.), Mitsui Hachiro 'emon Takamine Den. The genealogical tree of the Mitsui families is shown on 
p.208 and p.278.
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Tomoito, (bom Tokudaiji Takamaro), who came from a prominent family of the court 
aristocracy, and was later adopted into the Sumitomo family, becoming head of the 
Sumitomo family and its businesses, displays another pattern o f the yoshi system, 
namely downward mobility from the upper classes. The reason for choosing Tomoito 
as the yoshi of Sumitomo is apparent, since this adoption gave the Sumitomo family 
higher social status, a more prominent position and moreover credibility for its 
businesses (Tomoito’s elder brother, Marquis (later Prince) Saionji Kinmochi, had 
been adopted into the Saionji family from the Tokudaiji family, and became a well 
known political leader during the first half of the 20th century).37
Turning to the heimin-ohgin group, which constitutes a majority of the sample, it is 
almost impossible to accurately determine their social class in terms of their fathers’ 
occupational status. There is little doubt that this group almost certainly contained 
yoshi from the lower classes. On the other hand, it should be noted the ie system also 
means that this group is also likely to contain a certain number from the middle or the 
upper classes. In the case of those from the aristocracy and the former samurai group, 
even though they may have been formally separated from heimin with regard to social 
categorization, there was also a catch in the ie system. Since inheritance of the ie was 
strictly limited to the heir or eldest son’s family, and this system applied to 
aristocratic and samurai families in the modem period, all members, with the 
exception of the eldest son’s family, lost their status and were defined as heimin after 
the death of their father, or when the succession to the eldest son took place.38 This 
therefore suggests that the heimin group was not homogeneous in terms of social 
categorization.
In addition to this kind of sociological consideration, the historical context also helps 
to explain the limitations on upward mobility from the lower classes in the case of the 
adoption of yoshi. Most of our sample was bom in the late Tokugawa or early Meiji 
period, and the lack of a modem infrastructure and strict limitations on people’s 
movements during the Tokugawa period undoubtedly influenced the selection of
37 See Hosenkai (ed.), Sumitomo Shunsui, esp. pp.74-78, for detail. The relationship between Saionji 
Kinmochi and Sumitomo Tomoito is also described in Ritsumeikan Daigaku (ed.), Saionji Kinmochi 
Den (Kyoto, 1991) in more detail.
38 However, in the aristocracy case, some families, in particular prominent families, could receive a 
lower aristocratic title as the master of a branch house. This was quite a privilege for a limited number 
of aristocratic families. For details, see Sakamaki, Kazoku Seido no Kenkyu, pp. 101-105.
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yoshi. It may be assumed that in many cases member of heimin-ohgin group were 
adopted through utilizing a narrow and limited network of contacts. Among this 
sample we can find several cases where information is available to show that 
individuals became the yoshi of their relatives. Of those on whom such information is 
available, only one case indicates upward mobility from a lower social status. Inui 
Shinbei, a prominent financier in the modem non-banking sector, was adopted as a 
yoshi when he was an employee of the Inui family, which was engaged in several 
businesses, and married the eldest daughter of his adopted father.39 In spite of the 
existence of some possibilities of upward mobility from the lower category within the 
heimin group, it would appear that such cases were certainly in a minority among the 
group as a whole. This assumption consequently points to a lower level of upward 
mobility within the business wealth holders’ group, and the existence of a degree of 
homogeneity within it. These findings tend to support the results of work on yoshi 
from a more general perspective.40
3.3. The Function of the Japanese Ie System as a Business Organization
As the analysis of social origins, including the system of adopted sons, partly has 
pointed to the influence of the Japanese ie system, it may be assumed that modem 
Japanese business activities in general, and not just those of our wealth holders, have 
also been influenced by this system, and that this may therefore be regarded as 
constituting a characteristic feature of Japanese business development. However, 
numerous and varied research from a sociological perspective has made it apparent 
that the ie system did not have a monolithic character during the pre-industrial period; 
in Tokugawa Japan, and under the auspices of the Meiji government, the ie system 
was certainly reorganized and reinvented as the household unit of modem Japan 41
39 However, with regards to his earliest social origins, he was the son of a rice-wine trader, and did not 
truly come from the lower classes. For brief information about him, see Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsu Den, 
vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1931).
40 Some sociological studies have also stressed that differences in economic status caused difficulties in 
adopting sons among poor families. See S. Kurosu and E. Ochiai, ‘Adoption as an Heirship Strategy 
under Demographic Constraints: A Case from Nineteenth Century Japan’, in Journal o f Family History 
20-3 (1995).
41 Although research and analysis of the ie system have rapidly progressed throughout the postwar 
period, there is no concrete and clear definition about this system, since it is still a much-debated 
subject among researchers. For recent issues in these debates, see K. Funabashi, ‘Kazoku Kenkyu no 
Genjo to Kadai’, in C. Ueno (ed.), Iwanami Koza Gendai Shakaigaku vol. 19, (Tokyo, 1996), and also 
E. Ochiai, ‘Kindai Kazoku o Meguru Gensetsu’, in ibid, esp. pp.24-32.
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Although in theory this change brought about a great transformation within the ie 
system from the Meiji period, in the case of the merchant houses, from which the 
majority of our wealth holders’ sample originated, the concept of the family business 
based on the ie system had been established before the modem period, and continued 
to be a major influence on their businesses. While their business activities gradually 
shifted and were transformed to embrace the new economic system in the context of 
industrialization, the changes in the ownership, management and business 
organization of merchant houses were somewhat slower than changes in the Japanese 
economy itself. In addition, as many researchers have emphasized, some of the 
characteristics of modem Japanese business, for instance, attaching importance to the 
continuity of the business rather than to short-term profitability, may be considered as 
a part of the heritage of the management of merchant houses in the pre-industrial 
period.
Therefore, in this section, the main attention will be focused on the influence of the 
traditional business and management system, and also the impact of the external and 
internal factors which subsequently led to the transformation of these business 
systems, but within the context of the ie system. In addition we will seek to analyse 
the combination of persisting traditional features and newly introduced features that 
characterised these businesses. For this reason, firstly, it is necessary to give a brief 
outline of the merchant houses and their business system in the Tokugawa period, 
focussing in particular on those characteristics which strongly persisted, or continued 
to influence business practices after this era. The second concern will be with the 
external impact, which caused gradual changes in business and in the ie system of the 
merchant houses, and also the transformation in business and the way in which it 
occurred. This will be done by looking at some case studies of wealthy merchant 
houses, including those zaibatsu that had originated in merchant houses. The third 
point, namely the relationship between the formation of modem business in Japan and 
the ie system, will be discussed through highlighting certain peculiarities in modem 
Japanese family businesses and in the system of Japanese business as a whole. Finally, 
while this section focuses on discussions of the ie system of merchant houses, it does 
not seek to analyse more general perspectives on the modem Japanese ie system, 
because of major difficulties in establishing the nature of the ie as a concrete concept, 
which have resulted in serious disagreement among Japanese sociologists and
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historians. This also means that it is impossible here to offer any detailed analysis of 
the ie system of the merchant houses; many historical questions are still unanswered, 
which makes establishing a clear definition even more difficult.42 Nevertheless, the 
analysis here seeks to identify certain aspects of Japanese business practice that 
pertained to Japanese family businesses and their ie system, and their struggle to 
apply modem business and managerial concepts.
3.3.1. Merchant Houses in the Tokugawa Era
Although the merchant houses after the Meiji period differed considerably from those 
of the past in terms of their organizational structure or behaviour in business activities, 
they also retained in many important respects a basis from their experience during the 
Tokugawa period. For instance, one thing that some historical researchers (through 
various case studies of merchant houses) have regarded as being a remarkable 
achievement, is the separation of ownership and control by utilisation of the ie system. 
Though this separation was relatively incomplete by comparison with its achievement 
under the current business system, some business historians, especially Yasuoka, have 
emphasised that this characteristic played the decisive role in the application of 
modem and westernised business systems to merchant houses from the Meiji period 43 
Since this section is focused on the relationship between the Japanese business system 
and the ie system of the merchant houses, it is this aspect that will be the main 
concern in our analysis.
The tradition of the separation of ownership and control within the merchant houses 
during the Tokugawa era was largely due to one of the main concepts of merchant 
business throughout this era, that is, the importance attached to the continuity of the 
family business. Their approach to business was significantly shaped through the 
influence of the historical background, in particular the characteristics of the
42 Although there did exist some standard concept of the ie system for merchant houses, it is apparent 
from many case studies that in fact the details of the management rules or the patterns of ownership 
certainly differed between each house. See Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka, esp. pp. 17-44, and M. Miyamoto, 
‘Kinsei Shonin Ishiki no Kenkyu’, in Kodansha (ed.), Miyamoto Mataji Chosakushu vol.2 (Tokyo, 
1977). Some sociologists have argued that the ie system was a form of organizational cooperation. For 
example, see K. Aruga, ‘Nihon Kazokuseido to Kosakuseido’, in Miraisha (ed.), A ruga Kizaemon 
Chosakushu vol.2 (Tokyo, 1943).
43 For example see Yasuoka, ibid. And Zaibatsu Keiseishi, pp.491-515.
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Tokugawa regime. Under the system of this regime, the samurai caste enjoyed the 
highest authority as political and economic bureaucrats within each feudal domain as 
well as in the vast territories controlled under the auspices of the Shogun. The 
Tokugawa policy was particularly characterized by anti-commercial sentiment, 
largely due to the political theory of Confucianism which the Bakufu espoused. Even 
though the nature of economic policy within each domain was critical for the samurai 
bureaucrats’ own economic survival, their unrelenting intervention in commercial 
activities sometimes led to the downfall of merchants. In addition, the failures of 
inconsistent and inadequate economic policies within domains also caused great 
upheavals and short-term fluctuations in business among merchants. Even without 
such interventions by the authorities, merchants faced great risks in their businesses, 
for instance, in engaging in new business sectors, because of the complex and varying 
political and economic systems within each domain. Also, in many cases, business 
dealings with feudal lords suffered from the lords defaulting on large amounts of debt, 
largely due to financial crisis in the domains.44 This kind of background consequently 
influenced how the business of merchant houses was perceived, that is, their prime 
purpose was the continuity of the business, and to achieve this some limitation of the 
managerial power of the master or family of the merchant house was necessary. The 
limitations on family power were also partly due to a desire to avoid any intervention 
or antagonism on the part of samurai bureaucrats, who had enough power to destroy 
the merchant houses. The result was that an unstable position in terms of business 
activities and the vulnerabilities of merchants as a social group during the Tokugawa 
era cast a strong shadow over the formation of the merchant houses’ business system, 
which focused on forestalling any internal and external factors that might provoke 
business closure.
Stable management and business over the long-term thus became the great objective 
underlying the approach to business of the merchant houses, and this fundamental 
concept also restricted the activities of family members within merchant houses. One
44 This frequently happened during the Tokugawa period, especially at the beginning of the 18th century, 
when the Tokugawa government suffered from serious economic problems. In this period, many 
prominent merchants went into bankruptcy because of feudal lords evading payment and defaulting. 
Okazaki has pointed out the problem of the legal system in Tokugawa Japan which heavily protected 
the privilege of the samurai and daimyo from bankruptcy. See T. Okazaki, Edo no Shijo Keizai (Tokyo, 
1999), esp. pp.71-85, and also see S. Oishi, Kyoho Kaikaku no Shogyo Seisaku (Tokyo, 1998), esp. 
pp.6-14.
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particular example can be shown in the case of the Mitsui families, which even at this 
time was one of the prominent merchant houses. The Mitsui’s private family law, 
sochiku isho (Will regarding business activities by the Mitsui families), strictly 
regulated their business activities, from the management and organizational system of 
the Mitsui merchant houses through to rules on the sharing of wealth and the manner 
of inheritance among the Mitsui families.45 According to the will, members of the 
Mitsui families were prohibited from utilising their assets freely; while members’ 
assets were, in formal terms, personally owned, they were in fact commonly owned 
by the Mitsui families. Their living expenses were totally dependent on these returns 
from the commonly owned assets obtained through their business activities, and the 
distribution of returns was determined by the status of each family. In addition, to 
avoid any risk of the dispersion of the fortune within each family, only the eldest son 
of each family had any right to inherit an asset, and the other brothers or sisters’ rights 
to the family’s fortune were strictly limited. Though this system was really complex, 
many researchers insist that while the system of the Mitsui families was quite unusual 
among the merchant houses, the purpose was undoubtedly to continue the business 
activities over the long-term, and this system certainly influenced the ownership 
system of the Mitsui zaibatsu from the Meiji period 46
Although the case of the Mitsui families indicates some rather particular 
characteristics in relation to their asset management, this system was far from being 
totally unique among merchant houses. From a comparison of the family law of the 
Mitsui and Konoike families, both of which were prominent merchants during the 
Tokugawa period, Yasuoka notes that both merchant houses possessed a common 
feature in terms of asset management among families, that is, common ownership of 
assets by families was a widespread practice to avoid any risk that might prevent 
continuity of the business.47 In addition, in spite of some difference in detail, the 
establishment of a private family law was the norm among merchants during the 
Tokugawa period. These laws were named differently within each merchant house,
45 The will was left by Mitsui Takahira, the son of the founder, Takatoshi, who established the basis of 
Mitsui’s business. The whole text of the will is in Mitsui Bunko (ed.) Mitsui Jigyoshi Shiryohen vol.l 
(Tokyo, 1973), and also Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi, pp. 183-194.
46 For a detailed analysis of Sochiku Isho and the household organizational system of the Mitsui 
families, see Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka, esp. chap.3 and Miyamoto, ‘Soyu Sisutemu to Shoyushashuken no 
Seigen’ in K. Itami (eds.), Kesu Bukku Nihon Kigyo no Keiei Kodo vol.l (Tokyo, 1998).
47 See Yasuoka Zaibatsu Keiseishi, p. 197
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being referred to as for example, kakun (family rule), teihosho (book of (family) 
regulated law) or kokoroesho (rules to be recognized (by the family)). The rules 
regarding asset management for these merchant houses varied considerably according 
to these family laws. However, all of these laws in themselves indicated the 
importance of money, financial accounting or asset management among merchants.48 
Moreover, the tradition of having a private family law was shared by another social 
group, landlords, even after the start of the Meiji period. From case studies of the 
great landlords of Okayama prefecture during the transitional period, Oishi has 
emphasised that the establishment of a private family law by landlords had the same 
purpose as in the case of merchants, and according to these private laws, the main 
assets of the family would be commonly owned by the inheriting families, and non­
business expenditure among families was strictly limited.49 This evidence can be 
taken as showing that regulation of business and family activities by these private 
family laws was certainly common among those social groups who were engaged in 
business or had sufficient wealth to pass on to their descendants.
Another significant factor relating to these private family laws with regard to business 
activities was the limitation placed on the power of the family and the head of the 
family within the managerial organization of merchant houses. It is clear that even 
though the relationship between the senior employees (who took the role of what in 
contemporary business would be senior managers or executive managers) and the 
master of the merchant house (equivalent to the president) was a sort of servant and 
master relationship under the ie system, these employees were also given a certain 
authority when it came to management of the merchant houses (by these private 
family laws). These senior employees took the responsibility for running the business 
of the merchant houses, and consequently to some extent spearheaded the separation 
of ownership and control. Moreover, since they exercised managerial power in the 
merchant houses, their business authority necessarily exceeded that of the head of the 
house. Rule by family law also enforced the power of senior employees, since these
48 For example, see Y. Sakudo, ‘Omi Shonin no Keiei Senryaku to Kazokushugi no Shiso’, Hikone 
Ronso 262 (1989); and M. Uemura, ‘Omi Shonin Tonomura Sobei Ke to Kakun’, in Hikone Ronso 285 
(1995).
49 Oishi analyzes the private family law of three families, the Nishihattori, Higasa and Nomura families. 
He explains that all the family laws stressed the maintenance of the family assets and the continuity of 
their agricultural and business activities. See K. Oishi, Kindai Nihon ni okeru Jinushikeiei no Tenkai 
(Tokyo, 1985) pp.42-44 and pp.71-74.
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laws legitimated the position of the head of the house in accordance with the extent to 
which he devoted himself to the business activities of the house. For example, in the 
case of Mitsui, even though the eldest son of the master of the house had the right to 
inherit the master’s position, there was a rule that if he impeded the development of 
Mitsui’s business activities, he would soon be disqualified and forced to abdicate 
from his position, after which an adopted son from a related family would inherit his 
post.50 Private family laws also gave the more senior employees and family members 
the right to make any decision regarding the abdication of the disqualified master. 
Such rules were a common characteristic of these laws of merchant houses.51 In some 
cases, there is evidence of senior employees exercising their decision-making power 
in relation to the master. Suenaga cites the case of the head of an Omi merchant house, 
who inherited his position at a young age and was therefore less skilled in business 
management. He was threatened by senior employees with the prospect of leaving all 
employment with his merchant house because of his inappropriate behaviour and 
possible adultery.52 This example suggests that despite their lack of official status, 
these family laws certainly had the power to control the business and to restrict family 
members’ selfish activities.
To some extent, therefore, we can be certain that the private family laws, which were 
a part of the ie system of merchant houses during the Tokugawa era, consequently 
influenced the approach to family business in both Tokugawa Japan and modem 
Japan. Though the account of these laws in this section has offered only a preliminary 
and brief description, there is no doubt that these characteristics were maintained after 
the start of the modem period. The clear separation of ownership and control, and the 
concept of managing the family assets in this particular way, added some particular 
characteristics which separated modem Japanese family businesses from those found 
in some European countries. On the other hand, it is also plausible to argue that these 
characteristics played a significant role in the transformation of merchant houses into 
a suitable form of modem business organization, as will be discussed in a later section. 
However, the survival of these businesses after the Meiji era was largely dependent on
50 See Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka, p.20.
51 For example see Uemura, ‘Omi Shonin Tonomura’ p.330; Sakudo, ‘Omi Shonin’ p. 12; and Yasuoka 
ibid, p.34.
52 See Suenaga, Kindai Omi Shonin Keieishiron, pp.86-89. and for the employment and labour 
management system of Omi Shonin, see M. Uemura, Omi Shonin no Keieishi (Osaka, 2000), esp. 
pp.615-33.
157
external factors, in particular the frequent economic and financial crises they faced, 
and the reforms in the political and economic system, in addition to the destruction of 
the traditional regulations, which had partly protected their businesses from outside 
impacts. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the impact of these external shocks on 
merchants from the Meiji period, and their attempts to survive this critical situation, 
which on many occasions led to the downfall of businesses and the merchant houses 
themselves.
3.3.2. The External Impact on Merchant Houses
Looking at the historical background, it is apparent that a number of political changes 
from the end of the Tokugawa period had a major impact on the traditional business 
system and the merchants. The opening of the domestic market after the abolition of 
sakoku (closure of the nation to foreign intercourse) caused economic penetration by 
foreign powers. Then followed rapid inflation in the domestic economy, which swiftly 
brought the downfall of many merchants, although some of them succeeded in 
business even under the difficult conditions. The downfall o f the Tokugawa 
government and reforms subsequently conducted by the new Meiji government, for 
instance, the abolition of traditional forms of business protection, like the guild 
system, also accelerated rises and falls within the merchant group. Many merchants 
who had been in a pre-eminent position during the Tokugawa era, rapidly disappeared 
from the business world in the early Meiji period. In spite of the great changes in 
economic circumstances and business conditions, their response to these changes was 
often slow and inadequate. Later, Shibusawa Eiichi, the prominent business leader of 
modem Japan, criticized their attitude to the new economic conditions and described 
these merchants as old-fashioned and unable to cooperate in Japanese economic 
development.53 Although the great upheaval in the economy throughout this period 
seems initially to have generated a reluctance to engage in new business initiatives, 
merchants were forced to change their minds after major problems facing their 
businesses, largely due to the economic policies of Matsukata Masayoshi, the finance 
minister in the 1880s, and the so-called ‘Matsukata Deflation*.
53 This part of a critical lecture about this situation can be found in M. Iguchi (ed.), Shibusawa 
Danshaku Jitsugyo Koen (Tokyo, 1913), pp.391-93.
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The long-term economic recession that ensued seriously affected the business of the 
merchant houses, and for many finally led to business crisis during this period. As 
Matsukata had already warned some merchants at a personal meeting where he 
recommended his economic policy to them, there was a great danger of these 
merchants finding themselves in difficulties as a result of the economic policy, and in 
fact many merchants went into bankruptcy or were forced to close their businesses.54 
Therefore, these critical changes in economic circumstances finally contributed to a 
shift in business activities. The period of boom in the founding of firms from the late 
1880s, following this depression period, is evidence for this side effect of Matsukata’s 
policy.55 From the analysis of the statistical data in Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (Statistical 
Yearbook of Imperial Japan) Suenaga notes that in contrast to the period of the 
Matsukata deflation (the worst year of suffering from this depression was 1885), the 
number of new firms founded increased dramatically in 1889, from 1279 to 4067.56 
As Suenaga emphasises, this change partly reflected a shift in the business activities 
of merchants; many merchants began to engage in new business sectors by utilizing 
their assets to invest in new firms, and many of them were also appointed as directors 
or executives of these firms because of their investment activities.
Their response to this first stage, though the depression did have a negative impact on 
their family businesses, manifests a degree of dynamism in business activities. On the 
other hand, their business and investment activities were characterized by a tendency 
towards diversification and engagement in a number of business sectors unrelated to 
their original businesses. This may be taken as indicating that a zaibatsu-sty\e 
business expansion was a common characteristic among the modem Japanese 
commercial and business elite. In addition case studies of investment activities among 
wealth holders during this period have suggested that the pattern of their investment 
was characterized by the existence of personal networks, and this therefore gave to 
their activities the characteristic of some sort of group network.57 In addition, local 
landlords were involved in this boom, in particular in areas like Niigata, where
54 This part of Matsukata’s argument at this meeting is in Chogin Shokan 6th April and 3rd June, Meiji 
16 (1883): quoted from Yasuoka et al (eds.), Omi Shonin, pp. 166-167.
55 For the details of this movement during this period, see Takamura, ‘Introduction’ in Takamura (ed.), 
Kigyo Bokko, esp. pp. 1 -17.
56 See Suenaga, Kindai Omi Shonin, pp. 143-44.
57 See Y. Imuta, Meijiki Kabushiki Gaisha Bunseki Josetsu (Tokyo, 1976), pp.34-48, and also Wada 
‘Meiji 31’ and ‘Taisho 7’.
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landlords had established a predominant position economically and politically.58 
Undoubtedly, the depression period played a clear role in shifting these relatively 
conservative merchants and wealth holders in terms of their business inclinations 
towards becoming more actively involved in new circumstances.
The boom period in the late 1880s was followed by the enactment of the commercial 
code and the introduction of an income tax system in the 1890s. Although the legal 
system as a whole was gradually introduced throughout the 1890s, and also certain 
minor and major revisions of the commercial code took place during this period, this 
legislation finally contributed to the establishment of a modem business system and 
business organization in modem Japan. The introduction of income tax particularly 
influenced the business of merchant houses, since the income tax rate was much 
higher for those who personally managed their own businesses, than for those persons 
who changed their business organization into that of a corporate style firm. The tax 
burden on personally managed businesses was increased by the two wars at this time, 
the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, since the rapid and dramatic 
increase in military expenditure during this period forced further reforms in the 
income tax system by the government in order to respond to the heavy financial 
burden.59 This also played a critical role especially for those merchants whose scale of 
business had expanded rapidly, in compelling them to reorganize and reconstruct their 
business organization from a personally owned merchant house system to a modem 
corporate system. Mitsui is a particular example of this change, though the 
transformation took the form of a combination of modem and traditional factors, and 
will be discussed later. However, in contrast to the boom period, the organizational 
and managerial changes among merchant houses were characterized by the 
establishment of limited partnership companies (goshi gaisha) and general partnership 
companies (gomei gaisha), largely due to the desire to maintain family power with 
regard to ownership and management within the modem firm system. In addition, 
there was relatively little restriction on the founding of such partnership companies, 
since there was no obligation to disclose company information, and legal regulation of
58 For the particular example of Niigata, see Niigataken (ed.) Niigata Kenshi Tsushihen vol. I'.Kindai 2, 
p.90 and pp.239-43.
9 For the detail of the process that changed the income tax system, see Okurasho (ed.) Meiji Taisho 
Zaiseishi vol. 6 (Tokyo, 1937) pp. 1000-1150.
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these companies was limited.60 These shifts consequently indicate that, unlike in the 
boom period, in which merchants had focused on investment and business expansion, 
this stage was characterised by changes in the business system of the merchant houses. 
However, it should be noted that this change may be interpreted as having been 
conducted to minimize negative influences on the authority of the family, which had 
been firmly established under the ie system from the pre-industrial period. Therefore, 
these changes were not that great for merchants, since these reforms did not lead to 
fundamental changes in the managerial hierarchy of these businesses, which were 
essentially a mixture of traditional and modem systems, with regard to recruitment, 
employment and management.
When fundamental changes in the concept of the managerial system and business 
organization did come about, although these had gradually changed from the late 19th 
century in some cases, it was largely due to the First World War. Because of Japan’s 
distance from the main region of conflict and a serious shortage of commodities and 
goods in the world market, Japanese business experienced a great economic boom, 
which caused a rapid expansion of business activities to an unprecedented level. This 
economic boom also led to tax reform during and after the First World War, and this 
reform marked a critical turning point among merchants, since the reform increased 
the tax burden on the partnership companies managed by many merchants for the 
purpose of maintaining the power of the family in their family business.61 The 
economic boom and the taxation reform consequently stimulated a major change in 
business organization, namely reorganisation of the business from a partnership into a 
corporation. In addition, the economic recession from the early 1920s also encouraged 
this change, because many merchants went into bankruptcy in the context of the 
downturn in economic conditions.
From the late 1910s to the early 1920s, many merchants changed their business 
organization to become a corporation, and this shift spearheaded the dissolution of the 
traditional management system, which had been partly maintained among merchant
60 For detail see Matao Miyamoto, ‘Kazokukigyo, Kaishaseido, Keieiseika’ in S. Yasuoka (ed.), 
Zaibatsu no Hikakushi teki Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1985).
61 See Okurasho (ed.) Meiji Taisho Zaiseishi vol.7, pp. 192-203.
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•  < 1houses even in this period. The abolition of the bekke system, a sort of franchise 
system operated by the merchant houses, is one particular example. Under this system, 
the employees of merchant houses were permitted to open their own merchant house 
utilising the trademark of the master’s house, but subject to several contracts that 
strictly prohibited competing with or opposing the master’s business.63 However, the 
gradual reforms of business activities from the late 19th century, in addition to the 
economic boom and further changes, made this old-fashioned system meaningless. 
Many merchants therefore abolished this system or integrated it into a more modem 
managerial hierarchy, making those senior employees executive managers of the 
family corporation. 64 At this stage, the main focus of merchants was the 
modernization of the whole managerial system, including the managerial hierarchy 
and salary payment to employees. However, on the other hand, to maintain family 
power in the family-owned corporation, many merchants separated the day-to-day 
business and the asset management by establishing a holding company.65 Although 
the assets of the holding company were frequently utilised for business expansion in 
many cases, the formal separation of ownership and control finally took place under 
this compromise between the modem corporate system and the reorganized ie system 
of the merchants.
As explained above, therefore, the transformation of Japanese merchant houses may 
be divided into three stages in terms of historical time scale. Although a particular 
importance was attached to business survival, as Japan’s modem economy developed 
and the business gradually became stabilized despite certain upheavals in economic 
conditions, they quickly moved to a focus on changes in business organization, even 
if this change seemed to contemporary observers to be a slow and reluctant one. We 
may assume that, however, that success in these attempts was undoubtedly due to the 
merchant house system, which was based on business experience in the pre-industrial 
period, and to the ie system. The prime importance in the family business attached to
62 For details of these changes, see Suenaga, Kindai Omi Shonin, pp.347-61 and Yasuoka et al (eds.), 
Omi Shonin no Keieiisan, pp.173-85.
63 Details of the bekke system are in Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka, esp. chap.2 and also O. Saito, Shoka no 
Seikai: Uramise no Sekai, (Tokyo, 1987), pp.94-106 for example.
64 For example see Yasuoka, ibid, pp.337-344 and Suenaga, Kindai Omi Shonin, pp.356-61.
65 See Yasuoka et al (eds.), Omi Shonin, pp. 174-176 for the example of such a merchant shift. For the 
role of the holding company see, M. Kasutani and H. Takeda, ‘Ryotaisenkan no Dozoku 
Mochikabugaisha’ in Keizaigaku Ronshu 56-1 (1990).
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the continuity of the family business, even at the cost of family interest, also played a 
critical role in the application of more modem business concepts. However, these 
characteristics also added some particular characteristics to modem Japanese business, 
in particular to Japanese family businesses, since these features gave these 
modernized family firms a somewhat intermediate position between family and 
corporate companies.
3.3.3. The Attempt at Business Reorganization
Notwithstanding this brief description of the business transformation of merchant 
houses in historical perspective, the reorganization and reforming of business within 
merchant houses obviously took different forms. With regard to their investment 
activities, most merchant houses seemed to be diversifying their businesses and 
therefore shifting towards a zaibatsu-style organization. However, the investment 
activities did not necessarily lead to business expansion as was the case with the 
zaibatsu; the success of the diversification depended on the scale of business activities, 
and was also influenced by other factors, for instance, informal networks with the 
political world. It also indicates that business expansion without paying attention to 
these factors, in addition to the focus on long-term business strategy, could cause the 
failure of zaibatsu-style business. Therefore, we can assume that in many cases, the 
business policy of merchant houses was not directed towards diversification, but 
towards specialization in some particular business sector, either their traditional 
business or a relatively new sector. Our analysis will therefore focus not only on the 
diversification cases, but also on the cases of specialization.
Mitsui and Sumitomo, prominent merchant houses since the Tokugawa era which 
became zaibatsu in this period, will be discussed as the diversification cases. 
Merchant houses that started to engage in new business sectors will be the main focus 
of concern for the specialization case. In this context, those engaged in the department 
store business and the pharmaceutical industry will be briefly discussed. This will 
enable us to explore further the survival of merchants who engaged in the new 
business sector in modem Japan. The transformation in part characterises the attempts 
at business survival among merchants during this period, since both the department
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store and pharmaceutical businesses can be seen as representative of some of the 
particular characteristics of modem Japanese business, and also of this merchant 
group. In addition, both businesses show a strong contrast between the Japanese case 
and the two European cases. While these businesses were chosen by Japanese 
merchants as a means of survival in the modem business world, in Europe the two 
businesses typified new and modem businesses, in which it was very difficult for 
ordinary businessmen to become involved because of the requirements of massive 
investment for business expansion and modem management skills.
a) From Merchants to Zaibatsu: Mitsui
The business of the Mitsui families was primarily characterized by informal links with 
the political elite, especially in the early Meiji period. Intervention by political leaders 
in the various reforms, for instance, reorganization of the business system or business 
policy, has been demonstrated in a number of research works.66 However, these 
factors are far from being the only ones that influenced the business activities of the 
Mitsui families during the modem period, since their complex systems of business 
and management in the pre-industrial period, as explained in the previous section, 
strongly influenced the business and management of Mitsui’s firms and affiliates. 
Given the main focus of this section and also of this chapter as a whole, the analysis 
here will focus solely on how the Mitsui families and their business leaders adopted 
and integrated the old customs of their ie system into their modem business 
organization, which was on the face of it introduced from the contemporary western 
system.
As many merchants experienced and suffered from the economic upheaval from the 
end of the Tokugawa period, the Mitsui families and their business too were in a 
serious crisis in this period. They were saved from this crisis by Minomura Rizaemon, 
who was employed from outside the Mitsui merchant house, and who took the 
initiative as the business leader of Mitsui from the end of the Tokugawa period to the 
early Meiji period. Although Minomura rescued Mitsui’s business from bankruptcy
66 For example see S. Yasuoka, Mitsui Zaibatsu (Tokyo, 1982),esp. chs. 3 and 5; Zaibatsu Keiseishi no 
Kenkyu, chs. 13 and 14; H. Morikawa, Zaibatsu no Keieishiteki Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1977), esp. chap. 2 
and Kobayashi, Seisho no Tanjo (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 105-12.
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by engaging in the banking sector with a special connection with the Meiji political 
leaders, he also attempted to break down traditional practices in management and 
labour relations by introducing a westem-style business system, which was partly 
aimed at limiting the families’ power over Mitsui’s business in terms of ownership.67 
Despite Minomura’s early death in 1877, causing the disruption of further reforms, 
documentation on the establishment of the Mitsui Bank, suggests that Minomura’s 
ultimate aim was to dissolve the authority of the families as owners and reduce their 
power over the Mitsui business by utilizing the modem corporate system.68 After 
Minomura’s death there was a serious backlash from the Mitsui families in the mid 
Meiji period with regard to family authority and ownership, and Minomura’s plan was 
almost totally negated.69
Although many of the business changes within Mitsui’s business and families indicate 
that the reforms were largely associated the introduction of a westem-styled business 
system and associated skills, their traditional customs and the ie system also played an 
indispensable role in rescuing Mitsui’s business when it was in difficulties. According 
to Yasuoka, Mitsui’s ie system was effectively utilised for salvaging their original 
business of kimono retailing. In the early Meiji period, Mitsui had separated the 
kimono-retailing business from their main business, due to heavy losses in this sector. 
Formally this kimono retailing business became the independent company, 
Mitsukoshi. However, the managerial power in this company was in the hands of 
former senior employees of Mitsui. In this case, the bekke system, the traditional 
franchise system, was effectively utilized to maintain managerial power over this 
company. In addition, later the Mitsui families sent one of their children to be the 
adopted son of the former senior employee. Consequently, as the sales of Mitsukoshi 
recovered and regained a profit, in the late Meiji period the Mitsui families made this 
adopted son a member of the Mitsui families, and Mitsukoshi was integrated into the 
Mitsui zaibatsu as one of its affiliates. Through analysis of this complex process, 
Yasuoka insists that this is an example of how the business of the zaibatsu could be 
diversified without any risk to the families by utilizing traditional customs and the ie
67 See Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi, pp.259-69 for further detail.
68 See Mitsui Ginko (ed.), Mitsui Ginko 80nenshi (Tokyo, 1957) p.83 for further detail of this document.
69 See Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka, p.340.
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system.70
On the other hand, the integration of the modem system and traditional customs is 
particularly represented by the establishment of the Mitsui Kaken (the Mitsui family 
constitution), largely based on the traditional family law, sochiku isho, aimed at 
maintaining the business policy of focusing on the continuity of Mitsui’s business. 
The purpose of the establishment of this constitution was also to strictly control the 
families, now consisting of the soryoke (the chief main family, whose head always 
became the head of the Mitsui zaibatsu), the four honke (the main families, who were 
appointed as the presidents of the main affiliates) and the six renke (the special Mitsui 
term for the branch houses (bunke)). The aim was to prevent independent activities, 
which might possibly violate this family constitution. The constitution was divided 
into 10 sections and 109 articles. It regulated the families’ activities, from their duties 
and roles in the Mitsui business through to marriage, inheritance and organization of 
the ie system, in addition to the managerial system and the decision making of the 
Mitsui zaibatsu.71
This particular family business was therefore undoubtedly a mix of seemingly 
contradictory factors, that is, a traditional business system and a modernized legal 
system, both of which would appear to have constrained the newly introduced 
business system. However, there is no doubt that the family authority over Mitsui’s 
business was maintained under this private constitution, and this also indicates the 
influence of their former ie system into the new era. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that various attempts to draft the family constitution were made which involved legal 
experts and prominent political and business leaders, with the aim of minimising the 
contradictions within the Mitsui Kaken. A particular role was played by Max Warburg, 
the prominent Hamburg banker, through several meetings with Mitsui’s top directors 
and a special meeting on the occasion of a visit to Europe and the U.S. by Mitsui 
Hachiro’uemon Takamine, the head of the Mitsui zaibatsu from 1885.72
70 Explanation of the case of Mitsukoshi in this paragraph in based on ibid, pp.159-61.
71 The entire articles of the Mitsui Kakun and a detailed analysis are in Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi, 
pp.401-12, and also Mitsui Bunko (ed.), Mitsui Jigyoshi Shiryohen vol.3. pp.344-58.
For detail on these meetings and a brief summary of the discussion see Mitsui Hachiro’uemon 
Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Mitsui Hachiro'uemon Takamine Den, pp.296-98.
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b) Sumitomo
As well as Mitsui, Sumitomo had been a prominent merchant house in the Tokugawa 
period, and Sumitomo’s business, too, was successfully transformed into a zaibatsu in 
the late Meiji and Taisho periods. In spite of this common feature, however, 
Sumitomo exhibited different characteristics in terms of both its main business and its 
ie system. Unlike Mitsui, which had focused on commerce, Sumitomo’s main 
business was copper mining. Moreover, with regard to Sumitomo’s ie system, the 
family authority was concentrated on the head of the main house, the honke, and the 
branch houses, the bunke, played a really minor role in Sumitomo’s business activities. 
This forms a strong contrast with the case of the Mitsui families, which, as noted 
above, were divided into 11 families on the establishment of the Mitsui Kaken, and 
whose managerial power within the Mitsui business depended on status within the 
families. Therefore, it can be said that Sumitomo had a more simple structure in terms 
of its household and business system. Moreover, since the main business can be 
defined as heavy industry, Sumitomo’s operations were of major relevance to 
contemporary government policy, which stressed a ‘rich nation, strong army’ slogan 
and consequently the development of the heavy industries. This added a certain
7 ^nationalistic characteristic to Sumitomo’s business, especially from the Meiji period.
One of the factors that had the most decisive impact on Sumitomo’s business and its 
ie system was the early death of both the 12th and 13th heads of the Sumitomo house in 
the early Meiji period. In the absence of any male descendants at this time, Hirose 
Saihei, the business leader of the Sumitomo house in this period, formally made the 
wife of the 12th head the 14th head, and decided to select an adopted son from an 
aristocratic family, to give a more prominent social status to the Sumitomo family.74
thThe adopted 15 head of the house, Sumitomo Kichiza’emon Tomoito, bom 
Tokudaiji Takamaro but married with the daughter of the previous head, was therefore 
less influential in practical terms in Sumitomo’s day-to-day business, and although the 
master of the house had from the Tokugawa period already handed most power over
73 This nationalistic tendency was commonly acknowledged by employees, and was often utilised to 
differentiate Sumitomo’s business from those of Mitsui and Mitsubishi, on the grounds that the main 
aim of Sumitomo’s business was to serve the nation. For example see J. Kawata, Sumitomo Kaisoki 
(Tokyo, 1951) p.26.
4 See Hosenkai (ed.) Sumitomo Shunsui, pp. 105-11.
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the business to senior employees, the separation of ownership and control was further 
enforced by this situation. This can be regarded as offering a contrast with the Mitsui 
case, in which a complex business and family structure sometimes led to minor 
conflicts within and between the families and the executive managers.
In contrast, reforming the Sumitomo business and managerial system took much 
longer than in the Mitsui case. Due to its rapid business expansion, Mitsui established 
a holding company in 1909 to achieve more organisational control over its affiliates. 
However, in the Sumitomo case, the holding company was not founded until 1921, 
later than Mitsui. This would seem to have been caused by the slower speed of 
diversification of Sumitomo’s business, which was more focused on the industrial 
sector. Moreover we can also assume that despite some introduction and application 
of aspects of the westem-style business system to the Sumitomo business, these 
changes were insufficient to change the Sumitomo house completely into a corporate 
style business. Some sources indicate that Sumitomo’s affiliates tended to be 
independent from the authority of the Sumitomo house when it shifted its business 
organization into becoming a corporation.75 This evidence probably indicates the 
constraining power of the ie system over the business, although the same system 
could also be a significant factor in promoting business expansion. Moreover 
Sumitomo’s scale of business was smaller than Mitsui’s.
However, business expansion throughout the First World War period and taxation 
reform in the interwar period had a decisive impact on reform of the business system 
and the establishment of a holding company in Sumitomo. As briefly described in the 
previous section, the new plans for taxation increased the burden on those merchants 
who personally controlled their businesses rather than transforming them into 
corporations, and the executives of Sumitomo began to consider further reforms of the 
business when the government taxation plan were made public.76 The various 
documents relating to the plans for the organizational changes that established the 
holding company and separated the business of the Sumitomo house into affiliate 
corporations, indicate the aim of this reorganization. Although the overhaul of the
75 See K. Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Sohonten: Jo’ in Sumitomo Shiryokanho vol.26 (1995) esp. part 7, and 
‘Sumitomo Sohonten: Chu’ in Sumitomo Shiryokanho vol.27 (1996) pp.167-72.
76 See Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Goshigaisha no Seiritsu’ in Sumitomo Shiryokanho vol.29 (1998), pp.60- 
63.
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whole business system within the Sumitomo house was the prime purpose, attention 
also focused on the relationship between the Sumitomo family and its business in the 
context of the modem legal and economic system.77 The efforts of Sumitomo 
executives also show that in this context, it was regarded as being out of the question 
to separate the Sumitomo family and the business, and this reluctance was probably 
influenced by the ie system of the merchant houses, in which the family and the 
business were indissolubly connected. Although one executive of the Sumitomo 
holding company later stressed in a memorandum that the purpose of the 
reorganization had been to dispel the feudalistic relationship between the master and 
employees under the traditional ie system, there is no doubt that the authority of the 
family (or the family head) was still significant after this reform, since it was believed 
that the credibility of the Sumitomo business depended on the Sumitomo family.79 In 
addition, the establishment of Sumitomo Shasoku (general regulations of Sumitomo 
and its affiliates), based on the Sumitomo Kaken, the private family law that had 
operated since the Tokugawa period, indicates the influence of the former ie system.80 
Thus in the Sumitomo case, while the executives obtained enough power to run 
Sumitomo’s business after the reorganization and the founding of the Sumitomo 
holding company, with the result that the separation of ownership and control was 
more apparent than in the Mitsui case, they could not eliminate the family from the 
business, since their managerial power relied on the family’s authority.
c) Involvement in other business sectors
Apart from the case of the zaibatsu, the strategy of merchants towards new business 
systems, with regard to their business activities, was very varied. Some merchants 
shifted their business, for instance from kimono retailing to textile goods retailing, 
and business expansion inevitably stimulated organizational change within the 
merchant house towards a more modem style. There are some other cases in which 
business expansion finally caused diversification within a particular sector or the 
development of a new sector, for example, in the case of Itochu or Marubeni, both of
77 The document relating to the plans is in ibid, pp.68-106.
78 The feelings of the Sumitomo executives at this reform are partly shown in ibid, pp.69-75.
79 The memorandum of this executive is in ibid, p. 110.
80 The change from Kaken to Shakun was only a minor change, in terms of language usage. See ibid, 
pp. 146-47.
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which started as kimono retailers and later became trading companies.81 However, in 
this section, particular attention will be paid to merchants who were involved in 
related sectors, and as a result transformed their main area of business.
The two sample sectors chosen in the following are the department store business and 
the pharmaceutical industry. Since the attention in this section will be focused on how 
merchants survived under the new economic conditions in Japan, these two cases can 
help to show how these new industries (in both the industrial and service sectors) 
developed in the context of a traditional historical background and business system. 
The department store business, considered in most western cases as an innovation of 
the retailing sector, was a method of business survival for kimono retailing merchants 
in modem Japan. Thus the analysis of this particular business may exemplify how 
merchants in modem Japan applied new business concepts, introduced from western 
countries, to their traditional business system. The latter case, the pharmaceutical 
industry, also exhibits some particular characteristics of modem Japanese business. 
Although there were some industries in which the application of modem technology 
to industrial development was more important, for example the rice wine industry or 
soy-sauce brewing, the pharmaceutical industry is an unusual case in modem 
Japanese business history, since the development of this industry depended on 
medicine merchants who had no experience in the production of medicines. Their trial 
and error procedure for shifting their main business activities from retailing to 
production offers a number of insights into modem Japanese business. In particular, 
the case of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry, which was an industry which in the 
European cases needed huge capital for research and development from the period of 
its initial development, displays significant differences.
The Department Store Business
Although in the European case the department store business was relatively new 
within the service sector, and ambitious entrepreneurs led the growth of this kind of 
business from the late 19th century, in Japan the majority of the older department store
81 For detail see Itochu Shoji Kabushikigaisha Shashi Hensanshitsu (ed.), Itochu Shoji lOOnertshi 
(Tokyo, 1969), esp. pp. 11-63 and Marubeni Kabushikigaisha Shashi Hensanshitsu (ed.), Marubeni 
Zenshi (Tokyo, 1976), pp.21-58.
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companies, for example, Takashimaya, Daimaru, Mitsukoshi and Matsuzakaya, 
originated from among the merchants of kimono retailing in large cities.82 Moreover, 
unlike European department store companies, which made innovations in retailing, 
sales and advertising to capitalise on the purchasing power of the middle class, the 
Japanese department store business was a means of business survival for those 
kimono retailers who had suffered severely from huge losses due to the economic 
upheaval of the early Meiji period. Therefore, being the first stage of business survival, 
their business strategy took a different form, and their attempts at innovation in 
business were largely aimed at recovery of their main business. For example, 
Takashimaya, one of the famous kimono retailers in Kyoto, managed to survive partly 
by specializing in the foreign market. With the collaboration of various fine artists, 
Takashimaya invented a new style of kimono, which became an artistic item for 
export to the European market as well as the domestic market, and achieved huge 
success at domestic and foreign exhibitions. Other kimono retailers attempted to 
innovate in their sales style, advertising and promotion, by introducing new methods 
from European department store companies, like show cases for sales goods, and 
bargain sales, or by responding to new demands, for instance, the manufacturing of 
uniforms for students and officials.84 Despite the difference in starting point compared 
to the European case, the introduction and application of these commercial methods 
resulted in a shift of business from kimono retailing to the department store business 
in the late Meiji period, in the early 20th century.85
The shift into the department store business was accelerated by external factors. The 
growth in population and urbanization enlarged the mass market and created huge 
demand for various commodities, and thus led to further development in business. As 
a result of these changes, the kind of business organization adopted under the 
merchant houses’ ie system became insufficient for meeting the new demand and 
responding to growth. Therefore, along with the impact of the newly established
82 For a European case see, for example T. Coles, ‘Department stores as retail innovation in Germany*, 
in G Crossick and S. Jaumain (eds.), Cathedrals o f Consumption (Aldershot, 1999); R. Lenz, 
Karlstadt: Ein deutscher Warenhauskonzem (Stuttgart, 1995), esp. pp. 19-48; M. B. Miller, Bon 
Marche: Bourgeois culture and the department store, 1869-1920 (Princeton, 1981), esp. chs. 3 and 5.
83 See Takashimaya 150nenshi Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Takashimaya ISOnenshi (Osaka, 1982), pp.60-61.
84 For example, see Matsuzakaya 70nenshi Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Matsuzakaya JOnenshi (Nagoya, 1981) 
p.24 or Daimaru 250nenshi Henshu Iinkai (ed.), Daimaru 250nenshi (Osaka, 1967) pp.229-31.
85 See T. Hatsuda, Hyakkaten no Tanjo (Tokyo, 1999), esp. chap.3 for further details.
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commercial code, their business systems were transformed into those of the modem 
firm or corporation. This shift was marked firstly in Mitsukoshi, originally a business 
of Mitsui but which then became one of Mitsui’s affiliates in the early 20th century, 
when it reorganized its kimono retailing business into a corporation and began to 
devote itself to the department store business.86 Mitsukoshi was followed by other 
merchants who got involved in the department store business, and the scale of the 
stores and the retailing of goods dramatically expanded. Nevertheless, upheavals in 
the Japanese economy on occasion damaged their businesses, and sometimes business 
expansion provoked serious resistance from employees who were reluctant to change 
their business practices. For example, Daimaru, formally known as Shimomura 
Gofukuten, changed its form of business organization into a limited partnership in the 
early 20th century. However, the rapid reform led to conflict among executives, 
largely due to the antagonism towards modernization harboured by the older 
executive group, and with depression during this period as well, sales plummeted and 
the Daimaru business went into serious crisis, resulting in the closure of several 
branches.87 This indicates the clear difficulties that merchants faced in changing their 
business systems into modem organizational forms, as they attempted to change the 
more traditional mindsets of their senior employees.
Despite these kinds of conflicts, radical changes in economic conditions, especially 
from the early 1900s, further accelerated business and managerial reforms. The 
growth in sales and the expansion of branches in areas distant from the home store, 
along with the increase in the variety of traded goods, finally led to a managerial 
transformation into the modem corporate style. Many of the department store 
companies shifted from being merchant houses to become corporations during the 
early 20th century, and through this process, traditional customs, especially relating to 
labour management, were replaced by the introduction of more westernised systems. 
The separation of the owner’s family from day-to-day business also took place during 
this period. For instance, in Takashimaya, as a result of business expansion, all branch 
store managers, who were formal members of the founding Iida family, were replaced 
by senior managerial employees. This policy was aimed at concentrating the members
86 See S. Yasuoka, Kinsei Shoka, pp. 160-161 for example, and Hatsuda, Hyakkaten, pp. 145-210.
87 See Daimaru 250nenshi Henshu Iinkai (ed.), Daimaru 250nenshi, pp.232-66 for farther detail of 
conflicts and business crisis.
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of the Iida family in top management.88 On the other hand, in spite of these reforms, 
the nature of many business activities was still characterised by traditional factors. 
The fact that the trading names of these department store companies often still 
included the word gofukuten (kimono retailing store), provides just one particular 
example of this, even though this was largely due to their dependence for a large share 
of their sales on kimono retailing. In addition, the owner’s family invariably 
maintained a covert constraining power through the establishment of the holding 
company or the issue of shafcun, regulations for company employees. In some cases, 
there is evidence that these shakun were read at the daily meeting of employees in 
each branch, although the shakun did not tend to emphasise family authority.89
The Pharmaceutical Industry
In the European and US cases, the pharmaceutical industry formed part of the 
chemical industries and, as Chandler has emphasized, the scale of business had a 
decisive impact on the development of this new industry, which required massive 
investment in research and technological innovation.90 The pharmaceutical industry in 
these countries was therefore well known as a part of big business and took on the 
corporate style of firm at an initial stage of its business activities. However, unlike in 
these cases, the pharmaceutical industry in Japan was founded by medium-scale 
wealthy merchants, who had been medicine retailers since the Tokugawa period. The 
scale of their businesses was small compared to their counterparts in western 
countries. However, it is apparent that the progress of the development of this 
industry in Japan was largely overshadowed by the country’s relative technological 
and economic backwardness, rather than by any constraints from traditional business 
customs. The relative backwardness of scientific and technological knowledge in 
general may be assumed to be an additional factor in this.
The first stage of the shift from medicine retailing merchants to pharmaceutical 
industrialists was marked by the abolition of sakoku, and the opening of the domestic 
market to foreigners. The impact of the penetration of Western chemical-based
88 See Takashimaya 150nenshi Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Takashimaya ISOnenshi, p.90.
89 For example, see Matsuzakaya 70nenshi Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Matsuzakaya 70nenshi, pp.38-39.
90 See A. D. Chandler, Scale and Scope, esp. pp. 170-93.
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medicines into the domestic medicine market was sufficient to make these medicine 
retailers, who retailed traditional holistic medicines (kanpoyaku), change to selling 
western medicines. From the early Meiji period, these retailers dealt with the 
merchandising of these products through foreign traders in particular export ports, like 
Kobe and Yokohama, and some medicine retailers were directly involved in 
importing from foreign medicine makers or their agents.91 Consequently, in the early 
stage, there were remarkable changes among those medicine retailers in terms of the 
goods in which they dealt, and this also indicates a dramatic decline in the demand for 
traditional holistic medicines. In addition, from the early Meiji period, these retailers, 
particularly in Osaka, which had been a centre for the trade since the Tokugawa 
period, had strong interests in the manufacture of chemical-based medicines, and 
therefore began to engage in such manufacturing in the late 19th century, 
notwithstanding their technological backwardness and lack of modem equipment and 
factories. However, in spite of their efforts, success in the medicine manufacturing 
sector was limited in this period, and the shift from retailing to manufacturing was 
relatively slow.
As with merchants in other business sectors, the changes in economic conditions and 
business expansion also encouraged these medicine retailers to reorganise their 
businesses, although there were no drastic and rapid changes with regard to business 
organization. If we focus on the retailing business, as shown above, certain shifts and 
a tendency towards modernization are apparent, largely due to expansion in the scale 
of business, but the transition of these retailers into pharmaceutical industrialists was, 
by contrast, something that happened gradually. We can assume that since the main 
business of medicine retailing owed a great deal to the business of importing Western 
chemical-based medicines even in the early 20th century, these businesses still 
maintained a strong identity as ‘merchants’. In addition, their managerial systems, in 
some respects, maintained and utilised the traditional apprentice system. In Takeda, 
which was one of the big three medicine retailers in Osaka, along with the Tanabe and 
Shiono (Shionogi: Shiono is their family name) merchant houses, and which also 
initiated medicine production from the late 19th century, a dual structure of traditional
91 For example see Tanabe Seiyaku Shashi Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Tanabe Seiyaku 305nenshi (Osaka, 
1983), pp.40-46 and Shionogi Seiyaku (ed.), Shionogi lOOnen (Osaka, 1978), pp.62-66.
92 See Tanabe Seiyaku Shashi Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Tanabe Seiyaku 305nenshi, pp.50-56.
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apprenticeship and a modem recruitment was integral to management even in the 
early 20th century.93 Also some traditions dating from the Tokugawa period, like the 
payment methods for trading medicines, were not abolished until the middle of the 
20th century, despite an across the board shift into the pharmaceutical industry in this 
period.94
The transformation of the medicine retailers into pharmaceutical industrialists was 
significantly influenced by one great event, the First World War. The outbreak of the 
war meant a virtual cessation of the export of industrial goods from both Germany 
and the Allies. Retailers of imported medicines had relied heavily on Western 
chemical-based medicines, in particular German medical and chemical goods, which 
had a huge share of the Japanese market. The halting of the export of such goods from 
Germany, therefore, severely damaged the medicine retailers. Although this blow to 
the retailers contrasted sharply with the position of those merchants and businessmen 
who benefited from the great boom of war demand, it also provided the initiative for 
these retailers to devote themselves to medicine production. Moreover, Japanese 
government policy shifted towards encouraging domestic production of chemical- 
based medicines. Government guidance and protection of medical production, 
contributed to rapid technological innovation and modernization of production, and 
resulted in a complete transformation of these medicine retailing merchants into 
pharmaceutical industrialists.95 This transformation was accelerated after the First 
World War, largely due to the heavy industrialization from this period, and was also 
connected with the change of these businesses’ managerial systems into more of a 
corporate style organization. The restructuring of these retailers’ businesses into 
pharmaceutical corporations took place during the interwar period, conspicuously 
among those who survived the recession period after the war. Moreover, although the 
ownership of these corporations was still in the hands of the owner’s family, the 
requirements of rapid technological innovation and need for educated and skilled 
employees minimised the influence of traditional customs, particularly that of the ie 
system, compared to corporations in other business sectors that had also originated
93 See Takeda 200nenshi Henshu Iinkai (ed.), Takeda 200nenshi (Osaka, 1988), pp.239-41 for further 
details.
94 See Tanabe Seiyaku Shashi Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Tanabe Seiyaku 305nenshi, pp.60-61.
95 See ibid, pp.80-84.
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from merchant houses.96
3.3.4. The Role o f the Ie System in Modem Japanese Business
The above sections have suggested that it must be accepted that the ie system of the 
merchant houses played a critical role in the transformation of Japanese business from 
the Meiji period. Firstly, although there were clear differences compared to the 
modem business system, the businesses of merchant houses were already to some 
extent structured as formal organisations, rather than being personal fiefdoms. Since 
one of the most significant characteristics of merchant houses was their aim of 
continuing their family business over the long-term, this had a major influence on the 
business activities of merchants, and necessarily weakened the decision-making 
power of the head of the merchant house, in order to avoid any danger from a risky 
decision by the head, which might well damage business objectives. Secondly, the 
organization of the family business system gave a relatively strong power to 
employees, especially to senior and higher level employees, in running the business of 
the merchant house. The family heads who violated the rules of the business or had no 
interest in management were at serious risk of being ousted from their position by 
agreement between senior employees and other family members. This consequently 
separated the owning family of the merchant houses from day-to-day business and led 
to managerial control being mainly in the hands of the senior employees. These 
characteristics may therefore probably be said to differentiate Japanese family 
businesses from their European counterparts, which tended to be strongly under the 
personal control of the owner and his family.
However, although it may be true that the business and ie system of merchant houses 
was a significant factor in the adoption or application of the modem business system 
among merchant houses, traditional practices, which even appeared irrational in terms 
of the development of modem business, were also maintained, and continued to 
exercise influence over the formation of modem Japanese business. These remaining 
traditional customs, mainly originating in the ie system, worked as a constraining 
influence, despite certain reforms and reorganisation in business activities. For
96 For example, see Shionogi Seiyaku (ed.), Shionogi lOOnen, pp. 129-39 and Tanabe Seiyaku Shashi 
Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Tanabe Seiyaku 305nenshi, p.100 and pp.l 14-15.
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instance, in spite of the absence of official legalization, kakun or shakun (family and 
company laws), both of which were established to control the family and employees 
in the context of their business activities, exercised a decisive power in these 
businesses. It can be said that these constraining customs created difficulties in 
achieving a total separation of ownership and control within modem Japanese family 
businesses, which had mainly originated in merchant houses. Moreover, under these 
practices, the employees of modem Japanese firms that had their origins in merchant 
houses were compelled, albeit reluctantly, to recognise that their business activities 
owed a great deal to the family’s authority, as formulated under the ie system. One 
particular example of this was the Mitsui case, in which an annual New Year 
ceremony with families, directors and executives of the holding company and 
affiliates was held to read part of the family constitution, the Mitsui Kaken?1
On the other hand, even where the managerial and business system of these family 
firms indicated the co-existence of traditional and modem factors within the business, 
this did not necessarily create uncertainty in terms of the responsibility for business 
failure among these firms. Some evidence shows that sole responsibility for any 
particular business scandal lay with the owner or the owner’s family, even if the 
family had not committed the scandal. For example, in 1914, Sumitomo was involved 
in a bribery scandal between Siemens and the Japanese Navy, provoked by a joint 
venture project for an electric cable company between Siemens and Sumitomo. 
Although the inspector found no evidence that the top management of either firm had 
committed to this bribery scandal, and concluded that the responsibility lay solely 
with the employees of Siemens’ Japanese branch, Sumitomo immediately abandoned 
negotiations with Siemens, since Sumitomo Kichizaemon, the head of the Sumitomo 
house, was afraid that the widespread reports of this bribery scandal would end up 
damaging the credibility of Sumitomo’s business and his own credibility among the 
public.98 In addition, Mitsui Hachirojiro, the president of Mitsui Bussan, quit from his 
job at this time, since Mitsui Bussan was indirectly involved in the scandal through 
being a channel of bribery for one naval officer, and though this was a minor factor in
97 For detail of this ceremony, see Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Mitsui 
Hachiro ’uemon Takamine Den, pp.390-93.
98 For detail of this scandal see R. Takenaka, Siemens to Meiji Nihon (Nagoya, 1991), pp.230-46. Also 
for the opinion of Sumitomo Kichiza’emon on this scandal see K. Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Sohonten: 
Chu’, pp. 150-152.
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the bribery overall, it was sufficient reason for him to quit because of the certain 
damage it would do to Mitsui’s business." It may be argued that this incident also 
strongly influenced the decision of Sumitomo Kichiza’emon to abandon the joint 
venture, since Sumitomo had a family relationship with the Mitsui families through 
marriage.
A similar tendency is apparent in another case, the business scandal concerning 
Furukawa Shoji in 1921. Furukawa made heavy losses through speculation in soybean 
products in the Manchuria market undertaken by the senior manager of the firm’s 
Dairen branch in Liaoning, in addition to which there was accounting fraud. 
Furukawa Toranosuke, the owner of the trading company and the other affiliates, 
rescued this company by utilising his assets in the Furukawa Holding Company. 
Despite his countermeasures, however, the attempt contributed to a failure on the part 
of the Furukawa affiliates to develop as a zaibatsu.100 This evidence consequently 
suggests that the credibility of the business largely rested on the status of the family, 
and the family played a significant role in any case of business failure in restoring 
reliability and credibility to the business. It is apparent, moreover, that this tendency 
can be traced to the traditional practices of the ie system, with some influence from 
the modem business and legal systems.
3.4. Profits and Profitability of Wealth Holders’ Businesses
We may be sure that among those wealth holders who owned family businesses or 
who invested in various business sectors, the profits and profitability of these firms, 
the dividends and returns, were matters of great significance. On the other hand, in the 
context of modem Japan, in which development of Japanese business was focused on 
overcoming the relative backwardness of the economy, in particular in the industrial 
sector, such a profit-seeking attitude often met with heavy criticism from 
contemporary observers, and has also been criticised by researchers in business 
history. These criticisms have stressed the negative impact of a profit-seeking attitude 
on the part of big shareholders who were also wealth holders, and argued that this
99 See Mitsui Bunko (ed.), Mitsui Jigyoshi Honpen vol.3-1, p.245.
100 See H. Takeda, ‘Furukawa Shoji to Dairen Jiken’ in Shakaikagaku Kenkyu 32-2 (1980) for further 
detail.
178
tendency worsened the business performance of modem Japanese firms, since such 
shareholders were not interested in the long-term development of these firms.101 
These criticisms are in some respects true and accurate in explaining the potentially 
negative influence of shareholders on a firm’s business. However, it should be noted 
that the underdevelopment of the financial sector in the early stage of industrialization 
necessarily required wealth holders to invest in newly established firms through direct 
investment. In addition, these wealth holders also owned and ran their own family 
businesses, and thus there are likely to have been certain differences in their attitude 
towards the family business and towards the firms in which they invested, at least in 
terms of their commitment to day-to-day business and management. Moreover, the ie 
system, discussed above, probably functioned to prevent or limit the family interest in 
profit-seeking in the family business itself. Therefore, the question hinges on the 
extent to which wealth holders were profit-seekers or more business-oriented with 
regards to receiving returns, dividends or any sort of profits. In other words, we need 
to ask whether wealth holders could sacrifice their profits and returns to business 
expansion and to the development of the business activities of their own family firms 
and the firms in which they invested, whether they were profit-seekers outside their 
family businesses, or whether they were profit-seekers in both cases.
In this final section, attention will be focused on an analysis of these perspectives by 
looking at the profits and profitability of wealth holders’ businesses. Firstly, in order 
to focus on the level of returns from big business to the owners’ family, a revisionist 
view is presented based on recent research on some of the zaibatsu owners, especially 
the Mitsui, Sumitomo and Iwasaki (Mitsubishi) families. This sample has recently 
been considered as representative of business-oriented wealth holders, who had 
relatively less interest in making huge profits and returns for their families, 
notwithstanding the large scale of their businesses. In this context, the role of holding 
companies, which can be considered as the asset management companies of wealth 
holders, will also be discussed. However, certain limitations relating to the sources 
and the extent of previous research on these companies make it difficult to analyse 
them in great detail. This is largely due to the difficulty in accessing reliable sources,
101 For example see H. Morikawa, Top-Management, pp.76-79 and pp.98-102. Contemporary criticism 
is founded in, for example, M. Takahashi, Kabushikigaisha Bokokuron (Tokyo, 1930) p.48, quoted in 
Morikawa ibid, p. 101.
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for instance, balance sheets or other financial information, largely because the 
disclosure of such information also led to the opening of personal information in 
relation to these holding companies. The discussion of other minor holding companies 
here therefore relies on secondary Japanese sources.
Secondly, wealth holders’ business activities with regard to their investment activities 
will briefly be analysed. Since many firms in modem Japan were founded as 
corporations on the basis of investment by various wealth holders, the pattern of 
investment activities in particular exemplifies some of the characteristics of the 
development of modem Japanese business. It will also show to some extent the 
attitude of these business wealth holders towards the business activities of the firms in 
which they invested. In order to demonstrate another aspect of wealth holders, we will 
also seek to establish how far all wealth holders had a single, monolithic set of 
motivations for their investment activities outside their family businesses, and how far 
their motivations depended purely on individual objectives and inclinations.
3.4.1. Profit Distribution within Zaibatsu Families
a) The Mitsui Families
There is no doubt that the Mitsui families occupied the most prominent position 
among Japanese business wealth holders, in terms of the great scale of their business 
activities and wealth accumulation. This scale of activity and wealth possibly 
exceeded those of the top members of the wealthy business elite in Europe. However, 
unlike their European counterparts, who appear to have had fewer or no restrictions 
on personal utilisation of the assets they had accumulated through their business 
success, in the Mitsui case there was strict regulation and limitation on using personal 
and family assets, largely due to a more business-oriented attitude strongly influenced 
by their ie system. The recent disclosure of historical materials on the system whereby 
they managed their assets, utilised in a number of research works, has shown that the 
family’s returns and revenues from Mitsui’s business were certainly small compared 
to the scale of their business and total assets.
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Under the regulations of the Mitsui Kaken, their private family law, the total assets of 
the Mitsui families were divided into three categories, that is, the business assets 
utilised for business activities and expansion; those assets that were commonly owned 
by the Mitsui families; and the personal assets of each family.102 The percentage 
holding of each family in the business and commonly owned assets was based on the 
percentage of assets held by the different families since the Tokugawa period. 
According to this rule, the soryoke held 23 percent of total combined assets, each 
honke held 11.5 percent, and the other families, the rente, each held 3.9 percent.103 
This percentage of asset holding was also utilised for distributing the profits from 
Mitsui’s business activities to each family. However, their returns from Mitsui’s 
business were strictly regulated and comparatively small. For example, in the late 
Meiji period, the family received 40 percent of the net-profits from Mitsui’s business 
as the basis for the profit distribution among families. Moreover, the distribution was 
systematically conducted according to the rules on asset holding. Thus even the 
soryoke, the family whose head was also the head of the Mitsui zaibatsu, received 
only about ¥50,000 (£5,000) annually for the family’s expenditure.104 As the scale of 
business rapidly expanded, these annual returns gradually increased. Nevertheless, the 
level of returns to the families from the net-profits of Mitsui’s business was certainly 
limited, or, in other words, minimised.
In the early 20th century, the various reforms in taxation, especially relating to income 
tax, and the foundation of the holding company, made the system of profit distribution 
more complex. This trend was also influenced by the rapid expansion in Mitsui’s 
business activities. In the middle of the 1920s, the return from Mitsui’s business 
activities took the form of a payout of a dividend from the Mitsui Holding Company, 
which reached ¥20 million (£2 million) annually.105 Nevertheless, about two-thirds of 
this income was deposited in accounts at the Mitsui Bank, and utilised for investment 
in business activities within the zaibatsu. A further one-tenth or so was retained for 
the future payment of income tax and special reserves for the families. Thus, in the
102 See Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Mitsui Hachirou 'emon Takamine 
Den, p.226.
103 For the establishment of this asset holding system in the Tokugawa period see Yasuoka, Zaibatsu 
Keiseishi, pp. 180-82, pp. 194-198.
104 The details of this distribution system were actually more complex. See Mitsui Hachiro’uemon 
Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Mitsui Hachiro ’uemon, pp.227-29 for further detail.
105 Ibid, p.405.
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second half of 1929, out of about ¥10.5 million of income from the Mitsui Holding 
Co., the Mitsui families themselves only received ¥2.9 million as their return.106 
Moreover, out of this income, funds to cover the expenditure on managing the family 
committee and for several special reserves, which would be utilised for special family 
occasions, for instance, marriage, funeral services or the establishment of a new 
branch family by the children, were placed on deposit.107 Thus, despite the remainder 
of the return being distributed according to the rules for profit distribution, each 
family had to deposit a part of its returns as a reserve for special occasions. 
Consequently, the actual return that could be utilised as annual expenditure for each 
family became relatively small compared to the scale of business of the Mitsui 
zaibatsu. For instance, in the middle of the 1920s, the soryoke, the leading main 
family, received around ¥800,000 each year as the family revenue.108
Although this complex system was based on the business structure and asset holding 
methods established in the pre-industrial period, and was largely generated by the 
business-oriented attitude adopted towards business activities, it caused serious 
financial problems, in particular for the honke or renke, whose family status was 
lower than that of the soryoke. The annual returns of these families under this system 
were consequently inadequate, and insufficient for sustaining their social status and 
livelihood. Because of their higher social status among Japanese business families and 
within society in general, these families’ personal expenditure reached a level that 
could not be covered by their annual return from the Mitsui Holding Co.. Therefore, 
to avoid any conflict with regard to profit distribution among the Mitsui families, the 
special reserves that had been accumulated were frequently exploited to help with 
financial difficulties within the family and among members of the Mitsui families.109 
This evidence indicates that even while the families’ total fortune may have been 
enormous, it could not be used freely for personal purposes. While this displays a 
business-oriented attitude and a lesser interest in distributing the profit from Mitsui’s 
business activities, this complex system did sometimes lead to serious problems, and 
even financial difficulties, as the families’ social status became pre-eminent.
106 Ibid.
107 See ibid, pp.405-07 for further detail of this mechanism.
l08/hn/, pp.412-13.
109 In the face of financial difficulties, certain modifications in the system to change the method of 
utilisation of these reserves took place. See ibid, pp.415-17 for details.
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b) The Sumitomo Family
In contrast to the Mitsui families, the structure of profit sharing within the Sumitomo 
family was simpler, since the ownership of the Sumitomo house (as a business 
organization) and its affiliate firms was in the hands of the head of the Sumitomo 
family. On the other hand, because of the relative delay in reforming Sumitomo’s 
business and management structures, the profit share of the family during the period 
of its existence as a merchant house (until the early 20th century) is not clear, 
presumably due to the lack of separation between the business and the ie system. 
However, as a result of the founding of the Sumitomo Holding Company, largely due 
to the tax reforms that increased the tax burden on non-corporate personal businesses, 
it became necessary to clarify the distribution to the family o f returns from the profits 
of the Sumitomo Holding Co. and its affiliates. The process whereby profits were to 
be distributed appears in documents relating to the establishment of the Sumitomo 
Holding Co..110 These plans indicate that from an early stage in this process, the 
distribution of profits to the family was a significant concern. As in the case of Mitsui, 
the main purpose of the founding of the Sumitomo Holding Company was to supply 
sufficient capital to affiliates and business activities in general, and therefore on this 
basis, returns to the Sumitomo family tended to be minimized. The initial plan for 
profit distribution stated:
‘The objective of this holding company is to manage and increase the capital for the 
business activities (of Sumitomo), and so the annual profit (of the holding company) shall 
be utilised for capital accumulation, and (the returns to the Sumitomo family) will be 
made at the level of minimum requirement-— 11 
Later, this plan was revised to
‘ • •• the return shall be paid at a level, which is sufficient to support the head (of 
Sumitomo) and his family’s (social) life*.112 
However, even among the Sumitomo executives who formed the plan for the 
establishment of the holding company, it was noted that excessive minimization of 
returns to the family might be risky. They considered that even though the main 
motivation for the company’s establishment was to reduce the tax burden, which was
110 These materials are used in K. Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Goshi Gaisha no Setsuritsu’ in Sumitomo 
Shiryokanho vol.29 (1998).
111 ‘Rieki Bunpai narabini Mochibun Haraimodoshi: Ei An’ in ibid, p.87.
112 ‘Rieki Bunpai: Bii An’ in ibid, p.87.
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regarded as preventing the expansion of business activities, payment of too low a 
return to the family would lead to suspicions among the public, that the real objective 
of the holding company was tax evasion on the part of the Sumitomo family, and such 
suspicions could possibly damage the social respectability of the Sumitomo family 
and the credibility of Sumitomo’s business.113 Therefore, the level of the payment of 
returns in relation to the huge amount of funds in the Sumitomo Holding Co. actually 
held by the owners was a main discussion point among the Sumitomo executive.114
Eventually, the returns from the holding company to the Sumitomo family were 
determined as follows:
‘Most of the profit from the holding company reserves for investment (within the 
Sumitomo’s businesses), and returns to the family head (of Sumitomo) will be paid as the 
household payment (from the holding company), based on the level of the actual annual 
expenditure (of the family), ""and the payment of dividends to any other family members 
(who have invested in the holding company) will be decided by the family head’.115 
This indicates that the payment of returns to the family head, in other words, to the 
head of the Sumitomo zaibatsu, and to the family members would seem to have taken 
the form of the holding company’s payment of all necessary expenses. It also shows a 
contrast with the Mitsui case, in which returns were determined according to certain 
rules related to the rate of assets holding of each family. Under the Sumitomo system, 
returns from the holding company were not affected by the share of assets held, or by 
any increase in the asset of the holding company. Another difference in the Sumitomo 
case is that along with returns from the Sumitomo Holding Co., there was additional 
income from other sources. When the holding company was established, the shares of 
other firms, which had been part of the assets of the Sumitomo house’s business 
organization, and which included shares in Sumitomo’s affiliates and other firms, 
were given to the head of the family. Except for Sumitomo affiliates within the heavy 
industry sector, the annual rate of dividend from the other firms was around 10 
percent, and according to the calculation of dividend payout, in 1921 the annual 
returns from such shares were worth ¥500,000.116 This meant that, in addition to
1,3 This point of consideration is in ‘Kaisha Soshiki o katosuru Riyu: Shii An’ in ibid, p.70.
114 Formally, the capital of the Sumitomo Holding Co. was provided by the members of the Sumitomo 
family. Of the company’s ¥150 million capital, the owner funded ¥148 million. See ibid, pp. 119-22 for 
detail.
115 ‘Dai 9: Rieki Bunpai narabini Mochibun Haraimodoshi’ in ibid, p.89.
116 See ibid, p.l 14 and also the balance sheet of the Sumitomo family in Taisho 10, in ibid, p.l 16, for
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return from the Sumitomo Holding Co., which paid ¥500,000 annually, the total 
revenue of the head of the Sumitomo, who was also the president of the Sumitomo 
Holding Co., amounted to around ¥1 million at this time.117 Although we cannot be 
sure that this revenue was adequate for the annual expenditure of the Sumitomo 
family, this amount is slightly more than the case of the Mitsui soryoke, whose annual 
revenue was about ¥800,000 in the middle of the 1920s. Nevertheless, we may 
assume that the returns from the Sumitomo businesses to the Sumitomo family were 
low in relation to the scale of its businesses. As in the case of the Mitsui families, this 
evidence would seem to signify a business-oriented attitude on the part of the 
Sumitomo family. The data on the net profits of the Sumitomo Holding Company also 
reinforce this perspective. Although the return to the family was fixed from the outset, 
net-profit rapidly increased during the late Taisho period, and reached a level of 
around ¥4 million annually.118
c) The Iwasaki Families
Among the cases of the zaibatsu, the Iwasaki families, the owners of the Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu, constituted another particular case with regard to profit-sharing. The 
peculiarity of the Iwasaki families lay firstly in the ownership system of Mitsubishi. 
Mitsubishi’s business contrasted strongly with the cases of the Mitsui and Sumitomo 
families, in that it did not originate in a merchant house. The development of 
Mitsubishi’s business was undertaken by the founder, Iwasaki Yataro, and his 
younger brother Yanosuke, in the Meiji period. This situation caused ownership to be 
split between the descendents of the two brothers. The president of the Mitsubishi 
Holding Co. from the early Taisho period, Iwasaki Koyata, was the son of Yanosuke 
and, he had inherited his position from Iwasaki Hisaya, the eldest son of Yataro. This 
alternate inheritance of ownership between the two families would appear to have
detail of share holding.
117 The amount of the family head’s revenue was almost the same as in the plan for payment. See, 
‘Kaisha Soshiki: Shii An’ in ibid, pp.70-71. However, in fact, the payment of fixed returns to the family 
head included returns to the two sons of the head, who also invested in the Sumitomo Holding Co.. 
Therefore, the actual payment to the family head from the Sumitomo Holding Co. was ¥400,000, 
100,000 less than in this plan. See Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Goshi Gaisha: Jo’, in Sumitomo Shiryokanho 
vol.30 (1999), p. 102.
118 See Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Goshi Gaisha’, p. 105.
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became a tradition for the Iwasaki families.119 In addition, unlike the Sumitomo or 
Mitsui families, the owner of Mitsubishi actually ran the day-to-day business of 
Mitsubishi, including the business of its affiliates. Therefore, both ownership and 
control of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu were in the hands of the Iwasaki families. Although 
Mitsubishi’s business and management was founded on the introduction of a westem- 
style business system, and under this system, salaried managers were used to support 
the development of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, the coming together of ownership and 
decision-making power made Mitsubishi’s business more resemble the European 
cases of family business.
However, if  we turn to the profit sharing of the Iwasaki families from the Mitsubishi 
business, we can observe a surprising characteristic of the Iwasaki families. On the 
one hand, just as in the Sumitomo and Mitsui cases, the families manifested a strong 
tendency towards business-orientation in relation to Mitsubishi’s business activities. 
On the other hand, some evidence indicates that in contrast to the other two zaibatsu, 
the Iwasaki families rarely depended on Mitsubishi’s business activities in terms of 
profit sharing. Although, largely due to lack of sources by comparison with Sumitomo 
and Mitsui, we cannot be clear about the extent of the profits received by the Iwasaki 
families from Mitsubishi’s business, some research does signify that limited 
importance was attached to profit by the families. For instance, Takeda’s research on 
returns to the Iwasaki families from the Mitsubishi Holding Company has shown that 
the dividend rate of the Mitsubishi Holding Co. was quite low, at around 6 percent 
during the period of the First World War, 1 percent in the early 1920s, and 4 percent 
in the late 1920s. Moreover, the level of returns to the Iwasaki families from 1913 to 
1920 was almost equivalent to the increase in the capital of the Mitsubishi Holding Co. 
during this period, that is, ¥171.75 million for the former and ¥165 million in the
1 7 fllatter case. From this analysis, Takeda concludes that most of the returns to the 
families were reinvested as the capital of the Mitsubishi Holding Co.. Furthermore, in
119 Although the reason for this inheritance system is unclear, it may be suggested that the early death 
of Yataro led to this situation. After Yataro’s death, his son, Hisaya, was still young and it was therefore 
hardly possible for him to run Mitsubishi’s business by himself. Thus Yanosuke took the position of 
owner until Hisaya was old enough to inherit this position. Also, Koyata planned to pass on his position 
to Hikoyata, the eldest son of Hisaya, although the outbreak of the Sino Japanese War made the plan 
inpossible. See T. Miyakawa, Iwasaki Koyata, (Tokyo, 1996), pp.46-53 and p. 189.
120 See H. Takeda, ‘Zaibatsu to Naibu Shihonshijo’, esp. pp.39-40 in H. Okochi (eds.), Kigyo Katsudo 
to Kigyo Sisutemu (Tokyo, 1993) for further details.
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spite of the families’ involvement in Mitsubishi’s business and management, in some 
cases salaries were also less important for the families. For instance, in 1938, when 
the Iwasaki families decided to disclose their share in the Mitsubishi Holding Co. to 
the public and restructured the holding company as a corporation, the president, 
Iwasaki Koyata, refused to receive a salary after this reform.121 Furthermore, in 1940, 
the Iwasaki families decided to refuse any dividend payment from the Mitsubishi 
Holding Co., whose dividend rate was 6 percent in this period.122
This view with regards to returns, namely the lesser importance attached to the profit 
and profitability of Mitsubishi’s business by the Iwasaki families, is also reinforced 
by analysis of the financial records of the Mitsubishi Holding Co.. From a detailed 
analysis of these financial records, Okazaki has insisted that the main aim of the 
Mitsubishi Holding Co. was to supply capital and funds to the Mitsubishi businesses, 
and until Mitsubishi and its affiliates began to depend on the supply of finance from 
outside of Mitsubishi, due to the high speed of business expansion from the late 1930s, 
funds and financial assistance from the Iwasaki families, made available at the 
expense of personal profits from the Mitsubishi businesses, certainly played a 
significant role in the development of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.123 Consequently, this 
evidence signifies that a business-oriented attitude may be assumed to have been 
shared by the three cases of zaibatsu, that is, the Mitsui, Sumitomo and Iwasaki 
families. Also, the aim of the holding company of these zaibatsu was less self-interest 
than business expansion.
Even though the business-oriented attitude of the Iwasaki families towards 
Mitsubishi’s business is partly supported by this evidence, one question, namely the 
source of the families’ wealth, remains unsolved. One possible assumption is that 
since the Iwasaki families were involved in their own family businesses, in addition to 
Mitsubishi business, they therefore gained most of their returns and profit from 
running these businesses, and from their personal investment activities. The 
separation of the Iwasaki and Mitsubishi businesses, which constituted a particular
121 See Miyakawa, Iwasaki Koyata, p.205.
122 See ‘Mitsubishi Sha Showa 15nen Kaki Jigyogaikyo Sonota Hokoku’ in Mitsubishi Shashi 
Kankokai (ed.), Mitsubishi Shashi vol. 38(Tokyo, 1985), pp.1763-64.
123 See T. Okazaki, ‘Mitsubishi Zaibatsu Honsha no Zaimukozo’, in Mitsubishi Shiryokan Ronshu 1 
(2000).
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characteristic of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, may arguably be considered as a 
consequence of government intervention in the early Meiji period, when Mitsubishi 
mainly focused on the shipping business, and when the government issued a 
proclamation prohibiting the diversification of Mitsubishi’s business during this 
period, as noted by some researchers.124 It may also be suggested that this separation 
may possibly have led to a differing attitude within the Iwasaki families with regard to 
profit sharing from their family businesses and from the Mitsubishi businesses. 
However, to analyse this assumption will require further consideration of a range of 
sources, and cannot be undertaken here.
3.4.2. Other Holding Companies and the Pattern of Investment of Business Wealth 
Holders
It is apparent that, notwithstanding the scale of business and the amount of profit 
accruing from business activities, the cases of the zaibatsu indicate that clear 
limitations were set by the families in pursuit of their own self-interest and profits 
from the firms they owned. In spite of this evidence, it may still be safer to say, 
however, that these zaibatsu holding companies are unusual in the extent to which we 
have information on them at the present time, and it is possible that this evidence still 
leaves them as minor examples that may not be representative of the general trend of 
business activities of holding companies in modem Japan. However, it is very 
difficult to achieve a more general perspective on these holding companies, largely 
because of the lack of sources and non-availability of information. Therefore the next 
section will mainly rely on secondary sources which have focused on analysis of 
holding companies (either individual cases or collective analysis), with a view to 
sketching out some of the characteristics of some non-zaibatsu businesses. In addition 
to this analysis, attention will also be focused on the patterns of investment of these 
business wealth holders. Again, since there remain many points of debate among the 
researchers who have analysed these patterns, and also because the space for any 
detailed analysis in this thesis is limited, the description will not go beyond a partial 
analysis and explanation. Also, it should be made clear that the main focus point for 
the analysis here is to discuss the extent to which the main activities conducted by
124 See H. Takeda, ‘Shiryo Shokai: Shodai Shacho Jidai* in ibid, particularly p.283.
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business wealth holders were business-oriented or profit-oriented.
a) The Role of Holding Companies
According to Morikawa*s research, there were in the early Showa period 121 holding 
companies, including zaibatsu and others, which were mainly aimed at controlling 
diversified family businesses and asset management.125 Although analysis of these 
holding companies has formed part of the research on zaibatsu, recent studies of these 
companies have displayed another perspective, despite a certain lack of sources.126 
Part of the findings of this research is that, just as in the zaibatsu cases, these 
companies were relatively business-oriented. Additional factors, for instance, the 
scale of the business, financial problems and the degree of diversification in the 
business, also strongly influenced the business policy and management of the holding 
companies. From this perspective, we may assume that the scale of business, along 
with the extent of diversification, played a significant role in influencing the 
characteristics of the holding companies. Several cases of big business holding 
companies, like Asano or Furukawa, which were characterised by diversification of 
business but whose scale of business was not equivalent to that of the prominent 
zaibatsu, indicate the decisive impact of the nature of their business activities on the 
profits of the holding company.
For instance, analysis of the financial circumstances of the Asano Holding Co., which 
controlled Asano affiliate firms, shows that a heavy commitment to the heavy 
industrial sector from the late 1910s, and the huge losses made by these affiliates in 
the 1920s, consequently led to considerable losses for the Asano Holding Co. itself. In 
supporting these affiliates, the dependence on external funds of the Asano Holding Co. 
rapidly increased, and in the process the returns to the Asano family were sacrificed,
1 77since the shares in the Asano Holding Co. were solely owned by family members.
A case of family interest being sacrificed is also found in the case of the Furukawa
125 Morikawa, Zaibatsu no Keieishiteki Kenkyu, pp.295-298.
126 T. Okazaki, Mochikabugaisha no Rekishi (Tokyo, 1999) is one particular example, which has 
focused on analysis of the financial structure of the holding companies, especially the zaibatsu cases. 
See, esp. chap.2.
127 For further details, see H. Kobayakawa, ‘Asano Zaibatsu no Takakuka to Keieisoshiki’ in 
Keieishigaku 16-1 (1981).
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Holding Company, which covered the heavy losses of its affiliate, Furukawa Trading, 
by profits from asset management, resulting in the decline of the controlling power of 
the Furukawa Holding Co. over its affiliates.128 On occasion a serious failure in 
business activities could also cause the dissolution of a holding company. The Itochu 
Holding Company, which was founded in the early Taisho period to manage the 
business of the Ito family, including the famous trading company, Itochu Trading, 
collapsed in the early 1920s as a result of heavy losses by this company. This was 
largely due to the recession after the First World War, and the losses of Itochu 
Trading being so enormous that they could not be covered by the total assets of the 
Itochu Holding Co.129 Even from this limited sample, we may assume that the scale of 
business activities with regard to diversification necessarily determined the direction 
of the management of the holding company towards business-orientation, since rapid 
business expansion brought with it a great risk of instability in business activities, and 
thus made pursuing a profit-oriented policy almost impossible. This situation also 
signifies the relative difficulty which modem Japanese business faced in maintaining 
business success over a long period, even in the case of big business.
Other examples also signify certain important characteristics of these holding 
companies. From analysis of selected holding companies’ business activities, Takeda 
and Kasutani have pointed out several factors, which can be assumed to have 
influenced the business tendencies of their sample. Firstly, they observed that the 
level of significance of the family business for the family itself determined not only 
business and investment activities, but also the profitability of the holding companies, 
and analysis of their case studies led them to conclude that cases in which these 
holding companies acted as investors were really rare.130 Secondly, although the 
pattern of business and investment varied considerably, we may assume that in the 
case of those holding companies which seem to have had a profit-oriented tendency, 
this attitude may well have resulted in a clear failure of diversification in the business. 
The majority of holding companies may thus possibly have belonged to the business- 
oriented category, since diversification of business activities was relatively common 
among businessmen and merchants in modem Japan, though lack of financial
128 See Takeda, ‘Furukawa Shoji to Dairen Jiken’ for further details.
129 See Y. Katsura, Kansaikei Sogo Shosha no Genzo, (Kyoto, 1987) esp. pp.410-13.
130 H. Takeda and M. Kasutani, ‘Ryo-Taisenkikan no Dozoku Mochikabu Gaisha’ in Keizaigaku Ronso 
56-1 (1990), p. 147.
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resources as well as other significant factors almost certainly restricted expansion of 
their businesses.131
Despite Takeda and Kasutani’s insistence that the data which they have utilised for 
their analysis is deficient in a number of critical respects, particularly regarding the 
extent of family assets outside of the holding companies, such as shares or property, 
these scholars* research does provide a significant perspective on certain aspects of 
holding company activities. In addition, we have another example of a holding 
company’s contribution to the development of the family’s business activities. In the 
case of Chogin, a famous textile merchant since the Tokugawa period, Suenaga 
indicates that although the separation between the family business and asset 
management took place in the early 1920s, at least with regard to financing, the 
relationship between Chogin Shoten, the family business, and Kobayashi Gomei, the 
holding company, remained a interdependent one, and the investment activities of the 
holding company were mainly aimed at providing guarantees to ensure bank financing 
for Chogin Shoten.132 Therefore, overall, in spite of there being difficulties in 
reaching any concrete definition applicable to holding companies in modem Japan, 
these companies were far from being asset management companies in the normal 
sense, since the motivation behind their activities was not the pursuit of personal gain 
but the maintenance of the family business. Moreover, the extent of diversification in 
their business activities may well have affected the role of these holding companies, 
and their profitability.
b) The Pattern of Investment Activities
As mentioned in the above section, the starting point of investment activities was 
marked by the period of the Matsukata Deflation, since many merchants were 
confronted with business crisis during this period, and thus pursued survival through 
new business activities. Consequently, in the boom period of firms’ establishment, 
following this crisis period, merchants became the major force behind the founding of 
many firms, both large and small scale, and both local and national, through 
investment activities that served to provide capital. Moreover, most of the firms
131 Ibid, pp. 149-50.
132 See K. Suenaga, Kindai Omi Shonin, pp.354-56, pp.376-80.
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established throughout this period were founded as corporations, a totally new 
concept introduced from the west. The fact that investment activities were shaped 
through the experience of this period, and the elimination of foreign direct investment, 
strongly influenced the pattern of the main investment activities undertaken by 
business and local wealth holders, including merchants, businessmen and landlords.133 
Firstly, networks of wealth holders, formed through both long-term and short-term 
relationships, based either on specifically business networks or on informal personal 
networks, became quite common as a means of conducting investment in newly 
founded firms, both in rural localities and in more urbanised areas. Several factors 
may be considered as contributing to this characteristic, notably the lack of large scale 
and well-organised financial institutions for financing new firms, and the consequent 
heavy reliance on investment by relatively middling and small-scale wealth holders 
for the foundation of many firms; the necessity of collaboration between these 
individuals in these very risky activities; and probably risk-hedging to reduce the 
personal financial burden in the case of failure and loss of investment.134
Secondly, along with this first characteristic, the shortage of well-educated human 
resources for actual management meant that it was common for many of the wealth 
holders who were involved in investment activities also to engage in the management 
of the firms in which they invested. Moreover, because of their investment in various 
firms, multiple directorships became a common practice from the boom period of the 
establishment of firms. Although in the European cases, in particular in the German 
case, multiple directorships have been regarded as indicating the power of financial 
institutions, in Japan this phenomenon has been utilised to evaluate the power of 
investors, who exercised decision-making power over management through the 
holding of higher managerial positions, in addition to the sizeable amount of shares 
that they owned.135 Also this has been considered as having had a negative impact on 
the management of many corporations in modem Japan, since these investors have
133 For an analysis of resistance to foreign direct investment in the Meiji period, see H. Murakami, 
‘Boeki no Kakudai to Shihon no Yushutsunyu’ in K. Ishii et al(eds.), Nihon Keizaishi vol.2 (Tokyo, 
2000), pp.36-40.
134 For an analysis of such grouping, see for example, Miyamoto and Abe ‘Meiji no Shisanka to 
Kaishaseido’, Wada et al. ‘Meiji 31nen’ and ‘Taisho 7nen’, M. Uekawa ‘Meiji 40nen Osaka-fu no 
Kigyokashudan’ in Kyoto Gakuin Daigaku Keieigakubu Ronshu 8-2 (1998) and Uekawa ‘Meijiki 
Kyoto-shi no Kigyokaso’ in Doshisha Shogaku 50-5 and 6 (1999).
13 Recent European research in this field includes, for example, Cassis, Big Business, esp. pp. 168-76.
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been regarded as pursuing their own self-interest, especially in relation to returns and 
dividends from the firms in which they invested, thus impeding the business policies 
of salaried managers, who gradually took managerial power within these corporations, 
especially from the end of the 19th century, and thus interrupting their long-term 
business policies.136
Although these interpretations are right to point out some of the weaknesses in these 
wealth holders’ approach to investment, it should be noted that this characteristic of 
the pursuit of self-interest is likely to have been the result of the influence of 
contemporary economic conditions and upheavals. As some research has indicated, a 
lot of the corporations established during the boom period, in the late 1880s, 
experienced bankruptcy within the relatively short-term, particularly in the period of 
recession after the Sino Japanese War, and this caused a certain shift in the investment 
activities of wealth holders, especially in the urban areas, towards the property 
business and expansion of family businesses.137 This may be seen as signifying that, 
except for corporations in some business sectors or large scale firms, investment 
activities faced a huge risk of short-term collapse or financial losses in the firms 
invested in, a risk mainly caused by the uncertain economic conditions of modem 
Japan. We may also assume that these conditions in part promoted a tendency among 
business wealth holders towards self-interest. Moreover, some of the evidence 
indicates that the high dividend policy in firms invested in by wealth holders was not 
solely a reflection of the self-interest of these investors. In the case of the spinning 
industry, which is frequently utilised as an example of the conflict between investors 
and salaried managers in terms of business and management policies, the high 
dividend policy has in fact been cited as an example of the extent of investors* 
greediness as will be discussed below. It is certainly clear that the dividend rate of 
spinning firms was really high in contrast to other business and industrial sectors.
According to the data in Kabushiki Nenkan, the yearbook of company shares, in the 
big spinning firms, like Kanegafuchi, Toyobo, Dainihon and Fuji, the dividend rate in 
the late 1910s, the period in which these firms enjoyed an unexpected boom due to the
136 For this opinion, see, for example, Morikawa, Top-Management, pp.98-103 and Miyamoto and Abe, 
‘Meiji no Shisanka’ pp.277-98.
137 Uekawa, ‘Meijiki Kyoto-shi’, pp. 186-96.
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First World War, reached 50 to 70 percent per share.138 In some cases, the dividend 
rate reached an even higher level, for example 100 percent at Dainihon in the first half 
of 1918 and 130 percent at Fuji in the first half of 1920.139 Since at the time of their 
foundation, these firms had been established through investment from numerous 
wealth holders, in particular urban textile merchants, and many of these investors 
became large shareholders in these spinning firms, the high dividend policy could be 
argued to reflect the core of self-interest among those investors. However, it should be 
noted that the high dividend policy partly reflected a peculiarity in modem Japanese 
business with regard to the provision of capital. Firstly, investment by a large number 
of wealth holders in the establishment of spinning firms was the result of antagonism 
towards foreign direct investment, since it was considered that foreign investment 
would lead to takeovers by foreign capital, and thus prevent the swift and healthy 
economic development of Japan. It is interesting that this point is frequently insisted 
on in the company histories of spinning firms.140 In spite of the decisive role of this 
factor in preventing the injection of foreign capital into spinning firms, it also resulted 
in the high dividend policy, because these firms largely depended on investment from 
those wealth holders for business expansion and increasing their own capital. The 
high dividend policy was the most effective means of establishing incentives and 
stimulating further investment from wealth holders.141 Therefore, this policy was 
necessarily led by the condition of the business and it was difficult to shift to 
alternative business policies as long as these same conditions continued.
Moreover, the high dividend policy benefited not only investing wealth holders but 
also the salaried managers of these firms. Although any analysis of long-term changes 
is almost impossible, largely due to the lack of sources, official documents indicate 
that the salaried managers of spinning firms also gained huge returns from their shares 
in their companies. Though the details and content of their income from shares is 
uncertain, data from the Osaka Taxation Office in 1924 relating to the annual income 
of big taxpayers suggests that for salaried managers income from returns on shares
138 Data quoted from Nomura Shoten (ed.) Kabushiki Nenkan, Taisho 1 lnen volume (revised: Tokyo, 
1985), pp. 136-41,144-45.
139 Ibid.
140 For example see Toyobo lOOnen (Tokyo, 1979), pp.7-9 or Kanebo lOOnenshi (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 14- 
16.
141 See R. Hanai, ‘Keikogyo no Shihon Chikuseki’ in K. Ishii et al. (eds.), Nihon Keizaishi vol. 2, 
pp. 128-30.
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substantially exceeded income from salaries. For example, Kikuchi Kyozo, the 
president of Dainihon Spinning, had an annual income of around ¥210,000, in which 
the share of returns on shares was nearly 53 percent, surpassing his income from his 
annual salary, at about 44 percent. Other information also indicates a similar tendency. 
For Muto Sanji, the president of Kanegafuchi Spinning, the share of returns was about 
38 percent of his annual income, of about ¥338,000. The income of Taniguchi Fusazo, 
the president of Osaka Godo Spinning, has a similar profile. About 55 percent of his 
annual income (¥228,000) was accounted for by returns from his shares.142 Although 
we should be careful about drawing concrete assumptions from this limited evidence, 
we may assume that in the case of the spinning industry, the high dividend policy also 
benefited those managers at the top of the hierarchy, since these individuals are also 
listed as large shareholders in the companies that they managed.
Turning to other groups of business wealth holders who were not mainly involved in 
business activities, it is clear that landlords played a particular role in the development 
of local business and the local economy. The investment activities of landlords have 
long been considered as a part of their profit-seeking strategy, and as a result of the 
taxation reform at the end of the 19th century, many landlords engaged in investment 
in big business rather than in local business, a shift seen as marking the integration of 
the landlord economy into modem Japanese capitalism.143 Although we can be certain 
that this shift was significant in changing the income structure of landlords, and that 
in some cases after this shift the income from dividends on shares in firms 
overwhelmed the income from rent from tenants, recent researchers have also 
focussed on landlords* investment activities in local business.144 Recent studies have 
tended to tone down the extent of any remarkable shift in landlords’ investment 
activities becoming apparent after the outbreak of the First World War. The pattern of 
investment activities of landlords, it is argued, was relatively varied. Some research 
has also assumed that any complete shift in investment activities from local business 
to big business was rare until the middle of the 1910s, and that landlords* investment
142 These figures are calculated from Osaka Zeimu Kantokukyoku, Dai 3shu Shotoku Dai-Nozeisha 
Shotokukingaku Shirabe Taisho 13, in R. Shibuya (ed.), TBSJS Kinki Volume, pp.26-28.
143 See M. Nakamura, Kindai Nihon Jinushiseishi Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1979) esp. pp.38-91 for further detail.
144 For analysis of this shift, see K. Nagahara (eds.), Nihon Jinushisei no Kosei to Dankai (Tokyo,
1972) esp. chap.2.
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in local businesses had a positive impact on the development of the local economy.145 
Also from an analysis of the investment activities of local wealth holders in Niigata, a 
majority of whom were presumably landlords, Tanimoto has indicated that although 
the majority pattern in investment was for investors not to be involved in the 
management of firms they invested in, this group actively supported businesses by 
providing capital for these firms’ business activities, and therefore played an 
important role in the development of Niigata’s local businesses in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.146 He also emphasises that in some cases, we can see a tendency 
for landlords’ investment activities to be a part of their contribution to the local 
economy and society.147 Thus we can assume that, notwithstanding the purpose of 
landlords’ investments, whether risk taking or in the expectation of significant profit, 
their activities were partly aimed at, and had a positive influence on the development 
of the local economy. Also it is arguable that since these landlords stood in a 
prominent position within their local communities and economy, their investment 
activities possibly gave a credibility to the business activities of the firms in which 
they invested. The importance of this kind of credibility, despite its relatively minor 
role, also appears in some cases of investment by the aristocracy in modem Japan.148
3.5. Conclusion
Analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of business wealth holders, especially 
of the factors likely to have influenced their business activities and attitudes, would 
seem to make it apparent that the historical background, including to some extent 
same cultural aspects, cast a strong shadow over the formation of the significant 
characteristics indicated above. Although this sample only represents the small group, 
which stood at the top of the hierarchy of businessmen or other individuals engaged in 
relatively medium or small-scale business or commercial activities, the analysis of 
social origins indicates the existence of certain limitations on entering the business
145 See, M. Daimon, ‘Nosonshakai to Toshishakai’ in K. Ishii (eds.), Nihon Keizaishi, vol.2, esp. 
pp.350-53.
See Tanimoto and Abe, ‘Kigyo Bokko to Kindai Keiei, Zairai Keiei’ esp. pp.104-11; also M. 
Tanimoto, ‘Nihon ni okeru Chiikikogyoka to Toshikatsudo -Kigyo Bokkoki’ in Shakaikeizaishigaku 
64-1 (1998).
l47Tanimoto and Abe, ‘Kigyo Bokko’, pp.l 19-123.
148 For this example see H. Takeda, ‘Meiji Zenki no Fujitagumi to Morike Yushi’ in Keizaigaku Ronshu 
48-3 (1982).
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world of modem Japan and gaining huge success. It is clear that, as a result of the 
destruction of the old regime, and following longer term reforms and the transitional 
period, there was a great shake up and upheaval among business wealth holders, in 
particular within the merchant group, and this led to both rises and falls in their 
business activities. It also gave opportunities to individuals who had been in a 
marginal position within the business wealth holders’ group, who were able to take 
advantage by catching up with new technology, use of information, and business 
policies, all of which were subsequently connected with great success under the new 
economic conditions that followed.
However, despite this fact, these groups did not experience the kind of serious crisis 
faced by the ruling class of the old regime, including samurai, feudal lords and the 
court aristocracy, a group which had suffered from the total destruction of its basis 
and political position as a result of the reforms from the Meiji period. This old ruling 
class was forced either to transform itself into a new social class not based on the 
traditional social hierarchy, or to dissolve its old status, and fit into a new and 
westernised social system in which success depended on ability to adapt to the new 
economic and social circumstances. In contrast to this case, the business wealth 
holders’ group, whether merchants or landlords, remained relatively stable as a social 
class, and this evidence may be taken as showing that the barriers to entry into these 
two groups were stronger than might be expected. The number of individuals who 
could access or enter into these groups from the outside was certainly limited, even in 
the case of those who had obtained intellectual skills through their educational 
experience that might contribute to the transformation and reform of business 
activities and management, for instance, graduates from higher educational 
institutions. This evidence, if anything, confirms the existence of limitations on entry, 
since without any intellectual resources or capital, whether of a traditional or modem 
kind, access to these higher educational institutions was virtually impossible. Even in 
the case of adopted sons, who formed a relatively large group within the business 
wealth holders, upward mobility from lower social classes by utilising this system 
was limited. This would appear to have resulted from the methods used in adopting 
sons, which utilised informal family networks for selection, and the social status of 
the family from which the adopted son originated is likely to have played a major role 
in the choice.
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With regard to other factors, the Japanese ie system, which was traditional but also 
experienced radical social reform after the start of the modem period, necessarily 
played a significant role, not only in the survival of these business wealth holders, but 
also in the development of modem Japanese business, in particular in the field of 
family businesses. Though the details differ slightly in each case, the ie system of 
business wealth holders, especially in the case of merchant houses, was partly 
characterised by certain organisational aspects and a focus on the long-term survival 
of the family business. This system consequently influenced the formation of 
particular characteristics in modem Japanese business in terms of the family’s power 
over its own business. On the one hand, the ie system was undoubtedly useful in 
transforming these businesses of merchant houses along more modem, westernised 
lines, and this was largely due to the organisational system of business in traditional 
merchant houses. Although it took a relatively long period for the transformation to 
occur, some of the concepts associated with modem business, like the separation of 
ownership and control of day-to-day management, were acceptable to those merchants, 
since a certain degree of separation already existed under the traditional system. On 
the other hand, the style of adoption of modem business concepts made any total 
separation of the owner’s family from the business almost impossible, and this would 
appear to have been caused by the combination of the concepts of modem business 
and the traditional system. As the zaibatsu cases have already indicated, these 
families’ authority was not only utilised for the effective introduction of a modem 
business system, but was also exploited to give a certain status and credibility to the 
business, even where the commitment to business and management was not so great. 
This combination also led almost imperceptibly to a sort of clash between the 
traditional and modem systems. In spite of its having no official or legal constraining 
power, the existence of private family law (regulation) among business wealth holders, 
and its strong power to restrict a family’s wishes, certainly represented a conflict with 
the modem legal system. The constraining power of the ie system would thus seem to 
have cast a long shadow over business activities in general for much of the modem 
period.
Though it must be conceded that the analysis undoubtedly has certain limitations,
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much of the evidence also indicates a lesser interest in pursuing self-interest and 
gaining huge profits, and a greater interest in the development of the business. The 
alternative choice, that is, attaching importance to profit and the profitability of the 
business, was more likely to have resulted from a failure of business expansion. 
Moreover, as some cases show, this was possibly due to the need to confront the 
limits to business diversification that characterised the business activities of 
contemporary business wealth holders. Even in the case of their investment activities, 
it can be argued that the search for profit for self-interest was partly the result of the 
experience of business and investment failures, in addition to there being some 
influence from the business strategy of the firms they were involved in. Moreover, in 
other cases, for instance landlords, investment activities contributed to the 
development of the local economy, even if their aim was a rather different one, that is, 
returns or profit from firms.
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Chapter 4: Social Networking of Business Wealth Holders
4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapters, attention and analysis were mainly focused on certain 
aspects of the business of Japanese wealth holders, such as wealth accumulation and 
business activities. Though this analysis has shed light on a number of factors 
indispensable for an understanding of Japanese wealth holders, and has indicated very 
closely the interdependence of traditional and modem factors for the development of 
the modem Japanese economy and business, it also raises another question, namely 
the relationship between wealth holders’ achievements and their private lives. Since 
modernization and westernisation had a major impact in transforming the social 
system of modem Japan, and even the older traditions of Japanese society, for 
instance, the ie system, experienced reorganization and the invention of several new 
characteristics, we may assume that these social changes in themselves itself cast a 
strong shadow over their private life.
Japanese wealth holders certainly reflect this social transformation, largely as a result 
of their accumulated wealth and social status, both of which opened wider access to 
western cultural and social life. In addition, despite the ‘reinvention’ of some 
traditional factors, a reinvention which was utilised to revive cultural memories from 
the distant past, and which was exploited for building up certain aspects of modem 
Japan that could be used to portray Japan as standing morally higher than ‘corrupted’ 
or ‘decadent’ western societies, in another way, western society was also idealised, 
especially among people belonging to Japanese high society, as the model for their 
private and social life.1 In fact, along with modernization, westernisation was a part of 
the strategy whereby an ambitious social elite, both political and economic, sought to 
stand at the top of the social hierarchy in modem Japan, and their very success 
manifests the effectiveness of this strategy. Therefore, we may be certain that the 
fluctuating relationship of so-called western and traditional factors strongly influenced 
the formation of private life in modem Japan, even if there was a difference in its 
influence, depending on the social class to which an individual belonged.
1 See, for example Lebra, Above the Clouds, esp. chap 4.
2 Some research points out that this also caused some sort of enthusiastic attitude towards a good 
education in modem Japan. See for example, H. Takeuchi, Gakureki Kizoku no Eiko to Zasetsu (Tokyo, 
1999), pp. 145-90.
200
The role of informal networks, represented in kinship or marriage alliances among 
business families, has until recently been regarded as of limited importance for the 
development of business activities. The study of informal networks has tended to take 
a secondary position in research on business activities to factors such as the 
importance of organisational reforms, management or labour relations, or 
technological innovation to catch up and succeed in the business world. However, the 
formation of informal networks within a group of businessmen is one of the crucial 
factors for business, whether for day-to-day operation or long-term business 
expansion. A number of researchers have pointed out that such networks are 
significant for establishing trust between business partners, thus contributing to 
reduction in transaction costs. Utilising game theory, Grief has analysed the role of 
informal networks from his research of the Magribi traders during the middle ages.3 
Aoki has also focused on the role of informal networks in his recent work as part of 
the spontaneous order that consequently forms economic institutions, though his 
approach is slightly different from Griefs.4 Moreover, from sociological research on 
Hokkian Chinese traders, Landa has insisted that kinship and local networks within 
the Hokkians played a significant role for the formation of trading networks among 
them, since these factors reduced uncertainty in conditions of contracts and they 
therefore greatly economised on information and transaction costs, something 
indispensable for economic success.5 Granovetter has also discussed networks of 
personal relations in economic activities, and has pointed out that business relations 
have tended to be mixed up with social relations, as indicated by the existence of 
interlocking directorates in many firms that have made relationships among directors 
very densely knit. He has also emphasised that this kind of close personal network 
forms a crucial part of business activities, in establishing trust within business circles, 
thus reducing the risk of possibility of breaking business contracts, and that this sort 
of relationship is not limited to the business elite but applied to business activities at
3 See A. Greif, ‘Reputation and Coalition in Medieval Trade’, Journal o f Economic History 49-4 
(1989), and also Grief, ‘Cultural Belief and the Organization of Society’, Journal o f Political Economy 
102-5 (1994).
4 See M. Aoki, Hikakuseido Bunseki ni Mukete (Tokyo, 2001: English version forthcoming), esp. chs.2 
and 3. What is different between Grief and Aoki is that Aoki’s analysis has focused more on the 
changes and evolution of economic institutions, while Grief has focused on the analysis of decision 
making itself. See, Grief, ‘Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis’, American Economic 
Review 88-2(1998).
5 See J. Landa, Trust, Ethnicity and Identity (Ann Arbor, 1994), esp. chap.5 and 6.
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all levels.6 Although this research is not directly related to the Japanese case, it is 
apparent that it can give some general perspective on the importance of social 
networks in business activities. Moreover, since the Japanese economy was 
confronted with frequent economic fluctuations from the late 19th century, 
encountering both recession and depression, reinforcing business relationships 
through the formation of informal networks would seem likely to have been of 
importance for Japanese business wealth holders. It is also apparent that these external 
economic factors cast a shadow over their personal and individual relationships, 
which may also have contributed to the formation of such networks.
In this final chapter, the analysis will therefore be focused on the social networking of 
Japanese wealth holders. As in chapter 3, those wealth holders who engaged in 
business activities are the subjects of the research. This focus is also due to the desire 
to pursue comparative analysis with European cases, since most of the related works 
and studies utilised for the comparison focus only on the wealthy business elite. The 
main concern of this chapter is the marriage patterns of Japanese business wealth 
holders. Although this was part of the private activities of the members of the sample, 
and is not directly connected with their formal business activities, it is likely that an 
observation of this social aspect will demonstrate the significance of informal 
networking, as a characteristic of the social networks of Japanese business wealth 
holders. It will also enable us to identify the extent to which this hidden network was 
of importance in reinforcing relationships among the business elite or extending their 
networks into other social elite groups, for instance, the nobility. This perspective, too, 
is significant for the comparative analysis, since much of the European research has 
discussed the extent of the exclusiveness of this relatively new business elite, to the 
extent of its integration into old elite groups. It is hoped that the Japanese case will 
indicate a new perspective in relation to the dichotomy between the ‘modem* and 
‘old’ elites in the European cases, in terms of a definition of the ‘old’ elite as pre- 
industrial.
6 See M. Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’, 
American Journal o f Sociology 91-3 (1985), and Granovetter, ‘Business Groups’ in N. Smelser and R. 
Swedberg (eds.), Handbook o f Economic Sociology (Princeton, 1994), pp.453-75.
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In addition to marriage, the role of honours and titles, for example, aristocratic titles 
or other decorations and honours, will be analysed in the context of social networking 
between the modem Japanese state and the business elite. The granting of titles and 
decorations by the government is likely to have been considered as a kind of political 
strategy for strengthening formal ties with members of the business elite, and, to some 
extent, for establishing control over the bourgeois elite. This aspect, which has in the 
European cases been regarded as a sort of ‘aristocratization’ of the bourgeoisie, is 
likely to have influenced the social aspirations of Japanese business wealth holders, 
and may well have also had a strong relationship with the development of nationalism 
in modem Japan. Thus, analysis of this characteristic will reveal an important 
perspective on the business activities and dependence on state authority of Japanese 
business wealth holders.
4.1.2 Method of analysis
Before moving into the main discussion and analysis of social networks, it is 
necessary to explain the methodological approach in this chapter. The data on 
marriage in this chapter, and its analysis, will be focused on marriage alliances and 
social endogamy among Japanese wealth holders. This has meant that data on the 
occupational and social status of the spouse’s father was required. As in the previous 
chapters, the analysis is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
However, there is a particular problem relating to the quantitative data sets utilised in 
the following sections. Since the main data set, based on Zenkoku 5Oman yen ijo 
Shisanka Hyo, focuses only on the amount of personal wealth of Japanese wealth 
holders, it does not contain any sort of personal data, other than their occupational 
information for the current period. Thus additional data, especially regarding marriage 
partners, was required, and has been collected through research on autobiographical 
and biographical sources. In some cases, fictional literature, like novels, has provided 
these data. However, these biographical and literary sources also have another 
problem if  used for collecting personal data. Many of these autobiographies and 
biographies, in particular those edited and published under the auspices of companies 
owned or managed by the individual concerned, tend to concentrate on the description 
of the business contribution of the wealth holder, and therefore, in many cases, it is 
hard to trace data on their personal lives from these materials. Consequently, the most
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useful data sources for obtaining personal data are biographical dictionaries, for 
instance, Jinji Koshinroku and Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsu Den? Even so, the utilization 
of these dictionaries raises certain questions of reliability, and hence further 
complications relating to the credibility of the data. Therefore, to try and minimise 
and eliminate possible errors from the data set, the data from these dictionaries has 
been in as far as possible also confirmed by looking at autobiographies and 
biographies, and by data from other secondary sources. This is therefore helpful in 
trying to confirm wealth holders’ exact social status, when the biographical 
dictionaries do not mention the occupational status of the father of the spouse.
Among the Japanese sample, individuals whose spouse’s father’s status is identified 
only as heimin (commoner), have been eliminated from the data set, since analysis of 
marriage is based on the occupational status of the spouse’s father, and no information 
is available about occupation in the case of heimin. In the case of those identified as 
belonging to the samurai class, though it is a slightly vague definition, it was utilised 
to indicate social status in a broad sense, even in the early 20th century. Therefore, this 
category is included in the data set on spouses. In addition, in cases where this is 
possible, data on second or third marriages are also included.
The categorization of occupational and social status has been more broadly defined 
for the analysis of marriage. This is because of the categorisation in the data set in the 
European cases. In the data on the European cases, including from some secondary 
sources, the business elite group, whether merchants or businessmen, is just 
categorised as ‘businessmen’ in a general sense. There is no distinction, unlike in the 
Japanese case, and therefore a certain rearrangement of the Japanese categorisation is 
necessary for comparison. This is also the reason why landlords, the aristocracy and 
the political elite have been integrated into a single category, that is, the non-business 
elite. The purpose of this broad categorization is to be able to analyse more clearly the 
general tendency of these business wealth holders’ marriages, and also to minimise 
the differences in categorization with the comparative cases, which will be discussed 
later on from a slightly different perspective. Consequently, the sample of business
7 Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsu Den was a sort of brief collection of short biographies of famous 
businessmen in the pre-war period. It was published in two volumes in 1931 (Jitsugyo no Nihonsha 
(ed.), Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsu Den 2vols. (Tokyo, 1931)).
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wealth holders on whom information is available constitutes 317 individuals. Among 
these business wealth holders, landlords who were also engaged in business activities, 
either as owner of a company or as a salaried manager of a corporation, are included. 
By contrast, due to the categorisation in the comparative analysis, members of the 
aristocracy who originated from among the formal feudal lords or the court 
aristocracy have been excluded. However, there is only one case in this category.
Turning to the material for comparative analysis, the most useful data on the German 
case is again contained in Augustine’s study, which focussed on the wealthiest 
businessmen in Imperial Germany. Her analysis of the selection of spouse and 
marriage of this business elite provides a rich and fruitful source for comparison with 
the Japanese case, even though Augustine’s attention is concentrated on the Imperial 
era, partly due to the drastic changes and difficulties in data collection for the 
following periods, the Weimar and Nazi eras. In addition, as in my data set, because 
of certain limitations on the availability of personal information, out of the total 
sample of 501 in Augustine’s study, only 294 individual cases are available for this 
comparison. A more minor problem in using Augustine’s data for comparison is, as in 
the British case, the existence of differences in the categorization of the social groups 
from which consorts of the wealthy business elite originated, in particular in the social 
categorization of the upper class. In the German case, members of the non-business 
elite, for instance landowners {Junkers), military officers and members of the nobility, 
are defined as the pre-industrial elite, a distinction that stems from the difference in 
historical background. However, in the Japanese case, none of these social groups can 
be categorized as part of the pre-industrial elite, rather, they were part of the modem 
elite. Even in the case of landlords and the aristocracy, these groups experienced 
radical changes with regard to their social, economic and political status, and this 
certainly played a major role in bringing about discontinuity between their pre- 
industrial and traditional characteristics and their newer roles. Thus, there are some 
minor changes that need to be made if Augustine’s data is to be used for comparative 
analysis, that is, the pre-industrial elite group is re-categorised, along with the 
category of upper civil servant in Augustine’s data set, as the non-business elite for 
the purpose of this thesis. Another minor problem is that since Augustine’s sample 
only contains those who are presumed to have solely devoted themselves to business 
activities, there is a possibility of over-representation of the non-business elite in the
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selection of spouses in the Japanese case, because the Japanese data includes some 
wealthy landlords engaged in business as a subsidiary activity. To minimise this 
possibility, those individuals in the Japanese case whose main business activities 
focused on the agricultural sector as landlords have been eliminated from the data 
when it is being used for comparison.
In contrast to the German case, in the British case no such equivalent data or 
information is available from secondary materials and studies. Even in Rubinstein’s 
various research works on the British wealthy elite, which have been frequently 
utilised for comparison in this thesis, there is no information and analysis on this 
subject. Therefore, in the British case, though information is limited to the case of 
England, the data has been collected from the Dictionary o f  Business Biography 
(DBB), which incorporates a range of information on British business leaders,
o
including some of their personal data. The problem of utilising the DBB rests in the 
difference in the criteria used. Since the data on businessmen in the DBB was selected 
with regard to their business leadership and contribution in modem Britain, the wealth 
accumulation of these businessmen was less important for the editors of DBB. This 
possibility of bias in the data of the DBB is therefore likely to result in some 
inconsistencies in the comparative analysis. Nevertheless, we can be certain that the 
sample in the DBB is representative of the business elite in modem Britain in terms of 
its importance in the modem British business world, in either business expansion or 
economic development more broadly, and thus this sample will undoubtedly indicate 
some significant factors in relation to the selection of spouses among the British 
business elite. For the purpose of comparison, especially with the Japanese case, the 
sample chosen is from businessmen who were bom between 1850 and 1899, and who 
married before the outbreak of the Second World War. Those whose origins were in 
the hereditary peerage from the pre-industrial period have been eliminated from this 
data set. As a result, for Britain information on 309 cases of the selection of spouses is 
available. This data is utilised for the comparison with the German and Japanese cases 
in a later section of this chapter.
8 D. Jeremy et a/.(eds.), Dictionary o f Business Biography, 5 volumes (Aldershot, 1984-86).
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Apart from the analysis of marriage and spouse selection, this chapter also includes 
analysis of the granting of titles, honours and decorations. This section is based on 
non-quantitative methods of analysis. While the general tendencies perceived through 
analysing statistical data are significant in exploring spouse selection among Japanese 
business wealth holders, an analysis of the granting of these honorary decorations can 
only be undertaken in the context of recognition of the character and role of these 
decorations, and their consequent influence on social status. In other words, a focus 
on whether or not these tokens of honour played an important role in the relationship 
between the Japanese business wealthy elite and the state is crucial for exploring the 
social position, importance and self-determination of this group in modem Japan. For 
this reason, the analysis has relied heavily on primary sources from Kokuritsu 
Komonjokan (The National Archives of Japan). The main data sources for this subject 
are the jo i saikasho (declarations on granting non-aristocratic titles) and jokun 
saikasho (declarations on granting decorations), which contain a great deal of 
information about those individuals, including many of the business elite, who 
received these honours. However, because of certain difficulties in finding 
comprehensive data on individuals, in particular for cases where these honours were 
not granted to an individual per se, but to an individual as a member of a particular 
group, it is impossible to confirm all the cases of business wealth holders.9 Therefore, 
the analysis in this section is based on the cases that can be confirmed from both of 
these sources, and several hundred of these are available. The details of the system of 
granting titles and decorations in modem Japan will be discussed in this later section, 
again with the addition of some comparative perspective.
4.2. Marriage Alliances as a Method of Informal Networking
Before discussing the results from the analysis of the data sets, it is appropriate to 
discuss the main characteristics of the marriages of Japanese business wealth holders 
and their perspectives on marriage. Although it might appear plausible to argue that 
the comparison of the Japanese case with the European cases would indicate certain 
similarities in terms of social networking, there is a serious danger that without
9 This is largely due to the confused and poorly organised lists of both materials which are very large. 
Each list contains information on individuals who received these decorations in particular years in a 
chronological order, not an alphabetical order of individual names. Through the investigation of this list, 
I discovered that the names of some individuals were not mentioned in the list in some cases.
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consideration of the social and cultural aspects of marriage, the results from the data 
set could tend to be misunderstood as a simple phenomenon of convergence within 
the social context, even though there were crucial differences between modem Japan 
and contemporary Europe. Thus classification of similarities and differences in the 
comparative data analysis requires some explanation of the cultural and social factors, 
which can be assumed to have influenced the pattern, choice of spouse and marriage 
itself of the wealthy Japanese business elite. Using some comparisons and some 
evidence from biographical materials, the main characteristics of the selection of a 
marriage partner, the expansion of social networks into higher social classes and 
patterns of marriage alliance will now be explored.
4.2.1. Characteristics of Spouse Selection
In the two European cases, as many family historians have discussed, the 19th century 
has been defined as a period of transition, during which most middle class marriages 
were based neither entirely on material conditions nor entirely on emotions. The 
indication is that marriage throughout this period stood somewhere between 
‘arranged’ marriage and ‘love matches’.10 On the other hand, it seems clear that, as 
Gay insists in his research, love and sexuality were strong forces among the Victorian 
bourgeoisie, and these factors increasingly influenced the search for a mate as well as 
married life.11 The progress of economic development and industrialisation is also 
seen as having accelerated these changes. Kocka has described these changes in his 
study on the role of the family in modem German business, and concluded that, 
despite the importance of ‘convenient’ marriage in the early stage of industrialisation, 
largely due to its very significant economic functions, for example in expanding social 
networks among businessmen or exploiting dowries for business activities, over time 
social networks through marriage alliances became less meaningful, as these roles 
were played by other institutions. With the declining need for parents to select a 
marriage partner for their children, businessmen’s children, in particular their sons,
10 For example see P. Gay, Bourgeois Experience vol. 2 (Oxford, 1986), pp.98-99, pp.106-7, and M. 
Kaplan ‘For Love or Money’ in M. Kaplan (eds.), Marriage Bargain (New York, 1985).
11 See Gay, Bourgeois Experience vol.2, pp.5-43 for further details. However Gay does not deny the 
importance of the arranged marriage in some particular social groups. See ibid, p. 100.
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enjoyed greater freedom in the selection of a spouse.12 On the other hand, it has also 
been argued that arranged marriages did still play an indispensable role in the case of 
businessmen. In these cases, parents in particular exercised a major influence on 
spouse selection by utilising their own social networks, for instance, circles of 
relatives and friends, special occasions like marriage or vacation travels, and business 
networks. Kaplan insists that love marriages were, in the case of German businessmen, 
truly rare before the First World War. She explains that the selection of spouse by 
individuals themselves was hardly ever found, and that the parents still had a right of 
veto over their children’s decisions. Moreover, in particular in the case of the wealthy 
Jewish families in imperial Germany, a man’s motivation in marriage was the 
maintenance and augmentation of the family fortune, and the size of a woman’s 
dowry was often a decisive factor.13 Although Kaplan’s view has been attacked by 
some historians, especially by W. E. Mosse, who argued that arranged marriages no 
longer took place within the higher echelons of Jewish society in imperial Germany, 
these criticisms have had relatively little impact, as the criticisms have not been based 
on any extensive analysis of the materials.14 Augustine’s study may be regarded as 
standing between these two perspectives. From her analysis of autobiographical and 
biographical materials, Augustine has pointed to a relative freedom in the case of a 
son with regard to sexual behaviour, and argued that recognition of one’s own social 
status played a significant role in the choice of a spouse. Augustine also pointed out 
the existence in her sample of a psychological conflict between love marriage and 
arranged marriage.15 However, from Augustine’s analysis, it is clear that the selection 
of a spouse among the wealthy business elite was undertaken on a case by case basis, 
and that their experience became more varied, at least for the case of businessmen’s 
sons.
In the Japanese case materials are limited, but if we consider the results from the data 
set, which will be discussed in more detail later, we find that in contrast to the 
European cases, there were hardly any cases of ‘love marriage* among Japanese 
wealth holders. Several examples may serve to indicate the strong difference, which
12 See J. Kocka, ‘Familie, Untemehmer und Kapitalismus’ in Zeitschrift fur Untemehmensgeschichte 
24 (1979)
13 See Kaplan, ‘For Love and Money’, pp.124-138.
14 See W. Mosse, German-Jewish Economic Elite (Oxford, 1989), esp. pp. 108-10 and also the counter 
attack from Augustine, Patricians, p.63.
15 See Augustine, Patricians, esp. pp.63-69.
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seems to have separated the Japanese experience from the contemporary European 
cases. Mitsui Reiko, the fourth daughter of the soryoke, the grand main house of the 
Mitsui families which had the ownership rights over the Mitsui zaibatsu, has 
explained the pattern of marriage within these prominent wealthy business families in 
an interview. She firstly indicated that the selection of spouse was a sort of business 
strategy, used not only for extending the family networks to other social groups, but 
also to reinforce the relationship between families. All marriages within the Mitsui 
families took the form of ‘arranged’ marriage, even in the case of marriages between 
children of the families. In some cases, an arranged marriage between children of the 
families was used to give the formal status as a family member to illegitimate sons or 
daughters within the families.16 In Reiko’s own case, she explained as follows:
My engagement with Takaatsu (her relative, later the household head of the 
Nagasakacho-ke, one of the branch houses of Mitsui) took the form of an arranged 
marriage. Formally, he asked my father (Takamine, the head of the Mitsui zaibatsu) in 
order to obtain formal permission for this engagement, since it was for my father to make 
a final decision on this proposal. However, this was not my first experience of arranged 
marriage. When I was 16, a distant relative of mine offered a plan for my future 
engagement, something which my father had already arranged in the past and really 
wished. However, at this time, I strongly refused to accept it because I thought I was too 
young to get married. That was why I married Takaatsu later.17
Reiko’s case not only signifies the clear limitations on one’s own choice of spouse, as 
in the European cases, but also manifests the strong decision-making power of the 
father. Although Reiko’s case is very rare in that her father allowed her disapproval of 
the proposal the first time, we can assume that, in general, it was hardly possible for
Y fidaughters to refuse their fathers’ proposals. Under the legal system of modem Japan, 
in addition to the ie system, which was partly discussed in the previous chapter, the 
father could exercise a strong authority in family affairs over the members of his own 
family.19 The overwhelming power of the father in Japan also shows some contrast
16 See S. Yasuoka, ‘Mitsui Reiko Shi to no Taidan’ in Doshisha Shogaku 41-2 (1981) pp.l 14-16.
11 Ibid, pp.120-21.
18 There is another example of marriage being a part of the personal strategy of the father, in which the 
possibility of choice was not offered to daughters. Shibusawa Eiichi is one particular example. See 
Sano, Shibusawa-ke Sandai (Tokyo, 1998) pp. 102-3 for Shibusawa’s consideration of the arranged 
marriage of his eldest daughter.
19 See for example Y. Nishizawa, ‘Kindai Kokka to Kazoku’, in C. Ueno (ed.), Iwanami Koza Gendai 
Shakaigaku vol. 19.
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with the European examples, in which some cases indicate the covert influence of the 
mother of children in the making of decisions regarding the children’s selection of a 
marriage partner.20 Also, though not in the case of the business elite, research on the 
Japanese aristocracy by Lebra reveals similar tendencies in marriage within this social 
group. Lebra suggested that even in the case of those informants who enjoyed 
freedom of choice, the selection of prospective spouses was ultimately in the father’s 
hands, and a child’s freedom to reject was not exercised because the father’s choice 
was ‘excellent’.21 Although it is risky to generalise from the case of one particular 
social group for the case of Japanese business wealth holders, it is likely that, along 
with the influence of the modem legal system, social status and wealth probably 
created similar patterns in the selection of a spouse by fathers.
The lack of freedom of choice was, however, not only acceptable in the case of 
daughters, but was also experienced by some sons. One particular example is the case 
of Iwasaki Koyata, who was the head of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu in the early 20th 
century. According to his personal biography, during his study at Pembroke College 
Koyata once revealed his opinion on marriage to his Japanese friend, Imamura 
Shigezo, the son of a famous Japanese banker, insisting that he had no interest in 
marriage and would spend his life as a bachelor until his death. However, Imamura 
replied coolly that this was impossible for Koyata, who was the inheritor of 
Mitsubishi and its business. Koyata furiously opposed his friend’s view and promised 
that if he got married after returning to Japan, he would display a white flag (as a 
symbol of his defeat) at his wedding ceremony. Despite his assertion, after his 
graduation from Pembroke College, and return to Japan, Koyata found that his father 
had already arranged his marriage without hearing his opinion. He immediately 
married with Shimazu Takako, who was a descendant of the prominent feudal lord of
99the Satsuma domain, and whose father had received the title of baron. When 
Imamura heard this news, he pressed Koyata to carry out his promise. As a result, at 
his wedding ceremony Koyata put a white flag on the Japanese ceremonial doll which
20 Several such cases are discussed in Augustine’s work. See Augustine, Patricians, p.65 and p.75 for 
example.
21 See Lebra, Above the Clouds, p.234.
22 Takako’s father had not inherited the main house of the Shimazu family, whose head had been 
granted the title of prince after the Meiji Restoration.
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was presented by Imamura for the celebration of his marriage.23 This episode would 
seem to indicate that although Koyata was a long distance away from his parents 
when his marriage was arranged, the will of the children was clearly less important or 
even irrelevant in the Japanese case. It also suggests that little information on one’s 
own marriage tended to be provided by the parents, and in some cases no information 
at all, even in the son’s case. This case also occasions some doubts as to whether the 
Japanese modem wealthy business elite enjoyed any freedom in relation to love 
affairs or sexual behaviour, something which had already been partially won in the 
European cases.
From another perspective, it was assumed that a son’s marriage was also significant in 
helping parents to extend their social network to other social groups. In this context, 
the formalization of an arranged marriage was less likely to provoke resistance from 
the children, as this assumption was presumably shared by them as well. The case of 
Ito Chubei, who later founded Itochu Trading, one of the famous Japanese trading 
companies, exemplifies the strategic arranged marriage. Ito’s marriage with the 
daughter of Nagata Tobei, a prominent forest landlord in Nara prefecture, the 
neighbouring prefecture to Ito’s own native place, Shiga, was effectively arranged 
between both families with a view to achieving an ‘informal alliance*, which certainly 
included the objective of expanding the business network.24 Therefore, compared with 
the European cases, clear restrictions on the choice of spouse applied not only in the 
daughter’s case, but also, to some extent, in the son’s case as well.
If we consider a number of factors which restricted freedom of choice, it is clear that 
cultural and traditional constraints, in particular reflected in the ie system, 
undoubtedly influenced and reinforced these characteristics of marriage in the 
Japanese case. Along with this factor of the ie, which may be defined as constituting a 
sort of patriarchal structure, economic and business factors also played a definite role 
in the selection of a spouse. However, it is interesting that, in contrast to the European 
cases, in which the dowry from a marriage partner was unquestionably exploited for 
business expansion by the wealthy business elite, in the Japanese case there is little 
mention of the dowry, at least in the case of the business elite. Though this is hardly a
23 For this episode, see Miyakawa, Iwasaki Koyata, pp.39-40.
24 See Ito Chubei O Kaisoroku (Osaka, 1976) pp. 180-84.
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reliable basis for comparison, this does suggest that expanding social networks among 
the Japanese business elite was not necessarily directly associated with the business in 
financial terms. On the contrary, it appears that the economic and wealth power of the 
Japanese business elite was clearly exercised in order to expand social networks to 
other social groups, and this is related to the theme of the next section.
4.2.2. Marriage as a means of Elevation of Social Status
The social networking of the business elite and the aristocracy by creating strategic 
marriage alliances forms part of the debates about the role of the aristocracy 
throughout the modem period in the European cases. Despite Cannadine’s insistence 
on the gradual decline of the aristocracy in the British case, on the grounds that they 
lost their pre-modem privileges and largely failed to respond to social transformation, 
it remains true that the power of their wealth, obtained through long-term experience 
as a landed elite contributed to preventing any radical decline.25 The brief description 
in chapter 2, based on Lieven’s and Rubinstein’s data, indicated that in both Britain 
and Germany the aristocracy constituted a relative majority within the wealth holders’ 
group, even allowing for the possibility that data included some members of the 
business elite who had been granted titles. Even without the power of wealth, the 
aristocracy still maintained its social status, and to some extent its members’ political 
and military service contributed to supporting their status. There is no doubt that for 
these reasons, the integration of the aristocracy and the business elite, in relation to 
the strength of the social, economic and cultural values of the aristocracy, has become 
a major subject of academic research in the context of the formation of an upper class 
elite in the modem period. In the British case, the integration between these two social 
groups has been interpreted as a sort of complementary exchange of both sets of 
values, thus making social integration gradually easier.26
Cassis’s analysis of the strategic marriage alliances among City bankers signifies that 
although marriage with members of the aristocracy had become common among 
bankers in modem Britain, they did not have to abandon their professional careers,
25 For Cannadine’s works, see The Decline and Fall o f the British Aristocracy, and also Cannadine, 
Aspects o f Aristocracy (New Haven, 1994).
26 For this perspective, see P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, esp. chap 1 and 2 in vol.l.
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and instead they selectively introduced the values of the aristocracy, in particular into
• • 77their life style. In addition, through an econometric analysis of businessmen and 
landownership, Nicholas has indicated that among landed wealth holders businessmen 
constituted only a small minority. He has also shown that the inadequacy of 
landownership in terms of revenue caused many landowners to enter into business in 
order to preserve their wealth, status and power, and this was even true of members of 
the aristocracy.28 These findings may be taken as indicating the existence of a certain 
dynamism, and as a means of survival of the British aristocracy in the modem period.
In contrast to the British case, the social networking between the nobility and the 
business elite in imperial Germany tends to be interpreted as the social assimilation of 
the bourgeoisie into the old social elite, and this was a core concept of the 
‘aristocratization’ of the German business elite.29 However, recent studies have 
gradually revised this view. Through her analysis of partner selection, patterns of 
intermarriage and differences between the ennobled and non-ennobled business elite, 
Augustine insists that those members of the sample that can be categorised as 
examples of ‘aristocratization* were really in a minority, even among the wealthy 
business elite. In addition to a definite impact of ethnicity on behaviour, in particular 
among the Jewish business elite, there was a difference in the pattern of intermarriage 
in the case of sons and daughters, that is, daughters tended to get married with the old 
social elite, which could be interpreted as a strategy to expand social networks outside 
of the business group, while sons tended to marry with others from the business group, 
largely in order to continue their professional careers.30 Despite some differences 
caused by political, economic and social factors, both cases display the relative 
strength of the aristocracy in terms of their social status, economic power and a degree 
of cultural influence on the business elite’s behaviour.
27 See Cassis, City Bankers, esp. chap.6 and 7.
28 See Nicholas, ‘Businessmen and Landownership in the late 19th century’ in Economic History 
Review 52-1 (1999).
29 An analysis of social networks from this perspective is partly explored in W. E. Mosse, ‘Adel und 
Burgertum in Europa des 19Jahrhundert’ in Kocka et al (eds.), Burgertum im 19Jahrhundert vol.l 
(Munich, 1988). This article was later translated as W. E. Mosse, ‘Nobility and Middle Class in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe’ in J. Kocka and A. Mitchell (eds.), The bourgeois society in nineteen- 
century Europe (Oxford, 1993). See, esp. pp.75-77, pp.81-82 and pp.90-92.
30 See Augustine, Patricians, pp.79-80, p.85.
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One factor in the Japanese case which forms a sharp contrast with the European cases 
is the lack of economic power of the aristocracy. In particular, among the three groups 
which made up the Japanese aristocracy, that is, the former feudal lords, the former 
court aristocracy and the newly ennobled, the former court aristocracy group was the 
weakest group in terms of financial condition. As already mentioned in chapter 2, the 
Japanese aristocracy only represented a minority among the wealth holders in modem 
Japan, and there was no member of the court aristocracy whose wealth was over 1 
million yen in the data set. Moreover, since the early Meiji period, this group had 
suffered from personal financial crisis and the generally relatively poor economic 
conditions facing the Japanese aristocracy.31 Thus, in spite of their honoured and 
elevated social status even within the aristocracy, the court aristocracy tended 
sometimes to be depicted as a disgraced aristocracy which sold its honourable 
position in return for money. Some contemporary materials depict these examples, 
although it is virtually impossible to trace particular individuals’ names, since the 
accounts frequently used anonymous names, presumably to avoid any sort of legal 
action. However, the materials indicate that marriage was utilised to salvage these 
families from their poor economic situation. For example, one anonymous marquis 
who originated from the court aristocracy allegedly offered his daughter ‘for sale’ at 
100,000 yen. In this case, the marquis had gone into bankruptcy as a result o f foolish 
investment and subsequent involvement with loan sharks, and instead of offering 
money, the ‘buyer’ of the daughter was guaranteed to inherit the title of marquis as his 
adopted son-in-law.32 In another case, a member of the court aristocracy’s bride 
brought him a 500,000 yen dowry, and the dowry was spent for their honeymoon trip 
to Europe and the U.S.. The material signifies that such ‘disgraceful’ cases among 
the aristocracy were fairly numerous. This evidence consequently shows that without 
wealth and economic power, the higher social status of the Japanese aristocracy was 
almost meaningless, and this fact manifests a sharp contrast with the European 
aristocracies, since these aristocracies for the most part had both status and economic 
power, though they had experienced considerable decline.
31 For example see Asami, Kazoku Tanjo, pp.29-34.
32 See A. Yamaguchi, Yoko kara mita Kazoku Monogatari (Tokyo, 1932), p.25.
33 See ibid, p.35.
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We may assume that the court aristocracy group itself was well aware of its weakness. 
Lebra’s study contains an interview with an anonymous woman, who originated in the 
court aristocracy and later married with the aristocratic descendant of a feudal lord. 
The interviewee firstly insists that there was no sense in a poor court aristocrat {huge) 
marrying another poor court aristocrat. In her opinion, the nobility wanted money, 
while the new rich want to raise their status. Her comment was:
‘and that’s why the two are drawn together. It’s a matter of supply and demand. We could 
not afford a bride unless her family was wealthy enough to provide all the dresses, for 
example, that she needed—' Both sides are delighted (with the arrangement) and this is 
nothing new.’34
In this case, though the exact time and period is unknown, the woman took as her 
example the case of her son, who married the daughter of an extraordinarily rich man, 
who ran several entertainment businesses. From various cases, including this 
particular example, Lebra points out one of the characteristics of marriage of the 
Japanese aristocracy as being a form of complementary exchange. It is likely that a 
similar point of view can be applied to the analysis of marriage among business 
wealth holders in modem Japan. This is also likely to be a reason marriage between 
rich businessmen’s families and members of the nobility in modem Japan cannot 
really be defined as a sort of true ‘aristocratization’ in the sense of the European cases. 
The aristocracy’s lack of economic power indicates that regardless of the respect due 
to a spouse and spouse’s family, the poor aristocracy’s marriages with the wealthy 
business elite in modem Japan display a degree of dependency on the financial and 
economic power of the newly rich. For the wealthy business elite, the relative poverty 
of these nobles ensured that, unlike in the European cases (in particular the money- 
dominated marriage between the wealthy Jewish business elite and the old German 
nobility), there tended to be a mutually positive impact in these marriage alliances 
with the aristocracy.36 Undoubtedly, the values they held in common with the 
aristocracy, heavily influenced by modernization and application of westernisation, 
certainly played a role in breaking the barriers to entry through marriage, and in 
forming new social networks.
34 See Lebra, Above the Clouds, p.228.
35 Ibid, p.228.
36 For the case of the German Jewish economic elite, see Augustine, Patricians, p.85.
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On the other hand, in addition to the lack of economic power, the sharing of common 
values became a key factor in dividing marriages between success and failure. On 
occasions, conflicts over social values proved fatal in breaking down marriages 
between the business elite and the aristocracy. Yanagihara Akiko, better known by her 
poetic pseudonym, Byakuren, is an example of such a cultural conflict. Akiko 
originated from one of the old court aristocratic families (her father was granted the 
title of count in the Meiji period), and her aunt Naruko was a high ranking lady-in- 
waiting in the imperial palace, becoming one of Emperor Meiji’s informal consorts 
(she was actually the natural mother of the Taisho Emperor). Probably because of this 
reason, Akiko’s half-brother, Yoshimitsu, obtained the highest status within the 
palace, known as Jako-no-ma Shiko, a title meaning the closest associate of the 
Emperor at the imperial court.37 After the failure of her first marriage with a relative, 
Akiko’s father arranged her second marriage with Ito Den’uemon, a prominent coal 
magnate in Fukuoka prefecture. However, from the outset, Akiko was surprised by 
her husband’s crude manners and life-style. When Ito married with Akiko, he already 
had countless mistresses and some of them had already lived in his main residence as 
maids. Although Akiko herself was a concubine’s daughter, the manner of the 
relationship between a concubine and a formal wife was certainly different in 
aristocratic families. From the early period of her marriage, she felt she could not 
tolerate the attitude of his head maid-concubine, whose attitude and manner showed 
no respect towards her. She therefore hired a new maid, as a sort of strategy to punish 
this head maid-concubine; Akiko induced the new maid to become a new concubine 
of her husband, thus slashing the household power of the head maid.38 Nevertheless, 
Akiko gradually found herself unable to adjust to the discrepancies between the two 
life-styles of the aristocracy and of members of the business elite who had originated 
as commoners. She was disillusioned by the chaotic overall condition of the 
household and her husband’s reluctance to change his behaviour, which seemed to her 
to be a disturbing lawlessness. This marriage finally resulted in the scandalous event 
of Akiko leaving her husband and eloping with a young lover. Despite being 
confronted with this scandal, her husband refused to divorce her. In consequence
37 Jako hall attendance, the old status granted to courtiers. The name of this title had originated in the 
pre-modem period in the imperial palace of Kyoto.
8 Although the account took the form of fiction, Akiko later recorded her experience of this marriage 
in a novel. See A. Yanagihara, Ibara no Mi (Tokyo, 1928), esp. p.399.
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Akiko sent an open letter demanding divorce, which was printed in a newspaper, 
making the scandal even greater, particularly in view of the honoured and respected 
position of her family.39
Although this is something of an extreme example of marriage between the 
aristocracy and the business elite of modem Japan, it indicates that the sharing of 
common social values was probably significant, and not just the wealth of the 
business elite. On the other hand, it also shows that for members of prominent rich 
families, like the children of zaibatsu families, access to the aristocracy was easier 
than for the ordinary business elite, since it is clear that their educational experience in 
foreign countries and the strict manners and rules adopted in their households made 
them acceptable as spouses for members of the aristocracy or non-business elite. This 
will be in part discussed in the next section, which is concerned with the patterns of 
social networking through marriage alliances.
4.2.3. Patterns of Marriage Alliance
In this section, we are going to examine the issue of marriage and, if possible, to draw 
some conclusions regarding the pattern and strategy of marriage alliances among the 
leading members of the business elite in modem Japan. For these families, their 
immensely abundant fortunes and status in the Japanese business elite allowed for 
greater access to the higher classes of society, thus opening the gate to informal 
networking through marriage, both for themselves and for their children. However, 
the analysis here focuses only on particular individuals, because of the difficulty in 
tracing comprehensive information about the marriages of the prominent business rich 
and their children. Quantitative analysis of this aspect is just not possible. 
Nevertheless, despite certain limitations in the available information, these examples 
may be used to indicate some significant characteristics of the prominent business 
elite, that is, to indicate whether or not their marriage alliances tended to focus on 
particular social groups, like the aristocracy or the modem non-business elite, and 
whether or not the result from this sample displays any similarity with the European 
cases, in terms of the so-called aristocratization of the business elite. The sample used
39 Only fictional literature has treated this scandal. For example, see M. Nagahata, Koi no hana, 
Byakuren Jiken (Tokyo, 1990).
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in this section consists again of the Big-Four zaibatsu families, Mitsui, Iwasaki 
(Mitsubishi), Sumitomo and Yasuda, and in addition some other prominent and 
wealthy business families, that is, Konoike, Fujita, Furukawa, Okura, Kawasaki and 
Shibusawa. Except in the case of the Shibusawa family, all of the sample’s estimated 
wealth exceeded 10 million yen (equivalent to £1 million) in 1915. The reason for 
adding the Shibusawa case is largely the status and social position of Shibusawa 
Eiichi, who had a strong connection with the aristocracy and the top political elite 
through his business activities, thus presumably providing him with significant 
opportunities for forming an informal network with members of the upper class elite. 
In addition, except for Yasuda, these family heads had been granted the title of baron 
(Shibusawa was later elevated to the rank of viscount), and this factor is also likely to 
have played an indispensable role in any marriage alliance. In this section, the data on 
marriage of these wealthy business families is based on bibliographical dictionaries 
(like Jinji Koshinroku or Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsu Den), dictionaries relating to 
aristocratic families (Kazoku Taikan) and a range of autobiographies, biographies and 
secondary sources.40
a)Big-Four Zaibatsu Families
Mitsui
In the case of Mitsui, we find a difficulty in establishing any concrete hypothesis 
relating to the marriage alliances of the prominent business rich. As already 
mentioned before, the Mitsui families consisted of 11 families, and the social status of 
each family within the house of Mitsui, within Mitsui’s business and its position in 
the social hierarchy (only three families, the soryoke and two honke, were granted 
titles of nobility), make the pattern of intermarriage within the families more 
complicated. Moreover, the marriage alliances of the Mitsui families were influenced 
by some additional factors, for instance, the existence of illegitimate sons or daughters 
within each family, and the adopting of children into other Mitsui families or other 
business families. It is therefore very difficult to undertake a methodical analysis of 
their marriage alliances. However, the attempt in this section is to signify the
40 See Kazoku Taikan Kankokai (ed.), Kazoku Taikan (Tokyo, 1990).
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influence of westernisation and aspects of the traditional institutional system, like the 
ie system, both of which contributed to create an even more complex structure of the 
pattern of marriages among the Mitsui families.
The case of the soryoke, standing in the top position among the Mitsui families, and 
whose head of house became head of the Mitsui zaibatsu, provides the simplest 
example among the families. The characteristics of the marriage alliances of the 
soryoke can plausibly be interpreted as providing an example of aristocratization, 
even by comparison with the European cases. Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine, who 
was the head of the soryoke in the early 20th century, and who was granted a barony at
i t  #
the end of the 19 century, married twice. Though his first marriage was with the 
adopted daughter of a prominent merchant in Osaka, Hirooka Shingoro (himself 
married to a daughter from the Mitsui families), Takamine was predeceased by her, 
and her only son also died in early childhood.41 Shortly after her death, Takamine 
married Maeda Motoko, a daughter of Count Maeda Toshigoe, who was the former 
feudal lord of Toyama Domain. Motoko’s family was also famous as a branch family 
of the house of Maeda in Kaga, on the Japan sea coast, the former prominent feudal 
lord who had had the largest domain in the country during the Tokugawa period. 
From this marriage, Takamine had two sons and five daughters. If we look at 
Takamine’s children’s marriages, Mitsui Reiko, his fourth daughter, describes her 
father’s marriage strategy as follows:
Two of my elder sisters and younger sister married with the aristocracy. I suspect this 
was a part of my father’s strategy, since he wanted to be granted a title of nobility. He
never sent (his daughters) into other bourgeois families He probably wished them to
be assimilated into the aristocracy.42
Reiko’s testimony points out a crucial characteristic of the marriages of the soryoke's 
children. Except for two daughters, including Reiko, and one son, all of whom got 
married with members of the Mitsui families (in the daughters’ cases, both husbands 
later became a head of house), the eldest son and the other daughters married with 
members of the aristocracy. In particular, the marriage of Mitsui daughters with
41 She herself originated in a landlord family from north Osaka. See Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine 
Den Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Mitsui Hachiro 'uemon Takamine Den, p.83.
42 See Yasuoka, ‘Mitsui Reiko Shi to no Taidan’, p. 126.
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members of the nobility indicates what Lebra has pointed out as a complementary 
exchange of wealth and status, one of the characteristics of marriage of the Japanese 
aristocracy. All of the Mitsui daughters’ aristocratic spouses, Marquis Nakamikado 
Tsuneyasu (married to Noriko, the eldest daughter), Baron Takatsukasa Nobuhiro 
(married to Tomiko, the second daughter) and Baron Takatsuji Norimaro (married to 
Sakiko, the fifth daughter) came from the former court aristocracy, and despite all 
holding titles of nobility, their financial circumstance were poor, and they thus heavily 
depended on financial support from Takamine.43 In contrast to the marriage of the 
daughters, however, the marriage of Takamine’s eldest son, Takakimi, with the eldest 
daughter of Marquis Matsudaira Yasutaka, cannot be regarded as a case of 
complementary exchange, since the Marquis, a descendant of the second son of 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, Hideyasu, and former feudal lord of Echizen domain, was also 
known as one of the richest members of the aristocracy, who, according to the data set, 
had an estimated wealth of over 10 million yen in 1915. Given that the wealth of the 
Mitsui families appears to have been less significant for the Marquis in choosing his 
eldest daughter’s marriage partner, it is likely that the Marquis may well have 
recognised the social status of Mitsui’s soryoke as being equivalent to that of his own 
ie. This assumption also indicates that the elevation in social status of the soryoke was 
certainly advanced in terms of their marriage alliances.
However, if we turn our eyes to the other Mitsui families, it becomes evident that the 
marriage alliances of the Mitsui families as a whole cannot be defined as a sort of 
equalisation of social status with the nobility. Those members of the Mitsui families 
who were raised to the nobility as baron, along with Takamine, were Mitsui Takayasu 
and Mitsui Hachirojiro Takahiro, both of whom were elder brothers of Takamine and 
had been adopted into other Mitsui families, that is, the Muromachi-ke and the 
Minami-ke. Both of these were honke (main houses) of the Mitsui families, and thus 
held a high position within the houses of Mitsui. Both cases exhibit the existence of 
certain organisational difficulties, especially in the case of a house having too many 
sons. Although the social status of Takayasu’s wife is unknown, Takahito married 
Date Teruko, the sixth daughter of Date Munehiro, the former feudal lord of Uwajima
43 Lebra indicates the case of an anonymous daughter of a zaibatsu family, who married a poor huge, 
financially supporting him through her house. See Lebra, Above the Clouds, p.227, p.239.
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domain, who was later granted the title of marquis.44 This is somewhat surprising as it 
in part suggests that the reorganization of the social hierarchy and the feudal caste 
system took place very rapidly. Nevertheless, this did not mean that all members of 
the family enjoyed the same elevation in social status. Takayasu’s eldest son married 
the daughter of Marquis Tokudaiji Sanenori, the grand chamberlain of the Emperor 
Meiji, who was also the brother of Sumitomo Kichiza’emon Tomoito. However, the 
fate of the other sons was very different to that of their eldest brother. It occasionally 
happened that sons were adopted into less prominent business or merchant families 
through utilisation of informal networks of friends or relatives. Though some cases 
indicate the existence of adoption into families of the nobility, like the case of the 
sixth son of Takayasu, Takahiro, who was adopted by Viscount Makino Tadayori, this 
was a quite exceptional case.
The strategy concerning a son’s adoption into other families largely rested on the 
inheritance system for the family fortune within the Mitsui families. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, under the complex system of wealth holding and the clear 
limitations on any selfish exploitation of the family fortune, most of each family’s 
fortune was inherited by the eldest son, the future head of the house, meaning that the 
share of the inherited fortune accorded to other family members was really small.45 
Consequently, as the number of children increased, the inherited wealth of the other 
family members became smaller. This made an alternative solution, that is, creating 
another branch house for each son on the basis of a certain amount of the family 
fortune, quite unrealistic.46 It may be assumed that from this perspective the strategy 
of having their sons adopted into other business families was the most rational 
solution. In fact, except for the eldest son, many of the sons of Takayasu on whom 
information is available were adopted into other business families, presumably 
through the informal networks that existed. The most obvious example among these 
cases is that of Mitsui Takakiyo, the fifth son of Takayasu. At first, Takakiyo was
44 In this case, the Uwajima Date family was a branch house of the Miyagi Date family, the feudal lord 
of Miyagi domain in the Tokugawa era. However, the Uwajima Date family’s heavy support for the 
Meiji Restoration, changed the status of both families in the Meiji period, since the Uwajima Date 
family was granted the title of marquis, compared to the Miyagi Date family, which was granted the 
title of count, at the time of the formation of the westem-style hereditary peerage system. See Asami, 
Kazoku Tanjo, pp.208-09.
45 For this system, see Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi, esp. pp. 399-403 for further details.
46 In her interview, Mitsui Reiko also pointed out that this caused a serious problem in forming branch
houses among the 11 families of the house of Mitsui. See Yasuoka, ‘Mitsui Reiko’, p.l 17.
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Mitsui Takateru, who later became the head of the Ipponmatsu-ke, one of the renke, 
married Mitsui Mioko, an illegitimate daughter of Mitsui Takahisa, the head of the 
Gochome-ke, another of the renke. Reiko explains that because of her father’s 
(Takamine’s) anxiety over the future of Mioko, since Takahisa was his elder brother, 
it appears to have been Takamine’s decision to marry Mioko with Takateru.48
In addition to these multiple strategies, there was another characteristic which made 
the marriage of family members even more strategic. After the establishment of the 
Mitsui family constitution, which was briefly described in the previous chapter, all 
marriages of family members required formal permission from the family committee 
(idozokukai), which consisted of the heads of the 11 families, in accordance with the 
rules of the family constitution 49 This evidence also indicates that the marriage for 
the Mitsui families was far from any freedom for their children to choose their own 
spouses, and marriage itself seems to have been a sort of political strategy, as often 
seen in the case of dynastic marriage alliances among contemporary royalty.
Consequently, the marriage alliances within the Mitsui families manifested a complex 
structure, as was the case with their wealth holding system. It is clear that the status of 
each ie within the families, in addition to the status of family members within each 
family, influenced the choice of marriage partner. For this reason, the marriages of the 
household head or the children of the soryoke, the most prominent ie within the 
Mitsui families, may be seen as indicating the importance of elevating the family’s 
social status, since many of them married into the aristocracy. On the other hand, 
because of the household and wealth sharing system, the strategy of children being 
adopted into other business families or within the Mitsui families themselves also 
became crucial. This evidence suggests that there was a clear division of role within 
the families, depending on the status of the household head whose children were 
marrying. Also from this perspective, it is absolutely clear that under this strategy 
freedom of choice was a highly unrealistic prospect.
48 See Yasuoka, ‘Mitsui Reiko’, pp. 115-16.
49 This was laid down in article 39 of the family constitution. For how this constrained the marriages of 
the Mitsui families see, for example, Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai (ed.), Mitsui 
Hachiro ’uemon Takamine Den, pp.442-43.
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Other Families of the Big-Four
Other zaibatsu families exhibit a rather more simple structure of marriage alliance, 
since these families either had a much less complex household and ie system, or no 
such formal system at all. Even so, the other three zaibatsu families also display some 
particular characteristics, which would appear to stem from some diversity of 
marriage alliances. In the case of the Iwasaki families, on the one hand, we can see a 
gradual rise in social status with regard to the marriage partners of the founders and 
their descendants. However, from the period of the founders on, marriage manifested 
a tendency towards social endogamy with other members of the social elite. Although 
Iwasaki Yataro, the founder, married the daughter of a soy-sauce brewer, the spouse 
of his brother, Yanosuke (also the second head of Mitsubishi) was the daughter of 
Goto Shojiro, one of the prominent politicians of the Meiji period. In the following 
generation, an element of social exclusiveness became more apparent. The eldest sons 
of Yataro and Yanosuke, Hisaya and Koyata, both married with daughters of the 
aristocracy, and in both cases their wives originated from the family of a former 
feudal lord. This change in the selection of spouse within one generation clearly 
appears to be an attempt to elevate their social status rapidly, in other words, the 
integration into the aristocratic class in terms of marriage. However, the marriage 
alliances of the next generation again indicate some difference, even compared with 
the Mitsui case. While Koyata and his wife had no child, Hisaya and his wife had 
three sons and three daughters, and their selection of spouse was quite varied. 
Hisaya’s eldest son, Hikoyata, married a daughter of the aristocracy; the other sons’ 
spouses were the daughter of a prominent business family, and the daughter of an 
admiral. In the case of the three daughters, one married an official of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (eldest daughter), one a count descended from the court aristocracy 
(second daughter) and one a businessman. This evidence suggests a contrast with the 
Mitsui case; Iwasaki’s social networks through marriage alliances extended to non­
business elite groups, in particular to the political and military elite. In the case of 
Mitsui, which operated according to strict family rules and a long tradition, the 
formation of any informal connection with that same political and military elite was 
avoided. The case of the Iwasaki families, therefore, would appear to indicate some 
kind of social integration with the non-business elite, quite similar to the European
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cases, although it is very difficult to determine how this characteristic may have 
influenced them socially and politically.
The case of the Sumitomo family would appear to suggest that the social status of a 
marriage partner depended on the status of the child within the family. The head of 
the Sumitomo zaibatsu and family in the early 20th century, Sumitomo Tomoito, was 
an adopted son whose social origins were in the family of a prominent member of the 
court aristocracy. After the marriage with Sumitomo Masu, the eldest daughter of the 
former head of the family, he had three sons and a daughter. However, his eldest son, 
Kan’ichi, was excluded from his position as the next heir, the formal reason given for 
this being his weak physical condition.50 This event led to a certain confusion over the 
selection of a formal heir of the Sumitomo zaibatsu and family, since Tomoito’s 
health had been gradually deteriorating even before this event happened, and the other 
two sons were at the time too young to be appointed as the next head of Sumitomo. 
Besides, in the early 20th century, the Sumitomo zaibatsu experienced a radical 
reorganization in its business, largely related to the founding of the Sumitomo 
Holding Co.. It is thought that at this time Tomoito considered choosing his adopted 
son, Tadateru, who was the third son of Viscount Torii Tadafumi and married with 
Tomoito’s only daughter, Takako, as the possible next heir of the Sumitomo family 
and its business.51 However, this plan was abolished due to the early death of 
Tadateru. Therefore, after the death of Tomoito, his second son, Atsushi, inherited the 
position of head of the Sumitomo family and its business. The marriages of the 
children were also overshadowed by this process. On the one hand, Kan’ichi, who lost 
his status as the successor, married with the adopted daughter of relatives. On the 
other hand, Atsushi, who became head of the Sumitomo zaibatsu after his father’s 
death, had as his spouse the daughter of Saionji Hachiro, who was himself the adopted 
son of Prince Saionji Kinmochi, the real elder brother of Tomoito.52 This difference in 
the selection of spouse perhaps signifies that there was a degree of discrimination in 
social status between the heir and the other sons of the family, even in the case of 
these prominent business elite families.
50 See Hosenkai (ed.), Sumitomo Shunsui, pp.568-69 for further details.
31 See Yamamoto, ‘Sumitomo Goshigaisha no Setsuritsu’, pp.85-87, p. 109.
52 Hachiro himself came from the Mori family, the prominent daimyo family of Choshu domain, which 
had played a decisive role in the Meiji Restoration, and his father, Mori Motoatsu, held the title of 
prince.
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The pattern of intermarriage in the Yasuda family is also different, if compared with 
the other three cases. The founder of the Yasuda zaibatsu, Yasuda Zenjiro, married 
the daughter of a merchant in Tokyo. Since Yasuda had come from a poor provincial 
family, his marriage may be assumed to have been of little significance in elevating 
his social status.53 However, in the case of Yasuda’s children’s generation, it is clear 
that the significant wealth of the Yasuda family gave rise to integration into the social 
elite. Nevertheless, it was also apparent that there is a great difference in the social 
status of the spouse between the children. For instance, the eldest son, Zennosuke, 
who changed his name to Zenjiro the Second after his father’s death, when he 
succeeded to his father’s position, married the daughter of an aristocrat from a former 
daimyo family. No information on the spouse’s social status is available in the case of 
other sons; they were referred to only as heimin. However, if  we turn to the selection 
of the daughters’ spouses, the pattern is characterised by the fact that many daughters 
married with an adopted son or adopted son-in-law of Zenjiro, and all of these 
adopted sons were engaged in Yasuda’s business. For instance, Yasuda Zenzaburo, 
who came from the samurai class and later became Zenjiro’s closest business partner 
(he was actually appointed as the deputy head of the Yasuda zaibatsu by Zenjiro), 
married Zenjiro’s daughter and was chosen as the adopted son-in-law.54 This suggests 
that when it came to marriage alliances, strengthening social networks with other 
members of the business elite, in particular with those who were engaged in the 
business of the Yasuda zaibatsu, was more significant for Zenjiro than extending his 
informal network to other members of the non-business or aristocratic elite. The 
evidence suggests that this characteristic was widely shared with other members of 
the wealthy business elite, who will be discussed in the next section.
b) Other Wealthy Business Families
Apart from the Big-Four zaibatsu families, the cases of other families of the wealthy 
business elite, notwithstanding a high degree of diversity, indicate that the patterns of
53 Although it is not clear whether this marriage was his first or second, there is some evidence that 
Yasuda divorced his first wife because she spent too much money on luxuries. See, for details Mataro 
Miyamoto, Kigyoka tachi no Gunzo (Tokyo, 1999), pp.235-36.
S4However, as a result of open conflict with Zenjiro’s real sons, he was finally fired from Yasuda’s 
business and forced to retire. See Yasuda Zenzaburo in Jitsugyo no Nihonsha (ed.), Zaikai Bukko 
Ketsubutsu Den vol.2.
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marriage alliances was determined by the importance of family business activities to 
the family. In the case of the Furukawa family, marriage alliances were influenced not 
only by family interests but also, on occasions, by the lack of a male heir who might 
become the future head of the Furukawa family and its businesses. Furukawa 
Toranosuke, the owner of Furukawa’s businesses in the early 20th century, represents 
one particular example of this case. Toranosuke’s father was the adopted son of 
Furukawa Ichibei, the founder, and became the heir, as Ichibei himself had no 
children. The real father of this adopted son was the prominent politician Mutsu 
Munemitsu. In the case of Toranosuke himself, he married Saigo Fujiko, the sister of 
Marquis Saigo Tsunetoku. However, no child was bom of this marriage, and 
consequently Toranosuke adopted the second son of his brother-in-law, Tsunetoku, 
and this adopted son inherited the position of family head after the death of 
Toranosuke, including the ownership of Furukawa’s businesses. Even though this 
case may be quite unusual among the business elite, and although the adopted son did 
come from an aristocratic family, it appears that Toranosuke was more concerned 
with handing on the Furukawa businesses to his adopted son rather than maintaining 
the honoured status of the Furukawa family as a member of the nobility. The choice 
of adopted son was just the result of utilising the informal family network. The 
importance of Furukawa*s business for the family is also shown in the marriage 
alliances of Toranosuke*s sisters; all those on whom information is available married 
with businessmen, and almost all the spouses were executives of Furukawa and its 
affiliates.
The same pattern is also shown in the case of Okura Kihachiro, another prominent 
member of the wealthy business elite. Many of Okura’s daughters married executives 
of Okura’s businesses. In addition, Okura’s case is an example of the assumption that 
the marriage of the eldest son was aimed at giving the family high status, since his 
eldest son’s wife was the daughter of Count Mizoguchi Naomasa, who came from the 
family of a former feudal lord.
If we turn our attention to other families, the case of the Konoike family, which had 
originated in a prominent merchant house in the Tokugawa era, also indicates the 
importance of marriage alliances for strengthening the business network. Significantly, 
this family has frequently been referred to by business historians as a case of failure to
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become a large-scale zaibatsu, as a result of Konoike’s conservative mindset and 
strategy towards its business, which prevented its modernization and restructuring, in 
particular in relation to its management system.55 However, the marriage alliances of 
this family seem to show that the Konoike family did not lose its interest in the family 
business. Due to its historical background, Konoike had a strong relationship with the 
Mitsui families, and many Konoike spouses came from Mitsui. For instance, Konoike 
Zen’uemon, the owner in the early 20th century, and his brother Shijuro, married with 
the eldest and second daughters of Mitsui Takayasu. The marriage of Zen’uemon’s 
brothers and sisters also signifies a related tendency, since many of them married with 
the children of important business elite families, which were likely to have been part 
of the informal network of the Konoike family. Even in the case of Zen’uemon’s 
eldest son, his spouse was the daughter of a prominent businessman (also a urban 
landlord) in Tokyo. It may be assumed that the consolidation of the network with 
other parts of the business elite through marriage alliances was still crucial for the 
Konoike family.
In contrast to Konoike, the family of the famous shipping magnate Kawasaki was 
exceptional among these wealthy business families, since the Kawasaki family’s 
marriage alliances manifested an extreme tendency towards a degree of social 
integration into the aristocracy. Although Kawasaki Yoshitaro, the owner in the early 
20th century, was himself the adopted son of the founder, Kawasaki Seizo, and had 
married Seizo’s daughter, three of his five sons married daughters of the nobility. 
However, even in this case, it was the eldest son whose spouse had the highest social 
status, since the eldest son’s consort was the daughter of Marquis Saga Kinkatsu, who 
came from an old family of the court aristocracy. Moreover, in spite of the gradual 
decline in family interests in the shipbuilding business, these sons did not turn their 
backs on the business world.56
In the case of the Shibusawa family, the situation is complex and somewhat 
resembled the Mitsui families’ case. This was largely due to the fact that Shibusawa 
Eiichi married twice, and in addition had countless illegitimate children from his
55 For example, see Yasuoka, Zaibatsu Keiseishi, pp. 358 -64 .
56 Details of the loss of family interests in their business is in Y. Mishima, Zosen-O Kawasaki Seizo no 
Shogai, esp. pp.215-218.
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numerous mistresses.57 Nevertheless, the marriage alliances of the three children from 
his first marriage show some interesting characteristics of Shibusawa’s family. Unlike 
the case of other families, which chose the daughters’ spouses from prominent 
families of the social elite, whether business or non-business, one of the two 
daughters of Eiichi married with an academic, who specialised in legal studies, and 
the other with a junior official. Although these two spouses were successful in life, 
one as a famous academic, and one as a prominent official, and were finally both 
granted titles of nobility (baron), the marriages themselves indicate that Eiichi was
c o
less interested in utilising his daughters for informal social networking. On the other 
hand, his eldest son married the daughter of a court aristocrat who was granted the 
title of count during the Meiji period. This was presumably to give the son a higher 
social status. In addition, the limited information available indicates that there were 
two cases of illegitimate daughters who married relatives of Eiichi. This was possibly 
a sort of strategy to give these daughters a legitimate status as family members of 
Shibusawa.59
In some cases, marriage strategies display a particular kind of social networking that 
can be interpreted as a reflection of hanbatsu, the political faction based on politicians 
originating from certain domains, including Satsuma and Choshu. This example is 
apparent in the case of the Kuhara and Fujita families, both of which were related and 
originated from Choshu domain, and thus had a strong relationship with politicians 
from Choshu. Other studies have shown that in the development of their business 
activities, these families relied heavily on financial support from the Mori family, the 
family of the former daimyo of Choshu domain.60 If we look at the pattern of their 
marriage alliances, the marriages of the Kuhara and Fujita families seem to display 
similar characteristics to the case of the other families considered. In particular, the 
case of the Fujita family exhibits a strong tendency towards giving a high status to the 
eldest son by marriage with the daughter of a high ranking aristocrat, and a strong 
interest in forming informal networks with the business or non-business elite.
57 According to one biographical source, Eiichi is said to have had nearly 20 children, including 
legitimate children from his two formal wives and illegitimate children from mistresses. This 
complexity sometimes caused conflict among these children over their family interest in Shibusawa’s 
businesses and household. See S. Sano, Shibusawa-Ke 3dai, pp. 192-99.
58 See ibid, pp. 102-10.
59 Ibid, pp. 193-95.
60 For example see H. Takeda, ‘Meiji zenki no Fujitagumi to Mori-Ke Yushi’.
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However, the key element for these two families in terms of informal networking 
through marriage was the Aikawa family, which also came from the former Choshu 
domain, and whose origins were in the samurai class. Aikawa Yoshisuke, who was 
the family head of the Aikawa family in the early 20th century, had a strong 
relationship with both the Fujita and Kuhara families through marriage alliances (his 
sister was the wife of Kuhara Fusanosuke, the head of Kuhara, and one of his brothers 
became the adopted son of Fujita Kotaro, the head a of branch house of the Fujita 
family).61 The marriage alliances with the Aikawa family also determined the fate of 
Kuhara’s businesses. Through the alliance, Aikawa Yoshisuke later inherited 
Kuhara’s businesses in the 1920s, when they were confronted with a serious business 
crisis due to a rapid deterioration in business performance. Based on Kuhara’s 
businesses, Aikawa established his own business group, Nissan, one of the famous 
new zaibatsu. There seems little doubt that political and informal networking had a 
strong influence on the development of business activities by both families, in 
addition to the connection by marriage alliance with the Aikawa family.
If we summarise the characteristics of marriage alliances among the prominent 
wealthy business families, although there are major limitations in the data and certain 
differences in each case, these marriages indicate some critical points in relation to 
informal networking. First of all, it is clear that for the marriage of the eldest son it 
was seen as important that the heir of the family business should achieve a higher 
social status. We may assume that this characteristic was related to the existence of 
the ie system in modem Japan, which gave the decision-making power in the 
household to the head of the house. In contrast to the eldest son’s marriage, the 
strategy relating to the other children’s marriages depended on the economic and 
social conditions of each family, or their father’s ambitions, that is, whether or not the 
father was interested in expanding his informal network to other members of the 
business elite or non-business elite. Secondly, in contrast to the European cases, in 
which there is evidence of the tendency to reduce business interests through marriage 
with the nobility, Japanese business wealth holders do not appear to have had the 
explicit desire of socially integrating into the aristocracy through marriage alliances.
61 Aikawa Yoshisuke also had a close relationship with the family of Kaijima, the famous coal magnate 
in Fukuoka prefecture, through the marriage alliance of his sister. In addition, he also had a connection 
with Kimura Kuzuyata, the chief director of the Mitsubishi Holding Co., whom his sister had married.
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However, to analyse this characteristic, it is necessary to proceed to some analysis of 
the statistical data set, with a comparative perspective on the other cases, and this is 
going to be the topic discussed in the next section.
4.2.3. Analysis of the Data Set
a) General View
In spite of certain limitations on the availability of accurate information on the 
spouse’s social status (based on the social or occupational status of the father), the 
data set does indicate certain characteristics of intermarriage among this Japanese 
wealth holders group. Firstly, in this wealthy business elite, we can discover strong 
tendencies towards social endogamy. In effect, the rate of intermarriage with families 
of the same social group was quite high, as displayed in the data in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 The marriages of Japanese business wealth holders (percentage 
marrying spouses from each category(left side), number of the sample (right side))
(occupational status) (a) (b)
Non business-elite 20.8 66 18.7 55
Professionals 1.3 4 1.3 4
Businessmen (big and medium-scale) 52.4 166 55.1 161
Businessmen (status unknown) 8.5 27 9.1 27
The former samurai class 15.8 50 14.6 43
Lower middle class 0.3 1 0.3 1
Lower class 0.3 1 0.3 1
others 0.6 2 0.6 2
Total (by percentage) 100.0 100.0
Total (absolute number) 317 317 294 294
Note: (a) including all cases
(b) excluding business wealth holders who were mainly involved in agricultural activities; the 
absolute number of cases was 315 in (a) and 292 individuals in (b).
Lower middle class: in this case(only one sample), a daughter of poor merchant 
Lower class: in this case (only one sample), a daughter of blacksmith 
Sources: compiled from information on individuals collected from: SOman yen ijo Shisanka Hyo\ data 
of marriage partner; Jinji Koshinroku versions 5-10, Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsuden; Kazoku Taikan for 
data on ennobled businessmen’s spouses, other biographical dictionaries, biographies and 
autobiographies.
The majority of Japanese business wealth holders in the data set on whom we have 
information (315 individuals out of the total number of 317) were married to the 
daughters of businessmen (about 61 percent). Moreover, most of the sample selected 
their spouse from the family of a big (or wealthy) or medium-scale businessman,
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including merchants. The figure shows a relatively high concentration (52.4%) of 
intermarriage among business wealth holders, manifesting some sort of social 
exclusiveness among the Japanese wealthy elite with regard to marriage.We may 
assume that this tendency was not only due to the importance of business interests, 
which extended to the formation of informal networks, but was also reinforced by the 
limitations they faced in the marriage market, as it is likely to have been difficult for 
them to find a suitable marriage partner from outside of their own social group, 
meaning that the main pool of possible spouses was the prominent rich.
In addition, short-term and long-term networking through business activities is likely 
to have further reinforced the characteristic of social endogamy. For example, in the 
case of Nomura Tokuhichi, the founder of Nomura securities, who became one of 
richest members of the business elite, he found his wife through the assistance of his 
father’s business partner. Tokuhichi’s wife, Kikuko, came from a merchant house, 
was a friend of the daughter of this business partner in the girl’s high school, and so 
the daughter’s network was utilised by the business partner in arranging the marriage 
for him.62 Other cases also demonstrate the significant role of business networks in 
finding suitable consorts. Taki Sadasuke, a prominent textile merchant in Nagoya, 
married the daughter of Kobayashi Gin’uemon, a famous merchant in the Omi region 
(Shiga prefecture), since the two families had a strong business relationship dating 
back to the Tokugawa period.63 This example additionally shows that despite certain 
limitations on trade during the Tokugawa era, the business networks of merchants had 
clearly already expanded to areas distant from their main market, and thus made it 
possible to select a spouse from a merchant family some distance away. So even if the 
centre of business activities had already moved away from the place of origin, some 
of the business elite, for instance the Mitsui families, still maintained their informal 
network in these places. The Mitsui families, whose centre of family business 
activities moved to Tokyo from the Meiji period, continued to have a strong 
connection with Kyoto, the families’ old business centre, and with Matsuzaka, the
62 See Nomura Shoten (ed.), Nomura Tokuan, p. 184 details.
63 For the business relationship of both families, see Suenaga, Kindai Omi Shonin, esp. chap 7.
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place from which they originated, through an informal network formed over a long 
period.64
On the other hand, with the exception of spouses from the same social group, the 
biggest social group in terms of intermarriage with these wealthy business elite was 
the non-business elite, including the political elite, bureaucrats, landlords and 
members of the aristocracy. As already pointed out in the previous section, 
intermarriage with the non-business elite, especially the nobility, was to some extent 
prevalent among the business elite, although in the case of children such marriages 
would appear to have been particularly common in the case of the eldest son or heir. 
The rate of intermarriage with this group was relatively high, since about one-fifth of 
the sample married into this non-business elite. Even if we eliminate those in the 
sample whose main activities are likely to have been based on the agricultural sector, 
like landlords, for whom business activities were a sub-occupation, the figure for such 
intermarriage hardly changes, decreasing by only 2 percent.65 This evidence also 
indicates that the marriage of landlord families with members of the non-business 
elite, except for social endogamy within the same landlord class, was less prevalent 
than in the case of the business group, despite the small number of landlords in the 
sample. For example, the data reveal only two cases of intermarriage of landlords with 
the nobility, and both cases were in Niigata, typically regarded as the most dominant 
region of landlords in modem Japan.
Apart from this elite group, the other particular group significant for intermarriage by 
Japanese business wealth holders, was members of the former samurai class; about 16 
percent of the sample married daughters from this group. This is likely to have been 
the result of positive choice by certain members of the business elite, who had 
themselves originated in the former samurai class, and who were involved in business 
after the Meiji Restoration. Masuda Takashi and Dan Takuma, executives and 
business leaders of the Mitsui zaibatsu, or Wada Toyoharu, who later became a 
leading figure in the spinning industry, are famous examples in this category. 
However, the data set also indicates a major difference in the importance of the
64 For Mitsui’s informal networks with Kyoto and Matsuzaka, see Yasuoka, ‘Mitsui Reiko Shi to no 
Taidan’, pp. 115-6.
65 In this case, those landlords who were engaged in the urban property business are not categorised as 
agricultural landlords, since their income structure was very different from that of agricultural landlords.
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samurai group as a source of marriage partners. This difference is apparent if we 
divide the whole sample into two categories according to the chronological date of 
birth, namely those who were bom before 1870 and those who were bom 1870 or 
later.66 The figures on intermarriage by cohort are contained in Table 4.2. While over 
one-fifth (21.5 percent) of the wealthy business elite bom before 1870 chose their 
spouse from the samurai group, intermarriage with this group declined dramatically 
within the latter category (8.5 percent).
Table 4.2 M arriage patterns of business wealth holders by cohort (percentage of 
total marrying with each social group (left side), number of the sample (right side))
(occupational status) (bom 1869 or earlier) (bom 1870 or after)
Non-business elite 20.9 37 20.7 29
professionals 1.1 2 1.4 2
Businessmen (big or medium-scaled) 47.5 84 58.6 82
Businessmen (status unknown) 6.8 12 10.7 15
The former samurai class 21.5 38 8.6 12
Lower middle class 0.5 1
Lower class 0.5 1
Others 1.1 2
Total (percentage) 100.0 99.9
Total (absolute) 177 177 140 140
Sources: same as Table 4.1.
Note: Figures do not total 100 percent due to rounding
Several assumptions can be made regarding this result. Firstly, as a consequence of 
social reforms and the abolition of the feudal caste system, the former samurai class 
ceased to be a formal part of the social elite in Japanese society, and thus became less 
attractive as a potential source of spouses to members of the wealthy business elite 
who wished to expand their social networks into other elite groups. Secondly, the 
social reforms that had taken place seem to have also led to the dissolution of the 
former samurai class fairly quickly after the Meiji period, making the ‘samurai* 
category meaningless in terms of the classification of social class in modem Japan. In 
addition, some former samurais* success in other occupational sectors, for instance, 
military service, the political world, the bureaucracy, as professionals or as
66 This date setting is for considering whether or not many aspects, including social and economic 
changes influenced the pattern of the marriage of wealth holders.
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businessmen is likely to have accelerated the dissolution of this class.67 Therefore, the 
declining rate of intermarriage of the wealthy business elite with samurai can be 
interpreted as a part of the evidence for the decline of the samurai as a formal social 
class.
If we turn our eyes to the rate of the business elite’s intermarriage with other social 
groups, we find both similarities and differences between the two cohorts. On the one 
hand, there is almost no difference in the rate of intermarriage with members of the 
non-business elite, which reached 20.9 percent in the group bom before 1870, and 
20.7 percent in the group bom 1870 or later. This may well indicate the dramatic and 
rapid changes in social structure affecting the non-business elite, meaning that for the 
wealthy business elite, the barriers of social status in terms of marriage had already 
disappeared in the early Meiji period. Also, as Lebra has pointed out, complementary 
exchange of wealth and status might take place not only between the wealthy business 
elite and the poor aristocracy, but also with the political elite, who would appear to 
have been less wealthy compared to the business wealth holders. In addition, 
difficulties in finding suitable spouses, especially in local areas, because of the 
relatively small marriage ‘market’, may well have played a role in promoting 
intermarriage within the local elite, whether members of the business, landed or 
provincial political elite. Consequently, these factors are likely to have contributed to 
promoting intermarriage between the business and non-business elite, and therefore 
the formal social structure of the old regime disappeared relatively early on.
Apart from this particular elite group, the other data also suggest that the social 
endogamy of the wealthy business elite was further reinforced in the case of the later 
generation. While the sample bom before 1870 mainly married with businessmen, 
including large and medium scale businessmen, and those whose status was unknown 
(54.3 percent in total), this figure further increased for the group bom 1870 or later, to 
69.3 percent. Furthermore, of this latter category, nearly 60 percent selected their 
spouse from the category of large and medium-sized business families. This result 
signifies, notwithstanding some expansion of their marriage market into other social
67 Although the perspective adopted in this research is rather different, there are some studies focusing 
on the process of reorganization of the samurai class in modem Japan. For details, see H. Sonoda et al 
(eds.), Shizoku no Shakai Rekishiteki Kenkyu (Nagoya, 1995).
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elite groups, that this cohort of the business elite was just as likely to intermarry with 
other members of the wealthy business elite.
The background of the social changes that had taken place would seem to have played 
a role in forming this strong tendency. In addition to the demise of the samurai class, 
as a result of the dissolution of their social status, it was very difficult for the business 
elite to select their consorts from suitable social groups other than the non-business 
elite. Professionals, including academics and members of other intellectual 
professions, are hardly represented at all in this data. In both cases, around 1 percent 
of spouses in the sample came from the background of a professional family. 
However, since professionals were a totally new social group in modem Japan, and 
since the educational experience and training necessary for these occupations were not 
formally established until the early 20th century, it is likely that in the Japanese case, 
these occupations were not really recognized as constituting a suitable social group 
for the selection of the marriage partner of the wealthy business elite. Besides, the 
data indicate that other social groups such as the lower middle or lower classes, which 
is likely to include farmers, shopkeepers or workers, are almost completely absent 
from the spouses of the wealthy business elite. In the cohort bom before 1870, only 
four cases can be found of marriage with a daughter from these social groups, and no 
case can be found for the cohort bom in 1870 or after. These results make apparent 
the social exclusiveness of this wealthy elite in terms of the pattern of intermarriage, 
and it can be said that this characteristic became even stronger in the later generation.
Finally, if we consider other social influences on the case of intermarriage, we find 
that the marriages of the sample of adopted sons, who have formed a crucial part of 
this study, show some interesting points in relation to the ie system, as shown in Table
4.3. Although in this case, information on the social status of spouses is unavailable, 
which makes it very difficult to make any firm conclusion as to whether or not the 
marriage of adopted sons indicated enhanced social status for them, the results do 
illustrate the significance both of the continuity of the ie, and the continuity of blood 
inheritance. Among the members of the wealthy business elite who belonged to this 
category, over one-third (35.8 percent) married the eldest daughter of their adoptive 
father. If we add those who married with another daughter of the adopted father, we
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find that nearly half of the total of yoshi married a daughter of the adoptive father 
(46.8 percent).
Table 4.3 M arriage oiyoshi (adopted sons)business wealth holders (percentage of 
total adopted sons marrying each category(left side), number of the sample(right
side))
Married with the eldest daughter of adoptive father 35.8 58
Married with other daughter of adoptive father 9.9 16
Came from the relative of adoptive father
(either adopted son or adopted son’s spouse coming from
family related to that of adoptive father)
8.0 13
Not married with the daughter of adoptive father 42.6 69
Other (married with the former housemaster’s adopted 
daughter etc.)
1.8 3
unknown 1.8 3
Total (percentage) 100.0
Total (absolute number) 162 162
Note: the data in this table is not based on any sort of information about the occupational 
status of adopted father etc..
Sources: same as table 4.1.
On the other hand, it is clear that for a substantial minority the spouse did not come 
from the adopted family (42.6 percent). However, there are few cases where either the 
adopted sons or their spouses came from a family related to that of the adoptive father 
(8.0 percent). Thus, in spite of certain difficulties in identifying any clear 
characteristics from these results, it is possible to suggest some interesting features in 
the marriage pattern of adopted sons. Firstly, if the adoptive father had female 
children, the adopted son is likely to have had little choice apart from marrying the 
adoptive father’s daughter. Also, if the adoptive father had no male child, the most 
significant role in the succession of the ie was played by the eldest daughter, resulting 
in her marriage with the adopted son. Secondly, although the choice of marriage 
partner would appear to have existed if the son had been adopted into a childless 
family, we can assume that the adopted son’s own freedom to choose was minimal or 
non-existent, since the adoptive father would undoubtedly exercise influence over the 
choice of a suitable spouse.68 We may also conclude that even though continuity in 
the succession of the ie was the main purpose for accepting adopted sons as the heir of 
the ie, these results indicate that, at least in the case of the wealthy business elite,
68 However, more detailed analysis would be required to confirm this assumption. The different 
categorization of the adopted son, for instance, whether he was adopted into a childless family or into 
one with no effective head, certainly made a difference in the status of the adopted son within his 
adoptive ie. For detail on this information, see for example, Lebra, Above the Clouds, esp. chap 3.
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matches between adopted sons and the daughter of the adoptive father were regarded 
as indispensable in maintaining the blood line of the adoptive father’s ie. To some 
extent, the social exclusiveness of the wealthy business elite may well have 
strengthened the importance of blood succession.
b)Comparative analysis
In spite of various differences in the historical background, for instance, the level of 
economic development, the nature of the social hierarchy and socio-cultural factors, 
comparative analysis of the pattern of intermarriage highlights some interesting 
similarities and differences in the marriage alliances of the different business elites. 
Table 4.4 gives comparative data on marriage. As already mentioned in the 
introductory part of this chapter, Augustine’s data on wealthy businessmen in 
Imperial Germany and the data from the DBB in the British case are utilised for 
comparison with the Japanese case. To minimise the difference with the comparative 
data, which focuses just on businessmen, and does not include wealth holders engaged 
in business activities as a sub-occupation, those in the Japanese case who are 
categorised as landlords in terms of their main economic activity, have been omitted 
from the data in Table 4.4. For this purpose, therefore, information is available in the 
Japanese case on 292 individuals (294 cases, including the data on second marriage).
Table 4.4 Comparison of marriage patterns of the business elite in Japan, Britain 
and Germany (percentage of total in each sample)
(occupational status) Britain Germany Japan
Non-business elite 23.4 12.4 18.7
Professionals 17.9 8.6 1.3
Businessmen 32.5 67.9 64.2
Samurai class (Japan only) 14.6
Lower middle class 18.8 6.8 0.3
Lower class 5.2 0.9 0.3
Others 2.3 3.3 0.6
Total (percentage) 100.1 99.9 100.0
Total (absolute number) 309 312 294
Source : Compiled from Britain: Dictionary o f Business Biography 5 volumes (London, 
1984-86)
Germany: Augustine, Patricians and Parvenus, p.78.
Japan :based on Table 4.1. but excluding the landlord cases 
Note: figure do not total 100 percent due to rounding.
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Although it is dangerous to generalise too far or to draw any concrete theoretical 
conclusion from the comparison of these three data sets, which have incorporated a 
number of differences with regard to categorization of the spouse’s social status, 
spouse selection and the nature of the sample itself, it can be observed that the 
Japanese case shows several similarities with the German and British cases that 
appear to make some comparison possible. The characteristic of high level of social 
endogamy within the wealthy business elite is also shared by the German case, since 
the majority of the wealthiest German businessmen were married to the daughters of 
other businessmen, including those whose status is unknown (67.9 percent). The 
higher tendency towards social endogamy among the German business elite can also 
be traced from another study, that of Kaudelka-Hanisch, whose research was 
concerned with the members of the business elite in Rhineland Westphalia in the 19th 
century who had the title of commercial councillor, a specific title used to honour 
businessmen. According to Kaudelka-Hanisch’s research, the majority of this titled 
business elite had married with the daughter of a businessman (66.7 percent). This 
figure was followed by marriage with professionals (13.3 percent), military officers 
(6.7 percent), landowners (6.7 percent) and officials (3.3 percent).69 By contrast, 
Augustine’s data on these businessmen’s sons suggests some decline in the rate of 
social endogamy (49.1 percent).70 This would appear to offer some contrast with the 
Japanese case. Using a cohort analysis, Augustine explains that businessmen bom 
between 1860 and 1869 (those who became adults after the unification of Germany) 
and their children were more likely to intermarry with the traditional ruling class than 
were businessmen of the older generation, since the firm establishment of their social 
status and the adoption of an aristocratic life-style made these businessmen or their 
children more acceptable as marriage partners for the pre-industrial elite.71
Conversely, as explained earlier, cohort analysis by year of birth in the Japanese case 
indicates that in Japan social endogamy was further strengthened over time, although 
the selection of a marriage partner among other social elites was also more prevalent 
in the Japanese case. Turning to the British case, although the categorization is not 
based on wealth holding, it is clear that intermarriage with members of the same
69 See Kaudelka-Hanisch, ‘Titled businessmen’, in Evans (eds.), The German Bourgeoisie 
esp. p.98.
70 Augustine, Patricians, p.80.
71 Ibid, pp.82-83.
240
business elite, or with other businessmen, was less frequent (32.5 percent of the total). 
It may well be that this lower rate is because the choice of spouse was more varied in 
the British case, than in Japan or Germany.
By contrast, intermarriage with members of the non-business elite, for instance, the 
aristocracy, landowners, military officers or the political elite was most frequent in the 
British case, nearly one-quarter of the total (23.4 percent). Surprisingly, in this case, 
Japan stands in an intermediate position between Britain and Germany. While about 
one-fifth of the Japanese wealthy business elite was married with members of the non­
business elite (18.7 percent), the rate of such intermarriage in the German case is 
somewhat lower (12.4 percent). The result would seem to indicate that the progress of 
social integration in terms of marriage with other elite classes was fairly dramatic in 
the Japanese case, probably due to the dissolution and radical reorganisation of the 
non-business elite in Japan. Also, in Japan, the power of wealth had been an attraction 
for the newly emerged non-business elite, by comparison with Britain or Germany, in 
both of which the non-business elite possessed a higher social status, on the basis of 
its social and political influence from the pre-industrial period, and was thus more 
reluctant to accept the influence of the wealth of the business elite. However, 
especially in the German case, it is noticeable that Augustine’s data indicate that 
intermarriage with the non-business elite became more frequent in the children’s 
generation. The rate increased significantly in the case of sons (to 31.6 percent), and 
became even higher in the case of daughters (to 41.6 percent), although Augustine 
does point out that there is a clear difference in the patterns of intermarriage of Jewish 
and non-Jewish families, and of ennobled and non-ennobled businessmen. There were 
also differences in the function of marriage between sons and daughters. 72 
Consequently, marriage patterns in all three countries manifest the existence of a 
certain degree of social integration of the business elite into the non-business elite, 
although there are some differences in the detailed characteristics of social integration 
of each of the three countries.
Elsewhere, however, there are major differences if we compare the intermarriage of 
the business elite in the three countries with other social groups. For example, in
72 Ibid, p.80, p.84 and p.86.
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Britain a relatively large proportion of the business elite married the daughter of a 
professional (17.9 percent), while the rate of intermarriage with this class was lower 
in both Germany and Japan, at 8.6 percent and 1.3 percent respectively. There are 
different reasons behind the lower intermarriage rate with professionals in the German 
and Japanese cases. Undoubtedly, in the German case, the great division in the 
German bourgeoisie between the educated bourgeoisie and the propertied bourgeoisie 
played an important role in creating this situation. Since the higher professional 
occupations, like academics or lawyers, were mainly dominated by the educated 
bourgeoisie, their anti-materialist and anti-capitalist tendencies tended necessarily to 
give rise to antagonism towards the business elite.73 This difference in characteristics 
and a certain social distinctiveness contributed to less frequent intermarriage with the 
business elite, although some studies focusing on particular regions of Imperial 
Germany have indicated considerable variations in the pattern of intermarriage of 
these two bourgeoisie groups, as well as in the choice of professions.74 By contrast, in 
the Japanese case, we can assume that the initial lack of any significant marital ties 
with the professional group is because of the relatively recent appearance of these 
professionals. As one of the newly emerging social groups in modem Japan, 
professionals were in a relative minority compared to other social groups, and had not 
yet to establish their own distinctive status, based on their professional skills. The 
weak relationship between the business elite and the professionals in Japan and 
Germany clearly was thus caused by different reasons.
Apart from the inevitable appearance in the Japanese data of the samurai class as a 
symbolic indicator of differences in historical progress, there is one other respect in 
which a huge difference is apparent, namely in intermarriage with the lower middle 
class. Again, in this case, Britain shows a certain difference compared to the other two 
countries. Nearly one-fifth (18.8 percent) of the business elite in Britain married a 
daughter from this category of family. This evidence suggests that in terms of choice 
of marriage partners, the British business elite was less concerned with social 
endogamy within the same occupational or social groups. Moreover, the cases of 
some particularly wealthy British businessmen seem to indicate that social status was
73 For a brief explanation of this distinction, see for example Kocka, ‘The European pattern and the 
German case’ in J. Kocka et al (eds.) Bourgeois Society in the l$ h century, esp. pp.21-23.
74 For example, see R. Evans, ‘Family and class in Hamburg’ in Evans and D. Blackboum(eds.), The 
German Bourgeoisie, esp. pp. 116-17.
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not necessarily important in the choice of spouse. For example, Sir John Ellerman, 
known as the richest British businessmen in the early 20th century, and who left a 
fortune of about £37 million at his death in 1933, was considered mysterious not only 
for the unknown status of his wife, but also for the lack of evidence of any official 
certificate of his marriage.75 For another notable wealthy British businessman, Sir 
Julius Wemher, a diamond magnate who left about £10 million when he died in 1912, 
no information about his marriage partner is available.76 We may also take the view 
that in the British case, there was more possibility for a businessman originating in the 
lower classes to become a prominent business leader, and this factor resulted in more 
frequent marriage with a partner from a relatively lower class, even though more 
detailed analysis is required to substantiate this assumption.
As a result, comparison of the patterns of intermarriage among the three countries 
displays some similarities and some differences. The tendency towards social 
endogamy appears to have been higher in the Japanese and German cases. All of the 
three countries show a high rate of intermarriage with the non-business elite, although 
the results from the British case indicate a clear extension of intermarriage networks 
beyond the barriers set by the class system. It is also clear that patterns of 
intermarriage reflect the influence of various factors, including historical background 
and other cultural factors, even where the analysis is limited to looking at leading 
members of the business elite. However, we need to reconsider whether or not this 
shared tendency of intermarriage with the non-business elite implied that the business 
elite of the three countries also had shared aspirations with regard to social integration 
with this elite group, in particular with the aristocracy, extending to the adoption of 
their life-styles, or their desire to be granted a title of nobility or other decorations 
which might contribute to elevating their social status. This will be touched on in the 
next section, which focuses on the function of these honorary titles. Though our main 
attention will be concentrated on the Japanese case, comparison with Germany and 
Britain will again provide fruitful results, in helping to make clear similarities and 
differences between countries.
75 Rubinstein, ‘Sir John Ellerman’ in DBB vol. 2. esp. p.259.
76 J.J. Van-Helter, ‘Sir Julius Wemher’ in DBB vol. 5. esp. p.740.
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4.3. Honorary Titles and Decorations
4.3.1. Titles of Nobility
It goes without saying that in the European cases in particular, ‘aristocratization’ has 
been frequently utilised as a key term for analysing the business rich in the modem 
period, with reference especially to those who tended to be integrated into the nobility, 
the symbol of the pre-industrial elite and the possessors of the highest social status, 
whether through imitating the aristocratic societal life-style or pursuing the granting 
of aristocratic titles for themselves. This tendency has sometimes been interpreted as 
indicating the weakness of the business elite, since their attitude can be explained as 
resulting from their weaker position in the real political arena, which was dominated 
by the somewhat anti-modem pre-industrial elite, thus preventing the ‘normal’ 
development of the economy and the parallel development of social democracy. This 
perspective has been strongly emphasised in the case of the modem German business 
elite, which was considered as having failed to form a new unified elite group, 
consisting of the old and new elite, in which the latter had a predominant position in 
the share of political power.77 On the other hand, in the British case, the 
aristocratization of the business rich (usually referred to ‘gentrification’) has been 
considered as symbolising the decline in the British economy. Although some 
research opposed to this idea has gradually emerged, the mainstream of the research 
on the British business elite until recently identified their attitude as symbolising the 
loss of dynamism in the modem British economy. 78 It is also clear that 
aristocratization strongly influenced the formation of the business culture of the City, 
as a major driving force of the modem British economy, and this impact has been 
emphasised by recent research. 79 Whatever the case, this importance of 
aristocratization may be seen as displaying the degree of persistent influence of this
77 See for example, Wehler, German History, p.45 and also Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft unci Democratie, 
pp.64-66.
8 This subject has remained debatable with regard to landownership, which had been considered as a 
sort of anti-capitalistic spirit among the business elite. For example, see, F. M. L. Thompson, ‘Life 
After Death’. Recent research has provided another interpretation for landownership of the business 
rich. See, for example, Nicholas, ‘Businessmen and Landownership’, esp. pp.35-43. Also for a 
perspective on the gentrification of the British business elite which has been criticised by many 
researchers because of a strong tendency towards cultural determinism, see M. Wiener, English Culture 
and the Decline o f the Industrial Spirit (Cambridge, 1981).
79 See for example, Cassis, City Bankers, esp. chap. 7.
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particular social elite group, i.e., the pre-industrial elite, either positively or negatively. 
The ennoblement of businessmen therefore had a symbolic value in terms of status 
value and stepping into a more powerful position.
However, an evaluation of aristocratization raises a number of controversial points for 
any statistical analysis of the data set on ennobled businessmen. On the one hand, in 
the European cases among ennobled individuals as a whole, ennobled businessmen 
represented a minority compared to ennobled military officers, officials or landowners. 
On the other hand, with regard to socio-cultural perspectives, we should not 
underestimate the influence of such honours, as the chance for ordinary businessmen 
to be ennobled meant that they could enhance their position in relation to other 
businessmen. Nevertheless, it is apparent that in both Britain and Germany the 
number of ennobled members of the business elite increased throughout the modem 
period. For instance, in Britain, according to Rubinstein’s study, in the period 1920-39, 
53 out of 162 of the top non-landed wealth holders who died during this period had 
been given some kind of title: 21 were elevated to the peerage, 20 received a 
baronetcy, and 12 were granted a knighthood.80 Although from this result, Rubinstein 
emphasises the limited chance even of business wealth holders being raised to the 
nobility, there exists another study, which is based on cohort analysis, that of 
Berghoff. Berghoff s analysis offers another perspective on the ennoblement of 
businessmen. He finds that the proportion of ennobled businessmen among all 
ennobled individuals in modem Britain gradually increased over time, from 11.5 
percent in the period 1868-80, to 40.9 percent in the period 1900-09.81 This indicates 
that some kind of title of nobility had become more accessible for the business elite in 
modem Britain.
Germany shows a similar tendency to that of Britain. Although some studies insist 
that aristocratic titles were less accessible to businessmen in general, for instance 
Teuteberg’s study on Westphalian textile industrialists, which concluded there was 
only one nobleman among the sample of 225, and Pieremkemper’s research on 
Westphalian heavy industrialists, which found only three cases of titles being granted 
out of a sample of 248, there exist other studies that indicate that titles were rather
80 See Rubinstein, Men o f Property, p. 170.
81 See Berghoff, ‘Aristokratisierung des Burgertums?’, p. 183.
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more accessible to the particularly wealthy group of businessmen.82 Augustine’s study 
shows that among 502 wealthy businessmen in Imperial Germany, one-quarter held a 
title of nobility, including both hereditary and non-hereditary titles. Berghoff also 
suggests that despite the relatively low rate of ennoblement compared to Britain, the 
rate of ennobled businessmen in Prussia increased from 6.5 percent of all those 
ennobled in the period 1871-79, to 14.5 percent in the period 1906-14. The total 
number of ennobled businessmen was larger than in Britain, that is, 148 titles were 
granted in Prussia in the period 1871-1918, whereas 110 such titles were granted in 
Britain in the period 1868-1919.84 There seems no doubt that in both Britain and 
Germany a title of nobility became more accessible to the members of the business 
elite, in particular to the wealthiest group. Although it is hardly possible to evaluate 
any tendency towards aristocratization from this result alone, it suggests that the 
business elite in both countries may have had some motivation in introducing 
aristocratic values into their life-style, and to some extent, into their social behaviour
In contrast to the European cases, evaluation and analysis of the Japanese case is 
perhaps more complex; we need to consider the actual system of nobility in modem 
Japan, socio-cultural influences and the standard criteria for the award of a title of 
nobility. Firstly, compared to the European cases, the total number of ennobled 
businessmen was really small, even for our wealth holders* group. Only 18 
individuals had been granted a title of nobility, an estimated 3 percent of the total 
sample. However, there was one major difference between the Japanese aristocratic 
system and the contemporary European ones, namely that in Japan there was no title 
equivalent to a knighthood in Britain or ‘von’ in Germany. This means that Japanese 
titles of nobility were limited to titles of hereditary peerage. From this evidence, it is 
clear that all of the Japanese sample were granted the title of at least baron (one of 
these cases was later raised to the rank of viscount), and this figure is quite close to 
that in Rubinstein’s data, namely 21 hereditary peers. The figure is slightly higher 
than that in the German case, where 14 businessmen were granted a hereditary title,
82 See Teuteberg, Westfctlische Textiluntemehmer, p.38 and Pierenkemper, Die Westfalischen 
Schwerindustriellen, p.73.
83 Augustine, Patricians, p.43.
84 Berghoff, ‘Aristokratisierung’, p. 183.
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according to Berghoff.85 Thus, the difference in the whole system o f awarding titles 
undoubtedly had a decisive impact on the Japanese case, as compared to Britain and 
Germany.
In spite of the small size of this ennobled businessmen’s group, in the Japanese case 
regional distribution was a marked characteristic, since most ennobled businessmen 
were concentrated in Tokyo, the capital, although there were a number of cases in 
other areas.86 This could seem to suggest that only businessmen in highly 
industrialized areas in modem Japan had the chance of ennoblement. In addition, the 
primary intention of the state in granting a title of nobility to a businessman was to 
honour that individual’s business contribution to the development of the Japanese 
economy. The document granting the title of baron to Mitsui Takamine, cited in his 
biography, testifies to the effect that the modem Japanese state had granted him this 
title, not only for his significant business contribution, but also for the following 
reason:
‘—since many businessmen seeking their own interest are confronted with the difficulty 
of limiting their private interest in order to contribute to the public interest, he (Mitsui) 
demonstrated his passion to serve our imperial majesty, and his patriotism. His attitude 
must be considered as a standard and a good example for ordinary Japanese people’.87
Since Mitsui was the first Japanese businessman, along with Iwasaki Hisaya and 
Iwasaki Yanosuke, to be ennobled in 1896, and since this document was considered 
as having established a standard for the ennoblement of businessmen, it is plausible to 
argue that the evaluation of an individual’s business contribution, which constituted a 
significant element in his ennoblement, was constmcted as indicating his contribution 
to increasing the economic power of the nation. Although it is unclear whether or not 
the granting of a title of nobility to businessmen was in the European case due to their 
business contribution, in the Japanese case it is apparent, and this important standard 
may well have set Japan apart from the nature of ennobled businessmen in Europe.
85 Of the 14 who received a hereditary title in Imperial Germany, 13 were granted the title of baron and 
one was granted the title of count. See ibid, p. 183.
86 Except for the case of Yasukawa Keiichiro, a famous coal magnate in Fukuoka prefecture, all the 
other ennobled regional businessmen were in Osaka and Kobe, both of which were economic and 
commercial centres.
87 Joshakuroku: Mitsui Hachiroemon, quoted in Mitsui Hachiro’uemon Takamine Den Hensan Iinkai 
(ed.), Mitsui Hachiro ’uemon Takamine Den, p.205.
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Another difference in the system of Japanese nobility establishes a further distinction 
from the European aristocracy. With regard to the social hierarchy, the Japanese 
aristocracy had no hierarchical relationship with Japanese landlords. This is the 
greatest difference with the European nobility, in which landowners were the basis of 
the pyramid of the pre-industrial elite. With the nobility standing at the top of this 
pyramid, there was in Europe a strong vertical relationship between landowners and 
the aristocracy, meaning that they together created the social values of the pre­
industrial elite. It goes without saying that aristocratic title was granted to landowners 
in the European cases. According to Berghoffs study, 26 percent of ennobled 
individuals in Prussia belonged to the category of big-landowner.88 The institutional 
system established by the state also influenced the social behaviour of ennobled 
businessmen. As Augustine points out, a landed entail was a prerequisite for the 
granting of the title of baron in Prussia.89 In addition, although in Britain there was no 
such extreme regulation as in the Prussian case, it is apparent that here too landowners 
formed the foundation of a hierarchy among the elite, that included the nobility.
By contrast, the aristocracy and landlords were totally separate social groups in 
modem Japan; nothing of the same vertical hierarchical relationship between them 
existed. There is no case of a Japanese landlord being granted a title of nobility. This 
evidence further attests to the separation of the two groups. Moreover, in the Japanese 
case, it also indicates an absence of the social value of an aristocratic title found in the 
European case, as something creating a model for life-style or social behaviour. 
Instead, it is likely that, as Lebra suggests, it was western upper class society, 
including the wealthy bourgeoisie and the nobility, that became the crucial model for 
establishing the desired life-style.90 It is noticeable that in Lebra’s study, the 
testimony of an anonymous informant who was an ennobled businessman suggests 
that the reason for his purchasing a landed entail in a local area and engaging in the 
farming business was because of the recommendation of a friend, who had some 
knowledge of the life-style of the European aristocracy through his experience in 
foreign countries, and whose opinion was accepted on the grounds that it was
88 See Berghoff, ‘Aristokratisierung’, p. 184.
89 See Augustine, Patricians, p.44.
90 See Lebra, Above the Clouds, esp. chap. 5.
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appropriate to follow the practice of western ennobled businessmen.91 As a result, it 
seems that in the Japanese case aristocratization almost equalled the ‘westernisation’, 
and as such is likely to have had a completely different meaning from when the term 
was used in the European cases. For the Japanese upper class elite, ‘westernisation’ 
tended to symbolise ‘modernisation’.
Therefore, on the one hand, because of the difference in historical background in the 
Japanese case, there was lacking the social value system of the pre-industrial elite, of 
the kind that influenced the creation of new social values in the case of the European 
business elite, regardless of whether the direction of change was towards integration 
and restructuring of the elite class, or towards assimilation into the old elite. On the 
other hand, paradoxically, while the social values of the European landed elite 
included those considered as anti-capitalistic or even those that seemed to show pre- 
industrial characteristics that did not fit with contemporary European society, in the 
Japanese case these values were reinterpreted in the name of ‘westernisation’ and 
were partly introduced into the modem Japanese elite, including the aristocracy and 
the business elite. For these reasons, there are certain difficulties in analysing the 
Japanese ennobled businessmen from a socio-cultural perspective in comparison with 
the European cases.
What can also be said, however, is that the granting of a title of nobility to members 
of the wealthy business elite in Japan also demonstrates the prominent position and 
higher social status achieved by ennobled businessmen. As one might expect, most 
ennobled businessmen were either the owners of big businesses, like zaibatsu, or 
significant business leaders and promoters, for instance, Shibusawa Eiichi or Dan 
Takuma. The ennoblement of businessmen thus had almost the same characteristics as 
in the European cases, in particular with regard to distinguishing them from other 
ordinary businessmen and elevating their social status to the top of the business elite. 
However, some businessmen showed no interest in ennoblement, even though they 
had a very good chance of being granting a title. One particular example is the case of 
Yasuda Zenjiro, the owner of the Yasuda zaibatsu, who, as noted previously, had 
originated in a poor family in a provincial area. According to Fukuzawa Momosuke,
91 Ibid, p. 157.
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the adopted son-in-law of the famous intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was also 
known as a significant business promoter, there are several pieces of evidence 
suggesting that Zenjiro had no interest in utilising his informal network with 
contemporary political leaders to obtain a title of nobility. Moreover, Zenjiro also 
rejected approaches from these leaders for financial support in exchange for an 
aristocratic title, even though his initial business expansion had largely depended on 
his connections with those same political leaders. For instance, in the early Meiji 
period, the famous politician Okuma Shigenobu asked Zenjiro to lend him a 
substantial amount of money for his political activities, offering his residence as a 
guarantee. However, Zenjiro rejected this plan since the financial value of the 
residence was insufficient to guarantee the substantial sums involved.92 In another 
case, Katsura Taro, prime minister in the early Taisho period, asked Zenjiro to donate 
1 million yen for a public event. Katsura indicated in return that he could grant 
Zenjiro the title of baron. Nevertheless, Zenjiro donated 300,000 yen for this public 
event, which made Katsura furious.93 These episodes suggest that, although Zenjiro 
had a bad reputation among contemporary observers as a typical greedy financier or 
loan shark, he was, ironically, not greedy enough to purchase higher social status with 
money or through his informal influence. Although this seems to be a rare case, it is 
apparent that not all prominent businessmen were interested in raising their social 
status and entering the ranks of the nobility.
On the other hand, however, the ennoblement of businessmen did not become the 
main means whereby these businessmen sought to totally separate themselves from 
bourgeois values and become integrated into the aristocracy. Moreover, the ennobled 
Japanese businessmen and their families did not show some of the tendencies that 
typified European ennobled businessmen, for instance, changing their social 
behaviour and life-style to make them fully acceptable to the old aristocracy, or 
having some or all family members abandon the business world. In addition, in the 
absence of any model of traditional social values for the nobility, there were other 
systematic reasons that prevented the aristocratization of these Japanese business 
families. Firstly, under the Japanese aristocratic system, the hereditary titles of 
nobility were given not to individuals but to the ie. The logic of this was that only the
92 See M. Fukuzawa, Zaikai Jinbutsu Gakan (Tokyo, 1935), p.97.
93 Ibid, p.98.
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head of the ie had the right to claim and inherit the title, and the children of the head 
of the family in such a noble family would lose any aristocratic status when their 
father died, or retired as head of the ie. The only exception to this would be the eldest 
son or the inheritor of the ennobled ie, who took the position of the next household 
head. Consequently, in contrast to the European cases, in which children could claim 
themselves to be members of the aristocracy from being bom to aristocratic parents, 
the strong influence of the ie in the Japanese case posed certain difficulties for any 
‘aristocratization’ of the kind found in Britain or Germany, since there were clear 
distinctions in social status within aristocratic families, in particular among children. 
Secondly, and this was also related to the ie system of business families, it was almost 
impossible for children in ennobled business families, and especially the eldest son, to 
abandon the business world. As discussed in the previous chapter, the ie system had a 
strong constraining power over family members, and the sons of businessmen, even in 
the case of the Mitsui families, had almost no choice but to engage in the family 
business.
In addition, under the ie system, the abandoning of the business world by some sons, 
especially by the eldest son, indicated that that son was being expelled from his own 
ie. Such a course of action meant that he would lose his whole status, including the 
family head position, related social status, and, in the case of an ennobled 
businessman’s family, any title of nobility as well. One particular example of this is 
the case of Shibusawa Atsuji, the eldest son of Shibusawa Eiichi, and the likely 
inheritor of his father’s business, along with his title of viscount. As a result of 
Atsuji’s love affair with a geisha mistress, which led to his leaving his wife and 
children, Eiichi legally ousted Atsuji from his position as the next head of the house 
of Shibusawa; Eiichi instead appointed Atsuji*s eldest son, Keizo, as the formal 
successor.94 Thus, in addition to their own self-identity as businessmen, found also in 
the European cases, it is clear that the ie system in Japan influenced the social 
behaviour, life-style and mindset of family members in the families of ennobled 
Japanese businessmen. Undoubtedly, the ie system restricted children’s freedom in 
relation to the choice of their futures, whether their preferences were towards the 
aristocratic life-style or towards some other profession. Ironically, the ie system, in
94 See S. Sano, Shibusawa-ke 3dai, pp. 138-40.
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reinventing the traditional constraining power of the Japanese household, played a 
crucial role in determining the self-discipline of ennobled business families, and in 
preventing the total assimilation of these families into the aristocracy, which in the 
European cases seems to have been due to the influence of traditional or pre-industrial 
factors in society.
Therefore, despite its relative importance for particular wealthy businessmen, the 
granting of a title of nobility played a minor role in helping Japanese business wealth 
holders to re-define their social status. This was due not only to ennobled 
businessmen being a minority within the business elite, compared with the European 
cases, but also to the existence of other social constraints, represented in the ie system, 
which prevented them from changing their identities as businessmen. The hierarchical 
relationships within ennobled business families and the Japanese aristocratic system 
itself also had a significant impact on their choice of career. In addition, because of 
the difference in historical background, the Japanese aristocracy did not become a 
model for the ennobled businessmen, whereas in the European cases, the nobility 
became a clear model for those ennobled businessmen. This also indicates that titles 
of nobility were less exploited by the state in modem Japan to re-define the 
relationship with the wealthy business elite. However, despite aristocratic titles not 
working as in the European cases, in which titles of nobility acted to distinguish the 
business elite from other groups, who received different honours at the behest of the 
government authorities, in the Japanese case there were other significant honours 
which strongly reflected the power of the authorities. These will be explored in detail 
in the next section.
4.3.2. Non-Hereditary Governmental Titles and Honours
The most important difference between the non-hereditary titles and decorations 
bestowed by the contemporary government in modem Japan, and their European 
equivalents was their strong bureaucratic characteristic. These honours were primarily 
divided into two categories, that is, i (official rank of status) and kun-i (official rank of 
decoration). As might be expected, both were primarily granted to public servants, 
including bureaucrats, military officers and teachers, and exceptionally to members of 
the aristocracy. The system of i was based on the official ranking of the court
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public service, although, as in the i system, there was also a seniority element, and it 
was rare for kun-i to be awarded solely for meritorious service, except in periods of 
warfare.97 However, it is noticeable that the official document on kun-i contained 
strict regulations relating to the bestowal of such honours, to avoid granting them to 
officials whose tenures of office were characterised by a lack of merit in their public 
service, even where they requested the award of kun-i on the ground of having
Q O
sufficient years in the service. Therefore, in spite of certain similarities between both 
honorary systems, i and kun-i, kun-i attached more importance to achievements in 
public service and reflected the competence of officials, while i was more symbolic 
honour. In addition, unlike the titles of nobility, these other codes of honour, both / 
and kun-i, were non-hereditary titles, and bestowed on individuals, not on the ie. 
Consequently, kun-i and i were also titles denoting personal honour.
Although the relative importance of both kun-i or i in the political and social system 
of modem Japan is somewhat debatable, Sonoda has pointed out some important 
characteristics of the kun-i system in his study, in particular from a comparison of the 
order of precedence at court in modem Britain and modem Japan. While the order in 
Britain reflected the social hierarchy of all British citizens, that is, the King at the top 
of the hierarchy and the tenants at the bottom, the order of precedence in modem 
Japan was restricted to the bureaucratic hierarchy; other social classes had no position 
in this order.99 Secondly, since the order of precedence at court was based on the 
occupational status of officials and bureaucrats, not titles of nobility as in the British 
case, and since occupational status also reflected the rank of kun-i, Sonoda 
emphasised the relatively less powerful position of the Japanese aristocracy even in 
terms of their status at the Imperial court, pointing to the existence of some sort of 
meritocracy in modem Japan.100 From this evidence, he stressed the relative 
importance of kun-i, as compared to i, suggesting that this also showed the relative 
importance of occupational contribution rather than social status under the modem 
Japanese political system. Other studies have also indicated this point. From research 
on granted titles and kun-i bestowed on the newly ennobled aristocracy and former
97 Information based on Mon-Bu-Kan Jokun Naisoku , 3rd September Meiji 21 (1888), Sumitsu-In 
Monjo, 2A 16-3 145 1, National Archives.
98 Jokun Naisoku Toriatsukai Tejun, revised 30th September Taisho 3 (1914), Sumitsu-In Monjo, 2A 16- 
3 146 1, National Archives.
99 See H. Sonoda, Seiyoka no Kozo, pp.201-4.
100 Ibid, pp.204-5.
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feudal lords and court aristocracy group (in other words, the old aristocracy), Asami 
discovered that there was a strong correlation between higher kun-i and higher 
aristocratic titles among the newly ennobled aristocracy at the period of the 
establishment of the peerage system in modem Japan. For example, except in one case, 
all newly ennobled counts at this particular period were granted kun-itto (first class 
order of merit) status, largely due to their bureaucratic status.101
Although there is the possibility that Sonoda’s comparison is a flawed one, 
particularly in relation to his interpretation of the order of precedence at court in 
modem Britain, as it may be argued that this order just reflected the social hierarchy 
of the old regime, since the working class was totally absent from it, Sonoda’s 
findings do provide a key as to how we might interpret the system of i and kun-i. With 
regard to the characteristics of title and decoration, it can be said that the modem 
Japanese state was characterised by what can be called ‘social bureaucratisation’, as a 
key concept in the formation of the social hierarchy. The concept of ‘social 
bureaucratisation’ has recently been utilised by researchers of modem German history 
to reconsider the concept of ‘aristocratization’. It tends to redefine all the indicators 
which had been interpreted as a phenomenon of ‘aristocratization’, for example 
granting titles of nobility or other decorations, as demonstrating the close attachment 
of the bourgeoisie to the modem German state. Thus, according to this concept, 
ennoblement of the bourgeoisie suggests the political loyalty and cooperative attitude 
of the bourgeoisie towards the state, and did not indicate any subjection of the state to 
the nobility.102 According to this concept, social contribution to the state would seem 
to have become the standard for bestowing these honorary titles. This also indicates 
that there were possibly two hierarchies in Japanese society, that is, one based on the 
bureaucratic order and the other based on wealth and social status. However, this 
assumption does not necessarily mean the total separation of these two hierarchies. 
The relationship of both hierarchies must be regarded as being characterised by 
complexity and interdependence, and under some exceptional conditions the 
borderline of the two orders could become even more ambiguous.103
101 See Asami, Kazoku Tanjo, pp.136-38, pp.142-43.
102 For the concept of social bureaucratisation, see Kaelble, ‘Wie feudal’, pp. 164-66
103 Lebra recounts the unusual occasion when a baron’s heir, who was also a lieutenant, stood next to 
the commanders at the holiday ceremonies, because of his higher rank in the Imperial court, which 
made many officers furious. See Lebra, Above the Clouds, p. 166.
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On the other hand, the criteria for granting i and kun-i, which were based on the 
occupational status of public servants, raises the question of how the rules for 
bestowing i and kun-i were applied to cases where the grantee was a business wealth 
holder. The official instructions and the rules for both honours make no mention of 
cases where these titles and decorations might be awarded to non-official individuals. 
The rules for granting kun-i merely describe briefly how the decoration should be 
given to businessmen if they ‘have made an enormous contribution to agricultural, 
industrial or commercial activities’.104 Moreover, while minute details are laid down 
in relation to the bestowal of these honours on officials, for instance, which 
occupational status was equivalent to the granting of which class of honour, no such 
information is given for other cases, for either set of honours. This evidence suggests 
that the granting of these honours to others was totally dependent on the decision­
making and policy of the contemporary government, presumably including the 
decision as to which class of honour would be bestowed on a business wealth holder. 
In addition, the documentation on the announcements of these honours also shows 
major differences in the form of documents relating to official as opposed to business 
wealth holders. While several standard documents, for example, curriculae vitarum, 
were required in the case of public servants, the cases of business wealth holders 
given these honours indicate that a large amount of documentation would seem to 
have been required, including curriculae vitarum, letters of recommendation from the 
ministers of several related ministries, and a report on secret investigations into their 
contributions to society. In the case of Ohara Magosaburo, who was granted a third 
class order of merit (kun-santo) for his business, agricultural and social contributions, 
the documents include some relating to secret investigations of institutes, which he 
had established, that is, the Ohara Institute for Agricultural Research and the Ohara 
Institute of Social Affairs. These documents include financial reports on these two 
institutions and the amount of Ohara’s donations.105
These detailed documents consequently suggest several important characteristics in 
the granting of i and kun-i to business wealth holders. Firstly, we may assume that 
detailed investigations were conducted with a view to deciding which class of i or
104Article 18, Jokun Naisoku, Sumitsu-In Monjo, 2A 16-3 145 6, National Archives.
105 Ohara Magosaburo, Jokun Saikasho, 2A 18 686 13, National Archives.
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kun-i was suitable for bestowal on a particular individual. Because of the lack of any 
standard or instructions relating to the granting of these honours to non-officials, it 
was inevitable that a great deal of information and data would be needed for the final 
decision of the government. Secondly, it also makes apparent the existence of a strong 
influence of the governmental authorities in granting i or kun-i to non-officials. In 
contrast to the case of public servants, where bestowal of these honours totally 
depended on their occupational status and the level of their official contribution, in the 
case of the business wealth holders, the granting of i and kun-i was totally in the 
hands of the government, in other words, it depended on the government’s judgement. 
Thus, the bestowal of these honours, whether i or kun-i, may be seen as showing the 
extent to which the modem Japanese government valued the importance of the 
business and other activities conducted by the business wealth holders.
Although from both jo i saikasho and jokun saikasho, we can confirm 131 cases of i 
and 78 cases of kun-i being granted to businessmen, this does not give us the total 
number of business wealth holders who were granted these honours, since both 
materials contain many cases of both i and kun-i rank promotion. The lists of both 
materials in the National Archives of Japan are enormous, voluminous and clumsy, 
and these lists just display the table of content in chronological order by each year. 
Since the lists do not contain any index by individual names, it is impossible to trace 
all cases of wealth holders being awarded either i or kun-i. In addition, because of the 
cases where ennobled businessmen were automatically granted i (since they were 
automatically granted the rank of lower-fifth class of i at the age of 20), the total 
number from both sets of materials cannot be said to indicate all cases of business 
wealth holders being awarded such honours. Nevertheless, though they do not give us 
a complete picture, the evidence from the documents does indicate some important 
characteristics of the granting of these honours.
In the cases of the bestowal of i, the non-aristocratic and non-hereditary title, we can 
find there is frequently no mention of the degree and content of their business 
contribution. Only in a few cases is there an indication of the content of the 
contribution, for example, in the case of the Mitsui families in Meiji 29 (1896), when 
the heads of all the Mitsui houses were granted z, on the specific grounds of the
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substantial contribution of their business activities to the Sino-Japanese War.106 A 
similar case can be found in Konoike Zen’uemon, whose financial support for Kuhara 
Fusanosuke, who was engaged in secret funding of the revolutionaries during the 
Chinese Revolution, and whose secret negotiations over the Dutch West Indies, 
resulted in his promotion in 1916 to the higher class of i.107 However, these cases are 
truly rare among the documents granting z. The majority of business wealth holders 
honoured by the bestowal of z in this way, received it mainly for their reputation in 
making a business contribution. Despite this fact, it is apparent that in many cases in 
the sample, business contribution alone was insufficient for the granting of z, since 
many documents also mention the contribution of these figures to the public good, 
such as Okura Kihachiro, whose establishment of the Okura Commercial High School 
was highly regarded as a significant contribution to the public interest.108 We may 
therefore assume that the contributions of these figures to the public interest, along 
with their business contributions, played a significant role in the granting of z.
On the other hand, in contrast to z, the documents relating to the granting of kun-i, the 
official order of merit, mention in detail the contribution, whether to business or the 
public interest. However, as in the case of z, it is rare to find that the granting of kun-i 
was due to involvement in a particular event, for example, military action or some sort 
of secret negotiation related to political interests. Examples of these distinctive cases 
can be found in the case of Kuhara Fusanosuke (his acquisition of kun-i was due to 
the reasons mentioned above in the case of Konoike Zen’uemon), or Fujise Masajiro, 
one of the prominent executives of the Mitsui zaibatsu who was involved in secret 
negotiations with China to construct a large wireless studio in Beijing, something 
related to Japanese military interests; or Noguchi Jun, whose business expansion was 
intimately related to colonial policy in Korea.109 However, apart from these examples 
and some particular cases in the period of the Second World War, kun-i were 
bestowed mainly for more peaceful reasons, like contribution to the expansion of
106 Sho-Go-I Mitsui Hachirojiro hoka 1 lmei, 10th June Meiji 29 (1896), Joi Saikasho, 2A 16 43 10, 
National Archives.
107 Danshaku Konoike Zen’uemon, 10th November Taisho 5(1916), Joi Saikasho, 2A 16 508 19, 
National Archives.
108 Okura Kihachiro hoka 2mei, 22nd February Meiji 35 (1902), Joi Saikasho, 2A 16 118 17, National 
Archives.
109 Kuhara Fusanosuke, Jokun Saikasho, 2A 18 496 17, Fujise Masajiro, ibid, 2A 18 653 4 and Noguchi 
Jun, ibid, 2A 18 750 9-1, National Archives.
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foreign exports or to the educational or public interest. Consequently, the documents 
relating to the granting of i and kun-i display the perspective of the government on the 
evaluation of the business and social activities of business wealth holders. With a few 
exceptions, the granting of these honours rarely reflected the contribution of the 
grantees to political or military interests. Contribution to the public interest would 
seem to have had a much greater influence over the bestowing of i and kun-i. This 
also seems to suggest that the granting of these honorary decorations to non-officials 
was interpreted by the grantees as a symbol of honour within Japanese society, and 
functioned to firmly establish their social status.
Apart from these factors, it is also interesting to note that we rarely find cases where i 
and kun-i were granted solely on the basis of contributions through agricultural 
activities. Exceptional examples to this rule are Honma Mitsuteru, a prominent 
landlord of Yamagata prefecture, also known as the largest landholder in modem 
Japan, and Sato Tomo’uemon, a notable landlord in Niigata.110 This evidence suggests 
that for the contemporary government, the main importance was attached to industrial 
development, and while this priority created opportunities for business wealth holders, 
it also caused clear difficulties in landlords being granted these honours.
More weighty is the question of which businessmen were more likely achieve to these 
honours, and whether any other findings can be made from analysis of the i and kun-i, 
especially relating to the way in which these honours might have been granted to the 
general public. Despite certain limitations in the data in general, it seems that the 
majority of business wealth holders granted honours were in particular business 
sectors, in other words, in the growth industries of modem Japan. As might be 
expected, business wealth holders in the textile industries, in particular in cotton 
spinning or textile retailing, are frequently found in both sources. Along with this 
sector, the wealthy business elite in the heavy industries, whether they were involved 
solely in that sector or engaged in it as a part of their businesses (as in the zaibatsu 
cases), also constitutes an important group among the business elite so honoured. The 
possible explanation of this tendency is that the modem Japanese government quite 
consciously sought to reward in this special way the entrepreneurial achievement of
1,0 Honma Mitsuteru, 29th April Taisho 11 (1922), Joi Saikasho, 2A 16 706 23 and Ko Sato 
Tomo’uemon, 20th August Showa 8 (1933), ibid, 2A 17 1169 17, National Archives.
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this business elite, seen as significant as the driving force of the modem Japanese 
economy. Augustine finds almost the same tendency from looking at the percentage 
of ennobled businessmen in Imperial Germany who came from the growth 
industries.111 However, it is also notable that the granting of honours was, to some 
extent, partly exploited to reward businessmen who contributed to the development 
and expansion of foreign trade, whether these businessmen belonged to the modem 
sector or the traditional sector. For example, Kashiwabara Magozaemon, a merchant 
in Kyoto whose family had a strong relationship with the Mitsui families through 
marriage alliances, was granted an i, for his contribution to the export of lacquerware, 
product of one of Japan’s traditional industries.112 Another example is found in the 
case of Otani Kahei, a trader of Yokohama, who was granted an i because of his 
significant contribution to Japanese tea exports to foreign countries.113 We can assume 
that the giving of rewards to businessmen in the foreign trading sector was in part a 
reflection o f the economic view of the political elite, who considered the foreign 
trading sector as an important driving force in Japan’s quest to become a rich 
nation.114 In this quest for industrialisation, it is apparent that textiles, heavy industry 
and foreign trade were together the core of Japan’s modem economy, and thus the 
bestowal of honours on business wealth holders also reflected the political ideology of 
the government in Japan in this period.
However, there is one significant question raised by analysis of the method and timing 
of the granting of honours, since many of the documents make it clear that the 
majority of the honoured business wealth holders were granted i or kun-i immediately 
prior to their deaths. One possible reason for this may have been a problem with the 
actual system of these honours. As explained before, both sets of honours were 
designed to reward the contributions of public servants, and therefore, except for 
cases in which the government might exercise its influence in granting these honours, 
it is likely to have been very difficult for a non-official to have been granted these 
honours during his lifetime, and that was true of business wealth holders as well. A 
second, and perhaps more plausible, explanation is that the government might
111 See Augustine, Patricians, p.46; and also Berghoff, ‘Aristokratisierung’ pp. 186-88.
1,2 Kashiwabara Magozaemon, 15th April Taisho 5 (1916), Joi Saikasho, 2A 16 490 10, National 
Archives.
113 Otani Kahei, 20th September Meiji 44 (1911), Joi Saikasho, 2A 16 349 1, National Archives.
114 For a more general consideration of this perspective, see, for example, H. Takeda, Nihonjin no 
Keizai Kannen, esp. pp.224-26.
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consider the bestowing of these honours on particular individuals as exceptional cases, 
so that the granting of i or kun-i required an assessment of the importance of the 
contribution of an individual over the long-term and over his lifetime. It presumably 
also resulted from some difficulty in applying the standards of evaluation of officials 
for the reward of honours to, in this case, business wealth holders.
These possible explanations are substantiated in part by some of the official 
documents relating of the granting of i and kun-i. According to one document, it was 
argued that there needed to be certain reforms in the timing of any declaration 
regarding the bestowal of i on a particular member of the general public, since the 
custom of mainly granting i immediately prior to death made it impossible for anyone 
to achieve this honoured position while he was still alive. To resolve this problem the 
writer recommended a change in the date of issue of any such declaration so as to 
reward an individual during his lifetime.115 Consequently, this document indicates the 
existence of some kind of standard for granting these honours to business wealth 
holders. In addition, it is clear from this that these honoured business wealth holders 
who were granted i or kun-i during their lifetimes were regarded as having made a 
truly extraordinary social or economic contribution. These honours symbolised the 
extent to which the government was willing to reward their huge entrepreneurial 
accomplishments.
On the other hand, an analysis of changes over time in the number of cases of these 
honours, especially of i, does suggest some crucial insights, although any conclusions 
must be provisional and further research is needed. From a limited cohort analysis of i, 
however, we can easily find significant growth in the number of i granted to 
businessmen during the Showa period. While 62 such cases can be confirmed from 
late Meiji to the end of the Taisho period (1896 to 1926), there were 69 cases during 
the early Showa period, up to the year of surrender in the Second World War (1927 to 
1945), even though in the latter group, most cases were granted the honour 
immediately before their deaths. Although it is impossible to base any convincing 
discussion on this insufficient data, it does seem likely that there was a shift in 
government policy towards the reward system in the Showa period, for both i and
115 Minkan Korosha no Tokushi Jonin Hizukekata, 28th February Taisho 13 (1924), Sumitsu-In Monjo,
2A 16-3 143 64, National Archives.
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kun-i. Such a shift may well have made it easier for business wealth holders to access 
these honours.
The distinctive characteristics of these government honours of i and kun-i 
in modem Japan become more apparent if we explore further these attributes. Firstly, 
the characteristic that the granting of these honours mostly took place immediately 
before the death of the business wealth holder, may be taken as signifying that the 
honoured person had no right to reject an i or kun-i. Although it is likely that the 
wealthy business elite were anxious to acquire these honours, the timing of the 
bestowal also demonstrates that the government was not concerned with the real 
intentions of these business wealth holders, that is, whether or not they had any 
interest in the granting of i or kun-i. In addition to this factor, the bureaucratic order 
also overshadowed the system of honours, since most of the public was totally 
detached from it. While these clear limitations on access to these honours are likely 
to have made the honoured business elite socially distinctive and prestigious, it may 
well also have played a significant role in enforcing the authority of the government 
over businessmen, who were a key social group for the economic development of 
modem Japan, but who remained outside of the bureaucratic hierarchy. It is not hard 
to see how, despite the incomplete system of honours for the general public, both sets 
of honours provided the government with an indispensable instrument of control.
A comparison with the European cases seems to suggests a certain disparity in this 
respect. Despite an apparent respect for the acquisition of titles and decorations 
among the majority of German and British businessmen, their chase and quest for 
honours also worked to make them less attractive as an instrument of control. For 
instance, in the German case, there was the particular title of commercial councillor, 
used to honour the entrepreneurial achievement of businessmen. Because of certain 
difficulties relating to the bestowing of titles of nobility on the majority of German 
businessmen, this title functioned as a political tool both for businessmen themselves 
and for the governmental elite, supporting the political pacification of the bourgeoisie 
and social integration.116 The enthusiasm for honours has also been interpreted as
116 See Kaudelka-Hanisch, ‘The Titled Businessmen’ in Evans (eds.), The German Bourgeoisie; also D. 
Schumann, Bayems Untemehmer in Gesellschaft und Staat.
(Gottingen, 1992), esp. pp.330-57, pp.359-60.
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indicative of the close attachment of the bourgeoisie to the German state, even though 
it does not constitute evidence for the subjection of the bourgeoisie to the aristocracy. 
However, as the possibility of purchasing this title increased, it became obvious that 
there was a growing opportunity of obtaining the title of commercial councillor 
through informal methods, and in some cases through fraud, and so the title gradually 
lost its influence as a reliable political tool and as an instrument of businessmen’s 
interests.117 On the other hand, in Britain, granting the title of nobility to rich 
businessmen was utilised by the political leaders in return for substantial financial 
contributions for their political activities, and this led some political scandal in late 
Victorian England.118 Despite this loss in the political credibility of honours, largely 
due to individuals’ enthusiasm for obtaining these titles or decorations, the evidence 
of the European cases serves to highlight the strength of the bureaucratic order in 
modem Japan with regard to the granting of honours. Moreover, although historical 
background and the social system are certainly different, the term ‘social 
bureaucratisation’, which has been utilised in the analysis of the socio-cultural 
tendencies of the bourgeoisie in Imperial Germany, is perhaps more appropriate for 
the Japanese case, in particular in relation to the business elite, since the honours 
system in modem Japan appears to have prevented the sale and purchase of 
government honours. Overall, it appears to have precluded any possibility of 
downgrading the value of honours, as well as confirming the government’s authority 
over the business elite.
4.4. Conclusion
Although marriage alliances and the granting of honours seem to have depended 
mainly on the personal activities of modem Japanese business wealth holders, it has 
been argued here that these factors also represented tools whereby they could form 
and strengthen their informal networks, which in turn would to some extent support 
their formal business activities. Observation of marriage and the choice of spouse in a 
comparative perspective showed some similarities between Japan and the European 
cases, plausibly reflecting a degree of westernisation among the Japanese wealthy 
business elite, but also some differences largely due to the constraining power of
117 See Augustine, Patricians, pp.36-38.
1,8 See H. J. Hanham, ‘The Sale of Honours in Late Victorian England’, Victorian Studies 3 (1960).
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tradition. Although further consideration is required of other factors, for instance, the 
very different historical backgrounds of the three countries, and the limitations of the 
marriage market, the high rate of social endogamy among business wealth holders 
would seem to indicate a similar pattern to that found in the two European cases, 
especially in Germany.
In spite of differences in the patterns of intermarriage, it is clear that all three cases 
show that marriage did not necessarily mean integration of entrepreneurs into the old 
elite. In the British case, the choice of spouse from various social classes also 
indicates that the business elite lacked a tendency towards integration into any one 
particular social class. The pattern in Japan and Germany signifies some similarities, 
since the majority of the wealthy business elite retained a bourgeois pattern of 
intermarriage, as indicated in the data. However, there is no doubt that, if we consider 
the similarities in the patterns of marriage, it is conspicuous that marriage with the 
daughter of a family from the non-business elite, in particular from the nobility, was a 
status symbol for the business elite in all three countries, indicating the increasing 
power of business wealth holders within the society. From this perspective, the 
aristocratization, which was apparently caused by the granting of a title of nobility or 
the introduction of an aristocratic way of life, only played a supplementary role in 
confirming their social status, and in general, may not have necessarily resulted in the 
rejection of the bourgeois life-style among the monied business elite.
On the other hand, there were some strong differences in the characteristics of 
marriage across the three countries, in particular due to the persistence of traditional 
constraints in the Japanese case. It is apparent that there was enormous influence of 
the Japanese household (ie) system, closely linked to a patriarchal structure that meant 
that in business wealth holders’ families the father had the key decision-making 
power over marriage. This created major restrictions on the children’s freedom of 
choice of marriage partner, and it was almost impossible to avoid this constraint. This 
is in strong contrast to the European cases, where the constraints of patriarchal 
structures on the families of the wealthy business elite seem to have gradually 
declined, and men in this social group, whether wealthy businessmen themselves or 
their sons, enjoyed a growing freedom of choice in marriage. Although there are, of 
course, doubts over whether or not in the Japanese case the constraints of marriage
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also meant certain restrictions on freedom of sexual behaviour, in formal terms at 
least, marriage was seen as part of the overall strategy of Japanese business wealth 
holders, and was unlikely to be motivated by ‘love’.
As for the granting of honours, it has been suggested that such honours indicated the 
subordinate position of Japanese business wealth holders. Nor does analysis of 
informal networking through marriage signify that wealthy businessmen enjoyed an 
autonomous position independent of the state. Even though the number of ennobled 
businessmen among the Japanese wealthy business elite was small, in contrast to 
Britain and Germany, and while ennoblement played a relatively minor role among 
this elite group in the European sense of ‘aristocratization’, we may also conclude that 
the relative scarcity of ennoblement is likely to have contributed to enhancing the 
social value of titles of nobility among the business elite. In addition, in looking at 
the characteristics of ennoblement among business wealth holders, it is apparent that 
evaluation of their business contribution from a broader perspective of economic 
development played an indispensable role in differentiating the wealthy business elite 
from other business elite groups, who found it almost impossible to benefit from the 
ennoblement system.
The Japanese system of i and kun-i awards functioned as a supplement to 
ennoblement, because of their being more widely accessible to the business elite. 
Although the function of i and kun-i was different for the bureaucratic elite, and kun-i 
was more significant for public servants, if we look at the bestowal of these awards on 
the non-bureaucratic elite, there was no difference in the functions of the two, in that 
both were essentially to give an honoured status to an individual to reward his 
contribution to the development of the nation. However, the bureaucratic rules and 
characteristics of both of these sets of honours resulted in the government having 
greater authority over their granting. They were also the cause of pressure being put 
on Japanese business wealth holders of a slightly different kind, which may well have 
limited the direction of some of their business activities. Though we cannot 
overestimate the power of these honours, they also indicate some attempts by the 
government to integrate the wealthy business elite from above by exploiting these 
honours. It is, moreover, apparent that, despite the positive role of honours for the
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wealthy business elite in modem Japan, there did exist considerable pressure on them 
from the state through its bureaucratic order.
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Conclusion
Although Japanese wealth holders comprised a tiny group not only within the general 
public but also within the elite of modem Japan, it is apparent that their existence was 
closely identified with some key characteristics of Japan’s economic development 
throughout the pre-war period, from the late 19th to the mid 20th century. It is not hard 
to conclude that, since the majority of wealth holders were members of the business 
elite, as mentioned in chapter 2, the evidence points to the huge wealth of business 
wealth holders in this period. By contrast, the extreme concentration of wealth in this 
particular group undoubtedly signifies the wealth inequality that existed among 
Japanese in this period. The economic differentials highlighted a clear difference 
between the prosperous rich minority and the miserably poor majority. However, this 
is not to suggest that Japanese wealth holders represented the ‘modem’, ‘westernised’ 
group within Japanese society, in contrast with the ‘indigenous’, ‘traditional’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ Japanese people more broadly, standing out in the context of the 
relative backwardness of the pre-war period. The real situation and characteristics of 
Japanese business wealth holders were, as the analysis throughout this thesis has tried 
to explain, far more complex than suggested by this simple dichotomy. We therefore 
need to discuss the complexity of these characteristics in this concluding section.
Similarities and Differences
As the comparative analysis with the contemporary German and British business 
wealth holders has suggested, there is no doubt that the wealthy business elite in the 
three countries shared a number of characteristics in terms of their patterns of social 
strategies. The comparison of social origins in chapter 3 made it apparent that the 
recruitment of this economic elite was limited to certain social groups, especially 
those from business families. Even though there are inevitable differences in the 
cultural context, as in the existence of the former samurai group in Japan, and though 
the results from the analysis may not be applicable to businessmen as a whole, 
including the less rich and relatively poor entrepreneurs, the evidence of clear 
limitations on recruitment to the wealthy business elite indicates the existence of 
some sort of homogeneity among this group. This homogeneity goes beyond the
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holders to select their own spouses, influenced the patterns of marriage alliance in the 
Japanese case. There was in addition the father’s desire to extend the family’s social 
networks, which in turn contributed to reinforcing informal business networks. 
Although it does not concern marriage, there is some evidence to suggest that denial 
of the father’s authority by a child could result in expulsion from the family and 
consequent loss of status. Such sanctions may well have been applied in the case of 
marriage as well.
In the Japanese case, the existence of adopted sons, yoshi, also characterised Japanese 
business wealth holders. As mentioned in chapter 3, the group of adopted sons formed 
over one-quarter of the total sample. Although the relatively high proportion of 
adopted sons among Japanese business wealth holders, as already indicated, does not 
suggest the existence of huge opportunities for individuals from the lower classes to 
succeed in the business world by utilising this system, the evidence of yoshi, along 
with the pattern of marriage, also showed how the ie system strongly influenced the 
social activities and behaviour of business wealth holders. However, since the ie 
system was reinvented through social reforms during the Meiji period, this system 
cannot be categorised as an example of the constraining power of tradition over 
business wealth holders. In addition, both marriage alliances and the case of adopted 
sons suggests the social exclusiveness of Japanese business wealth holders, and it may 
well be that their social exclusiveness was reinforced by the application of western 
social customs and life-styles, which are likely to have influenced the pattern of social 
strategies of the Japanese business elite, and its formation as a distinctive social group 
in modem Japan. This also raises the question of what the ‘modernisation’ or so- 
called ‘westernisation’ really meant for Japanese business wealth holders.
Modernisation and Westernisation
With regard to ‘modernisation’ and ‘westernisation’, it is apparent that the majority of 
Japanese business wealth holders were strongly influenced by western culture and 
technology, and by the western method of business activities. As mentioned in chapter 
2, since most of them lived in urbanised areas, it may be assumed that business wealth 
holders had easy access to these western influences, and applied them to their social, 
personal and business activities. However, it should be noted that the introduction of
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new systems to business activities was a prerequisite if these business wealth holders, 
whether urban or provincial, were to survive the sustained economic fluctuations from 
the early Meiji period, and to reform their business activities along lines more suited 
to the new economic circumstances. Failure in accepting and applying new systems 
introduced from the economically more advanced Euro-American countries thus 
pointed to the collapse of the business, in particular from the late 19th century onwards, 
when the government took the initiative in generating social and economic reforms to 
revitalise the private sector. Therefore, in terms of business activities, there was no 
distinction between ‘modernisation’ and ‘westernisation’, since the western business 
system was applied to Japanese business throughout this period, with a view to 
modernising it sufficiently to compete with leading foreign players in business, in 
both domestic and foreign market.
Nevertheless, this did not lead to total convergence or assimilation of Japanese 
business with the western business system during the pre-war period. As in the case of 
the business reforms conducted by the merchant houses outlined in chapter 3, changes 
and business reorganisation had gradually taken place over a lengthy period, and the 
form that the reforms took within Japanese business consisted mainly of applying the 
newly introduced system to the existing business organisation, for example, in the 
case of merchants, to their merchant houses. Even in the case of the zaibatsu, the 
symbol of Japanese big business in the pre-war period, the systems of ownership and 
control remained different from those which seem to have existed in the Euro- 
American family businesses. In particular, in, for instance, Mitsui and Sumitomo, 
both of which had their origins in merchant businesses, the influence of the household 
system on the business was clearly apparent. This evidence indicates that the 
‘modernisation’ or ‘westernisation’ of Japanese business was somewhat selective. It 
also suggests that so-called ‘modem’ Japanese business was, to some extent, a 
combination of the existing business system and the newly introduced business 
system.
Awareness of the concepts of ‘modernisation* and ‘westernisation’ is more apparent if 
we turn to the socio-cultural perspective. On the one hand, as has already been 
pointed out in relation to marriage alliances and the system of adopted sons, in as far 
as there tended to be no clear distinction between ‘modernisation’ and
270
‘westernisation*, these concepts were less likely to have an influence in reducing the 
constraining power of family authority and the ie system. There is also evidence that 
with regard to the social context, both modernisation and westernisation were 
selective within the wealthy Japanese business families and the household system. 
Even in the case of the most prominent business rich, their enjoyment of western life­
styles did not necessarily lead to changes in their authoritative household systems, as 
in the case of the Mitsui families. On the other hand, since westernisation was 
considered as a part of modernisation in the context of the Japanese business wealth 
holders, it does appear that integration or assimilation into the non-bourgeois elite, 
something which frequently happened in the European cases through acceptance of 
aristocratic life-styles, the obtaining of titles of nobility and consequent retirement 
from business activities, was not seen in the Japanese case as part of westernisation. It 
is noticeable that even in the case of the ennobled business wealth holders, there was 
no one who spontaneously retired from the business world because of obtaining his 
aristocratic title. Any interpretation of the modernisation and westernisation of 
Japanese wealth holders must, therefore, be related to another aspect, that is, how they 
evaluated their business activities and how they considered the contributions they 
made through those activities.
The role of business contributions
It is apparent that in the Japanese case, there is no religious ethic that could be a 
driving force of commercial and economic activities. This suggests that there is no 
equivalent set to that discussed by Max Weber in his work on the relationship 
between the development of modem capitalism and the protestant ethic.1 However, 
instead of any particular ethics, I would like to suggest that the concept of the 
Japanese family business as represented in the merchant houses, that is, the 
importance given to the continuity of business in long-term perspective, may well 
have played a significant role in the development of business activities throughout the 
pre-war period. Although it may well be that this characteristic was not unique to 
Japan, it is clear that in the case of the merchant houses, as indicated in chapter 3, any 
head of the house betraying the concept of the continuity of the family business, put
1 See M. Weber, The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (New York, 1958), for 
details.
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The contribution of business wealth holders to the development of modem Japanese 
business suggests they, too, shared a nationalistic attitude towards business activities. 
It seems likely that this nationalistic ethic behind Japanese business activities 
necessarily led to the Japanese business wealth holders being to some extent 
dependent on the state. Since the ‘nationalist’ contribution of their business activities 
was to overcome the ‘underdeveloped’ status of modem Japan, this created certain 
difficulties for them when it came to resisting any policy of the state, whose ultimate 
objective was to overcome this position of ‘backwardness’, even if it was being 
implemented by a militaristic regime. This dependence is also indicated in the 
granting of titles of nobility, and the bestowal of honours and decorations on Japanese 
business wealth holders, as mentioned in chapter 4. The standard for granting these 
honours was, without doubt, the business contribution of the wealthy business elite, 
and thus posed a difficult problem for them. Their problem was different from that 
which faced wealthy European businessmen, namely that social integration with the 
upper non-bourgeois elite caused a decline of their bourgeois values. Japanese 
business wealth holders were faced with a rather complicated problem of which they 
were often unaware, and which seemed to be a sort of trap that was almost impossible 
to escape from. The dependence of business wealth holders on the state also signifies 
the limitations of ‘modernisation’ and ‘westernisation’ among them in the context of 
any acceptance of democracy, since their priority lay in the development of the 
Japanese economy and the Japanese state, at the expense of the broader welfare of 
society.
Business wealth holders as a mirror of modern Japan
It would be hardly surprising if the business wealth holders themselves were aware of 
the contradictions inherent in the means adopted to overcome the social and economic 
backwardness of Japan in the late 19th century-early 20th century. The ultimate 
purpose of Japan throughout the pre-war period, which may be assumed to have been 
becoming a rich and strong state, in itself stimulated a crucial problem for the 
‘modernisation’ of Japan. In the case of business wealth holders, on the one hand, as 
part of the social elite, they seriously devoted themselves to making this purpose a 
reality, by utilising their economic and business power as a tool. On the other hand, 
the business wealth holders recognised that the relationship between them and the
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state could also impede their business activities, as in the case of foreign trade, which 
was in most cases a huge source of profit for their businesses, since state policy 
tended to be characterised by expansionism, in particular from the early 20th century. 
In addition, they understood that the particular characteristics of modem Japan 
utilised to explain success in the pre-war period, which were regarded as being based 
on tradition, were in fact invented, and little more than a myth. To explain the attitude 
of Japanese business wealth holders, it is worth quoting the final statement made by 
Iwasaki Koyata as head of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu at the end of 1945, when the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu was inaugurated by the GHQ. The following is part of 
Koyata’s statement of resignation as president of the Mitsubishi Honsha, the holding 
company reorganised and renamed during the period of the Second World War:
—From the perspective of the new regime since the war, there has been particular 
criticism regarding the monopoly of profit among industrialists. Although there is no 
doubt that without profit, industries could not survive, it must be noted that businessmen 
have to be careful about the utilisation and distribution of (firms’) profits. I have always 
emphasised that the task of the industry is the prosperity of the nation and the welfare of 
the public, so that the pursuit of self-interest is a secondary position (to business 
activities). That is the corporate responsibility to society and the nation through industrial
activities. However, some people have doubts about this moral obligation, since they
consider it to be a feudalistic ethic and attitude resulting from militarism. However, this 
opinion is a total misunderstanding 2
It may well be that the view presented in this statement was widely shared among 
business wealth holders, even if the extent of the confidence with which this view was 
expressed, depended on an individual’s own ideas. The statement also gives a 
perspective on what ‘modernisation’ may have meant for the Japanese business elite. 
The business wealth holders considered in this thesis constituted a part of the social 
elite and exercised considerable influence through their business activities. As such, 
their dilemmas, to some extent, reflected the image of modem Japan.
2 Kokuji: Iwasaki Koyata, in Mitsubishi Shashi Kankokai (ed.),Mitsubishi Shashi vol. 40 
(Tokyo, 1985), p.2485.
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to provide some information and notes about the 
sources, utilised for the compilation of the data set of this thesis. Although some 
details about each sources, and any problems have already been explained in each 
chapter, further explanation of the characteristics and methods of the compilation of 
the data set is appropriate, since a great deal of additional information from various 
sources, along with the basic data on estimated wealth, has been collected in order to 
compile the data set. The methods for compilation of the data set used in the empirical 
and statistical analysis are shown below.
a) wealth data
As already explained in chapter 1, the main data on the Japanese wealth holders’ 
estimated wealth was collected from Zenkoku 50man yen ijo Shisanka Hyo, published 
by the Jiji Shinposha in 1915 and later collected in TSNZSJSS, edited by Shibuya 
Ryuichi. The wealth estimation of the surviving wealth holders in 1934 was based on 
50man yen ijo Zenkoku Dai Kinmanka Banzuke, published by Kodansha in 1934, and 
also included in TSNZSJSS. However, as already explained in chapters 1 and chapter 2, 
there are no reliable sources for testifying to what extent the data on estimated wealth 
in both lists are accurate. Unlike in the British case, where it is possible to access the 
probate records of wealth holders at Somerset House, no such kind of data exists in 
the case of Japan.
Other Japanese sources, for example, Kizokuin Tagaku Nozeisha Gosen Shikakusha 
Mikomi Hyo (a secret document about the leading taxpayers who had the right to elect 
representatives to the Upper House of the Diet), issued by the Home Ministry, does 
not contain all information about the personal wealth of these representatives, who 
included wealth holders in the data set. Other available information from official 
sources comes from several tax records, from detailed sources to just brief mentions 
of income tax. However, it is impossible to analyse these data in only long-term time 
scale, since it may be assumed that most such records were destroyed or burnt during 
the period of the Pacific War. Even if some unknown data is kept in any government 
office, namely the Ministry of Finance, it would be hardly accessible to anyone, since 
these government offices have been reluctant to disclose data, even if  it is an historical
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document. Therefore, there is no other means of analysing the accuracy of wealth 
estimation in both data sets.
However, it may be assumed that the wealth holders in both lists do represent the 
Japanese wealthy elite in the early 20th century, in particular their scale of wealth 
holding. For example, although it is not an analysis at the national level, the detailed 
tax records of leading taxpayers in the Kansai area, surveyed by the Osaka tax office 
in 1924, signify that all Kansai wealth holders in the data set belonged to the category 
of those whose annual income exceeded ¥30,000 in 1924 (Dai3 shu Shotoku Dai 
Nozeisha Shiorabe). Moreover, although information on income tax is limited, data on 
the leading payers of income tax published in the 1930s (Zenkoku Tagaku Nozeisha 
Ichiran: published in 1930 and 1933),1 indicates that in the case of the 1915 wealth 
holders’ surviving in 1934, all belonged to the upper category of the leading taxpayers 
of these lists. As a result, even if  there is some doubt about the accuracy of wealth 
estimation in the Zenkoku 5Oman yen and Zenkoku Dai Kinmanka, wealth holders in 
the data of this thesis clearly represented the top of the hierarchy among the Japanese 
wealthy elite throughout the first half of the 20th century. Therefore, this indicates no 
change in the basic data on wealth estimation collected from both wealth holders’ lists, 
though it needs detailed checks from other sources, as explained above.
b) occupational data
Basic data on the occupational category of wealth holders in the data set are, again, 
collected from Zenkoku SOman yen and Zenkoku Dai Kinmanka, in addition to the 
Taisho shoki no Dai Shisanka Meibo, compiled and edited by Shibuya. Among these 
lists, Dai Shisanka Meibo is the most reliable source on occupational category, since 
information was collected from various sources in compiling this list. The data on 
wealth holders’ occupational category is largely based on Dai Shisanka Meibo. 
However, since this list only gives data for a particular date (this list was also based 
on Zenkoku SOman yen, so that the occupational status of wealth holders was based on 
1916 data), it is impossible to trace any changes in occupational status after this 
period. This causes problems in checking the occupational status of surviving 1915 
wealth holders in 1934. In addition, this also caused a further problem for
' Kodansha (ed.), Zenkoku Tagaku Nozeisha Ichiran (Tokyo, 1930,1933) later contained in R. Shibuya 
(ed.), TSNZSJSS vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1985),pp.63-99,pp.l39-170.
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list of shareholders and members of the board of directors. This is particularly useful 
for checking the business activities of the wealth holders in the data sets over the 
longer term, since all of the volumes were recently reissued.
c) personal data (social origins, educational experiences and marriage etc.)
Personal data, including social origins, education and marriage, are totally reliant on 
supplementary sources, since no personal information is available in the basic data set, 
based on Zenkoku 50man yen, Zenkoku Dai Kinmanka and Dai Shisanka Meibo. The 
sources used to compile personal data for the analysis in this thesis are as follows:
1) social origins: in this case, data on wealth holders’ fathers (in the case of yoshi, 
their adoptive fathers) was necessary, since the definition of wealth holders’ origins is 
based on their fathers’ occupation. Biographical dictionaries, for instance, Jinji 
KoshinrokUy Zaikai Jinmei Jiten, or Zaikai Bukko Ketsubutsu Den were utilised to 
collect this information. Other biographical sources, namely Kazoku Taikan 
(Directory of Aristocratic Families), were useful for collecting information on 
aristocratic wealth holders, including ennobled businessmen. However, these 
biographical dictionaries tend to focus on business leaders, well-known individuals, 
and particularly rich persons. Therefore, in some cases, data on lesser figures among 
wealth holders was unavailable. Also, as pointed out in chapter 3, many wealth 
holders’ fathers were categorised as heimin so that has made it impossible to trace 
their exact occupation. The method used to try and resolve this problem, though not 
successful in many cases, was to search other sources, like the old version of Nihon 
Zenkoku Shokonin Meiroku (List of Japanese Merchants and Industrialists), especially 
in cases where the wealth holders’ father’s exact name was available. In addition, 
autobiographies, biographies and company histories were useful for some wealth 
holders who were well-known or successful in the business world, but for whom data 
on their fathers is unavailable in biographical dictionaries.
2) Educational information: this was the most problematic point in compiling the data 
set of this thesis. Although this information was mainly collected from biographical 
dictionaries, exact information on wealth holders’ education was very rare. Moreover, 
Jinji Koshinroku, the biographical dictionaries which usually contain more data on 
wealth holders’ educational experience than other biographical dictionaries, became
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increasingly unreliable for the particular reasons discussed in chapter 1. This meant 
abandoning the analysis of educational experience for the children’s generation, both 
because of the enormous size of the samples, and because of the unreliability of the 
data in biographical dictionaries. Thus, the data on education included in the data set 
were strictly limited to the cases in which exact and reliable information was available. 
In some cases, data were double or triple checked through various sources, including 
biographies, autobiographies and other materials, in order to establish the correctness 
of the data set.
3) Marriages: marriage data were obtained from various sources, namely biographical 
dictionaries, autobiographies and biographies. Information on ennobled business 
wealth holders was easily traced from Kazoku Taikan, since information on marriage 
was contained in the style of a genealogical family tree. However, there were several 
problems in tracing the occupational status of spouses’ fathers, which was necessary 
to analyse the patterns and characteristics of wealth holders’ marriages. Again, we 
could find many cases of spouses whose fathers were just categorised as heimin in 
biographical materials, including biographies. In this case, information on the name of 
the spouse’s father became a key point, because there was some possibility of tracing 
their occupational status from Jinji Koshinroku, or other materials, for instance, 
Shokonin Jinmeiroku. Except in these cases, those spouses* fathers who were just 
mentioned as heimin were omitted from the data on marriage, since the main aim of 
the analysis of wealth holders’ marriage was to consider the characteristics of the 
formation of informal networks through marriage.
4) Others: because of the smaller samples of ennobled wealth holders, the data on 
wealth holders’ ennoblement relied totally on secondary sources. The data on wealth 
holders who were granted non-aristocratic titles or decorations have been based on the 
collection of primary sources, Joi Saikasho and Jokun Saikasho from the KoJcuritsu 
Kobunshokan (National Archives of Japan). However, no statistical analysis has been 
made of the data on titles and decorations. Because of the nature of the data keeping at 
the Kokuritsu Kobunshokan, there is a great risk that some documents containing 
other wealth holders data are almost impossible to find from the titles of the official 
documents which mentioned the grantees of these honours. On the other hand, in 
some cases, these documents have been utilised to double and triple check wealth
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holders’ personal information, since the documents contain detailed curriculum vitae, 
occupational experiences and koseki.
d) the data set
the data set compiled according to the process outlined above is shown as the final 
figure in this Appendix.
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a) Businessmen: Tokyo and Kanto areas
(Tokyo)
N am e (rom anisation) P lace of residence Estim ated wealth D ate of birth Main source of wealth
Akaboshi T etsum a Tokyo 5 million yen 1882 Salaried m anager (Mitsubishi)
Akigusa Shogoro Tokyo 1 million yen 1878 Medical equipm ent trading
Amamiya W ataru Tokyo 1 million yen 1869 Salaried m anager
A m ano Genhichi Tokyo 2 million yen 1896 Commodity trading
Ando Tokunosuke Tokyo 1 million yen 1878 Construction
Ando Hiroshi Tokyo 1 million yen 1851 Salaried m anager
Aota Tsunazo Tokyo 5 million yen 1843 S alaried m anager
Asabuki Eiji Tokyo 1 million yen 1849 Salaried m anager (Mitsui)
A sada Jin 'em on Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1889 Buckw heat milling and banking
A sano Soichiro Tokyo 5 million yen 1848 Family business (zaibatsu-style)
Chiba M atsubei Tokyo 1 million yen 1864 S alaried m anager
D an Takum a Tokyo 3 million yen 1858 Salaried m anager (Mitsui)
Emori Zenroku Tokyo 2 million yen 1861 Pawnbroking
Fujise Masajiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1867 Salaried m anager (Mitsui)
Fujita Fumiko Tokyo 10 million yen 1874 Civil engineering
Fujiwara Ginjiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1869 Salaried m anager (Mitsui)
Fujiyama Raita Tokyo 2  million yen 1863 Salaried m anager
Fukada Yonejiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1856 Banking
Fukushim a Yahei Tokyo 1 million yen 1860 Pawnbroking
Fukushim a Namizo Tokyo 2.5 million yen 1860 Stock broking
Fukuzaw a M omosuke Tokyo 2 million yen 1868 Salaried m anager
Furukaw a Toranosuke Tokyo 30 million yen 1887 Family business (zaibatsu)
G o Seinosuke Tokyo 2 million yen 1865 Salaried m anager
G oto Choza 'em on Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1866 Medicine trading
H am aguchi Kichremon Tokyo 5  million yen 1883 S oy-sauce brewing
H ara Rokuro Tokyo 5 million yen 1844 Salaried m anager
H arada Jiro Tokyo 3 million yen 1848 Salaried m anager (Konoike)
Hashim oto Shinjiro Tokyo 2.2 million yen 1879 Salaried m anager
H ayakaw a Sahichi Tokyo 1 million yen 1861 Pickles trading
H atton Kintaro Tokyo 6 million yen 1860 W atch manufacturing
Hibiya H eiza'em on Tokyo 7 million yen 1848 Cotton thread trading
Hirobe Seibei Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1866 Banking
Horikoshi Sumijiro Tokyo 8 million yen 1885 Kimono retailing
Imamura Shigezo Tokyo 3 million yen 1877 Banking
Isono Chozo Tokyo 1 million yen 1874 Liquor and wine trading
Ito Shige'em on Tokyo 1 million yen 1849 Pawnbroking
Iwaide Sobei Tokyo 1 million yen 1872 Seafood trading
Iwasaki H isaya Tokyo over 200 million yen (com ­ 1865 Family business (zaibatsu)
Iwasaki Koyata Tokyo bined with K oyata's a s s e t s ) 1879 Family business  (zaibatsu)
K agam i Kenkichi Tokyo 2 million yen 1868 Salaried m anager (Mitsubishi)
Kajima Chiyo Tokyo 3 million yen 1865 Rice-wine trading
Kajima Seihei Tokyo 3 million yen 1879 Rice-wine trading
Kajima Seiichi Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1875 Construction
K am eda Sokichi Tokyo 2.5 million yen 1885 Rice trading
Kamiki Chisaburo Tokyo 1 million yen 1870 Pawnbroking
Kamiya D enbei Tokyo 2 million yen 1855 Rice-wine brewing
K anda Raizo Tokyo 5 million yen 1872 Stockbroking
K ase Chujiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1875 Fertiliser trading
Kato M asayoshi Tokyo 1 million yen 1854 Salaried m anager
Kawai Sahei Tokyo 1 million yen 1871 Iron goods trading
Kawasaki Eisuke Tokyo 1 million yen 1851 Cotton trading
Kawasaki H achrem on Tokyo 8 million yen 1866 Banking
Kikuike Shoshiro Tokyo 2 million yen 1852 Kimono retailing
K obayashi Denjiro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1860 W atch retailing
K obayashi Yataro Tokyo 6  million yen 1888 Food trading
Koike Kunizo Tokyo 3.5 million yen 1866 Stockbroking
Kokubu Kanbei Tokyo 1 million yen 1851 Food trading
Kondo Renpei Tokyo 2 million yen 1848 Salaried m anager
Kondo Rihei Tokyo 3 million yen 1859 Liquor and wine trading
Konishi Yasubei Tokyo 3 million yen 1847 Chemical goods trading
Kume Tam inosuke Tokyo 1 million yen 1861 Salaried m anager (Okura)
K uwahara Hichibei Tokyo 1 million yen 1848 H ardw are trading
M achida Tokunosuke Tokyo 2 million yen 1867 Silk and  Cotton thread  trading
M aekaw a Tahei Tokyo 1 million yen 1861 Kimono retailing
M aekaw a Tarobei Tokyo 10 million yen 1851 Textile trading
M agoshi Kyohei Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1844 Salaried m anager and  beer brewing
M asuda Takashi Tokyo 5 million yen 1844 Salaried m anager (Mitsui)
M asumoto Kihei Tokyo 2 million yen 1849 Rice-wine trading
M atsuda Seiichi Tokyo 1 million yen 1875 Salaried m anager
M atsukawa Cho'em on Tokyo 1 million yen 1841 Paw n broking
M atsum ura Seiichi Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1883 Medicine trading
M atsuzaw a Toku'em on Tokyo 2 million yen 1867 Medicine and  cosm etic trading
Minejima Mohei Tokyo 12 million yen 1850 Pawnbroking
Mitsui Hachiro'em on Takam ine Tokyo over 200 million yen 1857 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui Hachirojiro Tokyo (200 million yen 1849 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui T akaosa Tokyo in com m on owned 1892 Family b usiness (zaibatsu)
Mitsui Takayasu Tokyo by 11 Mitsui families) 1850 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui Toku'em on Tokyo 1871 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui Y onosuke Tokyo 1856 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui G en'em on Tokyo 1868 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui Morinosuke Tokyo 1875 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui M otonosuke Tokyo 1869 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsui Takatatsu Tokyo 1893 Family business (zaibatsu)
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Mitsui T akenosuke Tokyo 1855 Family business (zaibatsu)
Mitsuya Chozaburo Tokyo 1 million y en 1869 Metal trading
M omiyama C hosuke Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1873 Seafood trading
Morimura lchiza'enx>n Tokyo over 5 million yen 1839 Banking
Morioka HePemon Tokyo 2 million yen 1871 Iron-wire trading
Murai Kichibei Tokyo 10 million yen 1864 Banking
M urakami Kiyoji Tokyo 1 million yen 1878 Iron goods trading
Murakochl S boza 'em on Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1859 Kimono retailing
N agai Ri'emon Tokyo 1 million yen 1851 T ea trading
N agatomi Yukichi Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1868 Salaried M anager
Nakai Shin'em on Tokyo 5 million yen 1864 Rice-wine trading
Nakajima Ihei Tokyo 2.5 million yen 1865 Kimono retailing
N akam ura Shigehachi Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1867 Dried-food trading
N akayam a Saicbi Tokyo 2 million yen 1864 Salaried m anager
N akayam a Seizo Tokyo 1.3 million yen 1860 Rice trading
N akazaw a Hikokichi Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1877 S ak e  and soy-sauce trading
Nezu Kaichiro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1860 Salaried m anager
Nishimura N ao Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1888 Industrialist
N ozaw a Genjiro Tokyo 3 million yen 1864 Foreign trading
O biake Keizo Tokyo 5 million yen 1867 Shipbuilding
O buse Shizaburo Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1845 Stock broking
O da Shojiro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1855 Stockbroking
O gaw a H ana Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1898 Pawnbroking
O gura Kyubei Tokyo 1 million yen 1868 Fishery goods trading
Oguri Chobei Tokyo 1 million yen 1878 Dried-food trading
O hashi Shintaro Tokyo 3 million yen 1863 Publishing
O kada Shokichi Tokyo 1 million yen 1899 Cotton trading
O kaw a H eisaburo Tokyo 3 million yen 1861 Salaried m anager
O kura Kihachiro Tokyo 50 million yen 1837 Family business  (zaibatsu)
O m ura Hikotaro Tokyo 2  million yen 1869 Kimono retailing
O saw a Hikojiro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1868 Stock broking and  rice trading
O ta Tokukuro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1872 Timber trading
Sakai S otaro Tokyo 1 million yen 1879 Paw n broking
S atsum a Jihei Tokyo 5 million yen 1882 Cotton trading
S enoo  C hosuke Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1873 Banking
Serizaw a Shinpei Tokyo 1 million yen 1877 S oy-sauce brewing
Shibata Jiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1891 Dyestuff trading
S hibata  S einosuke Tokyo 1 million yen 1865 Dyestuff trading
Shibusaw a Eiichi Tokyo 3 million yen 1840 Family business (zaibatsu-style)
Shiraishi Motojiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1867 S alaried m anager
Suenobu  Michinari Tokyo 5 million yen 1855 Salaried m anager (Mitsubishi)
Sugim ura Jinbei Tokyo 6 million yen 1853 Textile trading
Sugiura Roku'em on Tokyo 1 million yen 1879 Photographic equipm ent
Sum ida Y aozo Tokyo 2 million yen 1861 Stockbroking
T akada Shinzo Tokyo 20 million yen 1852 Foreign trading
Takagi Yohei Tokyo 1 million yen 1860 Medicine trading
Takahashi Fukujiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1852 Egg trading
Takahashi Kadobei Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1868 Rice-wine trading
Takashim a Shinkichi Tokyo 1 million yen unknown Grain trading
Takatsu  Ihei Tokyo 2 million yen 1905 Dried-bonito Trading
Tam ura Hanjuro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1873 Rice-wine brewing
T anaka Chobei Tokyo 7 million yen 1858 Mining
T anaka Eihachiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1863 Salaried m anager
T anaka G innosuke Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1873 Mining
T anaka H eihachi Tokyo 2 million yen 1866 Banking
T anaka Takebei Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1852 T ea trading and  money changing
Tanimichi Kotaro Tokyo 1 million yen 1878 Shipping
T asak a  H atsunosuke Tokyo 1 million yen 1851 Salaried m anager
Tateishi Ima Tokyo 2 million yen 1897 Cotton trading
Tenm ei S o 'em on Tokyo 1 million yen 1853 Rice trading
Tonoike Uhei Tokyo 4 million yen 1880 Commodity trading
T suda Hichigoro Tokyo 1 million yen 1858 Stock broking
Utsunomiya Kinnojo Tokyo 1 million yen 1862 Transport business
W ada Toyoharu Tokyo 1 million yen 1861 Salaried m anager
W akabayashi Hichigoro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1848 Timber trading
W akao Shohachi Tokyo 1 million yen 1873 Salaried m anager and banking
W atanabe Chi'em on Tokyo 13 million yen 1871 Service
W atanabe Daijiro Tokyo 2.5 million yen 1847 Seafood trading
W atanabe Senjiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1860 Salaried m anager (Mitsui)
Yam am oto G enzaburo Tokyo 2 million yen 1860 Textile trading
Y am am oto Jo taro Tokyo 5 million yen 1867 Salaried m anager (Mitsui)
Yam am oto Yuisaburo Tokyo 3 million yen 1860 Foreign trading and shipping
Y am anaka R innosuke Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1840 Salaried M anager
Y am ashita Kamejiro Tokyo 9 million yen 1842 Shipping
Y asuda Zenjiro Tokyo 70 million yen (com bined 1838 Family business (zaibatsu)
Y asuda Zenzaburo Tokyo with Z enzaburo 's a sse ts ) 1870 Family business (zaibatsu)
Yasui Chihei Tokyo 3 million yen 1864 Pawnbroking
Yonei Genjiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1861 Salaried m anager
Yoshida K asuke Tokyo 1 million yen 1880 P aper trading
Y oshida Tanjiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1850 Salaried m anager
Yoshida T anza 'em on Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1871 Pawnbroking
Yoshida Yaichiro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1856 Kimono retailing
Y oshimura T e tsunosuke Tokyo 1 million yen 1858 Electrical equipm ent
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(K anto area )
N am e (rom anisation) R a c e  of residence Estim ated wealth D ate of birth Main source  of w ealth
A be Kobei K anagaw a (Yokohama) 5 million yen 1847 S uger and  oil trading
Agero Kohachi K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1.5 million yen 1663 Salaried m anager
Agero Seisuke K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1.5 million yen 1836 Pawnbroking
A sad a  Gonshiro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 2.5 million yen 1864 Shipping
A sako W aguri Saitam a 2 million yen 1899 Kimono retailing
E hara  Kohei G unm a 1.2 million yen 1848 Pawnbroking
H anda Zenshiro G unm a 1 million yen 1876 Kimono retailing
H ara Tomitaro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 9 million yen 1868 Silk trading
H arada Kyukichi K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1.5 million yen 1836 Service (various business)
H ashim oto Kisuke Saitam a 1.2 million yen 1889 C om m erce and  industry
H iranum a K yusaburo K anagaw a (Yokohama) 4.5  million yen 1892 Banking
H iranum a Yoshitaro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 2.5 million yen 1897 SHk trading
H onm a Chiyokichi G unm a 1.15 million yen 1856 Pawnbroking
Kato Hachiro'em on K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1.5 million yen 1880 S oy-sauce brewing
Kimura Ri'emon K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1 million yen 1834 Silk trading
M asuda M asuzo K anagaw a (Yokohama) 3.5 million yen 1863 Foreign trading
M inoda C hosaburo K anagaw a (Yokohama) 2.5 million yen 1875 Foreign trading
Mogi Hichiro'emon Chiba 3 million yen 1860 S oy-sauce brewing (Kikkoman)
Mogi Saheji Chiba 1.5 million yen 1891 S oy-sauce brewing
Mogi Sobei K anagaw a (Yokohama) 9 million yen 1893 Siik trading
Mori S osaku G unm a 1 million yen 1863 Salaried m anager
N akam ura Husajiro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1.5 million yen 1870 Foreign trading
N ishikawa Takejuro Saitam a 1 million yen 1860 Fertiliser trading
O no M itsukage K anagaw a (Yokohama) 3 million yen 1845 Silk trading
O tani Kahei K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1.5 million yen 1844 T ea trading
S a s o d a  Kiichiro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 2  million yen 1881 Banking
S a to  M asagoro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1 million yen 1857 Iron and  ship rigging trading
Shibusaw a Giichi K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1 million yen 1879 Silk trading
Suzuki S aburosuke K anagaw a 1 million yen 1867 M onosodium glutam ate manufacturing
T akahash i K atsutaro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1 million yen 1910 Com m erce
T akanash i H eiza'em on Chiba 1 million yen 1878 S oy-sauce brewing
Takizaw a Tami Tochigi 1 million yen 1885 Com m erce
T anaka  Shinhichi K anagaw a (Yokohama) 1.5 million yen 1844 Silk trading
U etake S an 'em on Tochigi 1.1 million yen 1854 S oy-sauce brewing
U m ehara Itsutaro K anagaw a 1.5 million yen 1880 S oy-sauce brewing
W akao Ikuzo K anagaw a (Yokohama) 2.5 million yen 1857 SHk trading
W atanabe Fukusaburo K anagaw a (Yokohama) 7.5 million yen 1855 Banking and  seafood trading
W atanabe Kazutaro K anagaw a (Yokohama) 2.5 million yen 1876 Salaried m anager
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M atsush iro  Y asu ta ro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million y en 1884 P aw nbrok ing
M atsu sh ita  Z en sh iro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.4 million y en 1856 Liquor a n d  w ine trad ing
M atsuu ra  F u sa z o O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1883 D yestuff trad ing
M atsu y am a Y ohei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1856 S a fe  trad ing
M izuta C hojiro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million y en 1875 L acq u er trad ing
Mori H eizo O sa k a  (O sa k a ) 2  million y en 1875 T im ber trad ing
Mori K yubei O sa k a  (O saka) 1.5 million y en 1853 T a tam i (s trew  m at) trad ing
M orishita H iroshi O sa k a  (O saka) 1 million y en 1869 P h a rm a ceu tica l
M urata C hobei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million y en 1853 K im ono retaling
M urayam a R yuhei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.3 million y en 1850 N e w sp a p e r  publish ing
N a g a ta  S an ju ro O sa k a  (O sak a) 2 .4  million y en 1885 Shipbuilding
N ak ab ash i T okugoro O sa k a  (O sak a) 2  million yen 1864 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
N akai R ihei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.5 million y en 1887 H ardw are  trad ing
N ak an o  H isa 'em o n O sa k a  (O sa k a ) 1.3 million yen 1862 C o m m erce
N ish im atsu  Kyo O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1 million y en 1865 R aw  co tton  trad ing
Nitta Chojiro O sa k a  (O sa k a) 3  million y en 1857 L e a th e r m anufactu ring
N oguchi S h ita g au O sa k a  (O sak a) 2 .7  million yen 1873 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
N om ura  H an zab u ro O sa k a  (O sa k a) 2  million y en 1875 C otton  th re ad  trad ing
N om ura  J itsu sa b u ro O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1 million yen 1880 S tockbroking
N om ura  Rihei O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1.5 million y en 1889 K im ono retaling
N om ura Tokuhichi O sa k a  (O sak a) 3 .5  million yen 1878 S tock  broking
O g aw a H eisuke O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.5 million y en 1857 S tockbroking
O hira T a k e su k e O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million y en 1872 P aw nbrok ing
O k ab ash i H aru su k e O sa k a  (O sak a) 4  million yen 1858 K im ono retaling
Omi G en b e i O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1870 P aw nbrok ing
O sh im a J in zo O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1862 S tockbroking
O ta  Uhei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.1 million yen 1861 J a p a n e s e  foo tw ear trad ing
O ts u so  G enjiro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.5 million yen 1886 Foreign  trad ing
O ya N an ah e i O sa k a  (O sak a) 7 .5  million yen 1865 S hipp ing  a n d  w holesa ling
S a d o sh im a  Ihei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.3 million yen 1854 H ardw are  trad ing
S a ib a ra  Itaro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1853 F ood  w holesa ling
S ak a g a m i Shinjiro O sa k a  (O sa k a) 2  million yen 1846 S ea fo o d  trad ing
S h ib ak a w a  E isu k e O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1.5 million yen 1865 Foreign  trad ing
S h ib a tan i Inosuke O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1 million yen 1861 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
S h ib a tan i T akejiro O sa k a 1 million yen 1853 R ice-w ine brew ing
S h im a  S ad a jiro O sa k a  (O sak a) 2 .5  million yen 1877 Foreign  trad ing
S h im a T okuzo O sa k a  (O sak a) 10 million y en 1875 S tock  broking
S h im a d a  Ichibei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.2 million yen 1867 D ried-food trad ing
S him izu  Eijiro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.2 million y en 1870 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
S hiom i M asaji O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million y en 1878 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
S hiom i Kyukichi O sa k a  (O sak a) 2  million yen 1858 S tockbroking
S h io n o  K ichibei O sa k a  (O saka) 1.5 million yen 1889 P h arm a ceu tica l
S o u m a  I’em o n O sa k a  (O saka) 1 .5  million yen 1865 P aw nbrok ing
S ug im o to  S h o ta ro O sa k a  (O saka) 3 .8  million yen 1874 W a re h o u se  b u s in e s s
S um itom o  K ich iza 'em on O sa k a  (O saka) 70  million yen 1864 Fam ily b u s in e s s  (za ib a tsu )
T a b u n a  M asajiro O sa k a  (O saka) 2  million yen 1863 Cotton  th re ad  trad ing
T a k a d a  H isa 'em on O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.1 million yen 1875 B en ib an a  (safflow er) trad ing
T akag i M atajiro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.5 million yen 1898 S tockbroking
T ak ak u ra  T ohei O sa k a  (O sak a) 2 .5  million yen 1874 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
T a k a m a tsu  C h o za 'em o n O sa k a  (O sak a) 3  million yen 1855 C o sm etic  m anufactu ring
T a k e d a  C hobei O sa k a  (O sak a) 2 .5  million yen 1870 P h arm aceu tica l
T a k e h a ra  Y u sab u ro O sa k a  (O sak a) 6  million yen 1849 S tock  broking
T a k eo  C hi'em on O sa k a  (O sak a) 3 million yen 1854 K im ono retaling
T akeuch i Saik ichi O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.5 million yen 1855 Foreign  trad ing
T am u ra  K om ajiro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 .6 million yen 1866 Textile trad ing
T a n a b e  G ohei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 .2 million yen 1849 P h arm aceu tica l
T a n a k a  Ichizo O sa k a  (O sak a) 3 .8  million yen 1892 B anking
T a n a k a  K ichitaro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1876 E s ta te  a g e n t
T a n a k a  S h o z o O sa k a  (O sak a) 2  million yen 1858 S a la r ie d  m a n a g e r
T a n a k a  T obei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.4 million yen 1855 Paw nbrok ing
T a n a k a  T o sab u ro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 .2 million yen 1872 M edicine trad ing
T aniguchi F u sa z o O sa k a  (O sak a) 2 .5  million yen 1861 S a la ried  m a n a g e r  (cotton sp inning)
T ash iro  Y utaka O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1864 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
T e ra d a  J inm oyo O sa k a 8  million yen 1853 C otton  sp inn ing
T e ra d a  Motokichi O sa k a 1.5 million yen 1855 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
T e ram u ra  S h o zab u ro O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1.4 million yen 1866 Textile trad ing
T o d a  Y ahichi O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.2 million yen 1867 T atam i (straw  m at) trad ing
T onom ura  H ei'em on O sa k a  (O sak a) 2  million yen 1873 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
T o n o y am a S u te z o O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.5 million yen 1883 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
T oyoda U sa 'e m o n O sa k a  (O sak a) 6  million yen 1852 M oney lending  a n d  C o m m erce
T su d a  K atsugo ro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.5 million yen 1855 Iron trad ing
T subo i H eibei O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1866 Tim ber trad ing
T sukush i S an jiro O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.2 million yen 1852 W ax trad ing
Uji S h o b e i O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 .4  million yen 1858 Paw nbrok ing
Ukita K eizo O sa k a  (O sak a) 1.6 million yen 1846 M edicine trad ing
Ukon G o n za 'em o n O sa k a  (O sak a) 5  million yen 1889 S h ipp ing  a n d  S a la ried  m a n a g e r
U m em ura  K am ehichi O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1870 B ook retailing
Y agi S e n n o s u k e O sa k a  (O sak a) 1 million yen 1865 R ice-w ine brew ing
Yagi Y o sab u ro O sa k a  (O sak a) 2  million yen 1865 C otton  th re ad  trad ing
Y am a d a  ichirobei O sa k a  (O sak a) 5  million yen 1851 D yestuff trad ing
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Y am a g a ta  T a k e su k e O sa k a  (O sa k a) 3  million y en 1859 P aw n  broking
Y am aguch i G en d o O sa k a  (O sa k a) 10 million y en 1863 T extile trad ing
Y am aguch i K ichirobei O sa k a  (O sa k a) 10 million y en 1883 B anking
Y am am o to  T o su k e O sa k a  (O sa k a) 3  million yen 1874 Iron trad ing
Y am a n ak a  N aohichi O sa k a  (O sa k a) 3 .8  million y en 1872 H ardw are  trad ing
Y am anouch i U n o su k e O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1 .5  million y en 1861 S to c k  broking
Y anag i K ozo O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1 million y en 1885 Stockbrok ing
Y ash iro  Yu ta ro O sa k a  (O sa k a) 2  million yen 1867 C otton  th re a d  trad ing
Y osh ida  C hohichi O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1 million y en 1853 Textile trad ing
Y osh iw ara  S ad a jiro O sa k a  (O sa k a) 1 million yen 1875 Oil trad ing
Yukii C hubei O sa k a  (O sa k a ) 1 .2 million yen 1853 M oney lending
(K ansai)
N am e  (rom an isa tion ) P la c e  o f living(prefecture) E stim ated  w ealth D a te  o f birth M ain so u rc e  o f w ealth
A be Ichirobei S h ig a 1.5 million y en 1891 Linen trad ing
A be ich itaro S h ig a 2  million y en 1882 Textile trad ing
A sam i M atazo S h ig a 2  million y en 1876 S h ipp ing
E n d o  K yu 'em on Kyoto 1 million yen 1857 K im ono retailing
E nom oto  K enhichiro H yogo 3  million yen 1866 In su ran ce  a n d  sh ipp ing
Fukui C hihei H yogo 1.5 million yen 1865 M iso m anufactu ring
H ach ium a Eizo H yogo 4  million y en 1875 Shipp ing
H ach ium a K en su k e H yogo 7 million yen 1839 S hipp ing
H a se g a w a  K an eg o ro H yogo 2  million y en 1867 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
H atsu i N arakichi H yogo 1 million yen 1872 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
Hirai G onhichi K yoto 1 million yen 1852 P u m p  m anufactu ring
Iba T eigo S h ig a 1 million y en 1847 S a la ried  m a n a g e r  (S um itom o)
lida Shinhichi Kyoto 1.2 million y en 1859 D ep artm en t s to re  b u s in e s s
In ab a  Y akichi Kyoto 1.5 million yen unknow n Civil en g in eerin g
Inam oto  R i'em on S h ig a 2  million yen 1899 K im ono retailing
Inui S h inbei H yogo 8 million yen 1862 R ice-w ine brew ing a n d  financing
Ish ibash i H ikosaburo S h ig a 1.3 million yen 1855 B rew ing
ishii S h irobei S h ig a 1.3 million y en unknow n R ice  trad ing
Ito Chojiro H yogo 10 million yen 1873 B anking
K akush in  H eijuro H yogo 2 .5  million yen 1879 R ice-w ine brew ing
K am ikaw a G en 'em o n Kyoto 1 million yen 1900 K im ono retaling
K ano  Jihei H yogo 1 million yen 1862 R ice-w ine brew ing
K ano  J iro 'em on H yogo 2 .5  million yen 1853 R ice-w ine brew ing
K ash iw ara  M ag o za 'em o n Kyoto 1.5 million yen 1897 L acq u erw are  m anufactu ring
K ataoka N a o a tsu Kyoto 1.5 million yen 1859 S a la ried  m a n a g e r  an d  politician
K atsu ta  Ginjiro H yogo 7  million yen 1873 Shipp ing
K aw achi K en ta ro H yogo 2  million yen 1861 S hipp ing
K aw anish i S e ib e i H yogo 6  million yen 1865 T extile  industry  a n d  tran spo rta tion
K aw asak i Y osh itaro H yogo 15 million yen 1869 B anking a n d  sh ipbuilding
K ishim oto S h in ta ro H yogo 1.9  million yen 1884 B anking
K o bayash i G in 'em on S h iga 2  million yen 1873 K im ono retailing
K odera  S e iz o H yogo 1.2 million yen 1852 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
K odera  Sokichi H yogo 1.5 million yen 1881 F ertiliser trad ing
K oizum i S h inbei S h ig a 1 million yen 1878 K im ono retailing
K onishi S h in 'em o n H yogo 1 million yen 1875 R ice-w ine brew ing
K osei S u k e ta ro H yogo 1 million yen 1871 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
K ure M endo H yogo 3  million yen 1855 Foreign  trad ing
M aek aw a Z e n zab u ro S h ig a 2  million yen 1848 C otton  th re ad  trad ing
M atsui H isa 'em on S h iga 1 million yen 1864 K im ono retailing
M atsu k a ta  Kojiro H yogo 1 million yen 1865 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
Mikami Toyoi H yogo 1.5 million yen 1863 Shipp ing
M om otani Seijiro W a k ay am a 1 million yen 1863 M edicine trad ing
Mori G orobei S h iga 2 .5  million yen 1877 K im ono retailing
M orim oto T a n e H yogo 3  million yen 1839 R ice-w ine brew ing
M uto S an ji H yogo 1 million yen 1867 S a la ried  m a n a g e r  (cotton sp inning)
N a g a s e  D en zab u ro Kyoto 1.3 million yen 1867 D yestuff trad ing
Naiki S e ib e i Kyoto 1.2 million yen 1878 K imono retaling
N ak a e  T a n e z o Kyoto 3  million yen 1846 M ining
N a ru se  M asayuki H yogo 5  million yen 1875 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
N a te  Y uhei W ak ay am a 1.2 million yen 1871 F ertiliser trad ing
N ish ida S h o su k e S higa 1 million yen 1859 K im ono retailing
N ishikaw a J ingoro S h iga 2  million yen 1870 T atam i a n d  fu ton  trad ing
N ishikaw a S ho roku S h iga 1.5 million yen 1872 C otton  th re ad  a n d  s u g e r  trad ing
N ishim ura S h igerobe i S h iga 5  million yen 1885 K im ono retailing
N ishim ura Y ohei S h iga 2 .3  million yen 1884 K im ono retailing
N oda S a n z o H yogo 5 .5  million yen 1848 R ice-w ine brew ing
O e  S a d a o H yogo 5  million yen unknow n R ice-w ine brew ing
O kazak i Tokichi H yogo 8 million yen 1856 Shipp ing
O kudo  K enzo H yogo 2  million yen 1857 R ice-w ine brew ing a n d  bank ing
O nishi J in 'ippei H yogo 1 million yen 1875 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
O z o n e  Kiichiro H yogo 4  million yen 1856 S a la ried  m a n a g e r  a n d  e s ta te  a g e n t
S a ito  Ikuta H yogo 2 .5  million yen 1859 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
S h im o g o  D enbei S h iga 1 million yen 1872 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
S h im om ura  C hubei K yoto 1.2 million yen 1892 K im ono retaling
S h in a g a w a  G en b e i H yogo 1 million yen 1837 P aw n  broking
S o n e  M asukichi Hyogo 1 million yen 1873 Foreign  trad ing
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S u g a n o  Y asujiro Hyogo 1.5  million yen 1855 R ice-w ine brew ing
S u g im o to  S h in 'em o n Kyoto 1 million yen 1873 T e a  trading
S uzuk i C h u 'em o n S h iga 2  million yen 1877 R ice-w ine brew ing
S uzuk i Y one H yogo 15 million yen unknow n Foreign  trading
T akai S a 'e m o n S h iga 1 million yen 1880 R ice-w ine brew ing
Taki K um ejiro H yogo 2  million yen 1859 F ertiliser industry
T ak igaw a B enzo Hyogo 1 million yen 1851 M atch  m anufacturing
T am u ra  Ichiro Hyogo 5  million yen 1866 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
T a m u ra  Shinkichi Hyogo 3  million y en 1863 F oreign  trad ing
T a n a k a  G en ta ro Kyoto 1.2 million yen 1853 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
T a tsu m a  K ich iza 'em on H yogo 13 million yen 1868 S hipp ing  a n d  rice-w ine brew ing
T o n o m u ra  Ichirobei S h iga 1 million yen 1858 K im ono retailing
T onom ura  U hei S h iga 1.3 million yen 1875 Textile trad ing
T o n o m u ra  Y oza 'em o n S higa 5  million yen 1878 K im ono retailing
T su k am o to  G en z a b u ro S higa 1 million yen 1866 K im ono retailing
T su k am o to  Ichi'em on S higa 1 million yen 1858 K im ono retailing
T su k am o to  Jo 'e m o n S higa 3 million yen 1865 Kim ono retailing
T su k am o to  S a d a 'e m o n S higa 10 million yen 1861 Kim ono retailing
T su k am o to  Y osaji Kyoto 1.2 million yen 1884 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
Tsuji C hurobei Kyoto 2  million yen 1861 K im ono retaling
U chida S h inya Hyogo 6 million yen 1880 S hipping
U enishi K am e n o su k e Hyogo 2  million yen 1866 S hipping
Y am a d a  M osuke Kyoto 1 million yen 1881 Silk trad ing
Y am a n ak a  H eigo Kyoto 1.2  million yen 1875 Oil trad ing  a n d  m oney  lending
Y ash iro  J inbei Kyoto 1 million yen 1893 K im ono textile industry
Y asu fuku  M atajiro H yogo 1.5  million yen 1871 Rice-w ine brew ing
Y o n ezaw a  Kichijiro H yogo 1 million y en 1858 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
Y u a sa  H ich iza 'em on Kyoto 1.2 million yen 1877 S te e l an d  m easu rin g  equ ipm en t
Y u a sa  T a k en o su k e H yogo 2  million yen 1870 F oreign trading
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a) Businessmen: Other areas
N am e  (rom an isa tion ) P la c e  of re s id e n c e E stim ated  w ealth D a te  of birth M ain s o u rc e  of w ealth
A so  D aikichi F ukuoka 5 million yen 1857 C oal mining
Fujii Y oichi'em on H iroshim a 1 million yen 1886 R ice-w ine brew ing  a n d  m o n ey  lending
F ujiyam a Y okichi H okkaido 1.5  million yen 1851 F ishery , sh ipp ing  a n d  mining
G o to d a  S e n lc h i T okush im a 1 million yen 1879 S a la r ie d  m a n a g e r
H a s e g a w a  J irobei Mie 4  million yen 1868 C o tton  a n d  k im ono retailing
H ash im o to  Kizo N agasak i 2 .5  million yen 1872 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
H ash im o to  Kichibei H iroshim a 1.5 million yen 1862 S a lt industry
H ash im o to  T a tsu jiro N ag asak i 2 .5  million yen 1868 S te e l trad ing
H attori H eibei O kay am a 1 million yen 1861 T im ber trad ing
H iro se  M itsu m asa E him e 1 million yen 1859 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
Hori Tojuro S h im a n e 2 .5  million yen 1853 Mining
Ig arash i K yusuke H okkaido 1 million yen 1849 M oney lending
Ik ed a  T e tsu ta ro E him e 1.5 million yen 1899 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
Inugam i K eigoro H okkaido 1 million yen 1865 S hipping
Itami Y ata ro S a g a 1 million yen 1866 S ala ried  m a n a g e r
Itaya Tom ikichi H okkaido 6  million yen 1857 S hipping
Ito D en 'em o n F ukuoka 3  million yen 1860 C oal mining
Ito D enhichi Mie 1.5  million yen 1852 B rew ing
Ito J iro za 'em o n Aichi 5  million yen 1848 D ep a rtm en t s to re  b u s in e s s
Ito K oza 'em on Mie 1 million yen 1869 S o y -sa u c e  brew ing
Ito S a n a e Aichi 1 million yen 1899 R ice-w ine a n d  s o y -sa u c e  brew ing
Iw am oto  S h inbei K agosh im a 1.6 million yen 1864 K im ono retailing
Izeri T en ta K um am oto 1.2 million yen 1851 R ice-w ine brew ing
K aijima T a isu k e F ukuoka 8  million yen 1844 C oal mining
K aizuka E in o su k e Mie 1 million yen 1882 C o m m erce
K am a ta  K atsu ta ro K agaw a 1.2 million yen 1862 S o y -sa u c e  brew ing
K aneko  G en z a b u ro H okkaido 1 million yen 1869 F ish ery  a n d  sa la ried  m a n a g e r
K asu g a i Jo 'e m o n Aichi 2  million yen 1844 K im ono retailing
K ataku ra  K an e ta ro N ag an o 3 .8  million yen 1849 Silk reeling
K aw akita K udayu Mie 1 million yen 1878 C otton  trading
K im ura M aruyoshi H okkaido 1.5 million yen 1871 Fishery
Kishi S ab u ro b e i Y am ag ata 1 million yen 1865 R ice-w ine brew ing
K ogum a Koichiro H okkaido 1.9 million yen 1866 F ishery  a n d  sh ipping
K oga Shun 'ich i N ag asak i 1.5 million yen 1882 Mining
K oga Z enbe i S a g a 2  million yen 1881 Banking
K ondo  T o m o 'em on Aichi 1 million yen 1874 C otton  th re a d  trading
K ubo H ikosuke H okkaido 1 million yen 1864 C om m odity  trading
K unitake Kijiro F ukuoka 1.5 million yen 1847 K im ono retailing
K uw ata  H ikosaburo H iroshim a 1.3 million yen 1868 M oney lending
M asu tan i O tozo Y am aguch i 1.2 million yen 1872 Iron trad ing
M asutom i H isajiro Y am aguch i 1 million yen 1841 W a re h o u se  b u s in e s s
M atsu d a  Eizo N ag asak i 1 million yen 1864 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
M atsu d a  S u k eh ac h i H okkaido 1 million yen 1873 S h ipp ing  a n d  m aritim e eng in eerin g
M atsum oto  K enjiro F ukuoka 1.5 million yen 1870 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
M atsu za w a  Seijiro Aichi 1.5 million yen 1879 M iso m anufacturing
Miki Yokichiro T okush im a 1.5 million yen 1875 Indigo trading
M im a Giichiro T okush im a 1 million yen 1867 S u g e r  refining
M iura G onsh iro Y am a g a ta 1 million yen 1854 C o m m erce
Mori R okuro T okush im a 1.2  million yen 1872 S o y -sa u c e  retailing
M ura H ikobei Ishikaw a 1 million yen 1869 R ice-w ine brew ing
N ag an o  Z e ngo ro O ita 1 million yen 1857 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
N ak am u ra  S an n o jo Fukui 1 million yen 1852 Shipping
N ak am u ra  S eih ichiro F ukuoka 1.7 million yen 1872 Shipping
N ak am u ra  Y o 'em on Aichi 1 million yen 1856 S o y -sa u c e  trad ing
N ak an o  H anroku Aichi 1 million yen 1889 V inegar b rew ing
N ak an o  M ataza 'em o n Aichi 1 million yen 1864 V inegar b rew ing
N ak an o  Tokujiro F ukuoka 1.5 million yen 1857 C oal mining
N ak a ta  S e ib e i T oyam a 1 million yen 1851 M edicine trading
N arazak i H eitaro H okkaido 1.2 million yen 1871 S hipping
N aw a S ab u ro 'em o n Akita 1.5 million yen 1889 R ice-w ine brew ing  a n d  paw nbroking
N ish ide M ago za 'em o n H okkaido 1.5 million yen 1864 F ishery  a n d  shipping
N ishino K a 'em on T okush im a 3 million yen 1878 Indigo trading
N ogam i S a ta ro K agosh im a 1 million yen 1871 S u g e r  trading
N om ura Hisaji F ukuoka 3  million yen 1857 P aw nbroking
N om ura Toyojiro Oita 1 million yen 1848 Banking
N ozaki Takekichiro O kay am a 6  million yen 1848 S a lt industry
O h ara  M ag o sab u ro O kayam a 3 .5  million yen 1880 C otton  sp inning
O k ab e  C hu ta ro N agasak i 3 million yen 1870 K im ono retailing
O k ad a  T oku 'em on Aichi 1 million yen 1884 P a p e r  trad ing
O kam oto  Eikichi E him e 1 million yen 1866 M oney lending
O kaya  S o su k e Aichi 2  million yen 1851 H ardw are  T rading
O g aw a  S e in o su k e N iigata 1 million yen 1880 Textile trad ing
O m ori Keijiro Y am a n ash i 2  million yen 1871 Banking
O m ori K unihei Y am a n ash i 1 million yen 1874 Banking
O s a b e  S h o zab u ro N iigata 1 .5 million yen 1870 Brew ing
O w a d a  Shoh ich i Fukui 1 .25  million yen 1857 S hipping
O yab u  F usajiro F ukuoka 1 million yen 1852 M oney lending
O zu  S e iz a 'e m o n Mie 6  million yen 1888 Banking
O zu  Y o 'em on Mie 3  million yen 1887 F ertiliser trad ing
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S aito  Kijuro N iigata 1 million yen 1864 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
S a k a  T a n e Aichi 2  million yen unknow n M oney lending
S ak ag u c h i H eibei Tottori 1 million yen 1854 Silk reeling  a n d  sh ipping
S a s a k i K ata ro Aomori 1.5  million y en 1841 K im ono retailing
S a w a h a ra  T osh io H iroshim a 1.2 million yen 1865 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
S ek ito  M orihiko Aichi 2  million yen 1869 B anking
S hirai O nhei F ukush im a 1 million yen 1846 Mining
S h io ta  Sumiji K agaw a 1 million yen 1867 C o m m erce
S o m a  T eppei H okkaido 7 million yen 1833 S h ipp ing  a n d  m oney  lending
S uzuk i S o b e i Aichi 1.5 million yen 1856 T im ber trading
T a b e  C ho 'em o n S h im an e 3  million yen 1850 Mining
T a ch ib a n a  Seijiro T oyam a 1 million yen 1850 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
T akag i Y osaku N agasak i 7  million yen 1840 B anking
T a k a m a tsu  S ad a ich i Aichi 1 million yen 1867 R ice  a n d  fertiliser trad ing
Taki N obush iro Aichi 1 million yen 1868 K im ono retailing
Taki S a d a s u k e Aichi 2  million yen 1869 K im ono retailing
T a n a k a  J iro za 'em o n Mie 1.5 million yen 1860 C otton  trading
T a n a b e  Kan'ichi T oyam a 1.5 million yen 1879 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
Tani N akakichi Miyazaki 1 million yen 1870 C o m m erce
T ash iro  S h ig e 'em o n Gifu 1.7 million y en 1853 S a la r ie d  m a n a g e r  (cotton sp inning)
T om ita S h ig esu k e Aichi 2  million yen 1872 C om m erce
W a ta n a b e  K um ashiro H okkaido 1 million yen 1867 S a la r ied  m a n a g e r  a n d  co m m erce
W a ta n a b e  R okum atsu N iigata 1.3 million yen 1845 Silk reeling
W a ta n a b e  S a n s a k u H okkaido 2 .5  million yen 1876 Shipping
W a ta n a b e  Y o sabu ro F ukuoka 1 million yen 1899 K im ono retailing
Y agi H eibei Aichi 1 million yen 1875 S ala ried  m a n ag e r
Y agi K am e sab u ro E him e 1.5 million yen 1863 Shipping
Y ajim a E isuke Y am a n ash i 1 million yen 1869 Silk reeling
Y ano  M ichiyasu E him e 2  million yen 1881 C o m m erce
Y asu k aw a  Keiichiro F ukuoka 10 million yen 1849 C oal mining
Y atom i Kan'ichi S a g a 4  million yen 1884 R ice-w ine brew ing
Y okoyam a Akira Ishikaw a 1.5 million yen 1874 Mining
Y okoyam a T aka to sh i Ishikaw a 2  million yen 1876 M ining
Y oshino  S h u ta ro F ukush im a 1.5 million yen 1871 Banking
Y uge  K azuzo K um am oto 1.5 million yen 1871 Banking
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T ak ah iro  Jihe i T oyam a 1.2 million yen 1859 Landhold ing
T a k e h a ra  Kiichiro N ara 1 million yen 1897 F orestry
T am ak i K en ta ro N iigata 2  million y en 1863 L andho ld ing  a n d  m oney  lending
T am ak i S ab u ro b e i N iigata 1.5 million yen 1883 L andhold ing  a n d  m o n ey  lending
T oriw am a Teijiro Tokyo 1 million yen 1848 Landho ld ing  a n d  e s ta te  le as in g
Tsuji H eikichi A kita 1 .5  million y en 1848 Landholding
T su c h id a  M an su k e Akita 1.5 million y en 1869 Landholding
T such ih izak i S a n 'e m o n F ukuoka 1 million yen 1857 L andhold ing  a n d  m o n ey  lending
T s u d a  R inbei F ukush im a 1.5 million yen 1855 Landholding
W a d a  Ai O sa k a 10 million yen 1861 U rban  landhold ing
W a k ao  T am izo Y am a n ash i 10 million yen 1853 L andho ld ing  an d  bank ing
W a ta n a b e  Jinkichi Gifu 5  million y en 1856 L andho ld ing  an d  bank ing
Yai S a h e i O sa k a 1.3 million y en 1852 U rban  landholding
Y a m a d a  S u k e sa k u N iigata 1 million yen 1886 Landholding
Y am ag u ch i S e iz o N iigata 1 million yen 1897 Landholding
Y am a g u ch i T a tsu ta ro N iigata 10 million yen 1858 L andho ld ing  an d  bank ing
Y am a m o to  K otaro S h im a n e 1.9 million yen 1886 Landholding
Y am azak i K en ta ro S h izuoka 1 million yen unknow n Landholding
Y osh id a  K yuhei N iigata 1.2 million yen 1855 Landholding
Y osh im o to  G oro 'em on O sa k a 2  million yen 1897 U rban  landhold ing
(O ther)
N a m e  (rom anisa tion) P la c e  of re s id e n c e E stim ated  w ealth D a te  o f birth M ain s o u rc e  of w ealth
E guch i H aruo O sa k a 2  million yen 1910 U nknow n
lida N obu taro Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1873 L aw yer a n d  sa la ried  m a n a g e r
Iw an ag a  Yukichi Tokyo 1 million yen 1885 Civil s e rv a n t
Mori R inpei Aichi 1 million yen 1864 D octor
N aku ra  K enzo Tokyo 1 million yen 1869 D octor
S h iro y am a  Z engo ro O sa k a 1.7 million yen 1865 U nknow n
T akag i B on ta ro Tokyo 1 million yen 1869 L aw yer a n d  sa la ried  m a n a g e r
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c) Aristocracy
N a m e  (rom an isa tion ) Title P la c e  of re s id e n c e E stim ated  w ealth D ate  o f  birth M ain s o u rc e  of w ealth
A b e  M asakun i V iscoun t Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1860 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
A b e  S u m isu g u C oun t T okyo o v e r 5  million yen 1891 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
A rim a R aim an C ount T okyo 2  million yen 1864 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
A sa n o  N agakun i M arquis T okyo 10 million yen 1842 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  p ro p ertie s
D a te  M unem oto C ount Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1866 Fund  m a n a g e m e n t
D a te  M unenori M arquis T okyo 3 million yen 1860 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
Doi Toshioki V iscount T okyo 1 million yen 1851 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
H ach isu k a  S h igeak i M arquis Tokyo 1 million yen 1847 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  landholding
H isam a tsu  S ad am o ri C oun t Tokyo 5  million yen 1867 F u n d  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  military se rv ic e
H onda T adakun i V iscoun t Tokyo 2  million y en 1863 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
H o so k a w a M oritatsu M arquis T okyo 5  million y en 1883 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  Civil se rv ic e
H otta  M a s a ts u n e C oun t C hiba 1 million y en 1887 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
Ikeda  N akah iro M arquis T okyo 5  million y en 1877 F u n d  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  military se rv ic e
Ikeda N o b u m asa M arquis T okyo o v e r 3  million yen 1895 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
ii N ao ta d a C oun t Tokyo 3  million yen 1881 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
In o u e  K a tsu n o su k e M arquis T okyo 5  million yen 1861 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  civil se rv ic e
Ito M uyoharu C oun t T okyo 1 million yen 1857 Civil se rv ic e  (Privy councillor)
K am ei K o re tsu n e C oun t Tokyo 1.5  million y en 1883 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  cou rtier
K ikkaw a M otom itsu V iscoun t Y am aguch i 3 million yen 1894 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
K itagaki T a sh ik a B aron Kyoto 1.5 million y en unknow n F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  civil se rv ic e
Kuki T a k a te ru V iscount H yogo 3  million yen unknow n F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  civil s e rv ic e
K uroda N a g ash ig e M arquis Tokyo 3  million yen 1867 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  civil s e rv ic e
M aed a  T o sh itam e M arquis Tokyo 20  million yen 1885 F und  m a n a g e m e n t an d  p ro p ertie s
M atsu d a ira  N aoyori C oun t Tokyo 1 million y en 1865 F und  m a n ag em e n t
M atsudaira  S a d a h a ru V iscount T okyo 1 million y en 1885 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
M atsu d a ira  Y asum ori M arquis Fukui 10 million yen 1867 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
M atsu d a ira  Y asu tam i V iscoun t T okyo 1.5 million yen 1864 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
M atsu d a ira  Y orikane V iscoun t T okyo 1 million yen 1876 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
M atsu d a ira  Y orinaga C o un t Tokyo 10 million y en 1874 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  p ro p ertie s
M atsu k a ta  M asayosh i M arquis Tokyo 5  million yen 1835 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  civil s e rv ic e
M atsu u ra  A tsush i C oun t Tokyo 10 million yen 1864 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  p ro p erties
M izoguchi N a o m a sa C oun t Tokyo 1 million yen 1855 F und  m a n a g e m e n t
Mori M otoaki P rince Y am aguchi 10 million yen 1865 F und m a n a g e m e n t
Mori M otohide V iscount Y am aguch i 1.5 million y en 1880 F und m a n a g e m e n t
N a b esh im a  N ao ta d a M arquis Tokyo 10 million y en 1846 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  p ro p ertie s
N aito  M asay o sh i V iscount M iyazaki 1.5 million yen 1850 F und  m a n ag em e n t
O g a s a w a ra  N agakam i C oun t Tokyo 1 million yen 1885 F und  m a n ag em e n t
O m ura  S um io C oun t Tokyo 1.5 million yen 1851 F und m a n ag em e n t
S a g a ra  S e is h o V iscoun t Tokyo 1 million y en 1853 F und  m a n ag em e n t
S a ig o  T su n e to k u M arquis Tokyo 1 million yen 1878 Military se rv ic e
S ak a i T adam ich i C oun t Tokyo 10 million yen 1851 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  p roperties
S ak a i T adaok i C oun t Tokyo 1 million yen 1877 F und m a n ag em e n t
S ak a i T ad ay o sh i C oun t Y am a g a ta 1 million yen 1888 F und  m a n ag em e n t
S a ta k e  Y osh iharu M arquis Tokyo 2  million y en 1890 F und  m a n ag em e n t
S h im a zu  T a d a m a ro C oun t T okyo 1 million y en 1877 F und  m a n ag em e n t
S h im a zu  T a d a sh ig e P rince Tokyo 15 million yen 1886 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  p ro p erties
S h im a zu  T a d a u k e P rince Tokyo 3  million yen 1903 F und  m a n ag em e n t
S h o  Nori M arquis Tokyo 1 million yen 1864 F und  m a n ag em e n t
S o m a  Jun 'in V iscoun t Tokyo 3  million y en 1864 Civil se rv ic e
T a ch ib an a  Y osh iharu C oun t F ukuoka 3  million yen 1857 F und  m a n ag em e n t
T o d a  Ujitaka C oun t Tokyo 2  million y en 1854 F und  m a n ag em e n t
T o d a  Y a s u m a s a V iscoun t Tokyo 1 million y en 1889 F und m a n ag em e n t
T odo  K osho C oun t Tokyo 1 million y en 1884 F und  m a n ag em e n t
T o k u g aw a le sa to P rince Tokyo 1 .5  million y en 1863 F und m a n ag em e n t
T o k u g aw a Kuniyori M arquis Tokyo 1 .5  million yen 1886 F u n d  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  military se rv ic e
T ok u g aw a T atsum ich i C oun t Tokyo 1 .5  million y en 1872 F und m a n a g e m e n t
T ok u g aw a Yorinori M arquis Tokyo o ver 10 million y en 1872 F und  m a n a g e m e n t an d  p ro p ertie s
T okugaw a Y oshichika M arquis Tokyo 4  million y en 1886 F und m a n ag em e n t
T ok u g aw a Y oshiom i B aron Tokyo 1 million y en 1878 F und m a n a g e m e n t
U esug i Sh igenori C ount Y am a g a ta 1 .2 million y en 1844 F und m a n ag em e n t
W a ta n a b e  C hiharu C ount Tokyo 1.5 million y en 1872 Civil se rv ic e
Y am ao  S h o z o V iscount Tokyo 1 million y en 1837 Civil se rv ic e
Y am anouch i T oy o k ag e M arquis T okyo o v e r 5  million yen 1875 F und  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  military se rv ic e
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d) Colonies
N a m e  (rom an isa tion ) P la c e  o f re s id e n c e E stim ated  w ealth D a te  of birth M ain s o u rc e  of w ealth
Arai M otoharu T a iw an  (Taipei) 1 million y en 1864 S a la ried  m a n a g e r
C h en  Z h o n g h e T a iw an  (T ainan) 1 million yen unknow n R ice  a n d  s u g a r  trading
G u X ianrong T a iw an  (Taipei) 1 million y en unknow n S u g e r  a n d  sa lt  refining
K im ura K yutaro T a iw an  (Q irung) 1 million y en 1867 Mining
Li C h u n s h e n g T a iw an  (Taipei) 1.6 million y en unknow n P etro l a n d  ca n d le  trad ing
Lin B o sh o u T a iw an  (Taipei) 1 million yen unknow n L andholding
Lin G ingren T a iw an  (Taipei) 2 million yen unknow n L andholding
Lin H esh o u T aiw an  (Taipei) 2  million yen unknow n M oney lending
Lin P e n g s h o u T aiw an  (Taipei) 1 million yen unknow n Landholding
Lin S o n g sh o u T a iw an  (Taipei) 1 million yen unknow n Landholding
Lin S u n g sh o u T a iw an  (Taipei) 1 million y en unknow n Landholding
Lin X iongzheng T a iw an  (Taipei) 5 million yen unknow n Landholding
Min Y o n g -d n g K orea  (S eou l) 2 million yen unknow n Landholding
S a k o m a  F usa jiro K orea  (P u sa n ) 1 million yen 1860 Foreign  trading
Yi W an-yong K orea  (S eou l) 1 million yen unknow n L a st prim e m in is ter of Yi D ynasty
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